对充分条件推理和必要条件推理的比较

用大学生为被试的实验考察比较充分条件推理和必要条件推理。实验结果新发现,充分条件推理和必要条件推理有不同的推理模式。充分条件肯定前件格式推理的正确率明显大于逻辑对应的必要条件肯定后件格式推理的正确率。充分条件否定前件格式推理的正确率与逻辑对应的必要条件否定后件格式推理的正确率无显著差异。充分条件肯定后件格式推理的正确率与逻辑对应的必要条件肯定前件格式推理的正确率无显著差异。充分条件否定后件格式推理的正确率明显小于逻辑对应的必要条件否定前件格式推理的正确率。     

巧用推理 智断疑案

逻辑与人们的现实生活密切相关,现实生活中许多棘手的看似复杂的问题只要用一下逻辑马上就可以迎刃而解。当然,逻辑包括很多方面,这里只介绍逻辑推理中的充分条件假言推理。 充分条件假言推理就是一个前提为充分条件假言判断,另一个前提和结论为直言判断的假言推理。根据真的充分条件假言判断的逻辑特征:前件真时,后件必真;后件假时,前件必假,我们可以得出充分条件假言推理有两种正确形式,即肯定前件式和否定后件式。下面就具体案例谈一下第一种形式。     

充分条件句语义关系知觉对条件推理的影响

作者通过实验考察了大学生被试对五种充分条件句语义关系知觉对其条件推理的影响。两个实验的结果表明,被试对条件句中前后件之间语义关系的知觉理解影响和调节其相应的条件推理的成绩。实验1新发现,被试对充分条件句后件对前件必要性的知觉理解存在难易差异,对许可句和定义句的后件必要性容易知觉,对偶然句、义务句和因果句的后件必要性难以知觉。实验2新发现,被试对充分条件句后件对前件必要性的知觉理解的难易差异导致被试在否定后件式推理成绩上的差异,对许可句和定义句的否定后件式推理成绩显著高于对偶然句、义务句和因果句的否定后件式推理成绩,对充分条件句否定后件式推理成绩随对后件必要性知觉增加而增加。     

必要条件、假言判断可以作为二难推理的前提

长期以来,人们认为二难推理的大前提(暂且称之)必须由充分条件假言判断来充当。本文提出,必要条件假言判断也可以用来作为二难推理的大前提。用必要条件假言判断作为大前提与用充分条件假言判断作为大前提的二难推理一样,具有四种基本的推理形式。 1.简单构成式这种式里大前提中的两个必要条件假言判断有相同的前件,不同的后件,小前提(暂且称之)     

条件推理的“去两元效应”

选取四种不同的命题类型,命题Ⅰ为前件二元、后件二元;命题Ⅱ为前件二元、后件多元;命题Ⅲ为前件多元、后件二元;命题Ⅳ为前件多元、后件多元;研究了4种不同的条件推理规则(MP,DA,AC,MT)下的条件推理。肯定前件与否定后件表现出了抑制效应,而否定前件与肯定后件则表现出了促进效应,这与以往的研究结果,否定前件与肯定后件表现出抑制效应,否定后件表现出促进效应是不一致的。集合映射模型很好的解释了本研究的结果。     

比喻图解讲授假言推理

假言推理是人们思维实践中经常运用的推理形式之一,按照假言判断前件与后件的三种不同关系,假言推理可分为充分条件假言推理、必要条件假言推理和充分必要条件假言推理三种。假言推理的规则与名称没有语义上明确的区分,而且规则比较复杂,初学者往往记不准确,常常弄错,成为教学中一个难点。     

关于逻辑知识的两点意见

《哲学研究》编辑部: 最近《哲学研究》发表了不少逻辑文章,其中有的提法似不妥。现仅指出两例,就正于作者和编辑同志。 第一,郭虹和陈明灏同志在《试论充分条件假言推理在刑事侦察中的应用》(《哲学研究》1981年第7期)中提出充分条件假言推理应补充两个叫做肯定后件式和否定前件式的形式,但他们并没有明确列出这两个形式来。从他们所举的例子来分析,他们心目之中所谓的肯定后件式的形式应该是:     

条件推理中的二元效应初探

通过预备实验选取前件(或后件)是二元(或多元)的5种条件命题的4种推理形式作为实验材料,以大学本科生为被试,考察了五种不同条件命题类型对4种推理结果的影响.结果表明命题类型、推理规则以及两者的交互作用都非常显著.这个结果进一步验证了条件推理的集合映射模型.     

具身化空间四卡问题解决的内容效应

利用三个实验探讨了左右、前后(实验1,2)具身化空间四卡问题解决的内容效应,同时探讨了条件推理后件类型(二分变量与连续性变量)对具身化内容效应的影响(实验3)。结果发现:(1)三个实验均表现出在自我参照空间四卡问题解决中,肯定前件和否定后件同时被选择的比率(P-Q)显著高于在经典四卡问题或环境参照空间四卡问题中P-Q卡被选择的比率,从而表现出四卡问题解决存在具身化内容效应;(2)具身化内容效应仅限于后件类型是二分变量的四卡问题;(3)在三个实验中被试均表现出"证真偏向"。具身化空间四卡问题解决的内容效应支持了条件推理领域特异性理论。     

命题逻辑的推理规则

关于复合命题的推理在传统逻辑里基本上只讨论了假言推理肯定式(Modusponens)和否定式以及假言联锁推理、选言推理、二难推理等。相对于某些推理形式,传统逻辑还列出了所谓推理规则。例如关于Modus ponens的规则是:承认前件就要承认后件。在现代逻辑里,命题逻辑研究关于命题联接词的推理。以(?)表示人工语言里演绎的推出关系,现代逻辑就把推理形式Modus ponens抽象为下列推理规则:     

Chronometric evidence for memory retrieval in causal conditional reasoning: The case of the association strength effect

According to many models of conditional reasoning, correct responses to the uncertain forms affirmation of consequent (AC) and denial of antecedent (DA) rely on the retrieval of an alternative antecedent from semantic memory. The main prediction issuing from this hypothesis of online retrieval is that the associative strength of the relevant information in long-term memory affects the latency of its retrieval and then of the correct response of uncertainty to AC and DA. This prediction was tested in 64 adults who performed a syllogism evaluation task with familiar causal conditional premises. As predicted, correct responses of uncertainty to AC and DA were not only more frequent but also faster when the antecedent term was weakly rather than strongly associated with the consequent. In line with the semantic framework, we also observed that this strength effect in response times was reversed for incorrect responses of certainty to AC.     

Individual differences in conditional reasoning: A dual-process account

Dual-process theories of conditional reasoning predict that relationships among four basic logical forms, and to intellectual ability and thinking predictions, are most evident when conflict arises between experiential and analytic processing (e.g., Stanovich & West, ). To test these predictions, 210 undergraduates were presented with conditionals for which the consequents were either weakly or strongly associated with alternative antecedents (i.e., WA and SA problems, respectively). Consistent with predictions, modus ponens inferences were not related to inferences on the uncertain forms (affirmation of the consequent, denial of the antecedent). On WA problems, modus tollens, affirmation of the consequent, and denial of the antecedent were related to each other and to verbal ability. Modus ponens was linked to verbal ability only when disabling conditions were activated. In accord with the predictions of Stanovich and West (), on most problems, thinking dispositions predicted variance in inferences independently from verbal ability. We argue that a largely automatic experiential processing system governs performance on modus ponens, unless disablers are activated. Consciously controlled analytic processing predominates on the uncertain forms and, under some conditions, on modus tollens.     

Conditional reasoning by mental models: chronometric and developmental evidence

The aim of this article is to verify two predictions resulting from the mental models theory of conditional reasoning. First, the denial of antecedent (DA) and modus tollens (MT) inferences should take longer to verify than modus ponens (MP) and affirmation of consequent (AC) because the former require subjects to flesh out the initial model whereas the latter do not. This prediction was confirmed in two reaction time experiments in adults. In line with Evans' proposal (Evans, J. St. B. T. (1993). The mental model theory of conditional reasoning: critical appraisal and revision. Cognition, 48, 1-20), there was a strong directionality effect: inferences from antecedent to consequent (MP and DA) took less time to verify than the inferences in the opposite direction (AC and MT). Second, the development of conditional reasoning should result from the increasing capacity to construct and coordinate more and more models. As a consequence, the pattern of conditional inference production should evolve with age from a one-model conjunctive pattern (production of MP and AC more frequent than DA and MT) to a three-model conditional production pattern (higher production rate for MP and MT than for DA and AC). This prediction was confirmed using an inference production task in children, adolescents, and adults.     

A Probabilistic Interpretation of llIf-Then

This study proposes that subjects interpret thematic conditionals ('if p then q ') probabilistically in solving conditional reasoning problems. Experiment 1 found that subjects' correct responses increased with the perceived probability of q , given p for each of the four forms of conditional arguments: modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), denial of the antecedent (DA), and affirmation of the consequent (AC). Experiment 2 ruled out two alternative explanations based on the comprehensibility of conditionals and on subjects interpreting conditionals as biconditionals. In Experiment 3, subjects solved two types of problems: (a) complete probabilistic problems, such as 'If p then q ; knowing p ; how probable is q ?', and (b) reduced probabilistic problems, such as 'Knowing p ; how probable is q ?' Two sources of information that determine the observable reasoning responses are identified. One source of information is based on one's general knowledge, and another is based on taking all premises into account.     

Efficiency of retrieval correlates with "logical" reasoning from causal conditional premises

In two experiments, we examined the prediction that there should be a relation between the speed with which subjects can retrieve potential causes for given effects and their reasoning with causal conditional premises (if cause P, then effect Q). It was also predicted that when subjects are given effects for which there exists a single strongly associated cause, speed of retrieval of a second potential cause should be particularly related to reasoning with invalid logical forms--namely, affirmation of the consequent and denial of the antecedent. In the first experiment, 49 university students were given both retrieval tasks and conditional reasoning problems. The results were generally consistent with the predictions. The second experiment, involving 57 university students, replicated the first, with some methodological variations. The results were also consistent with the predictions. An analysis of the combined results of the two experiments indicated that individual differences in efficiency of retrieval of information from long-term memory did predict performance on the invalid logical forms in the predicted ways. These results strongly support a retrieval model for conditional reasoning with causal premises.     

Inference suppression and semantic memory retrieval: Every counterexample counts

Reasoning with conditionals involving causal content is known to be affected by retrieval of counterexamples from semantic memory. In this study we examined the characteristics of this search process in everyday conditional reasoning. In Experiment 1 we manipulated the number (zero to four) of explicitly presented counterexamples (alternative causes or disabling conditions) for causal conditionals. In Experiment 2, using a generation pretest, we measured the number of counterexamples participants could retrieve for a set of causal conditionals. One month after the pretest, participants were presented a reasoning task with the same conditionals. The experiments indicated that acceptance of modus ponens linearly decreased with every additionally retrieved disabler, whereas affirmation of the consequent acceptance linearly decreased as a function of the number of retrieved alternatives. Results for denial of the antecedent and modus tollens were less clear. The findings show that the search process does not necessarily stop after retrieval of a single counterexample and that every additional counterexample has an impact on the inference acceptance.     

Bias in Conditional Inference: Implications for Mental Models and Mental Logic

Three experiments are reported in which subjects are given the opportunity to make any of the four inferences associated with conditional statements: modus ponens (MP), denial of the antecedent (DA), affirmation of the consequent (AC), and modus tollens (MT). The primary purpose of the research was to establish the generality and robustness of polarity biases that may be occasioned by systematic rotation of negative components in the conditional rules. In Experiments 1 & 2, three forms of conditionals were used: “if (not) p then (not) q”, “(not) p only if (not) q” and “(not) q if (not) p”. Experiment 1 used a conclusion evaluation task, whereas Experiment 2 used a conclusion production task. In Experiment 3, thematic conditionals were presented with and without a preceding scenario.

The biases investigated were (a) affirmative premise bias—the tendency to draw more inferences from affirmative premises and (b) negative conclusion bias—the tendency to draw more inferences with negative conclusions. The suggestive evidence for affirmative premise bias in the literature was not supported: very little evidence was found for it in the current experiments. Robust findings of negative conclusion bias were, however, found across the three experiments, although the bias was mostly restricted to DA and MT inferences. This suggests that the bias is best regarded as a difficulty with double negation.

The results are discussed with respect to both the mental logic and mental model accounts of propositional reasoning. Neither theory as currently formulated can explain all of our findings, although a plausible revision of each is considered.     

The development of reasoning with causal conditionals.

A total of 512 children in Grades 1 through 6 received a conditional inference task using causal conditionals (If cause P, then effect Q) and a generation of alternatives task. The inference task used premises for which there were few or many possible alternative causes. Results show a steady age-related increase in uncertainty responses to the two uncertain logical forms, affirmation of consequent (AC) and denial of antecedent (DA), and an increase in production of disabling conditions for modus ponens. More uncertainty responses were produced to AC and DA with premises with many possible alternatives. Individual differences in inference production were related to numbers of alternatives produced in the generation task. Results support the idea that both developmental and individual differences in reasoning can be at least partially explained by differential access to knowledge stored in long-term memory.     

A psychological study of unconnected conditionals

Unconnected conditionals, also called irrelevant conditionals, are sentences of form if A, C, whose antecedent and consequent bear no connection. According to the main theories of conditional reasoning, the truth or high probability of an antecedent and a consequent is sufficient to make true or highly probable the corresponding conditional. We tested this assumption and showed that it does not hold for unconnected conditionals. Furthermore, we investigated experimentally the factors which favour the endorsement of irrelevant conditional constructions and found that this rate increases when an analogy can be built between the antecedent and the consequent or when the conditional is asserted before its components.     

The initial representation in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditional sentences

All accounts of human reasoning (whether presented at the symbolic or subsymbolic level) have to reckon with the temporal organization of the human processing systems and the ephemeral nature of the representations it uses. We present three new empirical tests for the hypothesis that people commence the interpretational process by constructing a minimal initial representation. In the case of if A then C the initial representation captures the occurrence of the consequent, C, within the context of the antecedent, A. Conditional inference problems are created by a categorical premise that affirms or denies A or C. The initial representation allows an inference when the explicitly represented information matches (e.g., the categorical premise A affirms the antecedent “A”) but not when it mismatches (e.g., “not-A” denies A). Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that people tend to accept the conclusion that “nothing follows” for the denial problems, as indeed they do not have a determinate initial-model conclusion. Experiment 3 demonstrated the other way round that the effect of problem type (affirmation versus denial) is reduced when we impede the possibility of inferring a determinate conclusion on the basis of the initial representation of both the affirmation and the denial problems.