一个演绎推理难题对心理模型理论的验证

1　问题与目的1.1　问题的提出有一些被称之为“老实人—骗子”的逻辑推理问题 ,人们往往不能做出正确的推论。如 :有一个老实人和一个骗子 ,老实人永远说实话 ,骗子永远说假话 ,有一天他们在下象棋 ,分别说 :“一些平局是黑方先行的”“所有的平局都是黑方先行的”问 :是否可能 ,所有的平局都是黑方先行的 ?从逻辑的角度 ,正确的答案是“否”。但是 ,实际上人们却常常忽略了骗子所说的话 ,单凭某个老实人的话做出错误的推论。如上述问题 ,假定第一句话是老实人的话 ,由于这句话和结论可以同时为真 ,如果没有考虑骗子说的话 ,就做出了“是”…     

归纳推理的抽样理论

作者提出归纳推理的抽样理论,认为归纳推理实质是根据与归纳特征有关的抽样样本情况来推断结论类别具有归纳特征的可能性,其中的抽样可分为类别抽样和特征抽样两种。以大学生为被试的两个实验结果一致支持抽样理论而不是别的归纳推理理论。对于归纳推理的主要现象,抽样理论比其它的相似性解释具有更大的解释范围,特别是能够解释其它理论严格不能解释的归纳推理非对称性现象     

演绎推理中的心理模型理论及相关研究

推理是问题解决中的一个重要研究领域。多年来一直受到心理学家们的关注。推理有多种形式。演绎推理是其重要的一个组成部分。     

基于概率的归纳推理模型

归纳推理是指从个别前提推出一般结论的推理,它是人的一项基本认知能力,也是心理学研究需要解释的重要现象.在模拟归纳推理时,不能排除先验知识对归纳推理结论力度的影响,贝叶斯理论可以结合条件对先验概率进行修正,能够很好地将先验知识引入到归纳推理中来.文章重点介绍了基于记忆的贝叶斯模型,相似性概率模型和结构统计模型对归纳推理的解释.     

对归纳推理贝叶斯模型的检验

作者用实验比较检验特征归纳的贝叶斯模型、关联相似性模型、基于特征的归纳推理模型和相似性覆盖模型这四种模型。以大学生为被试的实验结果表明：1）在强关联强度一致时,被试的归纳推理基本符合贝叶斯模型和关联相似性模型的预测,在弱关联强度一致时,不符合这四种模型预测;2）在关联强度不一致时,关联强度效应不符合贝叶斯模型的预测;3）在关联强度一致时,贝叶斯模型和关联相似性模型的预测结果是一致的,不能区分两个模型。实验结果较多地支持贝叶斯模型和关联相似性模型。     

演绎推理的认知和脑机制研究述评

演绎推理是指假设在某些前提成立的条件下推测必然会出现的结论,它是人类重要的思维形式.不同的认知理论对人在推理过程中表现出的逻辑和非逻辑特性作出了相应的解释和预测,而来自认知神经科学的研究也进一步揭示了推理行为的脑机制,对演绎推理的认知理论进行了验证和发展.本文通过对国内外有关演绎推理认知与脑机制研究现状的回顾,以期能促进该领域研究的不断深入.     

归纳推理的多样性效应及其机制探索

归纳推理结论范围大于前提范围的这一特点决定了归纳结论的不确定性,寻求前提的多样化是增强结论可靠度的重要途径。已有研究通过寻找证据、力度判断、特征扩展与归宿选择等研究方法发现前提类别覆盖范围、前提概率原则可以较好地解释多样性的内在机制。事实上,多样性效应的实质是大数原则在归纳推理中的运用,其产生的心理过程包括差异识别、大数信息抽取与大数信息运用三个步骤     

归纳推理中相似性和类别标签的作用

该文采用“篇章阅读”实验范式探索了归纳推理中前提类别和结论类别间相似性、结论类别标签属性对归纳推理的作用。90名大学生被试参加了3个实验。实验1结果表明,归纳推理受前提类别和结论类别之间相似性的影响,相似性越高归纳推理力度越强;实验2结果表明,归纳推理还受结论类别上位类别知识的影响,当类别属性和相似性冲突情况下,被试更倾向按照类别属性进行推理;实验3结果表明,归纳推理通达上位类别知识是一个主动建构的过程,即使是在类别标签不确定的情况下,被试仍然依赖类别标签进行推理。并初步提出了“归纳推理力度=两事物相似性×归类概率”模型设想。     

归纳推理多样性效应的发展及其争论

归纳推理多样性效应指的是在归纳论断中,前提项目数量越多、越多样,将能构成归纳力度越强的推理。已有研究表明成人的归纳推理明显受到前提项目多样性的影响,而幼儿的相关研究却存在着两种对立的观点：一是认为幼儿不能基于多样性进行推理,二是认为5岁左右的幼儿就能够基于多样性进行推理。出现此争论的原因可能与研究方法方面的差异有关,如实验范式与前提组间差异、实验材料类别与概念范畴、属性特征及呈现方式、推理形式;此外,儿童的知识经验也是一个影响因素。未来研究可以结合相关领域的研究范式;深入挖掘影响儿童表现出多样性效应的因素;将任务设计多样化;将实验任务的计分方式多样化;开展相关的应用研究。     

归纳推理属性效应中背景关系提取原则的探究

本实验以生态关系、类别关系和无关三类项目为推理背景, 以基因X和疾病Y为不同的推理属性, 通过考察实验材料快速或延迟呈现时对推理可能性和推理信心的影响来探究属性效应中背景关系提取的原则。结果发现实验材料快速和延迟呈现时对推理可能性无显著影响, 但对推理信心有显著影响, 快速呈现时被试的推理信心显著高于延迟呈现时。由此可以认为归纳推理属性效应中人们优先按照相关性原则提取背景关系, 同时该结果还表明属性效应既有跨文化的普遍性也有其文化特殊性。     

Differential involvement of left prefrontal cortex in inductive and deductive reasoning

While inductive and deductive reasoning are considered distinct logical and psychological processes, little is known about their respective neural basis. To address this issue we scanned 16 subjects with fMRI, using an event-related design, while they engaged in inductive and deductive reasoning tasks. Both types of reasoning were characterized by activation of left lateral prefrontal and bilateral dorsal frontal, parietal, and occipital cortices. Neural responses unique to each type of reasoning determined from the Reasoning Type (deduction and induction) by Task (reasoning and baseline) interaction indicated greater involvement of left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) in deduction than induction, while left dorsolateral (BA 8/9) prefrontal gyrus showed greater activity during induction than deduction. This pattern suggests a dissociation within prefrontal cortex for deductive and inductive reasoning.     

Multiple layers of information processing in deductive reasoning: combining dual strategy and dual-source approaches to reasoning

The idea that inferential performance cannot be analyzed within a single model has been suggested within two theoretical contexts. The dual strategy model suggests that people reason using different approaches to processing statistical information. The dual-source model suggests that people reason probabilistically using both statistical information and some intuition about logical form. Each model suggests that people have different approaches to processing information while making inferences. The following studies examined whether these different forms of information processing were equally present during reasoning. Participants were given a series of problems designed to distinguish counterexample from statistical reasoners. They were then given a series of MP or AC inferences for which identical statistical information was provided. Results show that MP inferences were considered to be deductively valid more often than equivalent AC inferences. The effect of logical form was independent of reasoning strategy, and of relatively equivalent size for both counterexample and statistical reasoners. The second study examined explicitly probabilistic inferences, and showed smaller effects of logical form and of reasoning strategy, although with a complex set of interactions. These results show that understanding the way that people use information when making inferences requires a multidimensional approach.     

A multi-analyses approach of inductive/deductive asymmetry in the affective priming paradigm

Rapidly evaluating our environment's beneficial and detrimental features is critical for our successful functioning. A classic paradigm used to investigate such fast and automatic evaluations is the affective priming (AP) paradigm, where participants classify valenced target stimuli (e.g., words) as good or bad while ignoring the valenced primes (e.g., words). We investigate the differential impact that verbs and adjectives used as primes and targets have on the AP paradigm. Based on earlier work on the Linguistic Category Model, we expect AP effect to be modulated by non-evaluative properties of the word stimuli, such as the linguistic category (e.g., if the prime is an adjective and the target is a verb versus the reverse). A reduction in the magnitude of the priming effect was predicted for adjective–verb prime-target pairs compared to verb–adjective prime-target pairs. Moreover, we implemented a modified crowdsourcing of statistical analyses implementing independently three different statistical approaches. Deriving our conclusions on the converging/diverging evidence provided by the different approaches, we show a clear deductive/inductive asymmetry in AP paradigm (exp. 1), that this asymmetry does not require a focus on the evaluative dimension to emerge (exp. 2) and that the semantic-based asymmetry weakly extends to valence (exp. 3).     

The link between deductive reasoning and mathematics

ABSTRACT

Recent studies have shown that deductive reasoning skills (including transitive and conditional inferences) are related to mathematical abilities. Nevertheless, so far the links between mathematical abilities and these two forms of deductive inference have not been investigated in a single study. It is also unclear whether these inference forms are related to both basic maths skills and mathematical reasoning, and whether these relationships still hold if the effects of fluid intelligence are controlled. We conducted a study with 87 adult participants. The results showed that transitive reasoning skills were related to performance on a number line task, and conditional inferences were related to arithmetic skills. Additionally, both types of deductive inference were related to mathematical reasoning skills, although transitive and conditional reasoning ability were unrelated. Our results also highlighted the important role that ordering abilities play in mathematical reasoning, extending findings regarding the role of ordering abilities in basic maths skills. These results have implications for the theories of mathematical and deductive reasoning, and they could inspire the development of novel educational interventions.     

Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning

A number of single- and dual-process theories provide competing explanations as to how reasoners evaluate conditional arguments. Some of these theories are typically linked to different instructions—namely deductive and inductive instructions. To assess whether responses under both instructions can be explained by a single process, or if they reflect two modes of conditional reasoning, we re-analysed four experiments that used both deductive and inductive instructions for conditional inference tasks. Our re-analysis provided evidence consistent with a single process. In two new experiments we established a double dissociation of deductive and inductive instructions when validity and plausibility of conditional problems were pitted against each other. This indicates that at least two processes contribute to conditional reasoning. We conclude that single-process theories of conditional reasoning cannot explain the observed results. Theories that postulate at least two processes are needed to account for our findings.     

Effects of perspective and belief on analytic reasoning in a scientific reasoning task

The purpose of these studies was to test the hypothesis that changing perspectives from one's own to another's promotes the engagement of analytic processing and, in turn, reduces the impact of beliefs. In two experiments participants evaluated research vignettes containing belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent conclusions, and indicated whether the data supported a correlation between two variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, the tendency to endorse correlations consistent with prior belief was reduced when participants evaluated the data from the researcher's perspective relative to their own. We also administered the Actively Open Minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008), which did not predict belief effects on our task. We did however observe that the AOT was reliably associated with different response strategies: high AOT scorers were more inclined to choose ambiguous response options, such as “no conclusion is warranted”, whereas low scorers evinced a preference for more determinate options (e.g., there is no relationship between the two variables). We interpret our findings in the context of dual process theories of reasoning and from a Bayesian perspective.     

The reasoning skills and thinking dispositions of problem gamblers: a dual‐process taxonomy

We present a taxonomy that categorizes the types of cognitive failure that might result in persistent gambling. The taxonomy subsumes most previous theories of gambling behavior, and it defines three categories of cognitive difficulties that might lead to gambling problems: The autonomous set of systems (TASS) override failure, missing TASS output, and mindware problems. TASS refers to the autonomous set of systems in the brain (which are executed rapidly and without volition, are not under conscious control, and are not dependent on analytic system output). Mindware consists of rules, procedures, and strategies available for explicit retrieval. Seven of the eight tasks administered to pathological gamblers, gamblers with subclinical symptoms, and control participants were associated with problem gambling, and five of the eight were significant predictors in analyses that statistically controlled for age and cognitive competence. In a commonality analysis, an indicator from each of the three categories of cognitive difficulties explained significant unique variance in problem gambling, indicating that each of the categories had some degree of predictive specificity. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

比例推理的过度使用及其认知机制:一项发展性的负启动研究

从抑制控制模型出发,采用负启动范式探究过度使用比例推理的认知机制。研究包括3个实验,以小学生、中学生和大学生为被试,分别考察了抑制控制在解决缺值应用题、图片推理任务中的作用,以及数字比(整数比、非整数比)是否对抑制控制过程有影响。结果发现:小学生、中学生和大学生在两类实验任务中均出现了负启动效应,但负启动量不存在年级差异;在图片推理任务中,不同数字比类型下的负启动量具有显著差异。研究结果支持了抑制控制模型的观点,即成功解决问题不仅需要掌握问题的内在逻辑,更需要对不恰当策略进行抑制;在解决问题的过程中,无论是儿童、青少年还是成人都需要抑制控制的参与,三者在抑制控制效率上没有差异;数字比类型对抑制过程有影响,但仅限于图片推理问题。     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.