共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
2.
Pierre Le Morvan 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2017,25(6):1216-1238
According to a historical claim oft-repeated by contemporary epistemologists, the ‘traditional’ conception of knowledge prevailed in Western philosophy prior to the publication in 1963 of Edmund’s Gettier’s famous three-page article ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’. On this conception, knowledge consists of justified true belief. In this article, I critically consider evidence for and against this historical claim, and conclude with a puzzle concerning its widespread acceptance. 相似文献
3.
Wesley Buckwalter 《Philosophical Psychology》2014,27(3):368-383
Previous research in experimental philosophy has suggested that moral judgments can influence the ordinary application of a number of different concepts, including attributions of knowledge. But should epistemologists care? The present set of studies demonstrate that this basic effect can be extended to overturn intuitions in some of the most theoretically central thought experiments in contemporary epistemology: Gettier cases. Furthermore, experiment 3 shows that this effect is unlikely to be mediated by a simple desire to blame, suggesting that a correct psychological account of ordinary knowledge attribution may include moral judgment. 相似文献
4.
5.
Edouard Machery Stephen Stich David Rose Amita Chatterjee Kaori Karasawa Noel Struchiner Smita Sirker Naoki Usui Takaaki Hashimoto 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2017,51(3):645-664
In this article, we present evidence that in four different cultural groups that speak quite different languages (Brazil, India, Japan, and the USA) there are cases of justified true beliefs that are not judged to be cases of knowledge. We hypothesize that this intuitive judgment, which we call “the Gettier intuition,” may be a reflection of an underlying innate and universal core folk epistemology, and we highlight the philosophical significance of its universality. 相似文献
6.
Jianbo Cao 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(4):675-687
Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally
changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is
exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover,
the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary
judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition.
__________
Translated from Fudan Xuebao 复旦学报 (Fudan Journal), 2004 (5) 相似文献
7.
Jennifer Nagel 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(1):54-62
Abstract Williamson has a strikingly economical way of showing how justified true belief can fail to constitute knowledge: he models a class of Gettier cases by means of two simple constraints. His constraints can be shown to rely on some unstated assumptions about the relationship between reality and appearance. These assumptions are epistemologically non-trivial but can be defended as plausible idealizations of our actual predicament, in part because they align well with empirical work on the metacognitive dimension of experience. 相似文献
8.
9.
Yussif Yakubu 《Metaphilosophy》2016,47(3):449-466
Gettier (1963) presented the now famous Gettier problem as a challenge to epistemology. The methods Gettier used to construct his challenge, however, utilized certain principles of formal logic that are actually inappropriate for the natural language discourse of the Gettier cases. In that challenge to epistemology, Gettier also makes truth claims that would be considered controversial in analytic philosophy of language. The Gettier challenge has escaped scrutiny in these other relevant academic disciplines, however, because of its façade as an epistemological analysis. This article examines Gettier's methods with the analytical tools of logic and analytic philosophy of language. 相似文献
10.
Ian M. Church 《Philosophia》2013,41(1):171-177
If the history of the Gettier Problem has taught us anything, it is to be skeptical regarding purported solutions. Nevertheless, in “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved” (2011), that is precisely what John Turri offers us. For nearly fifty years, epistemologists have been chasing a solution for the Gettier Problem but with little to no success. If Turri is right, if he has actually solved the Gettier Problem, then he has done something that is absolutely groundbreaking and really quite remarkable. Regrettably, however, while Turri’s account is both intuitive and elegant—improving upon many seminal projects within contemporary epistemology—I argue in this paper that any success against Gettier counterexamples it affords is merely fleeting. Straightforwardly, this is done in two sections. In §1, I briefly sketch Turri’s proposed solution to the Gettier Problem. Then, in §2, I level a counterexample against it. Unfortunately for Turri and his solution, in this paper we will see history repeat itself. 相似文献
11.
Thomas M. Crisp 《Analysis》2000,60(265):42-50
12.
Mark McEvoy 《Synthese》2014,191(17):4115-4130
This paper argues that reliabilism can handle Gettier cases once it restricts knowledge producing reliable processes to those that involve a suitable causal link between the subject’s belief and the fact it references. Causal tracking reliabilism (as this version of reliabilism is called) also avoids the problems that refuted the causal theory of knowledge, along with problems besetting more contemporary theories (such as virtue reliabilism and the “safety” account of knowledge). Finally, causal tracking reliabilism allows for a response to Linda Zagzebski’s challenge that no theory of knowledge can both eliminate the possibility of Gettier cases while also allowing fully warranted but false beliefs. 相似文献
13.
Stewart Cohen 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(1):15-29
Abstract Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in Gettier cases and the specifics of the formal motivation. 相似文献
14.
Ian M. Church 《European Journal of Philosophy》2013,21(1):37-49
Abstract: In this paper I add credence to Linda Zagzebski's (1994) diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the current trend to abandon the standard analysis) by analyzing the nature of luck. It is widely accepted that the lesson to be learned from Gettier problems is that knowledge is incompatible with luck or at least a certain species thereof. As such, understanding the nature of luck is central to understanding the Gettier problem. Thanks by and large to Duncan Pritchard's seminal work, Epistemic Luck, a great deal of literature has been developed recently concerning the nature of luck and anti‐luck epistemology. The literature, however, has yet to explore the very intuitive idea that luck comes in degrees. I propose that once luck is recognized to admit degrees even the slightest non‐zero degree (of the relevant sort) precludes knowledge. Connecting this to Zagzebski's thesis, I propose that a given theory of warrant must guarantee truth in order to avoid Gettier counterexamples (or subsequently deny that warrant bears any relationship to the truth whatsoever), simply because a sufficient standard analysis of knowledge cannot allow for knowledge that is even marginally lucky. 相似文献
15.
Jim Stone 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2013,94(3):421-430
This article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti‐luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isn't distinctive of Gettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettier cases reveal about knowledge? 相似文献
16.
Machery Edouard Stich Stephen Rose David Alai Mario Angelucci Adriano Berniūnas Renatas Buchtel Emma E. Chatterjee Amita Cheon Hyundeuk Cho In-Rae Cohnitz Daniel Cova Florian Dranseika Vilius Lagos Ángeles Eraña Ghadakpour Laleh Grinberg Maurice Hannikainen Ivar Hashimoto Takaaki Horowitz Amir Hristova Evgeniya Jraissati Yasmina Kadreva Veselina Karasawa Kaori Kim Hackjin Kim Yeonjeong Lee Minwoo Mauro Carlos Mizumoto Masaharu Moruzzi Sebastiano Olivola Christopher Y. Ornelas Jorge Osimani Barbara Romero Carlos Lopez Alejandro Rosas Sangoi Massimo Sereni Andrea Songhorian Sarah Sousa Paulo Struchiner Noel Tripodi Vera Usui Naoki del Mercado Alejandro Vázquez Volpe Giorgio Vosgerichian Hrag Abraham Zhang Xueyi Zhu Jing 《印度哲学研究理事会杂志》2017,34(3):517-541
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail... 相似文献
17.
B. Brogaard 《Synthese》2004,139(3):367-386
The contextualist epistemological theories proposed by David Lewis and othersoffer a view of knowledge which awards a central role to the contexts ofknowledge attributions. Such contexts are held to determine how strong anepistemic position must be in order to count as knowledge. Lewis has suggestedthat contextualism so construed can be used both to ward off the skeptic and tosolve the Gettier problem. A person knows P, he says, just in case her evidenceeliminates every possibility that not-P, where the domain of `every' is determinedby the context. Lewis provides a list of rules that can tell us, for a given context,which not-P possibilities must be eliminated and which can properly be ignored.But his account entails, counterintuitively, that knowledge can truly be attributedeven to a person in a Gettier situation provided only that the attributor is ignorantof the fact that the person is gettiered. It has been criticized on those grounds byS. Cohen. In this paper I shall argue that most other forms of contextualism sufferthe same fate as Lewis's. The allies of contextualism haven't yet shown us whethercontextualism can succeed in maintaining a notion of ordinary knowledge whileresisting the absurdity that knowledge can be a matter of sheer good luck. At theend of the paper I shall suggest a possible solution to the problem by showing howCohen's line of criticism leads to a modified conception of what sort of justificationa belief must have to count as knowledge in ordinary contexts. 相似文献
18.
Chad Vance 《Ratio》2014,27(3):291-305
Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is either identical to, or else causally related to, the state of affairs which makes the believed proposition true. This amendment of the traditional analysis of knowledge purportedly escapes the problems identified by Gettier cases. In this paper, I will examine two particular recent endorsements of this solution – those from Sven Bernecker and Adrian Heathcote – and argue that truthmaker theory is not the key to solving the Gettier problem. 相似文献
19.