The nibbāna-parinibbāna controversy

Bahya ben Joseph Ibn Pakuda, The book of directions to the duties of the heart, Introduction, translation and notes by Menahem Mansoor. London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. VIII + 472. £6

Marasinghe, M.M.J., Gods in early Buddhism — a study of their social and mythological milieu as depicted in the Nikāyas of the Pali Canon, Sri Lanka, 1974, pp. xviii + 301. Library ed. RS. 50.00, Popular ed. Rs. 37–50

Conze, Edward, Buddhist wisdom books, The diamond sutra and The heart sutra, London: George Allen &; Unwin, 1975, paperback edition, pp. 110 £1.95

Schloegl, Irmgard (ed.), The wisdom of the Zen masters, London: Sheldon Press, 1975, pp. 80, paperback and cloth (£2.75)

Davies, W.D., The gospel and the land, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974, pp. xiv + 521

Dumery, Henry, Phenomenology and religion. Structures of the Christian institution, Translated by Paul Barrett. Hermeneutics: Vol. V. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975, pp. ix + 114 $7.95

Dhavamony, Mariasusai, Phenomenology of religion, Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1973, pp. 385. 4,000 lire

Larson, Gerald James (ed.), Myth in Indo-European antiquity, (co-edited by C. Scott Littleton and Jaan Puhvel), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, pp. 197. £5.00

Dumézil, Georges, From myth to fiction; the saga of hadingus, Translated by Derek Coltman, pp. 253, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973

Kinsley, David R., The sword and the flute, Kālī and Krsna: Dark visions of the terrible and the sublime in Hindu mythology, University of California Press, 1975, pp. 159 + bibliography, £7.80

McDermott, Six pillars. Introductions to the major works of Sri Aurobindo, Robert A. (ed.), Chambersburg, Pa.: Wilson Books, 1974, pp. 198

Sperber, Dan, Rethinking symbolism, London: Cambridge University Press, 1975. £1.90 (paper)

Poliakov, Leon, The history of anti-semitism (The Littman Library of Jewish civilization), London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1974. Vol. I, pp. ix + 340, £4.25; Vol. II, pp. xiii + 400, £4.25     

The importance of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

Volume 1. Hinayāna. Den tidlige indiske buddhisme. Volume 2. Mahāyāna. Den senere indiske buddhisme. Christian Lindtner, 1998, Copenhagen, Spektrum/Forum Publishers, Vol. 1: 228 pp., ISBN 87 7763 170 6; Vol. 2: 256 pp., ISBN 87 7763 174 9     

The Rāga Bhāva in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā: Rectifying an Age-Old Mistake

The last foot of the 23rd verse of the Sā?khya Kārikā (SK)—‘tāmasam asmāt viparyastam’—is in need of reinterpretation. Prevailing interpretations are generally based on the primary meaning of the verse. In that sense, it is understood as a declaration of the four tāmasika bhāva that are contrary to the sāttvika ones. Taking the primary meaning of the verse is problematic because it contradicts the gu?a-bhāva coherence required by the doctrine of satkārya. The doctrine of satkārya is one of the foundational principles of Sā?khya. The avirāga or rāga bhāva shows coherence to rajas rather than tamas. I show that the verse needs to be interpreted by taking the secondary meaning. Accordingly, avirāga or rāga is established as a bhāva of rajas rather than tamas. Further, I also show that the idea of bhāva in the Sā?khya Kārikā and the Bhagavadgītā may be closely related.     

Sankara's doctrine of Māyā

Like all monisms Vedanta posits a distinction between the relatively and the absolutely Real, and a theory of illusion to explain their paradoxical relationship. Sankara's resolution of the problem emerges from his discourse on the nature of māyā which mediates the relationship of the world of empirical, manifold phenomena and the one Reality of Brahman. Their apparent separation is an illusory fissure deriving from ignorance and maintained by ‘superimposition’. Māyā, enigmatic from the relative viewpoint, is not inexplicable but only not self‐explanatory. Sahkara's exposition is in harmony with sapiential doctrines from other religious traditions and implies a profound spiritual therapy.     

Cārvāka Miscellany II

Materialism in India, very much like materialism in Greece, has to be reconstructed on the basis of fragments. Although the materialist tradition can be traced back to the early Upaniṣads on the one hand and the Buddhist and Jain canonical works on the other, the fragments offer only a glimpse of materialist thought. The same is true of the Presocratic philosophical tradition in Greece. Yet the glimpses we have from other, non-philosophical works are no less illuminating than those found in philosophical works proper. Some instances of the early sources related to pre-Cārvāka materialism have already been offered before (see R. Bhattacharya 2012b). In what follows, I propose to add a few more instances related to (a) the anti-Vedic tradition mentioned by Patañjali, (b) the voice of rationalism found in the Purāṇas, (c) the reception of Jābāli, a proto-materialist thinker as well as (d) the Cārvāka/Lokāyata in modern Indian literature, (e) the representation of Lokāyata in Jain literature and (f) the Rājataraṅgiṇī.

     

Cārvāka Miscellany III

Since all that we know of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata is derived from fragments and allusions, the reconstruction of the materialist system has to depend on new sources and their interpretations. Some such allusions and references have been collected and analyzed here to show how materialism appears in the most unexpected places and how the verses attributed to the materialist are subjected to strange interpretations.

     

Ānando Brahmeti Vyajānāt

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The nature of Self is ever-blissful, yet we feel constant pains and sufferings in the world. Each one of us is forced to face the worldly...     

Mental Pain in the Mahābhārata

International Journal of Hindu Studies - A number of passages in the Mahābhārata draw the distinction between bodily pain (?ārīra? du?kham) and mental pain...     

The first argument for Sarvāstivāda

Philosophers belonging to the Buddhist school of Sarvāstivāda believed in the real existence of past and future dharmas. This paper explores the implications, soteriological and philosophical, of an argument for this belief presented at the beginning of an early abhidharma text. The argument is two‐fold: that past states of mind can be directly perceived; and that the temporal and causal context of these states of mind, including their karmic future and the possibility of an alternative saving future, can also be directly perceived. The paper relates the Sarvāstivādins’ theory of time to Buddhist concerns with self‐knowledge and with conditional‐ity; and suggests that the argument is an early example of their adherence to the epistemological position of Direct Realism.     

Prāmāṇyavāda in the Text Tātparyaṭīkā and Pariśuddhi

In the thirteenth century, Gaṅgeśapādhyāya of Mithilā wrote his magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi which marked the inception of the Navya- Nyāya School. It was from this time that the works of the Nyāya beginning with the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, and ending with Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamanjarī as well as Udayana’s Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi came to be designated as Prācīna-nyāya. We have elaborated the arguments of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana in order to support and prove the extrinsic nature of pramāṇa. In this paper, we have also shown that they have added extra strength to the views of the former Māsters—their predecessors by declaring that the inference (which is advanced by Bhāṣyakāra) is purged of fallacies of all sorts in the field of the validity of pramāṇa.

     

Rāgabodha: A Śābdabodha-Based Framework for a Theory of Rāga

In Indian knowledge traditions, Vyākaraṇa describes the rules for the formation (prakṛti-pratyaya-vibhāga) and use of correct words (sādhuśabda). The Vākya (sentence) is postulated as the primary unit of communication. “śābdabodha” deals with the cognition of sentential meaning. Similarly, in Indian music, every rāga has a lexicon and grammar (rāga-lakṣaṇa): a rāga only allows some notes and not others, and it has rules for constructing phrases—notes to be highlighted, notes to end phrases on, ornamentation, etc. These phrases of the rāga are comparable to “vākya” which when presented with due regard to certain other considerations generate an apprehension of the rāga (rāgabodha). During presentation of a rāga, an artist aims to evoke the rāga-cchāyā or rāga-svarūpa and also an emotive state in the listener. There is a cognitive aspect to the informed listening of a rāga that is parallel to linguistic communication. We seek to understand how these parallels work between śābdabodha and rāgabodha. We postulate that the conditions of expectancy (ākāṅkśā), logical consistency (yogyatā) and proximity (sannidhi) in combination with the theory of sphoṭa provide a framework to explain how a rāga is expounded and cognised.

     

Fārābī and Avicenna on Contraposition

The rule of contraposition has been investigated thoroughly by Arabic logicians. In this paper, we study the work done by Fārābā and Avicenna, the fathers of Arabic logic. Fārābā studied contraposition of universal affirmatives, discussed its four forms, and discovered a relation between one form and the conversion of negative universals. Although Fārābā and logicians before him have used contraposition only for conditionals, as well as for indefinite and universal affirmative categorical propositions, Avicenna generalized the rule to all the four Aristotelian quantified categorical propositions. However, many of his ideas on contraposition were opposed by his 12th and 13th century followers, which are to be investigated later.     

Four New Works on the Mahābhārata

International Journal of Hindu Studies -     

The early Yogācāra theory of no-self

ABSTRACT

I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asa?ga and Vasubandhu. I introduce the idea of the cognitive schema (CS) of the self, a conception borrowed from the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget. A fundamental CS is a psychological function that guides the formation of perceptions. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the CS of the self, a psychological mechanism from which perceptions of external objects are formed. In addition, I argue that non-imaginative wisdom can be regarded as an experience during which the CS of the self does not function, such that one only possesses pure sensations without perceptions of external objects. After the repeated experience of non-imaginative wisdom, the CS of the self is changed to the purified CS of no-self. It still supports interactions with the external world, but in a way that does not allow the four afflictions (self-delusion, self-belief, self-conceit, and self-love) to arise.

Abbreviations: MS: Mahāyānasa?graha; TS: Tri??ikā-kārikā; TSN: Trisvabhāvanirde?a; VVS: Vi??atikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi