Understanding risk: A guide for the perplexed

Over the course of the past decade, neurobiologists have become increasingly interested in concepts and models imported from economics. Terms such as “risk,” “risk aversion,” and “utility” have become commonplace in the neuroscientific literature as single-unit physiologists and human cognitive neuroscientists search for the biological correlates of economic theories of value and choice. Among neuroscientists, an incomplete understanding of these concepts has, however, led to a growing confusion that threatens to check the rapid advances in this area. Adding to the confusion, notions of risk have more recently been imported from finance, which employs quite different, although formally related, mathematical tools. Of course, the mixing of economic, financial, and neuroscientific traditions can only be beneficial in the long run, but truly understanding the conceptual machinery of each area is a prerequisite for obtaining that benefit. With that in mind, I present here an overview of economic and financial notions of risk and decision. The article begins with an overview of the classical economic approach to risk, as developed by Bernoulli. It then explains the important differences between the classical tradition and modern neoclassical economic approaches to these same concepts. Finally, I present a very brief overview of the financial tradition and its relation to the economic tradition. For novices, this should provide a reasonable introduction to concepts ranging from “risk aversion” to “risk premiums.”     

Conceptual knowledge in the interpretation of idioms

The authors examined how people determine the contextual appropriateness of idioms. In Experiment 1, idioms referring to the same temporal stage of a conceptual prototype were judged to be more similar in meaning than idioms referring to different temporal stages. In Experiment 2, idioms in a prototypical temporal sequence were more meaningful than idioms in sentences that violated the temporal sequence. In Experiment 3, idioms referring to the same stage of a conceptual prototype were differentiable on the basis of conceptual information. The conceptual coherence between idioms and contexts facilitated the processing speed of idioms in Experiment 4. Experiment 5 showed that speakers can recover the underlying conceptual metaphors that link an idiom to its figurative meaning. Experiment 6 showed that the metaphoric information reflected in the lexical makeup of idioms also determined the metaphoric appropriateness of idioms in certain contexts.     

Selective encoding in the interpretation of topographic maps

In two experiments, practised adult map users compared three-dimensional landsurface drawings against previously and separately studied contour maps. In the first experiment, adding extra contour levels, or marked drainage patterns, led to increased map study and decreased judgement times, whereas adding both led to no further increase or decrease respectively. In the second experiment, removing minor surface details from the drawings produced no overall variation in judgement times. These findings were taken as suggesting that map users selectively encode features from the map in task-determined fashion.     

Critique of social criticism in the interpretation process

Parin discusses the objections that Rolf Vogt and Peter Passett have raised in Psyche and elsewhere against his call for the incorporation of social criticism into psychoanalytic interpretations. He sketches the development of his own thinking and demonstrates that the psychoanalytic method and a critical view of the societal conditions in which patients as well as therapists live are not incompatible as his critics unanimously alleged.     

《周易·艮卦》释义

本文通过对<周易·艮卦>的解释,说明其中静、观、止三义.然后略述宋儒沿袭<易传>而来的对于艮卦的阐说及其有别于佛老之处.最后本文试图立足于现象学,对艮卦所敞显的生存意义作一说明.     

Focusing in statement interpretation

The present study reports on the processing strategies used by young children (7 and 9) in a task of statement interpretation. The statements were composed of two assertions, presented either in parataxis (Peter sees, he has a marble) or in a modal structure (Peter sees that he has a marble); variations on the form of the verb (affirmative or negative) and on the subjects of the two predicates (same subject or different subjects) were also taken into account. Through the study of the processing order of the two assertions, the purpose was to bring out the phenomena of semantic focusing on one or the other piece of information. The task used was a construction task: The child had to enact the statements with the help of various elements corresponding to the different assertions. Main results showed that, when the information was presented in parataxis, it was generally processed in the enunciation order. On the other hand, in the modal form the focusing was clear: It bore on the dictum (to have a marble) in the affirmative form, and on the modal verb (Peter does not see...) when it was negative. The interpretation of the various focusing processes are discussed.     

Comprehension and the interpretation of proverbs

The comprehension of proverbs was investigated in a series of four experiments. These experiments used unfamiliar proverbs like Thick ice and thin ice look the same from a distance. Experiments I–III compared reaction time latencies for literal and figurative uses of the proverbs after paragraphs of two lengths. In all three experiments, the longer paragraphs facilitated comprehension of the proverbs and figurative uses of the proverbs were understood more rapidly than literal uses. In the final experiment, literal uses of the proverbs were understood more rapidly than figurative uses when the proverbs followed single word cues.This research is based on portions of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of Cornell University. This research was supported by N.I.M.H. Training Grant 5-T01-MH08520-15, to the Department of Psychology, Cornell University. I with to thank Ulric Neisser, Dennis Micham, John S. Bowers, Carl Ginet, Ragnar Rommetveit, Lynn A. Cooper, and Lorraine Bahrick for their advice and assistance.     

Depression and the interpretation of ambiguity

A number of studies have produced findings consistent with the possibility that depressives display a negative bias in interpretation. However, the results of such studies can equally well be explained by the operation of a depression-linked response bias, reflecting an elevated tendency for depressives to emit or endorse negatively-toned response options. The present experiment compares the patterns of interpretative processing displayed by subjects who differ in their BDI scores, using a priming methodology developed by anxiety researchers to eliminate the contaminating influence of emotional response bias. The pattern of priming effects obtained provides no evidence to support the existence of a negative interpretative bias in the more depressive individuals. Indeed, quite the reverse conclusion is sustained by the findings, which indicate that high BDI subjects showed an attenuated tendency to activate the more negative interpretations of the ambiguous textual stimuli. The conceptual and methodological implications of these findings are discussed, together with some specific suggestions for future research on this topic.