Apes are intuitive statisticians

Inductive learning and reasoning, as we use it both in everyday life and in science, is characterized by flexible inferences based on statistical information: inferences from populations to samples and vice versa. Many forms of such statistical reasoning have been found to develop late in human ontogeny, depending on formal education and language, and to be fragile even in adults. New revolutionary research, however, suggests that even preverbal human infants make use of intuitive statistics. Here, we conducted the first investigation of such intuitive statistical reasoning with non-human primates. In a series of 7 experiments, Bonobos, Chimpanzees, Gorillas and Orangutans drew flexible statistical inferences from populations to samples. These inferences, furthermore, were truly based on statistical information regarding the relative frequency distributions in a population, and not on absolute frequencies. Intuitive statistics in its most basic form is thus an evolutionarily more ancient rather than a uniquely human capacity.     

Aging and intuitive physics

The present study was aimed at comparing the judgment capacities manifested by young adults, middle-aged adults, and elderly people in an everyday life setting implying the consideration of direct as well as inverse relationships between the cues and the criterion. The chosen situation was borrowed from elementary physics and concerned the relationships between mass, volume and density. In forming their estimations of mass, all elderly people were able to use volume and density information. In addition, most of them were able to combine these pieces of information in a correct, multiplicative way. In forming their estimations of volume, all elderly people were able to use mass and density information but a majority of them used the density information in a direct way. By contrast, most young and middle-aged adults correctly used the density information in an inverse way. The findings strengthen and extend the case made by Chasseigne et al. [Acta Psychologica 97 (1997) 235] as regards the trouble elderly people face in using inverse relationships in a judgment situation. The difficulty elderly people face is not confined to learning settings. It may also be observed in ecological, non-learning environments, where the relationships considered do not entirely depend on the experimenter's choice.     

The intuitive concept of art

A great deal of work in analytic philosophy of art is related to defining what counts as art. So far, cognitive approaches to art have almost entirely ignored this literature. In this paper, I discuss the role of intuition in analytic philosophy of art to show how an empirical research program on art could take advantage of existing work in analytic philosophy. I suggest that the first step of this research program should be to understand how people intuitively categorize something as art. Drawing on results from cognitive science and analytic philosophy, I show that the intuitive categorization of an artifact as art rests on the intentions attributed (frequently implicitly) to the creator of the artifact based both on its appearance and on background knowledge. I discuss how the issue of categorization is related to other empirical issues concerning our relationship to works of art, such as perception, appreciation, interpretation, and evaluation.     

The reality of the intuitive

According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought experiments to refute general claims about the nature of knowledge, freedom, thought, reference, justice, beauty, etc. Philosophers working under the banner of ‘negative experimental philosophy’ have criticized more traditional philosophers for relying on this method. They argue that intuitions about thought experiments are influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the truth of their contents. Cappelen and Deutsch defend traditional philosophy against this critique by rejecting the picture of philosophical methodology it presupposes: philosophers do not really rely on intuitions. In this paper, I defend methodological orthodoxy by arguing that philosophers must rely on intuitions somewhere and that they do in fact often rely on intuitions about thought experiments. I also argue in favor of a reply to the negative experimental critique that is similar to at least part of Deutsch’s own.     

The nature of intuitive justification

In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions.     

A psychometric approach to intuitive physics

The literature on intuitive physics shows that many people exhibit systematic errors when predicting the behavior of simple physical events. Most previous research has attributed these errors to factors specific to a certain class of tasks. In the present study, we investigated the possibility that intuitive physics performance may be related to general measures of cognitive ability. Two hundred four adults (ages, 20-91 years) were presented with five pairs of intuitive physics questions. It was found that performance on the intuitive physics items was moderately intercorrelated, suggesting that they were tapping into a unitary construct. Despite the correlation with factors that decline with advancing age, intuitive physics performance was not correlated with age (r= .00). The findings are discussed in the context of research on intuitive physics, as well as research on cognitive aging.     

Hare on utilitarianism and intuitive morality

InMoral Thinking R. M. Hare offers a very influential defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections. Hare's argument is roughly that utilitarianism conflicts with defensible moral intuitions only in unusual cases and that, in such cases, even defensible moral intuitions are unreliable. This paper reconstructs Hare's arguments and argues that they presuppose the success of his problematic proof of utilitarianism. Contrary to what many have thought, Hare's negative defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections is not separable from his proof. In the second part of the paper I argue that Hare does not succeed in defending utilitarianism against the objection that it is too demanding. The final section of the paper sketches a substantially revised version of Hare's reply to intuitive objections. So revised, the argument is independent of Hare's proof and affords a plausible answer to the objection that utilitarianism is too demanding.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Loyola University and Saint Olaf College. I am greatly indebted to my colleague Harry Gensler for helpful comments on numerous drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Michael Gorr, Brad Hooker, Shelly Kagan, Heidi Malm, Richard Hare, Peter Singer, Onora O'Neill, George Trey, Joe Sullivan, and an anonymous referee. This paper developed out of a series of discussions with Mark Overvold. I dedicate the paper to his memory. I would also like to thank Loyola University for a paid leave of absence which enabled me to write the paper.     

Enhancing intuitive skills among adolescent mothers

Studies indicate that adolescent mothers differ from adult mothers in their ability to interact with the infant in an adaptive fashion. In particular, teenage mothers appear to possess immature representational capacities which prevent them from predicting imminent infant achievement. As a result, they behave in a manner that undermines the emergence of new developmental skills in the infant. For example, the visual and vocal cues of adolescent mothers tend to be either subdued or absent, while holding behavior often fails to convey a sense of security. Physically punitive actions are also more common among these younger caregivers than among adult mothers. The application of a new developmental strategy referred to as previewing may, however, reverse these trends by fostering representational and interpersonal skills in adolescent mothers.     

The intuitive is a red herring

In this article, we discuss critically some of the key themes in Max Deutsch’s excellent book, The Myth of the Intuitive. We focus in particular on the shortcomings of his historical analysis – a missed opportunity by our lights, on the claim that philosophers present arguments in support of the judgments elicited by thought experiments, and on the claim that experimental philosophy is only relevant for the methodology of philosophy if thought experiments elicit intuitions.     

Children and adults as intuitive scientists

The metaphor of children and lay adults as intuitive scientists has gained wide acceptance. Although useful in one sense, pertaining to scientific understanding, in another, pertaining to the process of scientific thinking, the metaphor may be fundamentally misleading. Research is reviewed indicating that processes of scientific thinking differ significantly in children, lay adults, and scientists. Hence, it is the instruments of scientific thinking, not just the products, that undergo "strong restructuring" (Carey, 1986). A framework for conceptualizing development of scientific thinking processes is proposed, centering on progressive differentiation and coordination of theory and evidence. This development is metacognitive, as well as strategic. It requires thinking about theories, rather than merely with them, and thinking about evidence, rather than merely being influenced by it, and, hence, reflects the attainment of control over the interaction of theories and evidence in one's own thinking.     

Adlerian psychology as an intuitive operant system

Traditional accounts of the Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler tend to sentimentalize his system and obscure its functional flavor. Six basic Adlerian positions on human behavior, including Rudolf Dreikurs' "four goals of misbehavior," are interpreted as a primitive statement of operant principles. Applied techniques long used by Individual Psychology practitioners strongly resemble interventions that applied behavior analysts have developed by more systematic means.     

Cultural preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning

The authors examined cultural preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning among East Asian (Chinese and Korean), Asian American, and European American university students. We investigated categorization (Studies 1 and 2), conceptual structure (Study 3), and deductive reasoning (Studies 3 and 4). In each study a cognitive conflict was activated between formal and intuitive strategies of reasoning. European Americans, more than Chinese and Koreans, set aside intuition in favor of formal reasoning. Conversely, Chinese and Koreans relied on intuitive strategies more than European Americans. Asian Americans' reasoning was either identical to that of European Americans, or intermediate. Differences emerged against a background of similar reasoning tendencies across cultures in the absence of conflict between formal and intuitive strategies.     

The use of heuristics in intuitive mathematical judgment

Anecdotal evidence points to the use of beauty as an indication of truth in mathematical problem solving. In the two experiments of the present study, we examined the use of heuristics and tested the assumption that participants use symmetry as a cue for correctness in an arithmetic verification task. We manipulated the symmetry of sets of dot pattern addition equations. Speeded decisions about the correctness of these equations led to higher endorsements for both correct and incorrect equations when the addend and sum dot patterns were symmetrical. Therefore, this effect is not due to the fact that symmetry facilitates calculation or estimation. We found systematic evidence for the use of heuristics in solving mathematical tasks, and we discuss how these findings relate to a processing-fluency account of intuition in mathematical judgment.     

Psychological momentum: intuitive physics and naive beliefs

The present research examines psychological momentum (PM), a perceived force that lay intuition suggests influences performance. PM theory is proposed to account for how momentum perceptions arise, and four studies demonstrate the influence of lay intuitions about PM on expectations regarding performance outcomes. Study 1 establishes that individuals share intuitions about the types of events that precipitate PM, and Study 2 finds that defeating a rival increases momentum perceptions. Study 3 provides evidence for the lay belief that as more PM accumulates during a prior task, there should be more residual momentum left to carry over to a subsequent task, and Study 4 finds that an individual whose PM is interrupted is expected to have greater difficulty completing a task than is an individual whose steady progress is interrupted. Discussion focuses on linkages between PM and related constructs.     

The intuitive personologist and the individual differences model

Subjects are required to estimate sociability as expressed in questionnaires supposedly completed by different individuals and make a prediction of conduct for each of these individuals. The results are compared to four models: three versions of the individual differences model (IDM) and a dialectical model. Two rudimentary versions of the IDM give the best approximations to results obtained, one for absolute value judgments of sociability, the other for conduct prediction. The conclusion is that the IDM does exist as a model in implicit psychology before becoming a model in learned psychology. The fact that such a model be preponderant in intuitive psychology in spite of its known inadequacies is discussed in terms of self-fulfilling prophecy in the exercise of power.