认知冲突协调问题与心智的架构

心智架构或认知架构是指一个功能相对完整的认知系统的基本组织结构。经典认知科学的理论或模型大多采纳了某种类似于冯·诺依曼式计算机体系结构的心智架构,即认知系统由一些各司其职的心理模块与一个负责整合与协调的中枢部门所构成。进化心理学的众量模块性论题对经典认知科学的心智架构观提出了严厉挑战,并引发了许多争议。本文提出认知冲突协调问题是任何一个足够复杂的认知系统均需要处理的基本问题,并以此来审视关于心智架构的论战,指出此问题对众量模块性论题构成了严重的困难。     

西方哲学心智转向对心理学的影响

心智哲学是20世纪中末期西方哲学所发生的继语言(义)学转向和语用学转向之后的一次重要转向,它为心理学提供了新的元理论和方法论。(1)为心理学提供了"心智-语言-世界"新的世界观;(2)从哲学角度对人的心理进行了探讨,促进了哲学与心理学的结合并互哺;(3)促使人们对"人是什么"重新审视与理解;(4)引发了对以往心理学尤其是主流心理学的基石——身心二元论的质疑;(5)催生了第二代认知科学、活动主义、情境认知等新取向的兴起。它对心理学有很大启示:第一,人工智能、动物研究等研究是有限度的;第二,应重视身体的作用;第三,应重视人的意向性,注重隐喻分析;第四,应关注人的存在,尤其是生命的意义。     

具身心智对进化心理学的质疑与挑战

具身-生成心智倡导生命与认知的深刻连续性,它重新定义了自然选择,强调身体和生命活动对认知的关键意义,并指出每一个人都是经过文化适应的主体。它在心智进化的本质、认知的核心工作假设、人类本性与文化,以及基因、身体、生命活动与认知的关系等问题上都有着完全不同于进化心理学的理解,并对后者提出了质疑和挑战。     

第三代行为治疗的核心概念:心智觉知

心智觉知(又称正念)源于佛教心理学,古典心智觉知的含义是觉知、注意和记住.心智觉知被西方心理治疗界采用以后,其含义中加入了不评价和接纳.心智觉知可以通过心智觉知训练培养.基于心智觉知和接纳治疗取向的治疗师帮助病人改变与其自身经验的关系,而不是直接挑战病人的非适应性的思维、感觉或者行为模式.     

认知与身体:理论心理学的视角

文章站在理论心理学的立场,从具身的维度,探讨了认知与身体的可能关系。文章指出,自古希腊以来的西方文化中,二元论思想一直占据主导地位。柏拉图是二元论思想的最早代表,笛卡尔从认识论上确证了心、物二元世界的存在。传统认知心理学承袭了身心分离的二元论传统,视心智为独立于身体感觉运动系统的抽象符号信息加工。但是具身认知的兴起对二元论提出了挑战。从具身的维度来看,认知是身体的认知,身体是认知的主体。认知在以下三个方面表现出对身体的依赖性:a.身体限制着认知的特征与范围。有机体的身体结构、身体的活动能力限制了认知表征的性质和内容;b.身体不仅限制着认知加工,而且可以作为认知加工的一个组成部分,在大脑和身体之间分配认知任务,发挥着一种类似于分销商的作用;c.身体调节着认知,影响着思维、判断、情绪和动机等心智过程。上述事实说明,身心并非对立的二元,而是一体,身体与环境的互动造就了心智和认知。心智、身体、环境是一体化过程。     

心智游移：现象、机制及意义

心智游移是一种常见的非自主内源性意识体验, 是意识流的重要组成部分, 它的存在提示非感官意识在人类意识经验中的重要地位, 以及持续进行的无意识加工对个体生存可能具有的重要意义, 对心智游移的研究是心理学和认知神经科学领域内新兴的热点课题。本文重点回顾了关于心智游移的体验内容、与情绪的关系及其相关神经活动方面的研究成果, 在此基础上探讨了心智游移的发生机制及适应性功能。文章最后总结了目前心智游移研究中存在的定义不清、研究策略和方法过于局限以及研究内容上存在的问题, 并提出了该领域未来的研究方向以及应用价值。     

知识表达及其理论

知识表达是认知心理学和人工智能研究中倍受重视的一个问题,认知心理学研究怎样把知识表征在人的大脑中,而人工智能研究则关心怎样把知识表达在系统的知识库中。本文主要介了绍人工智能研究中知识表达的三种形式(语义网络、产生式和框架),并介绍了有关的知识表达理论。     

有限理性信任观:对理性计算和非理性态度的整合

信任是理性的还是非理性的,一直是信任研究中争论的焦点。在对理性信任观和非理性信任观进行比较分析之后,在"有限理性"和"心智成本"的框架下,提出了信任的有限理性观点,对信任的理性观和非理性观点做一整合。     

团队心智模型相似性与正确性对团队创造力的影响

现代组织越来越依赖团队进行创造与创新活动, 团队创造力成为理论与实践共同关注的热点问题。最新理论指出, 与个体类似, 团队也是信息加工者, 团队决策实质上也是信息搜寻、编码、存储和提取的认知加工过程。从团队认知角度开展研究是团队创造力领域的新方向。鉴于此, 本研究从团队认知的角度出发, 探讨共享心智模型与团队创造力之间的关系。基于80个信息平台运行维护团队的数据, 研究结果表明, 心智模型的相似性与正确性均能影响团队创造力, 但方向正好相反。心智模型相似性负向预测团队创造力, 而心智模型正确性则正向预测团队创造力。两者还共同影响团队创造力, 当成员心智模型正确性高且相似性低时, 团队创造力最高; 而当成员心智模型彼此相似但错误时, 团队创造力最差。本研究首次将团队认知和团队创造力两个研究领域结合起来, 研究结果有望丰富和拓展两个领域研究成果。     

智能时代的工程心理学

智能技术为智能时代的工程心理学研究和应用提供了新的机遇。为此, 系统提出了智能时代工程心理学的工作框架。该工作框架包括工程心理学研究和应用的对象、核心问题空间、学科理念、研究重点、应用范围、方法等。智能时代的人机关系呈现出一种新的形式: 人机组队式的人机合作关系。“以人为中心的人工智能”应该是智能时代工程心理学的学科理念。针对智能技术, 近期工程心理学研究者开始开展围绕新型人机关系的理论框架和基本问题、人机组队中的心理结构和决策控制、人机交互等方面的研究工作。为有效支持智能系统的研发, 概括总结了一些工程心理学新方法和提升的方法。最后, 针对当前工程心理学所面对的一些挑战提出了具体的建议。     

人类自我意识的多重起源：兼论精神分裂症的进化论解释

将ＰｏｗｖｉｎｅｌｌｉａｎｄＣａｎｔ提出的栖处降服假说推广以生态位－亚生态位中的维数－参量之间的更一般的互相降服情景,提出了人类的自我意识的多重起源的假设及对精神分裂症作出了进化方面的解释,最后对意识起源之谜进行了探讨和推测：意识具有精炼信息的功能。     

精神、意识到底有无实体

精神、意识有无实体历来是一个有争议的问题。神经科学家从“心网”与“脑网”的关系出发,在这个问题上形成了片面的认识。由于精神、意识依赖于人脑,因而他们就把精神、意识与实体的关系等同于“心网”与“脑网”的关系。我们的基本观点是：首先,精神、意识与实体之间的关系实际上是哲学上的主观与客观的关系;第二,意识作为哲学范畴还有人类意识与个体意识之分,并认为“三个世界”的理论能够较完满地解决这一争端。要揭示意识的本质不能仅仅依赖神经科学家。     

On the link between mind wandering and task performance over time

Here we test the hypothesis that fluctuations in subjective reports of mind wandering over time-on-task are associated with fluctuations in performance over time-on-task. In Study 1, we employed a singleton search task and found that performance did not differ prior to on- and off-task reports, nor did individual differences in mind wandering predict differences in performance (so-called standard analytic methods). Importantly however, we find that fluctuations in mind wandering over time are strongly associated with fluctuations in behavior. In Study 2, we provide a replication of the relation between mind wandering and performance over time found in Study 1, using a Flanker interference task. These data indicate (1) a tight coupling between mind wandering and performance over time and (2) that a temporal-analytic approach can reveal effects of mind wandering on performance in tasks where standard analyses fail to do so. The theoretical and methodological implications of these findings are discussed.     

Mind wandering in schizophrenia: A thought-sampling study

Mind wandering has consistently been associated with impairments in cognition, emotion and daily performance. However, few experimental studies on mind wandering have been conducted in individuals with schizophrenia. The present study aimed to examine mind wandering in schizophrenia patients with a thought-sampling experiment embedded in a rapid go/no-go task and the relationship between the frequency of mind wandering and psychotic symptoms. Fifty-eight schizophrenia patients and 56 matched healthy controls were recruited and engaged in a task that assessed mind wandering. The results showed that schizophrenia patients (1.4%) reported less frequent mind wandering than healthy controls (5.8%). Moreover, there was no significant correlation between the frequency of mind wandering and psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia patients. Further studies in different stages of schizophrenia and in patients with more severe psychotic symptoms are needed to demonstrate a more comprehensive picture of mind wandering in schizophrenia.     

The frozen cyborg: A reply to Selinger and Engström

Selinger and Engstrom, A moratorium on cyborgs: Computation, cognition and commerce, 2008 (this issue) urge upon us a moratorium on ‘cyborg discourse’. But the argument underestimates the richness and complexity of our ongoing communal explorations. It leans on a somewhat outdated version of the machine metaphor (exemplified perhaps by a frozen 1970’s Cyborg). The modern cyborg, informed by an evolving computational model of mind, can play a positive role in the critical discussions that Selinger and Engstrom seek.     

On the influence of re-reading on mind wandering

Re-reading has been shown to have a minimal benefit on text comprehension, in comparison to reading only once or other types of study techniques (e.g., testing; self-explanation). In two experiments we examined the effect of re-reading on mind wandering. Participants read two texts, during which they responded to intermittent mind wandering probes. One text was read once and the other twice. Consistent with previous findings, there was no effect of re-reading on comprehension even though participants reported feeling more competent when they re-read the text. Critically, participants mind wandered more while re-reading. Furthermore, the effect of re-reading on mind wandering was specific to intentional forms of mind wandering rather than unintentional. The implications of these results for understanding mind wandering and the limited effectiveness of re-reading as a mnemonic are discussed.     

Reflections on the use of spirituality to privilege religion in scientific discourse: incorporating considerations of self

Many lay writers have claimed that psychologists and other scientists need to integrate something called “spirituality” into their work. This spirituality, usually undefined, is not something the truth of which may be determined by scientific means, yet it should be called upon to guide or govern our actions in certain all-important ways. This paper deconstructs two such calls that, in the end, are based on the notion of revealed, or religiously held, truth. A paradigm by which spirituality can be investigated integrating the individual self with culture is proposed, and use of this paradigm when considering modernization and supply-side theses of religious propagation is suggested.

The more your mind wanders,the smaller your attentional blink: An individual differences study

The present studies investigate the hypothesis that individuals who frequently report experiencing episodes of mind wandering do so because they under-invest attentional/executive resources in the external environment. Here we examined whether self-reported instances of mind wandering predict the magnitude of the “attentional blink” (AB) in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task, since a prominent view is that the AB derives from an over-investment of attention in the information stream. Study 1 demonstrates that subjective reports of mind wandering in a sustained attention task have a negative predictive relation with respect to the magnitude of the AB measured in a subsequent RSVP task. In addition, using the Spontaneous and Deliberate Mind Wandering Questionnaire in Study 2, we were again able to show that trait-level mind wandering in everyday life negatively predicts AB magnitude. We suggest that mind wandering may be the behavioural outcome of an adaptive cognitive style intended to maximize the efficient processing of dynamic and temporally unpredictable events.     

The eyes know what you are thinking: eye movements as an objective measure of mind wandering

Paralleling the recent work by Reichle, Reineberg, and Schooler (2010), we explore the use of eye movements as an objective measure of mind wandering while participants performed a reading task. Participants were placed in a self-classified probe-caught mind wandering paradigm while their eye movements were recorded. They were randomly probed every 2–3 min and were required to indicate whether their mind had been wandering. The results show that eye movements were generally less complex when participants reported mind wandering episodes, with both duration and frequency of within-word regressions, for example, becoming significantly reduced. This is consistent with the theoretical claim that the cognitive processes that normally influence eye movements to enhance semantic processing during reading exert less control during mind wandering episodes.     

The Minds of God(s) and Humans: Differences in Mind Perception in Fiji and North America

Previous research suggests that how people conceive of minds depends on the culture in which they live, both in determining how they interact with other human minds and how they infer the unseen minds of gods. We use exploratory factor analysis to compare how people from different societies with distinct models of human minds and different religious traditions perceive the minds of humans and gods. In two North American samples (American adults, N = 186; Canadian students, N = 202), we replicated a previously found two‐factor agency/experience structure for both human and divine minds, but in Fijian samples (Indigenous iTaukei Fijians, N = 77; Fijians of Indian descent, N = 214; total N = 679) we found a three‐factor structure, with the additional containing items related to social relationships. Further, Fijians’ responses revealed a different three‐factor structure for human minds and gods’ minds. We used these factors as dimensions in the conception of minds to predict (a) expectations about human and divine tendencies towards punishment and reward; and (b) conception of gods as more embodied (an extension of experience) or more able to know people's thoughts (an extension of agency). We found variation in how these factors predict conceptions of agents across groups, indicating further theory is needed to explain how culturally generated concepts of mind lead to other sorts of social inferences. We conclude that mind perception is shaped by culturally defined social expectations and recommend further work in different cultural contexts to examine the interplay between culture and social cognition.