从道德运气到伦理运气——美德伦理视野中的运气问题研究

自威廉姆斯和内格尔1976年同以《道德运气》为题发表两篇重要论文以来,运气问题逐渐成为伦理学讨论的热门话题.作为存在于生活之中但又超出行为者能动性之外的不确定因素,运气始终是人类所无法逃避的.然而,现代道德哲学出于对能动性(尤其是人类理性)的信任,不尽合理地将“道德”圈定在能动性范畴内,而把运气限定在一个相对边缘的地带.与之相比,美德伦理学从一开始就正视运气的存在,较为全面地容纳和考察运气的伦理意义.美德伦理学通过区分“道德”与“伦理”,并将“道德运气”拓展为“伦理运气”,为人们理解伦理生活和伦理知识的实质提供了新的启发.     

平等与运气:以德沃金为中心的考察

作为运气均等主义理论--当代平等理论争论的焦点问题之一--最为著名的代表,罗纳德·德沃金将运气分为"原生运气"与"选项运气",并认为町以通过虚拟保险市场这种思想试验将原生运气转化为选项运气.实际上,德沃金对选项运气与原生运气的区分是不合理的,同时德沃金通过虚拟保险市场将原生运气转化为选项运气的努力亦是不成功的.虽然如此,原生运气和选项运气仍是运气均等主义理论的重要分析概念.     

评运气均等主义的三种变体理论

传统的运气均等主义理论遭到了来自平等主义和非平等主义的双重批判,运气均等主义者发展了三种变体理论来为运气均等主义辩护。制度运气均等主义将关注的范围限定在制度领域,这难以解决与运气相关的不平等问题,它的解释更像是一种民主互惠的理想。虽然动态运气均等主义为思考责任问题提供了一个新的理论视角,但是其所依赖的基础理论问题重重,并且其所建议的措施会导致对有才能者的奴役和对个人选择自由的限制。相对基线运气均等主义没有成功解决基线悖论、偏好以及多元化的担忧问题。     

道德运气

康德主义者认为,道德只跟动机相关,不受运气影响。威廉斯以未尽基于真实历史事实的高更和小说人物安娜为例展开讨论。高更这位画家为了自己的艺术追求,背逆、冲撞了社会的道德要求。如果他最后成功了,他将能为自己提供理性辩护,失败了则不能。而最初,没谁(包括他自己)知道他的追求是否结出正果——这有一部分依赖于运气。威廉斯对这一阐论中的几个关键概念做出辨析,运气(指的不是意外受伤之类,而是内在于其计划的运气),成功(不是功效主义意义上的,而是指他最终成为他曾希望会是的那个人),辩护(理性辩护可以回溯性的,且不一定能为所有人接受)。他尤其详细地阐发了行为者憾恨的概念。本文的结论是:道德并不免受运气影响。     

反运气认知的三条进路比较

通常认为,获得知识不能靠碰运气,凭借好运气获得的真信念不足以被视为知识。知识与运气是近年来认识论研究的热门话题。一般认为,一个好的知识理论应该能排除认知运气的影响。在当代认识论中,过程可靠主义、德性认识论和反运气认识论这三条主要进路都分别在一定程度上排除了认知运气,但各自都存在明显不足。由于缺乏对"运气"统一的、明晰的概念,迄今为止还没有一种认知论进路能够完全满足排除认知运气这一要求。     

自发特质推理的指向性之争

自发特质推理是个体根据他人行为信息自发推断人格特质的过程,自发特质推理的指向性则是指个体将根据行为信息推理出的特质指向谁。文章首先概述了自发特质推理的指向性及其研究范式,接着介绍了关于自发特质推理指向性的两种对立观点。在此基础上,梳理了近二十年来该领域的相关研究,最后针对当前研究中存在的一些局限,就未来的研究方向提出了建议。     

运气均等主义理论:证成与反对

运气均等主义理论是当今平等理论争论的焦点问题之一.人们关于运气均等主义的争论可以分为"外部之争"和"内部之争"两个方面:运气均等主义的外部之争是争论运气均等主义本身"能否证成"的问题,而运气均等主义的内部之争是在认同运气均等主义基本信条的前提下,争论应该以"什么的平等"来体现它.实际上,就平等理论关注的对象而言,运气均等主义错置了关注的重心,与平等主义政治运动相脱节,已经走进了死胡同.运气均等主义要实现自我救赎,应扩大其关注的范围.     

从美德伦理学到幸福伦理学——亚里士多德论幸福、美德与运气

关于在亚里士多德看来何种因素造就了幸福的问题,学界形成了美德伦理学和道德运气论两种流行的解释.美德伦理学认为伦理学的核心是培养人的美德而非仅仅关注行为的合乎法则;道德运气论认为美德具有脆弱性,受到运气的影响很大.笔者赞同幸福伦理学的解释,幸福不仅仅停留在美德层次,它不仅必须上升到美德的成全活动,还必须增添由运气决定的外在善.此外,笔者认为美德行为有因其自身的快乐,相比欲望满足的过程的快乐,作为成全的美德快乐才是更高的快乐.最后,笔者认为伦理美德不能脱离城邦政治,个人美德的培养离不开良好的政治秩序,且城邦的美德与幸福最终落在政治家的美德行为的事功之上.     

心理特权:概念、测量及相关研究

心理特权是指一种感到有权利获得优待、被豁免社会责任的稳定而普遍的主观信念或知觉,在不同的领域可以表现为学业特权感、消费者特权感、职场特权感等。心理特权能够使个体变得自恋,诱发人际冲突、自私行为和攻击行为等。影响心理特权的因素主要有生活经历、教养方式、依恋类型、社会经济地位、组织环境等情境因素和自我同情、主观建构、平等主义价值观等个体因素。未来研究应深入探究心理特权的概念与结构,拓展其研究方法,强化纵向研究以及本土化研究,并进一步探究影响心理特权的可能因素和避免(或减弱)心理特权消极后果的方法。     

边际意识与中国传统思想文化

边际意识是研究中国传统思想文化的一种恰当且切中肯綮的视角。从哲学上看,它反映出中国古代哲人对于有限与无限关系问题的思考。边际意识的相关理解可从四个层面入手:首先,有边无际突出了儒学本体论思维的特质与困境,即有限不能分有无限;其次,边际游走重在突出道家思想对于人类自由的认识,即有限需依据无限而获取意义。第三,不着边际突出了运气介入的问题,强调有限与无限在某种程度上的悲剧性不相关,从而对前两个层面的完美理想提出了质疑;第四,边际相即提出有限与无限的互具遍应,以佛教的不但中思想对但中式的边际意识做出补充,从而对运气问题给予了积极的回应。借助边际意识的相关思考,中国传统思想文化或许能获得某种融贯性的解释。     

Dispositional optimism and luck attributions: Implications for philosophical theories of luck

We conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property.     

Subject‐Involving Luck

In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event (taken in the broadest sense of the term) and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right‐hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ____. We can call such accounts of luck subject‐relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. This essay argues that we should understand subject‐relative luck as a secondary phenomenon. What is of philosophical interest is giving an account of subject‐involving luck, i.e., filling in the right‐hand side of this biconditional: it is a matter of luck that S ?s iff ____. The essay argues that one of the upshots of focusing on subject‐involving luck is that lack of control accounts of luck (LCALs) become more attractive. In particular, a range of counterexamples to LCALs of subject‐relative luck do not apply to LCALs of subject‐involving luck.     

福至心灵：幸运感知对消费行为的影响及其理论解释

寻求幸运的行为从古至今广泛存在于人类生活的方方面面, 幸运感知如何影响消费行为的理论成果为消费研究领域做出了重要贡献。通过系统回顾相关文献发现, 个体的幸运感知会对冒险行为、独特性寻求、传染效应、特定事物的态度和幸运消费产生影响。归因理论、人格特质理论、认知启动理论、反事实思维、社会比较理论、控制感理论和启发式决策可以用于解释幸运感知对消费行为的影响。未来研究应深化幸运感知影响消费行为的作用机制并拓展边界条件及其双向结果。     

The Machinations of Luck

Luck is at issue when it is a matter of pure chance that a result of significant positive of negative value ensues for someone. Luck differs from fate, which pivots on an individual's condition, and from fortune, which pivots on an individual's talent and effort. It is by luck that you are rich when you win the lottery, by fortune if your wealth comes from talent and hard work, and by fate if you inherit those millions. On this basis luck lies beyond anyone's rational control. With risk (R) as the probability of failure in a chancy situation and the stake (S) as the difference between a favorable and an unfavorable outcome, luck (L) can be measured as the product of these quantities: L = R × S. The condition of humankind in an uncertain world being as it is, luck cannot be eliminated as a key factor of our existence, be it in cognitive, practical, or ethical regards.     

Games of luck and games of chance: the effect of luck- versus chance-orientation on gambling decisions

Chance and luck are conceived as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. The present study examined the proposition that persons who habitually attribute the outcome of random events to chance (chance-oriented persons) and those who prefer to attribute such outcomes to luck (luck-oriented persons) cope differently with decision making under uncertainty. Chance-oriented persons decide according to given or estimated odds that define the decision problem. Luck-oriented persons, on the other hand, rely on self-attributions of personal luck, and ignore the probabilities of decision outcomes. The hypothesized qualitative difference between the approaches of chance- and luck-oriented persons to decision making under uncertainty was supported substantially by the findings. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Getting Moral Luck Right

Moral luck, until recently, has been understood either explicitly or implicitly through using a lack of control account of luck. For example, a case of resultant moral luck is a case where an agent is morally blameworthy or more morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for an outcome despite that outcome being significantly beyond that agent's control (Nagel 1993). Due to a shift in understanding the concept of luck itself in terms of modal robustness, however, other accounts of moral luck have surfaced. Both Duncan Pritchard (2006) and Julia Driver (2013) have offered an alternative way of understanding moral luck by employing versions of a modal account of luck. This essay considers some problems with these accounts and attempts to resolve them.     

The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?

According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities are justified if and only if they arise from choices for which it is reasonable to hold agents responsible. This position has been criticised for its purported harshness in responding to the plight of individuals who, through their own choices, end up destitute. This paper aims to assess the Harshness Objection. I put forward a version of the objection that has been qualified to take into account some of the more subtle elements of the luck egalitarian approach. Revising the objection in this way suggests that the Harshness Objection has been overstated by its proponents: because luck egalitarians are sensitive to the influence of unequal brute luck on individuals’ choices, it is unlikely that there will be any real world cases in which the luck egalitarian would not have to provide at least partial compensation. However, the Harshness Objection still poses problems for the luck egalitarian. First, it is not clear that partial compensation will be sufficient to avoid catastrophic outcomes. Second, the Harshness Objection raises a theoretical problem in that a consistent luck egalitarian will have to regard it as unjust if any assistance is provided to the victim of pure option luck, even if such assistance could be provided at no cost. I consider three strategies the luck egalitarian could pursue to accommodate these concerns and conclude that none of these strategies can be maintained without either violating basic luck egalitarian principles or infringing upon individual liberty.

Belief in good luck and psychological well-being: the mediating role of optimism and irrational beliefs

The authors examined the relationship of belief in good luck with depression and anxiety within the context of a number of cognitive and personality variables used to explain depression and anxiety. Undergraduate students (46 men, 98 women) were administered measures of belief in good luck, depression, anxiety, optimism, neuroticism, attribution style, self-esteem, and irrational beliefs. The results showed that belief in good luck was significantly related to optimism and irrational beliefs. A number of models were tested to determine whether irrational beliefs or optimism mediated the relationship between belief in good luck and depression and anxiety. The findings suggested that negative relationships between belief in good luck and both depression and anxiety are best addressed by the theory that belief in good luck engenders optimistic traits and a reduced level of irrational beliefs.     

Constitutive Luck

‘Constitutive luck’ refers to luck that affects the sort of person one is. This article demonstrates that it is a philosophically troubling sort of luck, causing problems in, at least, ethics and political philosophy. Some, notably Susan Hurley, Nicholas Rescher, and Daniel Statman, have argued that such trouble can be avoided, by pointing out that the notion of constitutive luck is incoherent. The article examines this claim by means of a discussion of the idea of luck in general, settling on an account of luck in terms of the notions of chance, value, and (lack of) control. This account is then used to show that the notion of constitutive luck is not incoherent. We are stuck with the problems made by constitutive luck.