Doing business: an obscure notion of the ethics of public associations in ordinary Chinese

Along with the notion of being a person (zero run 做人), the notion of doing business (zuo shi 做事) in ordinary Chinese is basically an over-all notion of the norms in the practical and associative activities, carrying typically obscure meanings on practice and association affairs in some external world. Ordinary Chinese not only distinguishes these two notions but also defines a dictionary order of them, with the affairs of the internal world prior to those of the external. The fact that the notion of doing business refers to business (shi 事) rather than person (ren 人) makes this order clear at a deeper level. It shows that this notion regards the practical affairs of the external world less important to the person itself than those of the internal. Except for these qualities, the notion of doing business holds some normative meanings, although contains no definite rules. These meanings indirectly relate to the notion of person that people form in their private associations and emerge as some mixture with a tactical attitude out of the need of earning a life. The notion of person gives birth to some obscure requirements, for instance, the requirement of ‘doing business in accordance with your conscience’ and that of ‘doing business seriously’. The core world of family is marginalized in the public transition of associations. There are reasons to anticipate that in this process the notion of doing business will undergo more radical changes than that of being a person. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2005 (7)     

"以生言性"的传统与孟子性善论

This article analyses the tradition of “articulating xing in terms of sheng” and related other expressions, and also examines the debate between Mencius and Gaozi concerning “xing is known by sheng.” It claims that while Mencius’ “human nature is good” discourse is influenced by the interpretive tradition of “articulating xing in terms of sheng”, Mencius also transcends and develops this tradition. Therefore it is only when Mencius’ views about the goodness of human nature are understood in the context of this interpretive tradition that his ideas can be fully understood. Utilizing this framework, the Confucian understanding of rights is then explored. Translated by Andrew Lambert from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (7): 36–42     

命与天命:儒家天人关系的双重视角

As a pair of important categories in traditional Chinese culture, “ming 命 (destiny or decrees)” and “tian ming 天命 (heavenly ordinances)” mainly refer to the constraints placed on human beings. Both originated from “ling 令 (decrees),” which evolved from “wang ling 王令 (royal decrees)” into “tian ling 天令 (heavenly decrees),” and then became “ming” from a throne because of the decisive role of “heavenly decrees” over a throne. “Ming” and “tian ming” have different definitions: “Ming” represented the limits Heaven placed on the natural lives of human beings and was an objective force that men could not direct, but was embodied in human beings as their “destiny”; “Tian ming” reflected the moral ideals of human beings in their self-identification; It originated in man but had to be verified by Heaven, and it was therefore the true ordinance that Heaven placed on human beings. “Ming” and “tian ming” are two perspectives on the traditional relationship between Heaven and human beings, and at the same time Confucians and Daoists placed different emphasis on them. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Zhongguo zhexueshi 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese Philosophy), 2007, (4): 11–21     

老庄哲学与上博竹书《恒先》

The bamboo slip essay Hengxian 恒先is historically valuable because it serves to further the ontological understanding and comprehension of issues related to the existence of the universe from the perspective of Laozi’s Daoist thought. Hengxian explores important propositions such as how “Qi originated and activated itself” and “they came out of the same source but differed in nature” from several aspects. The idea that “Hengxian is ‘being’ without any definiteness” responds to the issue of the relationship of difference and identity of all things in the world, and thus examines the interdependent relationships between subjects and objects. It proposes that humans can further understand the existence of the universe through cognitive activities and practices such as “analysis and comparison” in which objective realities are checked. The issues discussed in Hengxian are consistent with Laozi’s Dao de jing, the works of Zhuangzi, Huangdi sijing 黄帝四经 (The Four Classics from the Emperor Yellow) and other Daoist works, and deserve significant attention. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Daojia wenhua yanjiu 道家文化研究 (Research of Daoist Culture), 2007, (22): 539–563     

Making a Political Statement or Refusing to Grow Up—Reflections on the Situation of the Academic Youth in Postwar British Literature

The author attempts to apply the psychoanalytic concept of “prolonged adolescence” to two literary works, both of which are embedded in England’s postwar social and political climate. The discussion of John Wain’s Hurry on Down ([1953] 1979) and John Osborne’s Look Back in Anger ([1956] 1989), by necessity, involves a look at those factors responsible for shaping the cultural “mood” in those days. However, the author’s primary concern lies with how two particular (fictional) individuals, or antiheroes, deal with the frustration, which, although generally felt among contemporary academia, in their cases seems to hide a much deeper layer of mental insecurity and instability. In fact, we come to feel that the characters have not achieved a proper sense of identity (“self”) and are, from the point of view of maturity, delayed and, hence, “unfitted” to cope adequately with the external world. Having long achieved formal adulthood, they seem to have gotten “stuck” somewhere along the passage of growing up. Essential papers by Sigmund Freud and his daughter Anna, as well as a very early paper on the topic by Siegfried Bernfeld, are, among others, taken into account, as is the profound research done by Peter Blos on the subject in question.     

The Laozi Code

The term “dao” (道) has been playing the theoretically paradigmatic role in almost all East Asian philosophies, religions, and cultures. The meanings of the term “dao” in the Dao De Jing and other ancient East Asian texts have remained hermeneutically problematic up to this point in time. This article argues that one of the main causes of this hermeneutical problematic is the failure to establish a theoretically formal typology of the “dao.” It further suggests that a hermeneutically disciplined reading of the 76 uses of the term “dao” in the Dao De Jing accomplishes two important goals: (1) it demonstrates that a typological approach may enhance an understanding of the Laoian Dao, and (2) it provides some good data to begin reconstructing such a theoretically formal dao-typology.     

On the Dao in the Commentary of the Book of Change

The existence of the Dao 道 (the Way), according to the Yizhuan 易传 (the Commentary), is something intangible. The connotation of the Dao is the law of change caused by the interaction between yin and yang. The main functions of the Dao are “to change” and “to generate”. The intangible refers to the law of change caused by the interaction between yin and yang, and the law is expressed by the divinatory symbolic system (卦爻符号, the trigrams or hexagrams). It is through the unique permutation of yin and yang lines of a trigram or hexagram that the law of change is explained as a universal model uniting celestial, terrestrial and human laws. The symbolic system is used to express the universal nature of continual generation of life. __________ Translated from Zhongguo Zhexue Shi 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese Philosophy), 2005(4) by Yun Yufen     

人的存在的历史性及其现代境遇

This article argues that the problem of modernity concerns the circumstances of existence and human destiny in modern times. To understand the nature of this problem and find the corresponding solution, we need to reinterpret the thought of Karl Marx regarding the contradictions of human existence and its historical dimensions. Following Marx’s line of thinking, this article reviews his critical sequence, creative transformation, and development of duality of thought on man and the world in Western history, focusing on the following four issues: (1) how Marx, on the basis of man’s sensuous objective activities, observes the duality of man and the world as well as the relationship between man’s internal and external activities; (2) how Marx discloses the true connotation and real significance of man’s historical existence, history, and historicity; (3) how Marx reveals the inherent contradictions of modern capitalist society and the destiny of modern man based on historic thought concerning man’s existence; and (4) by praising Marx’s views on material production and the eternal significance of ancient Greek culture, the article reveals another dimension of Marx’s thought, a dimension that tends to be ignored. This article holds that in this era of globalization, it is extremely important and urgent to have an in-depth understanding of Marx’s historical thoughts regarding human existence and of the feasibility of his theory. Moreover, it is imperative to further develop this understanding to create a clearer picture of our own path of development and our outlook on humanity. Translated by Cui Hui from Zhongguo Shehuikexue Wenzhai 中国社会科学文摘 (China Social Science Digest), 2005, (3): 44–46     

"气"概念几个层次意义的分殊

In Chinese philosophy, although the concept of “qi” has numerous meanings, it is not completely without order or chaotic. Generally speaking, “qi” has several different levels of meanings, such as in philosophy, physics, physiology, psychology, ethics, and so on. On the philosophical level, “qi” is similar to “air,” and it is essentially similar to the “matter-energy” or “field” in physics, which refers to the origin or an element of all things in the world. It is from this point that the meanings of “qi” in physiology, psychology, ethics as well as aesthetics are derived. This paper analyzes the meanings of “qi” on five levels and seeks to clarify misunderstandings about “qi,” such as its alleged pan-vitalistic, conscious and pan-ethical characters. Translated by Yan Xin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2006, (9): 34–41     

The debate on the yan-yi relation in Chinese philosophy: Reconstruction and comments

The debate on the yan-yi relation was carried out by Chinese philosophers collectively, and the principles and methods in the debate still belong to a living tradition of Chinese philosophy. From Yijing (Book of Changes), Lunyu (Analects), Laozi and Zhuangzi to Wang Bi, “yi” which cannot be expressed fully by yan (language), is not only “idea” or “meaning” in the human mind, but is also some kind of ontological existence, which is beyond yan and emblematic symbols, and unspeakable. Thus, the debate on the yan-yi relation refers firstly to metaphysics, secondly to moral philosophy, and then to epistemology and philosophy of language. Guided by this view, this paper recalls the source of the debate on the yan-yi relation to Yijing and Lunyu, distinguishes four meanings of “yi” in Chinese philosophy, and reconstructs three arguments. These arguments are the “yan cannot express yi fully” argument, “forget yan once you get yi” argument, and “yan can express yi fully” argument. Finally, this paper exposes and comments on those principles, methods and the general tendency shown in the debate from the following five aspects: starting point, value-preference, methodology, texts (papers and books), and influences. __________ Translated from Jianghai Xuekan 江海学刊 (Jianghai Academic Studies), 2005 (3)     

中国哲学与文化之根——"象"与"象思维"引论

To grasp the truth in traditional Chinese classics, we need to uncover the long obscured “xiang” 象 (image) thinking, which has long been overshadowed by Occidentalism. “xiang thinking” is the most fundamental thought of human beings. The logic of linguistics all comes from “xiang thinking”. Through conceptual thinking, people can understand Western classics on metaphysics, yet they may not completely understand the various schools of Chinese classics. The difference between Chinese and Western ways of thinking originated in the difference of the basic views developed in the “Axial period”. Since Aristotle, Western metaphysical ideas have all been manifested in substantiality, objectivity, and being ready-made, whereas Chinese Taiji, Dao, Xin-xing, and Zen were manifested in the non-substantiality, non-objectivity, and non-ready-made-ness of a dynamic whole. To grasp substance, rational and logical thinking such as definition, judgment, and reasoning is necessary. On the other hand, to grasp Taiji, Dao, etc., which is a dynamic whole or non-substances, “xiang thinking”, which is related to perception and rich in poetic association, is essential. History has taught us a lesson, i.e., when we opened the window to logical thought, we closed that of “xiang thinking”. We should remember the words of Xu Guangqi, i.e., “To mingle harmoniously and understand thoroughly so as to excel”. Translated by Zhang Lin from Hebei xuekan 河北学刊 (Hebei Academic Journal), 2007, (5): 21–25     

孔子与亚里士多德的朋友观之比较

Before and during the times of Confucius and Aristotle, the concept of friendship had very different implications. This paper compares Confucius’ with Aristotle’s thoughts on friendship from two perspectives: xin 信 (fidelity, faithfulness) and le 乐 (joy). The Analects emphasizes the xin as the basis of friendship. Aristotle holds that there are three kinds of friends and corresponding to them are three types of friendship. In the friendship for the sake of pleasure, there is no xin; in the legal form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by law; and in the moral form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by morality; in the friendship for the sake of virtue, xin is an indispensable part. Both thinkers believe friends can bring joy to human life. According to Confucius, it is the joy of rendao 仁道 (benevolence), whereas for Aristotle, it is the joy of Reason. There are many commonalities and differences between the two. The commonalities reveal some inner links between Confucian rendao and Aristotelian Reason. It seems that the differences between rendao and Reason are the differences between moral reason and logical reason. The comparative study is helpful for us to understand the two masters’ ethics, politics and philosophy. Translated from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Research in Ethics), 2006, (1): 47–52     

Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth

The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it strikes close to the heart of the traditional view. I begin this paper by discussing and refuting Zalta’s argument in the context of a language for propositional modal logic with an actuality connective (section 1). This involves showing that his argument in favor of real world validity his preferred explication of logical truth, is fallacious. Next (section 2) I argue for an alternative explication of logical truth called general validity. Since the rule of necessitation preserves general validity, the argument of section 2 provides a reason for affirming the traditional view. Finally (section 3) I show that the intuitive idea behind the discredited notion of real world validity finds legitimate expression in an object language connective for deep necessity. Earlier versions of this paper were read at the universities of Graz, Maribor, and Salzburg, and at a workshop on the philosophy of logic at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City. My thanks to those present at these events for many helpful suggestions. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.     

What is at Issue in Argumentation? Judgment in the Hellenistic Doctrine of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Krinomenon</Emphasis>

This paper offers an account of the Hellnistic doctrine of krinomenon, elaborating on the idea of rhetoric’s restoration as a major tool of contemporary research and philosophical study. As opposed to theories of argumentation that identify judgment with its propositional version and establish legitimization on speaker-audience identity, failing to acknowledge difference and controversy, the doctrine of krinomenon focuses on the question posed, connecting rhetoric to judgment. The crucial difference from classical rhetoric lies in the concept of zētēma: In the doctrine of krinomenon, participants in a common inquiry are reasonable, while logos refers to judgment itself – not the audience. Whereas a proposition dismisses its own problematization, controversy, i.e. non-identity that gives meaning to utterances, is inscribed in krinomenon, which is the product of dialectic between contradictory utterances. Beyond the two opposite logics of dogmatism and relativism, difference in the doctrine of krinomenon is judgment’s very condition.     

The evolution of tianxia cosmology and its philosophical implications

The terminology tianxia has both historical evolution and cultural and philosophical connotations. This concept not only denotes a geographical and spatial meaning, but also implies the moral construct of metaphysics. A systematic study of its historical and cultural repercussions can show that the evolution of the meaning “tianxia” not only embodies the cosmological construction, moral belief and self-identity of the Chinese nation, but also manifests the historical processes of modern China evolving from “tianxia” to a modern nation-state. Meanwhile, the deconstruction of the tianxia cosmology has shattered the old Chinese concept of a single united tianxia, or the whole world under one Heaven. Also, “Confucian China” has been increasingly losing its vitality and strong hold on the people, while the concept of nation-state has gained its way into people’s consciousness, which has added more diversity and open-mindedness to the concept of tianxia. __________ Translated from Wenshizhe 文史哲 (Literature, History and Philosophy), 2004 (6) by Huang Deyuan     

Three sources of wisdom of Chinese traditional virtue and a contemporary examination

There are three explanations of the sources of virtue in the history of Chinese traditional ethical thoughts. The first source is tian Dao (the Dao of Heaven) (natural), the second is xing Dao (the Dao of nature) (mind-nature), and the third is ren Dao (the Dao of human) (social). These explanations not only demonstrate the unique wisdom of ancient Chinese thinkers in constructing mortality, but also have special revelations for us to comprehend more accurately the Chinese traditional morality, to clear up the wrong ideas about morality that have formed since modern times, to make virtue ‘present’ instead of ‘latent’, and to construct a moral society. __________ Translated from Fujian Luntan 福建论坛 (Fujian Forum) (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), 2005 (2) by Xi Liuqin & Peng Hua     

Husserl’s transcendental philosophy and the critique of naturalism

Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism: First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification. Second, naturalism essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’. This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude. The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoché.

《恒先》义释——思想史视野下的一种解读

Hengxian, one of the bamboo books of the Chu State during the Warring States Period that is kept in the Shanghai Museum, was collected by the museum in 1994, and is an important piece of literature that discusses cosmic issues prior to Huainanzi. Based on Li Ling’s work on the text, as well as hermeneutic work by some other scholars, this essay represents another attempt to determine the words and meanings of the Hengxian, with a focus on its cosmological commentary. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Xi’an Jianzhu Keji Daxue Xuebao 西安建筑科技大学学报 (Journal of Xi’an University of Arch & Tech), 2007, (1): 1–8     

Ideology and the Harms of Self-Deception: Why We Should Act to End Poverty

In thinking about global poverty, the question of moral motivation is of central importance: Why should the average person in the West feel morally compelled to do anything to help the poor? Various answers to this question have been constructed—and yet poverty persists. In this paper I will argue that, among other difficulties, the current approaches to the problem of poverty (from Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge) overlook a critical element: that poverty not only harms the poor, it harms every human being. Its existence forces us to live in a world where we are compelled by a pervasive ideology to eviscerate our own humanity and neglect our human impulses. Drawing on Karl Marx’s Aristotelian-influenced notion of our human essence as “species-being,” I will construct an account of moral motivation in the face of poverty that stems from a selfish desire to avoid these harms. Thus our moral impetus for acting to help the poor comes not from feelings of guilt about how poverty harms them, but rather from recognizing that poverty is harming all of us. By fighting against global poverty, we seek to make the world a better place for ourselves and the poor alike.     

The Responsible Subject in the Global Age

The first thesis of this article is that the concept of responsibility takes on an unprecedented meaning in the twentieth century resulting from the emergence of a new dimension of the other: to be responsible comes to mean not just to account for oneself in relation to the other, but also to take the other into account, to take care of the other—what I call responsibility towards (the other). The main reason for this change consists in the emergence of global risks and the necessity, as underlined by Hans Jonas, to be responsible for the destiny of the world and future generations. The problem, as explored in the article’s second thesis, is that this implies the existence of a subject who is capable of responsibility. Jonas’s insights on this point are insufficient, since he only recognizes duty as the fundament for his ethics of responsibility and thus neglects the problem of motivation. This is a particularly crucial problem today as we are witnessing the presence of a pathological subject, characterized by a split in his faculties (between doing and imagining, knowing and feeling). To underline this fact, this article makes use of Günther Anders’s reflections, which provide a psycho-anthropological analysis of the subject, showing his pathologies and the necessity, from a moral perspective, to overcome his scission. Finally, this author suggests, as the article’s third thesis, that this overcoming is the necessary fundament for the perception of risk, which in turn reinstates the subject’s perception of his own vulnerability. Responsibility thus finds a motivation, which is neither altruistic nor duty-centred, in the awareness of our own vulnerability and the bond with the destiny of humankind as a whole.