A NEW LOOK AT THE SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION DIALOGUE

Abstract. Cognitive science is beginning to make a contribution to the science‐and‐religion dialogue by its claims about the nature of both scientific and religious knowledge and the practices such knowledge informs. Of particular importance is the distinction between folk knowledge and abstract theoretical knowledge leading to a distinction between folk science and folk religion on the one hand and the reflective, theoretical, abstract form of thought that characterizes both advanced scientific thought and sophisticated theological reasoning on the other. Both folk science and folk religion emerge from commonsense reasoning about the world, a form of reasoning bequeathed to us by the processes of natural selection. Suggestions are made about what scientists and theologians can do if they accept these claims.     

Paradigms and possibilities

This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ‘paradigms’, is almost ubiquitous.

These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport – faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science – must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport.     

REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM

An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science.     

“Start Together and Finish Together”: Shifts in the Premises and Paradigms Underlying the Scientific Study of Religion

The main theme of this article is that the scientific study of religion passed through three stages in its development in the twentieth century. It was well integrated into the mainstream of early social science but by 1950 it had drifted into a more marginal position. The 1980s marked the beginning of a return to a more central position—not only because social scientists specializing in the study of religion were increasingly willing to adopt mainstream premises and paradigms but also because religion was becoming more interesting to other social scientists. Selected illustrations of this pattern of evolution focus on the sociology of knowledge, Marxism, new religious movements, post‐modernity, feminism, globalization, and rational choice theory. The conclusion is that the social scientific study of religion is now taking up themes of much broader interest to many social scientists. It has become less defensive, more expansive, more contentious, and perhaps more interesting than it ever was.     

THEOLOGY AND THE SCIENCE WARS: WHO OWNS HUMAN NATURE?

Lluís Oviedo examines in his article the current conflict over human nature and the role of the sciences in the debate, suggesting that there may be a role for theology to play as well. In this essay I examine and respond to some aspects of Oviedo's article and suggest that the nature of the conflict needs to be nuanced to understand it as a conflict not between scientific and philosophical/social‐scientific views of human nature but among scientists, social scientists, and philosophers over the role of science in thinking about human nature. I analyze some of the obstacles for theology's becoming involved and propose that thinking about what are distinctively theological questions as opposed to scientific ones may be an appropriate starting point.     

Ethical issues in communicating science

Most of the publicized work on scientific ethics concentrates on establishing professional norms and avoiding misconduct. The successful communication of science is the responsibility of all involved in the process. In one study, the increased incidence of autism and other social developmental disorders in males was investigated by examining individuals with Turner's syndrome (XO females). In the national newspaper this became "Genetic X-factor explains why boys will always be boys". The steps by which a study on developmental disorders, published in a highly prestigious journal, was transformed into an article in the science section which 'explained' the socially expected gender-based behavior of genetically normal children are fascinating and, unfortunately far too typical. The scientists wrote an excellent article that has just one sentence at the end that hesitantly suggests that the findings might, with further study, have some relevance to understanding normal behavior. The general interest article in the front of the journal gave a good account of the research, but suggested more strongly that there could be an in-built biological dimorphism in social cognition. This was misrepresented in the press as proof of gender differences that "undermines the trend towards sexual equality", and both illustrates cultural bias and provides fodder for feminist critiques of science. The study has been made to appear to be biased in favor of justifying the social structure of society, and yet it was the translation from the scientific study to national news that produced this transformation to biased genetic determinism. It is poor communication of the actual science, coupled with a lack of skepticism on the part of the public, that contributes to such a misapplication of science. Scientists should resist the urge to generalize their results to make them more compelling. The science community should not allow misconstructions of scientific facts to go unchallenged. Journalists, for both the scientific publication and the newspaper, should resist the inclination to embellish the finding with social significance that is not present. For their part, readers must be doubly skeptical of any finding that appears to underwrite any current social hierarchy. We are all responsible for a communication and interpretation of science that is as accurate and socially responsible as possible.     

Why Frankenstein is a Stigma Among Scientists

As one of the best known science narratives about the consequences of creating life, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818) is an enduring tale that people know and understand with an almost instinctive familiarity. It has become a myth reflecting people’s ambivalent feelings about emerging science: they are curious about science, but they are also afraid of what science can do to them. In this essay, we argue that the Frankenstein myth has evolved into a stigma attached to scientists that focalizes the public’s as well as the scientific community’s negative reactions towards certain sciences and scientific practices. This stigma produces ambivalent reactions towards scientific artifacts and it leads to negative connotations because it implies that some sciences are dangerous and harmful. We argue that understanding the Frankenstein stigma can empower scientists by helping them revisit their own biases as well as responding effectively to people’s expectations for, and attitudes towards, scientists and scientific artifacts. Debunking the Frankenstein stigma could also allow scientists to reshape their professional identities so they can better show the public what ethical and moral values guide their research enterprises.     

Scientific Reforms,Feminist Interventions,and the Politics of Knowing: An Auto‐ethnography of a Feminist Neuroscientist

Feminist science studies scholars have documented the historical and cultural contingency of scientific knowledge production. It follows that political and social activism has impacted the practice of science today; however, little has been done to examine the current cultures of science in light of feminist critiques and activism. In this article, I argue that, although critiques have changed the cultures of science both directly and indirectly, fundamental epistemological questions have largely been ignored and neutralized through these policy reforms. I provide an auto‐ethnography of my doctoral work in a neuroscience program to a) demonstrate how the culture of science has incorporated critiques into its practices and b) identify how we might use these changes in scientific practices to advance feminist science agendas. I critically analyze three areas in current scientific practice in which I see obstacles and opportunities: 1) research ethics, 2) diversity of research subjects and scientists, and 3) identification of a project's significance for funding. I argue that an understanding of the complicated and changing cultures of science is necessary for future feminist interventions into the sciences that directly challenge science's claim to epistemic authority.     

Theology and the Crisis in Darwinism

In the past decade, the scientific challenges to “orthodox Darwinism” have multiplied rapidly, such that it is no longer unthinkable that natural selection’s days as a universal law are numbered. But if this is the case, theologians have their work cut out for them. If Darwin’s law proves to be historically and scientifically false, a new horizon appears for the discourse between theology and natural science. What will orthodox Christianity make of the crisis in Darwinism? This article, which follows the methodological imperative of “Radical Orthodoxy”, employs Aquinas and contemporary “post‐Darwinian” science to trace a space for a theological discourse beyond both natural selection and natural theology.     

Scientists Negotiate Boundaries Between Religion and Science

Analysis of interviews with 275 natural and social scientists at 21 elite U.S. research universities suggests that only a minority of scientists see religion and science as always in conflict. Scientists selectively employ different cultural strategies with regards to the religion‐science relationship: redefining categories (the use of institutional resources from religion and from science), integration models (scientists strategically employ the views of major scientific actors to legitimate a more symbiotic relationship between science and religion), and intentional talk (scientists actively engage in discussions about the boundaries between science and religion). Such results challenge narrow conceptions of secularization theory and the sociology of science literature by describing ways science intersects with other knowledge categories. Most broadly the ways that institutions and ideologies shape one another through the agency of individual actors within those institutions is explored.     

UPHOLDING THE HUMANUM: SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY'S FOUNDATIONAL CHARACTER1

Theologians in the liberal tradition have developed the distinctive method of critically correlating Christian revelation with critical interpretations of history, texts and social realities. Non‐foundationalists react to this stance by developing theological anthropologies for which interdisciplinary correlation is deemed unnecessary. In response, this paper argues for a retrieval of a philosophical anthropology that address the advances made in the fields of genetics and evolutionary biology, though aware of the secularizing failings of theological liberalism. In contrast to the anti‐religious materialism of scientists such as Daniel Dennett and Steven Pinker, human freedom needs to be argued on the basis of complexity science and the emergent systems it explains. Both correlationist and non‐foundationalist theological strategies are unable to respond to the threat to human freedom posed by scientific materialism. The science of emergent complex structures is the most plausible research programme for constructing a viable theological anthropology. To uphold the humanum is to uphold human freedom based on a scature. This leads me to suggest that theology is best characterized as foundationalist in the general sense of its universal scope.     

Chile's Environmental Assessments: Contested Knowledge in an Emerging Democracy

Abstract

In 1990, Chile transitioned to democracy after 17 years of military rule. The new democracy built the country's first environmental institutions and began efforts to revitalize science, among them attempts to connect scientific expertise to public decision-making. Just over a decade into these efforts, conflicts over the environmental impacts of large industrial projects began to multiply. These environmental conflicts were often also credibility contests, where the authority of science to speak to public issues was contested. Two such conflicts, a gold mine called Pascua Lama and a hydroelectric project called HidroAysén, enrolled several scientific teams, yet in each case the state made its final decision on each project autonomously from science. Though some scientists became central participants in each conflict, carving out for themselves access to needed resources that they used to practice ever-narrower forms of science, their credibility was called into question by many of their scientific colleagues. Chile's scientific community fractured over how to define credible science. Divisive and decisive issues included the source of funding, ethics, access to resources, and being local. Although some scientists and non-scientists used boundary work to try to affirm the authority of science, no stable map of scientific credibility resulted from these efforts. Chile's new democracy is more plural than its recent military dictatorship but still lacks adequate spaces in which to negotiate what counts as credible science. These experiences highlight the need to better understand how science fares through regime transitions and what it contributes to emerging democracies.     

SCRIPTURAL REASONING AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

This essay explores of the relationship between religion and science using Max Weber's insights into the philosophy of social science, C. S. Peirce's philosophy of religion and the Qur’anic treatment of material reality. The Weber‐Peirce‐Qur’an conversation opens up the possibility of a (social) scientific affirmation of religion and a religious affirmation of science. Scriptural Reasoning (SR) has already demonstrated that it is capable of creating “mutual ground” between the different religious traditions. This exploration of the exchange between SR and the social sciences suggests that SR has the potential of contributing to the creation of mutual ground between the religious traditions and the “secular” academy.     

Rhetorical Strategies for Scientific Authority: A Boundary-Work Analysis of ‘Climategate’

The term ‘Climategate’ refers to the episode in November 2009 when emails between climate scientists were stolen and published online. The content of this private correspondence prompted criticism from diverse commentators who cast doubts on the methods, claims, and members of the climate science community. In response, individual scientists and scientific institutions published statements responding to the allegations of scientific fraud. Gieryn's concept of ‘boundary-work’ can be used to analyse the rhetoric of scientists in situations where their legitimacy is disputed. More specifically, boundary-work can be used to analyse the responses of scientists in terms of: how they represent the attributes of science, what types of boundary-work they undertake (e.g. expulsion, expansion, and protection), and the professional interests that come into play. A boundary-work analysis of the commentaries published in the aftermath of Climategate reveals that scientists characterised climate science as consensual, asocial, and open. Scientists depicted climate science as consensual with the purpose of expelling dissenters and protecting areas of climate science from criticism. Scientists also described knowledge about climate as being ideally produced apart from society so that they could preserve their autonomy and exclude individuals who are accused of being ‘politically biased’. Scientists characterised climate science as necessarily open as the means to justify both existing and additional public funding for science and to avoid external corrective interventions against scientific opacity. Scientists and their critics alike interpreted the stolen emails as embarrassing deviations from the alleged social demands of a consensual, objective, and accessible science.     

THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME IN NATURAL SCIENCE

The various aesthetic phenomena found repeatedly in the scientific enterprise stem from the role of God as artist. If the Creator is an artist, how and why natural scientists study the divine art work can be understood using theological aesthetics and the philosophy of art. The aesthetic phenomena considered here are as follows. First, science reveals beauty and the sublime in natural phenomena. Second, science discovers beauty and the sublime in the theories that are developed to explain natural phenomena. Third, the search for beauty often guides scientists in their work. Fourth, where beauty is perceived, feelings of the sublime often also follow upon further contemplation. This linkage of beauty in science with truth and the sublime runs counter to most aesthetic theory since Kant. Scholarship in theological aesthetics has recently argued that the modern and postmodern elevation of the sublime over beauty is merely a preference that reveals a bias against transcendence—against God. If doing and understanding science can show this sundering of the sublime from the beautiful to be in error, science also gives evidence of transcendence.     

From Validating to Verifying: Public Appeals in Synthetic Biology

Synthetic biology provides a vivid and richly entangled contemporary example of a science being made public. A science, however, can be made public in different ways. A public could validate, legitimate, de-legimate, object to, verify, confirm or dissent from science. Practically, scientists could publicise science—in the mass media—or they could make science public. The contrast between high-profile, media scientists such as J. Craig Venter, and community-based participatory mechanisms such as OpenWetWare allows us to see how these alternatives play out in practice. While it is easy to criticise and dismiss the public-relations oriented promotion of synthetic biology by figures such as Venter, how should we evaluate the open participatory mechanisms of a social media effort such as OpenWetWare? I suggest, drawing on the work of Isabelle Stengers and Michael Warner, that the case of synthetic biology is interesting because many synthetic biologists commit themselves to making it public, and making its public-ness part of how it is done. They place hope in publics to make the science viable. At the same time, however, the publics who are welcomed into OpenWetWare are largely confined to validating the coordination mechanisms on which the claim to public-ness rests. Whether publics can do more than validate synthetic biology, then, remains a question both for publics outside and inside this emerging scientific field. And whether the alternatives of validation or participation themselves adequately frame what is at stake in the emergence of fields such as synthetic biology remains debatable.     

The Essentiality of “Culture” in the Study of Religion and Politics

This article reviews various theoretical approaches political scientists employ in the analysis of religion and politics and posits culture as a conceptual bridge between competing approaches. After coming to the study of religion slowly in comparison with other social science disciplines, political science finally has a theoretically diverse and thriving religion and politics subfield. However, political scientists’ contributions to the social scientific study of religion are hampered by a lack of agreement about whether endogenous or exogenous theoretical approaches ought to dominate our scholarship. I assert that the concept of culture—and more specifically, subculture—might help create more connections across theoretical research traditions. I emphasize how the concept of religion‐based subculture is inherent in psychological, social psychological, social movement, and contextual approaches to religion and politics scholarship, and I explore these theoretical connections using the example of religion‐based “us versus them” discourses in contemporary American politics.     

QUESTIONING SCIENTIFIC FAITH IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The late nineteenth century was not only a time in which religious faith was questioned in light of increasing claims of natural science. It is more accurate to see the familiar Victorian crisis of faith as but one aspect of a larger historical phenomenon, one in which the methods of both religion and science came under scrutiny. Among several examinations of the status of scientific knowledge in the waning decades of the century, the treatment of the subject by the German theologian Wilhelm Herrmann and philosopher Hans Vaihinger rejected its objective nature and denied that either scientists or theologians had access to the truth of nature. Although this stance regarding the nature of science, religion, and their relationship was limited to intellectuals in German society at the time, it foreshadowed developments in our own day in which the traditional search for truth has been problematized.     

The Broad Challenge of Public Engagement in Science

Timely public engagement in science presents a broad challenge. It includes more than research into the ethical, legal and social dimensions of science and state-initiated citizen’s participation. Introducing a public perspective on science while safeguarding its public value involves a diverse set of actors: natural scientists and engineers, technology assessment institutes, policy makers, social scientists, citizens, interest organisations, artists, and last, but not least, politicians.