Moral Psychology of Shame in Early Confucian Philosophy

In Western philosophy and psychology, shame is characterized as a self-critical emotion that is often contrasted with the similarly self-critical but morally active emotion of guilt. If shame is negative concern over endangered or threatened self-image (usually in front of others), guilt is autonomous moral awareness of one’s wrongdoings and reparative motivation to correct one’s moral misconduct. Recently, many psychologists have begun to discuss the moral significance of shame in their comparative studies of non-Western cultures. In this new approach, shame is characterized as a positive moral emotion and active motivation for self-reflection and self-cultivation. If shame is a positive and active moral emotion, what is its moral psychological nature? In this paper, I will analyze shame from the perspective of cultural psychology and early Confucian philosophy. Unlike many Western philosophers, Confucius and Mencius discuss shame as a form of moral excellence. In early Confucian texts, shame is not a reactive emotion of an endangered self but a moral disposition that supports a self-critical and self-transformative process of moral development.     

Confucian Moral Realism

In this paper I construct Confucian moral realism as a metaethical theory that is compatible with, or even derivable from, traditional Confucianism. The paper is at once interpretative and constructive. In my analysis, Confucians can establish the realist's claims on moral properties because they embrace the view of a moralistic universe. Moral properties in Confucian ethics not only are presented as objective, naturalistic properties, but also are seen as ‘causally efficacious’. There are several theses commonly endorsed by contemporary moral realists. I will explain how many of the remarks by Confucius, Mencius, in Yijing, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean can be understood as implicit endorsements of these theses. I will also analyze the theses specific to Confucian moral realism. The paper will end with a brief defense of this form of realism.     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation in Confucian Role-Based Ethics

How is the Confucian moral agent motivated to do what he or she judges to be right or good? In western philosophy, the answer to a question such as this depends on whether one is an internalist or externalist concerning moral motivation. In this article, I will first interpret Confucian ethics as role-based ethics and then argue that we can attribute to Confucianism a position on moral motivation that is neither internalist nor externalist but somewhere in between. I will then illustrate my claim with my reading of Mencius 6A4, showing that it is superior to readings found in the literature, which typically assume that Mencius is an internalist.     

儒家道德哲学及其审美境界

中国审美文化从本质意义上说是一种与天地亲和的生命文化,儒家传统最基本的特征就是肯定天人之间所具有本体论的一致性,因此儒家不从信仰出发来解释生命的伟大德行,而是从生生不息的生命本身来观照道德的本源。儒家作为生命的实践者,凭借其内在的生命力量,通过澄心静虑、心游目想,通过直观感悟、直觉体悟,以达到人生境界与审美境界的合一。这一过程既是道德主体的一种心理体验,更是道德主体通过一种外在践履工夫的求证。     

Addiction,Responsibility and Moral Psychology

Public intellectuals have long played a role in American culture, filling the gap between the academic elite and the educated public. According to some commentators, the role of the public intellectual has undergone a steady decline for the past several decades, being replaced by the academic expert. The most notable cause of this decline has been both the growth of the academy in the twentieth century,which has served to concentrate intellectual activity within its confines, and the changing nature of the media, which has framed the way in which information is conveyed to the public. We argue that although bioethics has developed primarily within the academic tradition and utilized the role of expert when dealing with the public, bioethicists are well suited to don the mantle of the public intellectual. Indeed, because they address issues in medicine and science of great relevance for the general public, bioethicists have a duty to revitalize the tradition of public intellectuals as a necessary complement to the important, but narrower role of expert.     

Social Psychology,Moral Character,and Moral Fallibility*

In recent years, there has been considerable debate in the literature concerning the existence of moral character. One lesson we should take away from these debates is that the concept of character, and the role it plays in guiding our actions, is far more complex than most of us initially took it to be. Just as Gilbert Harman, for example, makes a serious mistake in insisting, plain and simply, that there is no such thing as character, defenders of character also make a mistake to the extent that they imply there is no problem raised by the psychological literature for either the concept of character or the nature of character‐based ethics. My hope for this paper is to avoid both of these mistakes by first, exploring exactly what is the concept of character that is so firmly rooted in our philosophical and everyday thinking; and second, exploring the implications of the psychological literature for this appropriately understood concept of character. In so doing, I will come to a resolution that vindicates the existence of character, while at the same time calls attention to the real and serious problem suggested by the psychological evidence. This, we will see, is a problem of moral motivation.     

Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide from Confucian Moral Perspectives

This essay first discusses the three major arguments in favor of euthanasia and physician-assisted-suicide in contemporary Western society, viz., the arguments of mercy, preventing indignity, and individual autonomy. It then articulates both Confucian consonance and dissonance to them. The first two arguments make use of Confucian discussions on suicide whereas the last argument appeals to Confucian social-political thought. It concludes that from the Confucian moral perspectives, none of the three arguments is fully convincing.     

The Psychology of Moral Conviction

This paper reviews current theory and research that indicates that attitudes held with strong moral conviction (‘moral mandates’) represent something psychologically distinct from other constructs (e.g., attitude strength, partisanship, or religiosity), and that variance in moral conviction has important social and political consequences, such as increased intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others, difficulties in conflict resolution, increased political participation, willingness to accept violent means to achieve preferred ends, strong ties to positive and negative emotions, and inoculation against the usual pressures to obey authorities, obey the law, or to conform to majority group influence. The normative implications of these findings are both reassuring (moral convictions can protect against obedience to potentially malevolent authorities) and terrifying (moral convictions are associated with rejection of the rule of law, and can provide a motivational foundation for violent protest and acts of terrorism). Implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

斯洛特的美德伦理学及其心理学预设

作为当代美德伦理学界的重要思想者,迈克尔·斯洛特的美德理论典型地代表了美德伦理学对道德心理问题的重视.依据斯洛特的新近作品与思想发展,本文对斯洛特的两种理论,即,常识美德伦理学和基于行为者的美德伦理学分别予以分析和评论,并具体揭示了其背后的心理学预设及叙述.斯洛特的美德理论及其心理学基础向我们突出了道德心理问题的重要性,展示了美德伦理学关注人的内在品质和动机的显著特征.     

儒家伦理的基德和荣格的道德观

作为中国传统文化之主体的儒家伦理,已经确立了中国传统文化的"基德"或"母德",这是在长达2000多年历史发展中形成的,经过先秦时期的百家争鸣,形成了独树一帜的儒家思想,董仲舒提出"抑黜百家、独尊儒术"的建议,确立了儒家在中国社会的统治地位。经过以后历代的兼收并蓄和对立融合,发展成为儒、道、佛融合一体的宋明理学,近代中国社会对儒家思想的批判性发展,促使人们对儒家伦理思想进行时代的反思。荣格的分析心理学思想为东西方道德观的比较提供了一种独特的研究视角。     

Confucian Moral Cultivation,Longevity, and Public Policy

By investigating the link between the Confucian ideal of longevity and moral cultivation, I argue that Confucian moral cultivation is founded on the ideal of harmony, and, in this connection, it promotes a holistic, healthy life, of which longevity is an important component. My argument is internal to Confucianism, in the sense that it aims to show these concepts are coherently constructed within the Confucian philosophical framework; I do not go beyond the Confucian framework to prove its validity. Finally, I show that if these Confucian beliefs are true, they have serious implications for public policy-making in contemporary societies.     

儒家和谐伦理体系及其道德哲学意义

儒家在历史上进行的最成功的努力之一,就是建立一个和谐道德哲学体系与和谐伦理精神体系.这个和谐道德哲学体系与和谐伦理精神体系具体表现为四个结构:道德哲学体系、伦理精神体系与家国一体、由家及国的特殊社会结构之间的和谐;以"五伦"为原理的伦理世界的和谐;以"四德"为内核的道德世界的和谐;以"中庸"为境界的伦理世界与道德世界之间的和谐.     

儒家德刑观论析

在道德与法律、德治与刑罚的关系问题上,儒家从其仁爱的思想原则出发,主张为政以德,强调社会管理者自身的道德修养;主张德刑兼治、德主刑辅,重德治、轻刑政;主张宽猛相济,先教后刑;主张富而后教,强调社会道德教化,重视道德对人们行为的规范作用。儒家的德刑观在中国社会长期的历史发展中产生了深远的影响,今天仍然可以为我们的道德建设和法制建设提供许多有益的借鉴和启示。     

儒家文化与中国人健康心理的交互建构

中国传统文化的主体是儒家文化,文化与健康心理之间存在着相互作用、相互建构的关系。儒家文化与中国人的健康心理的交互建构作用主要表现在三个方面:一是心理问题躯体化,即文化心理与躯体症状的交互建构;二是心理问题道德化,即文化心理与德行标准的交互建构;三是心理问题生活化,即健康心理与伦理规范的交互建构。它们既是中国人健康心理与行为的典型表现特征,也是儒家文化与中国人的健康心理和行为交互建构的结果。心理健康、道德健康、伦理健康三者之间是一个相互作用、相互建构、协调发展的完整体系。中国心理健康服务要充分发挥心理健康理论的建构特性和行动特征,促进心理健康服务理论与实践协调发展。