Locus of control,perceived responsibility for prior fate,and helping behavior

One-hundred-and-sixty adolescents participated in two studies designed to investigate the relationship between $\text{I}\text{E}$ and helping behavior as mediated by the perceived cause of another's need. In the first study, Ss were given the opportunity to help, either “indirectly” or “directly,” a supervisor who had been over- or underpaid in a prior similar task. Internals helped more in the “direct” help than the “indirect” help conditions but their helping behavior and their perceptions of their supervisors were not consistent. The perceptions of the externals were relatively consistent with their greater help of the “overpaid” supervisor. In study 2, the Ss were given additional information to increase the possibility of their making causal attributions as a function of the supervisor's prior fate. Once again, the external subjects' helping behavior reflected their perception of their supervisor's merit. The internal subjects exhibited relatively little helping behavior regardless of their supervisors' prior fate or perceived competence.     

Decision responsibility, task responsibility, identifiability, and social loafing

Two laboratory experiments were conducted. Results of the first experiment revealed that identifiability had no impact on the degree of cognitive loafing when group members were asked to make a decision. Identifiability did have an impact when group members were asked to express an opinion. The second experiment replicated findings of the first experiment and, in addition, indicated that unidentifiable individuals with sole task responsibility loafed more than unidentifiable individuals who shared task responsibility. Cognitive effort was measured through recall of stimulus material.     

Operant control of smoking in great apes

A methodology was developed for bringing smoking behavior in great apes under the control of a contingent food reinforcer. In this procedure, Ss were required to maintain long continuous draw durations (5 sec) against lighted cigarettes in order, to obtain candy rewards. By beginning with short criterional durations and gradually, working up to the desired response criterion, Ss were successfully habituated to the aversive aspects of smoking. The results indicated that it is possible to both shape and maintain smoking behavior with response-contingent reinforcement. The successful implementation of this procedure suggests that the pulmonary route can be used for drug administration with nonhuman primate species.     

Keeping the illusion of control under control: Ceilings, floors, and imperfect calibration

Prior research has claimed that people exaggerate probabilities of success by overestimating personal control in situations that are heavily or completely chance-determined. We examine whether such overestimation of control persists in situations where people do have control. Our results suggest a simple model that accounts for prior findings on illusory control as well as for situations where actual control is high: People make imperfect estimates of their level of control. By focusing on situations marked by low control, prior research has created the illusion that people generally overestimate their level of control. Across three studies, we show that when they have a great deal of control, people under-estimate it. Implications for research on perceived control and co-variation assessment are discussed.     

Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility

In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.

Locus of control and attribution of responsibility for academic performance

This study tested Phares, Wilson, and Klyver's (1971) hypothesis that locus of control differences are unimportant in a situation which provides very explicit cues arousing specific expectancies regarding the locus of blame for poor performance. Two hundred and seventeen undergraduate students (134 men and 83 women) completed Rotter's I-E Scale as part of classwork in midsemester. During the last week of the semester they were routinely administered a questionnaire containing items on course evaluation, instructor evaluation, and expected grade. Expected grade was significantly correlated with ratings on several course evaluation and instructor evaluation items for internals and externals in the male, female, and total samples. However, these correlations were not significantly different for internals and externals in each sample. These results provided strong empirical support for the tested hypothesis.     

Control,responsibility, and moral assessment

Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor.

Ethics,AIDS, and community responsibility

In the discussion of the responsibilities of society to the HIV infected and uninfected, a serious question seems to have been left out of the picture: To what extent are people who are not infected, have no special relationship to the infected and have no professional responsibilities for the care of AIDS patients under an obligation to come to the aid of people with the HIV? In this paper, I shall examine our responsibilities, as members of society, for the welfare of others to whom we may or may not have a special relationship. I shall argue that those responsibilities flow from the conditions that structure our transactions with others; conditions that make such transactions possible.     

Deteriorating memory confidence, responsibility perceptions and repeated checking: comparisons in OCD and control samples

Repeated checking has been repeatedly associated with memory distrust. We sought to extend previous research using a computer-based checking task by incorporating a group of 15 individuals with OCD, and examining the effect of increased perceived responsibility. Participants were asked to repeatedly check a virtual stovetop, with half the participants also placed under a condition of high-perceived responsibility. Our observations replicated previous research showing that the act of repeatedly checking leads to reductions in memory vividness, detail and confidence, without accompanying reductions in memory accuracy. Furthermore, while a sense of increased personal responsibility had little effect on a student control sample, it led to a significant further deterioration in memory confidence in individuals with OCD. These results suggest that in people with OCD, normal reductions in memory confidence over repeated trials are exacerbated and intensified by inflated responsibility perceptions.     

Conversation,responsibility, and autism spectrum disorder

In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory lays out but who are nevertheless not responsible agents. Attending to the moral psychology of such individuals will, I think, help shed light on an important gap in the conversational theory.