An overview of transpersonal psychology

Abstract

An overview of transpersonal psychology is provided with specific focus on a number of its central themes (nonduality, intrinsic health, self‐transcendence, and inclusivity) and practices (meditation, ritual, and inquiry). The relationship of transpersonal psychology to both mainstream psychology and spiritual wisdom traditions is discussed. The field's implications for diversity issues, research, and service applications are also considered.     

Teleological behaviorism.

A psychological science of efficient causes, using internal mechanisms to explain overt behavior, is distinguished from another psychological science, based on Aristotelian final causes, using external objects and goals to explain overt behavior. Efficient-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of how a particular act is emitted; final-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of why a particular act is emitted. Physiological psychology, modern cognitive psychology, and some parts of behaviorism including Skinnerian behaviorism are efficient-cause psychologies; final-cause psychology, a development of Skinnerian behaviorism, is here called teleological behaviorism. Each of these two conceptions of causality in psychology implies a different view of the mind, hence a different meaning of mental terms.     

Developing a transpersonal approach to pastoral counselling

A key area of difficulty for those engaged in pastoral counselling often concerns the adequate integration of pastoral, psychological and spiritual concepts and resources. The roots of this tension can be identified within modernity between what can be known through objective observation and reason over what is known through subjective experience. Pastoral counselling, in general, represents an attempt to hold together both scientific and subjective accounts of human existence. Existing forms of Christian pastoral counselling will benefit, however, through a deeper use of spiritual resources drawing both on transpersonal psychology and the tradition of Christian mysticism.     

Probability and radical behaviorism

The concept of probability appears to be very important in the radical behaviorism of Skinner. Yet, it seems that this probability has not been accurately defined and is still ambiguous. I give a strict, relative frequency interpretation of probability and its applicability to the data from the science of behavior as supplied by cumulative records. Two examples of stochastic processes are given that may model the data from cumulative records that result under conditions of continuous reinforcement and extinction, respectively.     

On radicalizing behaviorism: A call for cultural analysis

Our culture at large continues many practices that work against the well-being of its members and its chances for survival. Our discipline has failed to realize its potential for contributing to the understanding of these practices and to the generation of solutions. This failure of realization is in part a consequence of the general failure of behavior analysts to view social and cultural analysis as a fundamental component of radical behaviorism. This omission is related to three prevailing practices of our discipline. First, radical behaviorism is characteristically defined as a "philosophy of science," and its concerns are ordinarily restricted to certain epistemological issues. Second, theoretical extensions to social and cultural phenomena too often depend solely upon principles derived from the analysis of behavior. Third, little attention has been directed at examining the relationships that do, or that should, exist between our discipline and related sciences. These practices themselves are attributed to certain features of the history of our field. Two general remedies for this situation are suggested: first, that radical behaviorism be treated as a comprehensive world view in which epistemological, psychological, and cultural analyses constitute interdependent components; second, that principles derived from compatible social-science disciplines be incorporated into radical behaviorism.     

A critique of Dennett

This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views.In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense.In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency.