锚定效应的种类、影响因素及干预措施

锚定效应是指个体在不确定情境下的决策会受到初始无关锚影响致使其随后的数值估计偏向该锚的一种判断偏差现象。不同种类的锚定效应其影响因素和干预措施不同, 如影响传统锚定效应的有锚定信息特征、能力变量、情绪因素及个体差异性等, 基本锚定效应的主要影响因素有知识技能与时间压力, 自发锚定效应则受动机变量、认知因素及内部信念等影响。未来研究可深入挖掘认知加工机制、类比推理过程和开发DDS系统等来帮助减少各种锚定偏差。     

基于直觉判断的初始信任：启发式线索及影响因素

初始信任是许多重要关系的开端,也是多数研究主要关注的信任形式。缺乏可靠线索的不确定性特征使得初始信任往往依赖于直觉。基于直觉判断的初始信任可从信任者自身和信任对象两方面获取启发式线索,同时还会受到来自个体和情境因素的影响。未来可以进一步深化启发式线索的相关研究、拓展直觉初始信任的影响因素研究,并结合启发式线索和影响因素提高初始信任准确性。     

判断与决策中的锚定效应

versky和Kahneman提出锚定与调整启发式以来,锚定效应在不同领域判断与决策研究中得到广泛验证,提出了不同类型的锚定效应、多种研究范式、心理机制的不同理论观点,以及锚定效应作为有关心理现象的内在作用机制。文章阐述了锚定效应的最新研究进展,提出应深化对锚的种类和形态研究,以丰富的技术手段发展锚定效应神经心理机制研究,系统地进行锚定效应影响因素研究,深入探讨锚定现象对人的心理与行为的正负面影响以及锚定效应与其他有关心理现象间的关系     

“时间折扣”还是“单维占优”?——跨期决策的心理机制

为探索跨期决策的心理机制,本研究利用加工分离程序范式,检验了跨期决策过程的主导策略究竟是分析系统的时间折扣策略还是启发式系统的单维占优策略。3个实验分别操纵了决策目标、认知负荷和策略启动因素,实验结果一致性地发现:能够影响分析系统策略的决策目标和策略启动因素没有导致分析系统策略贡献率的变化,能够影响启发式系统策略的认知负荷和策略启动因素导致了启发式系统策略贡献率的变化。研究结果支持启发式系统的单维占优策略在跨期决策中起作用的假设,但不支持分析系统的时间折扣策略起作用的假设。本研究或能加深人们对跨期决策心理机制的理解,并为建立、健全与跨期决策相关的政策、法律、法规提供理论支持和帮助。     

学习不良儿童的元认知偏差：内部线索的影响

通过改变实验材料内部线索,旨在考察内部线索在学习不良儿童元认知偏差形成过程中的影响。实验1发现,学习不良儿童低关联字对的元认知偏差显著高于一般儿童,关联强度对学习判断的影响显著小于对测试成绩的影响;实验2发现,学习不良儿童反向方向字对的元认知偏差显著高于一般儿童,关联方向对学习判断的影响显著小于对测试成绩的影响。综合以上研究发现,相对一般儿童,学习不良儿童存在更大的元认知偏差,内部线索对学习判断和测试成绩的影响不一致模式适用于两组儿童。     

货币幻觉的心理机制与影响因素

货币幻觉是指经济交易活动中,人们因倾向于以货币的名义价值而非实际价值思考而对其消费和投资行为造成影响的一种认知偏差。大量研究表明,货币幻觉普遍存在于房地产投资、股票投资、组织管理以及捐赠等领域中。目前,研究者主要从决策框架、锚定与调整启发式、数目启发式以及神经心理机制这四个方面解释货币幻觉的形成机制。研究发现,货币幻觉的影响因素有心境、货币兑换率、通货膨胀率、情感依恋和先前经验。未来的研究可以从深入探讨货币幻觉的心理机制、影响因素和探索货币幻觉的应对策略这三个方面展开。     

运算动量效应的理论解释及其发展性预测因素

了解运算偏差的形成与发展对探索算数运算系统的内在机制具有重要意义, 早期的算数运算能力是儿童理解和进行复杂数学运算的基础。运算动量偏差是指个体在进行基本数学运算时倾向于高估加法运算结果而低估减法运算结果的一种运算偏差, 主要包括三种理论解释, 即注意转移假说、启发式解释和压缩解释。鉴于运算动量效应在成年群体中相对稳定却在不同发展阶段儿童中存在不一致的证据, 数学能力的提高与空间注意的成熟可结合不同的理论解释来阐明儿童发展过程中运算动量效应的变化趋势。未来可以进一步整合多种研究任务以揭示运算动量效应的发展轨迹, 考察数量表征系统与运算动量效应间的关联, 探究运算动量效应在不同运算符号中的稳定性, 探讨不同因素共同作用对运算动量效应的影响, 并设计有关数学能力的干预措施以减少运算动量效应这一运算偏差。     

情景判断测验效度的研究述评

文章在回顾近年来情景判断测验研究的基础上,总结了情景判断测验的效标关联效度、结构效度、增量效度和情景判断测验效度的影响因素.研究发现情景判断测验有较高的效标关联效度,是一种较好的人才选拔工具;情景判断测验是一种测量方法,可以用来测量指定的结构;情景判断测验对认知能力、人格、工作知识等变量具有增量效度;试题特性、测验开发模式、研究设计、评分方式等会影响情景判断测验的效度.     

判断与决策中的情感启发式

情感启发式是指在判断与决策的过程中,个体会有意识或无意识的利用自己对任务选项的主观情感反应来做出决策。具体来说,个体头脑中物体和事件的表征会激起不同水平的情感体验,这种不同的体验会对所有的表征做出积极或消极的标记,人们根据这些被标记的体验来做出判断和决策。情感启发式是个体在决策中常用的策略。目前,关于情感启发式心理机制的解释主要有情感启发式模型和双加工理论。此外,情感启发式的影响因素主要包括经验、时间压力、可评估性和计数能力等。未来的研究应主要集中在探究情感启发式的产生根源和进一步扩展情感启发式应用领域的研究。     

线索靶子关联和搜索策略对注意捕获的作用

采用线索化范式, 通过实验任务设计线索与靶子不同的关联并鼓励被试采用不同的搜索策略, 探讨线索与靶子间的知觉关联、语义关联及特征独子检测模式、特征搜索模式对注意捕获的作用。通过线索无效条件和线索有效条件反应时之差判断每一条件下的捕获量, 并综合各条件的反应情况做出结论如下：(1)线索与靶子的知觉关联调控注意捕获, 其效应不受语义关联和搜索策略影响; (2)线索与靶子的语义关联只在排除知觉关联后调控注意捕获; (3)控制知觉关联和语义关联后, 特征搜索模式不影响注意捕获, 而特征独子检测模式对注意捕获有影响。这表明语义知识和知觉经验根据当前任务要求共同作用指导个体的视觉加工, 表现了人类加工系统的灵活性和可调节性。     

Reducing the Linear Perception of Nonlinearity: Use of a Physical Representation

Research shows that while judging accumulations of quantities over time (e.g., money in a bank account or CO₂ in Earth's atmosphere), people assume that the shape of the accumulation is similar to the shape of the inflow (i.e., people rely on a correlation heuristic). Relying on the correlation heuristic is particularly worrisome for Earth's climate, as judging the CO₂ accumulation according to its emissions (inflow) would underestimate the actual (nonlinear) increase. This misperception undermines the seriousness of climate problem and results in wait‐and‐see behavior. We report two experiments where the effectiveness of a physical representation is compared with graphical and text representations in reducing people's underestimation of nonlinear accumulation in different contexts and problems. A physical representation presents an accumulation using a picture that works as a metaphor. In the first experiment, participants drew the shape of an accumulation over time relying on physical or graphical representations in one of two contexts: carbon dioxide and marbles. Although the participants underestimated the accumulation in both contexts, underestimations were reduced in the physical representation compared with the graphical representation. In the second experiment, we extended the evaluation of physical representations against both text and graphical representations in two different climate problems (with linearly increasing or decreasing inflow). Again, underestimations of the accumulation were reduced in the physical representation compared with the other two representations, regardless of the nature of the problem. We discuss implications of using the physical representation for improving people's estimates of nonlinear CO₂ accumulation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why don’t well-educated adults understand accumulation? A challenge to researchers,educators, and citizens

Accumulation is a fundamental process in dynamic systems: inventory accumulates production less shipments; the national debt accumulates the federal deficit. Effective decision making in such systems requires an understanding of the relationship between stocks and the flows that alter them. However, highly educated people are often unable to infer the behavior of simple stock–flow systems. In a series of experiments we demonstrate that poor understanding of accumulation, termed stock–flow failure, is a fundamental reasoning error. Persistent poor performance is not attributable to an inability to interpret graphs, lack of contextual knowledge, motivation, or cognitive capacity. Rather, stock–flow failure is a robust phenomenon that appears to be rooted in failure to appreciate the most basic principles of accumulation, leading to the use of inappropriate heuristics. We show that many people, including highly educated individuals with strong technical training, use what we term the “correlation heuristic”, erroneously assuming that the behavior of a stock matches the pattern of its flows. We discuss the origins of stock–flow failure and implications for management and education.     

Information search in heuristic decision making

Simple heuristics of the type introduced by Gigerenzer, Todd, and The ABC Research Group ( 1999 ) embody principles for information search, stop and decision making. These heuristics suggest that such processes are simple. In an analysis of general practitioners' (GPs) information search and decision‐making behaviour when prescribing a lipid lowering drug, we examined whether information search was simple, and whether a heuristic that predicts a simple decision‐making process was also accurate at describing information search. We found that GPs' information search behaviour was simple in that it demonstrated characteristics of the matching heuristic (e.g. stopping rule). In addition, although the matching heuristic which correctly predicted on average 75% of GPs' decisions used significantly fewer cues on average than the GPs did in the information search task, it was reasonably accurate in describing order of information search. These findings have implications for the validity of simple heuristics describing both information search and decision making. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Training fast and frugal heuristics in military decision making

Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in applied domains very effectively, suggesting that they could be used to improve applied decision making. We developed a fast and frugal heuristic for infantry decisions using experts from the British Army. This was able to predict around 80% of their decisions using three cues. Next, we examined the benefits of learning to use the fast and frugal heuristic by training junior officers in the British Army to apply the heuristic and assessing their accuracy and mental workload when making decisions. Their performance was compared to a control condition of junior officers who applied standard military decision methods. Participants using the fast and frugal heuristic made decisions as accurately as participants in the control condition, but with reduced mental demand. This demonstrates that fast and frugal heuristics can be learnt and are as effective as analytic decision methods.     

Heuristics as social tools

Psychological models of judgement and decision making assume that people use heuristics to make inferences when faced with constraints in time, information, or processing capacity. This paper explores the use of heuristics in social interaction. Extending the concept of heuristics to social domains can be used to construct better understandings of behavioural regularities, especially when such regularities are not easily predicted by or accounted for in conventional models of rational choice.     

Stability/Instability of Cognitive Strategies Across Tasks Determine Whether Stress Will Affect Judgmental Processes'

Previous research indicates that individuals employ various cognitive heuristics and decision modes in making decisions and judgmental tasks that do not follow an expected value model. It further indicates that several cognitive faculties are affected by stress. The purpose of this study was twofold: first, to examine whether individual differences exist in the use of cognitive heuristics and risk-assessment decision modes; second, to examine whether stress would affect the use of these cognitive strategies. Three versions of a questionnaire measuring the representativeness and availability heuristics, and risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes were administered to three different groups of subjects. Consistent individual differences were only observed in the subscales measuring risk-seeking and risk-aversion modes, but not in the use of the heuristics. In a different group of subjects, exposure to noise and task overload stress increased the use of the representativeness heuristic, but did not alter the use of risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes. These results indicate that the existence of individual differences in cognitive strategies may determine, in part, whether stress will modify judgmental processes.     

The similarity heuristic

Decision makers often make snap judgments using fast‐and‐frugal decision rules called cognitive heuristics. Research into cognitive heuristics has been divided into two camps. One camp has emphasized the limitations and biases produced by the heuristics; another has focused on the accuracy of heuristics and their ecological validity. In this paper we investigate a heuristic proposed by the first camp, using the methods of the second. We investigate a subset of the representativeness heuristic we call the “similarity” heuristic, whereby decision makers who use it judge the likelihood that an instance is a member of one category rather than another by the degree to which it is similar to others in that category. We provide a mathematical model of the heuristic and test it experimentally in a trinomial environment. In this environment, the similarity heuristic turns out to be a reliable and accurate choice rule and both choice and response time data suggest it is also how choices are made. We conclude with a theoretical discussion of how our work fits in the broader “fast‐and‐frugal” heuristics program, and of the boundary conditions for the similarity heuristic. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition: cooperation and competition

Like all probabilistic decisions, recognition memory judgments are based on inferences about the strength and quality of stimulus familiarity. In recent articles, B. W. A. Whittlesea and J. Leboe (2000; J. Leboe & B. W. A. Whittlesea, 2002) proposed that such memory decisions entail various heuristics, similar to well-known heuristics in overt decision making. Using verbal stimulus materials, Whittlesea and Leboe illustrated 3 separate memory heuristics: fluency, generation, and resemblance. In the present investigation, the authors examined the generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition. In 12 experiments, people memorized faces and later performed exclusion (source memory) tasks. Every experiment contained natural groups of facial photographs (e.g., Caucasian vs. Asian faces), but such groups were not always valid source-memory predictors. Instead, across experiments, the potential utility of generation and resemblance strategies was systematically varied. People were quite sensitive to such variations, changing from one heuristic to another as needed. However, they also combined heuristics, both improving and damaging performance across conditions. The relevance of recognition decision heuristics to eyewitness memory is considered.