Physician-assisted suicide reconsidered: dying as a Christian in a post-Christian age.

The traditional Christian focus concerning dying is on repentance, not dignity. The goal of a traditional Christian death is not a pleasing, final chapter to life, but union with God: holiness. The pursuit of holiness requires putting on Christ and accepting His cross. In contrast, post-traditional Christian and secular concerns with self-determination, control, dignity, and self-esteem make physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia plausible moral choices. Such is not the case within the context of the traditional Christian experience of God, which throughout its 2000 years has sternly condemned suicide and assisted suicide. The wrongness of such actions cannot adequately be appreciated outside the experience of that Christian life. Traditional Christian appreciations of death involve an epistemology and metaphysics of values in discordance with those of secular morality. This difference in the appreciation of the meaning of dying and death, as well as in the appreciation of the moral significance of suicide, discloses a new battle in the culture wars separating traditional Christian morality from that of the surrounding society.     

Reconsolidation reconsidered

Some of the considerations that led to a consolidation interpretation of retrograde amnesia (RA), which states that RA results from the disruption of memory processing and storage when neural activity is interrupted by a brain insult, are reviewed here. The time-dependent gradient of memory loss (i.e., new memories are more vulnerable to amnesia than old memories) that characterizes RA seemed to fit nicely with the notion of a cascade of cellular events occurring during the immediate post-acquisition period that would transform a labile representation into a more stable form (i.e., consolidate the memory). However, a variety of observations came to challenge the storage-disruption model, and among these was the finding of amnesia for old but reactivated memories. A recent study by Nader, Schafe, and LeDoux (2000) provides an important analytic extension of the work on “reconsolidation” by showing that inhibition of protein synthesis in the lateral and basal nuclei of the amygdala immediately following the reactivation of old memory will induce retrograde amnesia. We offer a retrieval-oriented conceptualization to account for the temporal gradient and the “reconsolidation” phenomena.     

Warranting reconsidered: Response to Feldman

Summary The examples presented by Professor Feldman underscore the need to distinguish several of the notions of warranting examined in Counterfactuals. It is tempting to apologize for the complexity of the above considerations. But this complexity reflects the truth of the matter, that our intuitions concerning warranting require a variety of warranting notions. The aim of Counterfactuals was to make this complexity manageable by providing a unified method, the method of e-systems and contractions, for distinguishing and explaining the types of warranting.     

Anonymity reconsidered

This paper questions the concept of the therapist's anonymity and offers as an alternative the concept of an anonymity/self-disclosure dimension along which the therapist can position himself depending on several criteria. These criteria pertain both to characteristics of the therapist, the patient, and the material to be disclosed.     

Nostalgia reconsidered

Nostalgia is standardly assumed to be directed towards the past, to involve some salient feeling of the irretrievability of the past, and to be directed towards the memory of an event. In this paper I argue that none of these standard assumptions hold. I use a time-traveller example to demonstrate that nostalgia is not essentially past-directed. Once nostalgia is prised from the objective past, we can examine the other purported conditions, making space for the conclusion that the felt irretrievability of the past is not the necessary feature of nostalgia that we assumed it to be. I then argue that the notion that nostalgia is directed towards the memory of an event is misguided. Finally, I distinguish two routes to nostalgia and, with this distinction in place, argue that nostalgia is neither essentially time nor place directed. Nostalgia is simply change-directed.     

Representation-hunger reconsidered

According to a standard representationalist view cognitive capacities depend on internal content-carrying states. Recent alternatives to this view have been met with the reaction that they have, at best, limited scope, because a large range of cognitive phenomena—those involving absent and abstract features—require representational explanations. Here we challenge the idea that the consideration of cognition regarding the absent and the abstract can move the debate about representationalism along. Whether or not cognition involving the absent and the abstract requires the positing of representations depends upon whether more basic forms of cognition require the positing of representations.     

Congruence reconsidered

Carl Rogers' definitions of congruence are discussed. Four specific requirements are identified for the concept and practice of therapeutic congruence. Drawing on examples from practice, the interface between congruence and the other necessary and sufficient conditions of change is examined.     

Mindfulness reconsidered

Mindfulness has recently become a popular addition to the range of methods available to counsellors and psychotherapists, especially in the field of stress reduction but is the method being over-sold? This article reviews the origins of mindfulness, attempts a balanced review of what mindfulness is and is not good for, looks at the question of whether the meaning of the term has mutated or suffered dilution as its popularity has grown and considers what that popularity and possible mutation tell us about the current state of thinking in the psychotherapy field. In the process, it puts the usefulness and nature of mindfulness in a new perspective, challenging a number of commonly held contemporary views on the subject.     

Sabellianism reconsidered

Sabellianism, the doctrine that the Persons of the Trinity are roles that a single divine being plays either simultaneously or successively, is commonly thought to entail that the Father is the Son. I argue that there is at least one version of Sabellianism that does not have this result and meets the requirements for a minimally decent doctrine of the Trinity insofar as it affirms that each Person of the Trinity is God and that the Trinity of Persons is God while maintaining monotheism without undermining the distinctness of Persons. I am grateful for comments by participants at the Society of Christian Philosophers 2000 meeting and University of San Diego Philosophy colloquium at which earlier versions of this paper were read, and by anonymous referees for this journal.     

Metacognition reconsidered: Implications for intervention research

Metacognitive training techniques have been used successfully to improve children's problem-solving skills. The concept of metacognition needs further refinement, however, if it is to continue to be useful as an explanatory construct. Specifically, we argue that more attention needs to be paid to how metacognitive abilities are acquired, how this knowledge could be used to help improve the performance of children with learning difficulties, and how metacognition may be related to other self-evaluation processes.This paper was completed with support from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (Grant HD05951), and from the Department of Education (Grant 00840068). We would like to express our appreciation and thanks to Joseph Campione and to Annemarie Palinscar, who patiently listened to, and frequently commented upon, the ideas presented in this paper.     

Bioethics critically reconsidered: Living after foundations

Given intractable moral pluralism, what ought one to make of the bioethics that arose in the early 1970s, grounded as it was in the false assumption that there is a common secular morality that secular bioethics ought to apply? It is as if bioethics developed without recognition of the crisis at the heart of secular morality itself. Secular moral rationality cannot of itself provide the foundations to identify a particular morality and its bioethics as canonical. One is not just confronted with intractable moral and bioethical pluralism, but with the absence of a secular ground that can show why one should act morally rather than self-interestedly. The result is not merely the deflation of much of traditional Western morality to life-style and death-style choices, but the threat of deflating to political slogans the now-dominant secular morality, including its affirmation of human autonomy, equality, social justice, and human dignity. All of this invites one critically to reconsider the meaning and force of secular bioethics.     

Sensory storage reconsidered

Memory & Cognition - Models of sensory storage appear to incorporate three features: capacity in excess of short-term memory, rapid decay of information, and an unprocessed trace as the storage...