Towards a Theory of Oppression

Despite the concern with oppressive systems and practices there have been few attempts to analyse the general concept of oppression. Recently, Iris Marion Young has argued that it is not possible to analyse oppression as a unitary moral category. Rather, the term 'oppression' refers to several distinct structures, namely, exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. This paper rejects Young's claim and advances a general theory of oppression. Drawing insight from American chattel slavery and the situation of the German Jews during the 1930's, I argue that to be oppressed is to be unjustly denied the opportunity for what I call 'resilient autonomy'. I argue that all instances of oppression can usefully be analysed in these terms. I test my analysis against each of Young's five structures of oppression, concluding that in each case they are captured by my analysis.     

'Self-exploitation' and Workers' Co-operatives—or how the British Left get their concepts wrong

ABSTRACT  In this article I examine the concept 'self-exploitation' and its use in criticising workers' co-operatives. I argue that the concept is incoherent and that the kind of exploitation which members of workers' co-ops actually face is 'market-exploitation'. Moreover, some of the criticisms of workers' co-ops which are made by those who employ the confused concept 'self-exploitation' are shown to be inapposite when 'market-exploitation' is recognised to be the real problem. I conclude with a discussion of the reasons for the acceptance of the misguided concept 'self-exploitation' by a number on the Left in Britain today.     

Exploitation and Remedial Duties

The concept of exploitation and potentially exploitative real‐world practices are the subject of increasing philosophical attention. However, while philosophers have extensively debated what exploitation is and what makes it wrong, they have said surprisingly little about what might be required to remediate it. By asking how the consequences of exploitation should be addressed, this article seeks to contribute to filling this gap. We raise two questions. First, what are the victims of exploitation owed by way of remediation? Second, who ought to remediate? Our answers to these questions are connected by the idea that exploitation cannot be fully remediated by redistributing the exploiter's gain in order to repair or compensate the victim's loss. This is because exploitation causes not only distributive but also relational harm. Therefore, redistributive measures are necessary but not sufficient for adequate remediation. Moreover, this relational focus highlights the fact that exploitative real‐world practices commonly involve agents other than the exploiter who stand to benefit from the exploitation. Insofar as these third parties are implicated in the distributive and relational harms caused by exploitation, there is, we argue, good reason to assign part of the burden of remediation to them.     

Own-Race-Absent Racism

Abstract

I propose that a distinction can be drawn between two fundamental kinds of racism: own-race-present racism and own-race-absent racism. In own-racepresent racism, the race of the racist figures as a term in her racist thinking; in own-race-absent racism it does not. While own-race-present racism might conform readily to commonsense understandings of racism, own-race-absent racism less clearly does. I provide evidence that these two kinds are there to be identified and raise considerations regarding the benefits, both theoretical and practical, of adopting the less-obvious concept of own-race-absent racism.     

Theodor Lipps and the shift from "sympathy" to "empathy"

In the course of extensive philosophical debates on aesthetics in nineteenth-century Germany, Robert Vischer introduced the concept of Einfühlung in relation to art. Theodor Lipps subsequently extended it from art to visual illusions and interpersonal understanding. While Lipps had regarded Einfühlung as basically similar to the old notion of sympathy, Edward Titchener in America believed it had a different meaning. Hence, he coined the term empathy as its translation. This term came to be increasingly widely adopted, first in psychology and then more generally. But the lack of agreement about the supposed difference between these concepts suggests that Lipps had probably been right.     

Exploitation as Domination: A Response to Arneson

In a recent paper in this journal, Richard Arneson criticizes the domination account of exploitation and attributes it to me and Allen Wood. In this paper, I defend the domination account against Arneson's criticisms. I begin by showing that the domination view is distinct from the vulnerability‐based view defended by Wood. I also show that Alan Wertheimer's influential account of exploitation is congenial to the domination view. I then argue that Arneson's own fairness‐based view of exploitation generates false negatives and trivializes the concept of exploitation, rendering it entirely parasitic on the notion of unfairness.     

Culture and context in the evolutionary concept of mental disorder.

The evolutionary theory of the concept of mental disorder as harmful dysfunction that J. C. Wakefield (1999) proposed (a) does not correspond to how the term disorder is used in psychiatric nosology or in clinicians' everyday practice; (b) does not cover the territory to which the term reasonably could be applied; and (c) is not especially useful for research, clinical, or social purposes. The broad concept of disorder is a polythetic, not a monothetic, concept. As such, there need be no essential characteristic, criterion, or single prototype of disorder. Instead, multiple prototypes with varying features are used to group together a wide range of disparate phenomena by analogy. Useful refinements of our concepts of disorder have come from analyses of the nature of action and intentionality. What are most needed now are careful analyses of the social embedding of our concepts in cultural knowledge and practice.     

Clinical and theoretical aspects of enactment

Enactment as a concept can serve analytic discourse through its established meaning of an act intended strongly to influence, persuade, or force another to react. We might agree to use the term in two complementary ways: Broadly, enactment can designate all behaviors of both parties in the analytic relationship, even verbal, in consequence of the intensification of the action intent of our words created by the constraints and regressive push induced by the analytic rules and frame. Patient and analyst are vulnerable to falling back on behaviors that actualize their intentions, doing so in ways motivated by and reflecting transference hopes, fears, and compromises shaped in their developmental past. Specifically, enactment can then be defined as those regressive (defensive) interactions between the pair experienced by either as a consequence of the behavior of the other. While nominally an interpersonal perspective, this concept of enactment facilitates more balanced attention to the involvement of both parties and to the intrapsychic dynamics in both that specifically shape their interactions. A clinical vignette illustrates the analyst's contributions to enactment, especially those reflecting his reactivated conflicts and their relation to his theoretical and technical preferences.     

知识点认知规律的实验研究

知识点是人的认知单位,人学习知识,必须以知识点为单位、逐个知识点地学习。本实验以概念学习为例,研究了人一次学习一个知识点与同时学习两个知识点时的成绩差异。研究结果表明,1. 在概念中的信息组块数不超过短时记忆容量的前提下,一次学习一个概念,构成概念的信息组块数对概念掌握影响不显著。2.在同样条件下,一次学习一个知识点的成绩好于同时学习两个知识点的成绩,从而验证了知识点认知规律。     

Bioethics and sin.

On the basis of a historical reconstruction of the stages through which the Christian notion of sin took shape in Protestantism, the significance of this term for modern bioethics is derived from its opposition to a holiness of God and his creatures, which in turn translates into the secular moral concept of dignity. This dignity imposes obligations to respect and to relationships that are sustained by faithfulness and trust. In being based on the gratuitousness of God's grace, such relationships preclude attempts at instrumentalization, denial of singularity, and subjection to market forces. Accordingly, reproductive cloning as well as exposing medicine to economical considerations can be classified as sinful. The difference between sinful acts and humans' sinful state furthermore permits to address the problems of evil and misfortune in the world, and to acknowledge humans' responsibility for the threats to humanity entailed by those ills. While the Christian faith relies on God's mercy, it also imposes the task of following Christ by fighting against evil and misfortune.     

Current status of the motor program: Revisited

The motor program is a concept that has had a major influence on theorizing in the field of motor control. However, there has been a lack of consensus as to what exactly is a motor program and its role in movement organization and execution. In 1994 Morris, Summers, Matyas, and Iansek concluded from a review of the application of the motor program concept in the field of physical therapy that continued use of the term may impede progress in the field. In this paper we examine what has happened to the motor program concept in the thirteen years since the previous evaluation. The review indicates that although the term is still being used in different ways, the theoretical existence of a motor program appears to be generally accepted by researchers in experimental psychology, movement science, and neurophysiology. The recent development of powerful brain imaging techniques may allow determination of whether the motor program should be regarded as a metaphorical or literal concept.     

Learning from experience: The value of analysing Avalon

In this article some of the experiences and insights gained from roughly fifteen years of conducting a long term study of Glastonbury are examined. Glastonbury, a small town in the south west of England, has become a multivalent pilgrimage site for a variety of spiritual seekers, and an icon of integrative spirituality (my preferred term for ‘alternative’ or ‘New Age’ spirituality).The concept of vernacular religion is explained, and its appropriateness in relation to both place-centred study and research into integrative spirituality is demonstrated. The rationale and some of the methodological complexities underlying this type of study are explored, and some of the trends and phenomena that the long term observation of one location has revealed are considered. The contextual detail and depth of knowledge gained from such long term study feed into an appreciation of both the internal dynamics of Christianity in Glastonbury, for example, and the growing institutionalisation of the Glastonbury Goddess movement and the spread of its influence through a variety of conduits. The role of the internet in framing expectations and presentations of Glastonbury is examined, and research relating to its unique spiritual service industry is briefly summarised.While Glastonbury is by no means ‘typical’, it is indicative of a number of trends in relation to ‘integrative’ spirituality and therefore lessons learned from there can have wider implications for the study of phenomena increasingly common in the contemporary milieu.     

An ethical framework for the responsible management of pregnant patients in a medical disaster

The ethics of managing obstetric patients in medical disasters poses ethical challenges that are unique in comparison to other disaster patients, because the medical needs of two patients--the pregnant patient and the fetal patient--must be considered. We provide an ethical framework for doing so. We base the framework on the justice-based prevention of exploitation of populations of patients, both obstetric and non-obstetric, in medical disasters. We use the concept of exploitation to identify a spectrum from ethically acceptable, to ethically challenging, to ethically unacceptable, management of obstetric patients in medical disasters. We also address the ethics of the care of obstetric and neonatal patients when the resources of a hospital are completely overwhelmed in a large-scale medical disaster.     

Moral Hazard in Pediatrics

“Moral hazard” is a term familiar in economics and business ethics that illuminates why rational parties sometimes choose decisions with bad moral outcomes without necessarily intending to behave selfishly or immorally. The term is not generally used in medical ethics. Decision makers such as parents and physicians generally do not use the concept or the word in evaluating ethical dilemmas. They may not even be aware of the precise nature of the moral hazard problem they are experiencing, beyond a general concern for the patient's seemingly excessive burden. This article brings the language and logic of moral hazard to pediatrics. The concept reminds us that decision makers in this context are often not the primary party affected by their decisions. It appraises the full scope of risk at issue when decision makers decide on behalf of others and leads us to separate, respect, and prioritize the interests of affected parties.     

Is rowe committed to an expanded version of theism?

I argue in this paper two theses. First, I argue that the internal consistency of the argument from evil demands that it take into account some form of EST. Thus, there is no ground for the atheist to chide the theist when the theist appeals to an expanded version of theism. Second, I show that it isprima facie probable that RST does in fact ential EST. I show this by capitalizing on the distinction between what is contained in a concept and what is entailed by a concept. What a term or concept means is different from what it may entail. What a concept or term entails is conceptually more robust than what it simply means. I call this the “containment objection” and if is true, then the restricted conjunction rule cannot apply since a version of theism sufficient to deflate the evidential argument would not be logically independent from RST,pace Rowe.     

Psychic functions of failure

While we can explain significant differences in social mobility between different occupational categories in terms of the economic and social resources made available to them, in order to understand those who deviate from the statistical mode we need to look at the unconscious meaning of "success" and "failure." Beatrice, Dave, and Sally are all children of professional families and yet have great difficulty being successful at work. Their difficulties with work are multi-determined and there are oedipal and preoedipal issues involved. However, in the case of Beatrice the issues are predominantly oedipal, while in the other cases the issues are primarily preoedipal. It seems that while the common oedipal themes inhibiting productive work and work satisfaction have been discussed in psychoanalytic literature under the rubric "work inhibition," albeit to a small extent, the preoedipal themes have been given less attention. This is because the traditional concept of "inhibition" has taken such a central place in the psychoanalytic perspective on work. The concept of "work inhibition" has paralyzed the development of a broader psychoanalytic framework for the analysis of work problems. As long as we limit our discussions of problems with work to the term "inhibition," they will focus on the oedipal problems of neurotic patients and a large gap will remain between theory and clinical experience because a large number of our patients have difficulties with work that are rooted in preoedipal issues. Unless we can stop being "inhibited" by the very concept, our theoretical understanding of problems with work will continue to lag behind our clinical understanding. "Work inhibition" is not the only type of major problem with work patients can have--they can be the result of a variety of dynamics on either oedipal or preoedipal levels.     

The development of the drive object concept in Freud's work: 1905-1915

In 1905 Freud established the idea of an object of an instinctual drive as the basic object concept of psychoanalysis. He also introduced the derivative concepts of object directedness, object choice, and object finding. While taking these steps he simultaneously deemphasized the importance of drive objects in sexual life, contradicted himself on whether drives are autoerotic or object-directed in infancy, and made incompatible statements about whether or not object choice occurs before puberty. Freud's clinical work, reflected especially in the major case reports and a series of papers on fantasy, led to an apparent recognition of complexity in the mental life of children far greater than had been described earlier. The increased attention to and appreciation of mental content in childhood especially augmented Freud's understanding of the role of drive objects, object directedness, and object choice in infancy. This, in turn, led him to postulate a sequence of organizations of sexual life, named according to the zonal drive source plus the mode of object directedness, a process of theory development that continued through 1924. Object choice and, to a lesser extent, object directedness are concepts derived from and dependent upon the concept of drive object. Both require, however, explanatory constructs besides drive constructs. In 1915 Freud defined the term "object" in the context of stating his drive theory. Freud used the term object with several new modifying words during this decade. No new object concept was introduced, however, in this work, although some steps in that direction appeared to be in progress.     

A Reappraisal of Children’s ‘Potential’

What does it mean for a child to fulfil his or her potential? This article explores the contexts and implications of the much-used concept of potential in educational discourses. We claim that many of the popular, political and educational uses of the term in relation to childhood have a problematic blind spot: interpersonality, and the necessary coexistence for the concept to be receivable of all children’s ‘potentials’. Rather than advocating abandoning the term—a futile gesture given its emotive force—we argue that the concept of children’s potential must be profoundly rethought to be workable as a philosophical notion in education. In an era marked by the unspoken assumption that ‘unlimited potential’ is always a good thing, we argue that it might be necessary to think about the limitations of the notion of individual potential; namely, the moment when it comes into contact with other people’s projects. We propose a conceptualisation of potential as the negotiated, situated, ever-changing creation of a group of individuals, in a process marked by conflict, and which remains essentially difficult.     

Experience as site of contested meaning and value: The attributional dog and its special tail

Religious Experience Reconsidered was premised on the idea that experience is a site of contested meaning and value for subjects (and scholars). Although the concept of specialness has drawn considerable attention, my goal in writing the book was to update efforts to use attribution theory to bridge between religious studies and the psychology of religion. I intended the focus on micro-social processes to complement analysis at the macro-social level. The need for a broader, more generic second order term, such as specialness, emerged in the context of working out an attributional approach and can and should be extended more broadly. While anything can be set apart as special and an analysis of the politics of deeming is essential, we can still ask if there is empirical evidence to suggest that humans are more likely to set some things apart than others within or across cultures. When we take experience as a site for study, we do not have to limit ourselves to describing the range of views held by our subjects, but can also legitimately seek to explain experience in terms that make sense to us as researchers. The breaking of taboos against explaining experience in naturalistic terms will only have apocalyptic consequences if we assume a special/ordinary binary; viewed on a continuum, we can still find special meaning and value in experiences that are not protected by taboos.     

The Contribution of Professor Ninian Smart to Religious Education

Religious Experience Reconsidered was premised on the idea that experience is a site of contested meaning and value for subjects (and scholars). Although the concept of specialness has drawn considerable attention, my goal in writing the book was to update efforts to use attribution theory to bridge between religious studies and the psychology of religion. I intended the focus on micro-social processes to complement analysis at the macro-social level. The need for a broader, more generic second order term, such as specialness, emerged in the context of working out an attributional approach and can and should be extended more broadly. While anything can be set apart as special and an analysis of the politics of deeming is essential, we can still ask if there is empirical evidence to suggest that humans are more likely to set some things apart than others within or across cultures. When we take experience as a site for study, we do not have to limit ourselves to describing the range of views held by our subjects, but can also legitimately seek to explain experience in terms that make sense to us as researchers. The breaking of taboos against explaining experience in naturalistic terms will only have apocalyptic consequences if we assume a special/ordinary binary; viewed on a continuum, we can still find special meaning and value in experiences that are not protected by taboos.