On the logic of psychoanalytic theory

Psychoanalytic theory shows some specific features and problems. It exists in a number of variations, according to different schools as well as cultural and subcultural conditions, with different understandings even of core concepts. Instead of producing definite knowledge, results remain uncertain. They vary in use and imply a permanent reworking of ideas and conceptions. This is the effect of the kind of theory psychoanalysis has to use. Since psychodynamics are a special kind of heterogeneous, changing, always different, emergent-in a word, autopoietic-reality, psychoanalysis cannot use the methods of a denotative theory (algorithmic reduction leading to strictly defined and formulated calculations) but has to use connotative theories. Connotative theories use open concepts which provide an active and flexible access to autopoietic reality. They are able to cope with the difference between singularities as well as with the distance between general logic and empirical reality. Problems tied to this possibility are structural fuzziness, a dependence on forms of use, multiple paradigms and difficulties in legitimation and balance of theories. This causes problems of institutionalisation. These problems are not a sign of immaturity but the normal way in which connotative theories appear and develop. They can therefore not be eliminated but only be treated in a better way.     

Anna Freud's contribution to the psychoanalytic theory of development

This paper elaborates key areas of Anna Freud's theory of development, setting these in the context of Freud's structural model and its influence on her early work. The centrality of the role of the ego and the beginnings of one of her major achievements, the elaboration of a psychoanalytic developmental psychology, are shown in evidence in 1936, in The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence. The author develops this theme in an exploration of the 1965 work Normality and Pathology in Childhood, looking from the base of normal development, via defence and conflict, to regression and significant developmental factors.     

Forms of logic in faith development theory

A fundamental characteristic of structural-developmental psychology is that development is governed by a logico-mathematical, hence scientific, principle of equilibrium. In this article I examine James Fowler's proposal for a metaphorical interpretation of logic in his theory of faith development. I intend to argue that a metaphorical understanding of logic radically shifts the theory of faith development away from Piagetian structuralism and towards dialectical psychology. A metaphorical reading of stages and their transformation raises serious questions about the attempt to define faith in terms of stages of individual psychological development. A secondary proposal to be considered is the relevance of metaphorical theology to faith development theory.An earlier version of this paper was read at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion and the Religious Research Association in Salt Lake City, Utah, October 29, 1989. I am indebted to Professor Brown from the University of New South Wales, Australia for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Some observations and hypotheses about the psychoanalytic theory of adult development.

The developmental framework, when applied to adulthood, emphasizes the continuing evolution of the personality at five or fifty and 'focuses on the formation of psychic structure in process and underscores the continuity of normal and pathologic outcomes.' (COPER 9, 1974, p. 14). Many of the events we have discussed here are experiences unique to the adult and outside the realm of the child. Their uniqueness and developmental significance need to be better accounted for in psychoanalytic theory. Confrontation with each adult developmental task or crisis produces basic change in the life of each individual. To quote Bibring (1959): 'We find them as developmental phenomena at points of no return between one phase and the next when decisive changes deprive former central needs and modes of living of their significance forcing the acceptance of highly charged new goals and functions.' (p. 119). One purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate that such developmental turning points of no return are not limited to childhood but occur throughout the life cycle.     

Toward a psychoanalytic theory of violence,fundamentalism and terrorism

Abstract

Why would a group of people behave in ways that appear to us as moral nihilism, such as the events of 9/11? One cause is an affective one that underlies all violent behavior, namely, narcissistic injuries severe enough to threaten the survival of the self or of the group with which the self identifies, in the absence of non-violent means of maintaining or restoring individual or collective self-esteem. But there is also a uniquely modern cognitive reason for this uniquely modern form of violence, and of the apocalyptic fundamentalism that legitimizes it: namely, that terrorists see themselves as destroying the nihilism that they perceive as coming from us, that is, from the modern Western scientific mentality that destroys the credibility of the traditional sources of moral, legal and political authority and legitimacy, God and religion. Fundamentalism originated in the United States and has spread throughout the world as a rebellion against modernity. This suggests means of curing it: by facilitating access to modern education, psychological awareness, socio-economic equality and political democracy, to help protect all societies from the affective threats of shame and humiliation, and the cognitive threats of nihilism, anomie and anarchy (and their alternatives, nationalism, dogmatism and theocracy).     

Loewald's approach to psychoanalytic theory

The author suggests that part of the legacy of Hans Loewald is the nature of his approach to psychoanalytic theory. Loewald carefully considered and selectively utilized the work of theorists from a number of psychoanalytic schools of thought: id psychology, object relations theory, ego psychology, self psychology, and the interpersonal tradition. In addition, he helped pave the way for the current widespread interest in intersubjectivity, and also positioned himself in relation to those who embraced hermeneutics. Through all of this, he maintained a skeptical attitude, embodied in his belief in the complexity of the phenomena to be explored and his commitment to the perspective that psychoanalytic ideas should be open to revision.     

The current status of the psychoanalytic theory of instinctual drives. I: Drive concept, classification, and development

The evolution of Freud's theory of instinctual drives, with the accompanying models of a mental apparatus, is remarkable for its tenacious adherence to addressing the fundamental problems of human psychology, here phrased as the problems of body-mind-environment relationships. The concept of instinctual drives continues to be one of the most pervasive concepts of psychoanalysis, weathering considerable attack over the last several decades, although losing some clarity in the process. I have cited and discussed as basic issues of the concept of instinctual drives: the relationship of observational data and theoretical constructs in psychology; whether our construct of drives is or should be or can be purely psychological; the problem of conceptualizing the ontogenetic origin of mind; the issues of the "force-meaning conjunction" and the problem of psychic energy in psychoanalytic constructs; and the relation of our concept of instinctual drives to the concept of instincts in general. It seems that progress with these fundamental issues might be made by utilizing models that are more homologous with present knowledge in related fields than is Freud's reflex arc model of the nervous system, in order to build a better drive construct within the framework of psychoanalysis. The classification of instinctual drives remains a problem. Clinically, aggression seems to be a factor in conflict, very much like sexuality. Despite widespread acceptance of the idea of aggression as simply parallel to sexuality in all respects, there are major discrepancies. Perhaps aggression cannot be viewed as a drive after all; perhaps our drive construct needs to be modified to accommodate aggression. Certainly, controversy in this area has interfered with the production of good clinical studies which could begin to increase our understanding of aggression and its place in the human personality. The psychoanalytic theory of drive development has probably undergone less change in the last forty years than other aspects of drive theory, although careful observational work has led to alterations of our views of the age of onset of genital awareness, of female sexual development and function, and of the latency period. This is the conclusion of the first of two papers examining the post-Freud development of the theory of instinctual drives in psychoanalysis. The companion paper follows on p. 402 of this issue of The Psychoanalytic Quarterly.