Perceptual effects and recollective experience in face recognition

Four experiments were conducted investigating the effect of size congruency on facial recognition memory, measured by remember, know and guess responses. Different study times were employed, that is extremely short (300 and 700 ms), short (1,000 ms), and long times (5,000 ms). With the short study time (1,000 ms) size congruency occurred in knowing. With the long study time the effect of size congruency occurred in remembering. These results support the distinctiveness/ fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the memory systems account, since the size congruency effect that occurred in knowing under conditions that facilitated perceptual fluency also occurred independently in remembering under conditions that facilitated elaborative encoding. They do not support the idea that remember and know responses reflect differences in trace strength.     

Perceptual enhancement of contrast by attention

Allocating spatial attention to a visual stimulus or increasing stimulus contrast both enhance neuronal responses. In a recent study Carrasco et al. demonstrated that attention itself changes perceived contrast. Using an elegant experimental manipulation, they showed that the contrast of an attended stimulus was perceived to be higher than when the same stimulus was unattended. This provides evidence that the enhancement of stimulus salience observed in electrophysiological studies creates an enhanced perceptual representation of attended stimuli.     

Perceptual experience and seeing that p

I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . And thus we can’t sustain fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that $p$ , a non-propositional view of seeing that $p$ is, I argue, perfectly intelligible.     

Perceptual experience in learning to read

A group of 24 children (12 boys and 12 girls) aged 10 yr. was given the Children's Embedded Figures Test and a Reading Ability Test on Comprehension, Accuracy, and Speed. Only the correlation of CEFT and Accuracy scores was statistically significant, while that for CEFT and Comprehension scores fell just short of significance, and that for CEFT and Speed was nonsignificant. Data are discussed in terms of more holistic and more articulated processes in learning to read, respectively, as adopted by more field-dependent and more field-independent subjects.     

Perceptual enhancement of tumor targets in chest X-ray images

Under tachistoscopic viewing conditions, precuing the location of potential lung tumorlargets in chest X-ray images was less effective than precuing followed by bounding the region of interest (ROI) with a circle directly on the image. Detection performance increased as the image was systematically masked so that its size approximated that of the circled ROI. When viewing time was extended to allow shifts in eye position, circling the ROI was found to restrict the dispersion of fixations and increase the accuracy of fixating the target tumor. When targets were placed outside the ROI, the circle inhibited their detection relative to detection of targets inside the circled region. These findings suggest that cuing by circling restricts target detection to the ROI, and by doing so reduces the interfering effects of outside distractors that compete with the target for attention.     

Perceptual constancy and the dimensions of perceptual experience

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Perceptual constancy, often defined as the perception of stable features under changing conditions, goes hand in hand with variation in how things look. A...     

The persistent impact of incidental experience

As we perform daily activities—driving to work, unlocking the office door, or grabbing a coffee cup—our actions seem automatic and preprogrammed. Nonetheless, routine, well-practiced behavior is continually modulated by incidental experience: In repetitive experimental tasks, recent (~4) trials reliably influence performance and action choice. Psychological theories downplay the significance of sequential effects, explaining them as rapidly decaying perturbations of behavior, with no long-term consequences. We challenged this traditional perspective in two experiments designed to probe the impact of more distant experience, finding evidence for effects spanning up to a thousand intermediate trials. We present a normative theory in which these persistent effects reflect optimal adaptation to a dynamic environment exhibiting varying rates of change. The theory predicts a heavy-tailed decaying influence of past experience, consistent with our data, and suggests that individual incidental experiences are catalogued in a temporally extended memory utilized in order to optimize subsequent behavior.     

Perceptual dependence: Evidence for an internal threshold

Ss were asked to make two forced-choice discriminations on each trial: in Experiment I, they had to tell on which side of the display a latter pair appeared and whether or not its members were identical; in Experiment II, to say where the pair appeared and whether it consisted of Xs or Os; in Experiment III, to say where a letter appeared and whether it rhymed with E; and in Experiment IV, to say whether a letter pair was presented and whether it was a word. In Experiment III, and for some Ss in Experiment I, the second discrimination was dependent on the first; that is, when the S was wrong on the first, he performed at chance level on the second. In Experiment IV, when Ss indicated that nothing was presented (with confidence), they performed at chance level on the recognition task; thus, recognition was dependent upon some information about the detection task. It is argued that perceptual dependence implies that a threshold state, a state in which the S has no information, exists for the dependent discrimination. One explanation of dependence assumes mediation of the dependent discrimination by a processing stage which succeeds stages mediating the other task.     

Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity

Philosophical Studies - According to capacitism, to perceive is to employ personal-level, perceptual capacities. In a series of publications, Schellenberg (2016, 2018, 2019b, 2020) has argued that...     

Perceptual isolation effects: Short-term visual storage vs cognitive-perceptual structure

Two hypotheses concerning the effects of perceptual isolation were examined. Three experimental groups were defined by the interval between the first and second stimulus presentations within a recognition-discrimination problem. Ninety Ss were exposed to 12 recognition-discrimination problems for each of three physical dimensions of random forms, both before and after 1/2 h of perceptual isolation. Analyses of the number of correct responses indicated support for the hypothesis that isolation increases the duration of the short-term visual storage, but not for the hypothesis that isolation produces change in the hierarchy of physical dimensions to which Ss selectively attend.     

Perceptual interactions in two-word displays: familiarity and similarity effects

Previous studies have demonstrated the existence of perceptual interactions in the processing of two-word displays such as SAND LANE. When postcued to report one of the two words, subjects often make migration errors, in that the report of the specified word includes a letter of the other word (e.g., LAND or SANE instead of SAND). We find that migrations depend on the abstract, structural similarity of the strings, but not on the physical similarity; on whether the strings are words; and on whether the possible migration responses are words. We also rule out an interpretation of migration errors that attributes them to a guessing strategy. Our findings are interpreted in terms of models in which both strings simultaneously access high-level structural knowledge, that is, knowledge about what sequences of letters fit together to form familiar wholes.     

Happy talk: Perceptual and acoustic effects of smiling on speech

Smiling is a universally recognized visible expression of happiness. A side effect of smiling is an alteration of the vocal tract, suggesting that during vocalization smiling may be heard as well as seen. The present studies investigated this hypothesis. Smiled and straight-faced tokens of 29 utterances were collected from six speakers, and presented to three groups of 12 subjects for forced-choice identification. Groups 1 and 2, instructed to select the. smiled or happier sound, respectively, performed significantly better than chance for all speakers. Group 3, asked to select the sadder sound, chose the straight-faced token reliably :For four speakers, but for one also picked the smiled token. Acoustic analyses showed that smiling raised the fundamental and formant frequencies for all speakers and amplitude and/or duration for some. Particular cue combinations appear to be heard as smiling specifically, whereas others are associated with emotionality in general.     

Perceptual learning can reverse subliminal priming effects

Masked primes presented prior to a target can result in inverse priming (i.e., benefits on trials in which the prime and the target are mapped onto opposite responses). In five experiments, time-of-task effects on subliminal priming of motor responses were investigated. First, we replicated Klapp and Hinkley's (2002) finding that the priming effect is initially straight (i.e., it benefits congruent trials, in which the prime and targets are mapped onto the same response) or absent, and only later reverses (i.e., faster responses in incongruent than in congruent trials). We show that the presentation of the mask plays a crucial role in this reversal and that the reversal occurs later if the mask pattern is very complex. We suggest that perceptual learning improves the recognition of task-relevant features. Once recognized, these features can trigger the preparation of the alternative response and/or inhibit the prime-activated response. These findings support an active role of the mask in priming.     

Perceptual learning of noise vocoded words: effects of feedback and lexicality

Speech comprehension is resistant to acoustic distortion in the input, reflecting listeners' ability to adjust perceptual processes to match the speech input. This adjustment is reflected in improved comprehension of distorted speech with experience. For noise vocoding, a manipulation that removes spectral detail from speech, listeners' word report showed a significantly greater improvement over trials for listeners that heard clear speech presentations before rather than after hearing distorted speech (clear-then-distorted compared with distorted-then-clear feedback, in Experiment 1). This perceptual learning generalized to untrained words suggesting a sublexical locus for learning and was equivalent for word and nonword training stimuli (Experiment 2). These findings point to the crucial involvement of phonological short-term memory and top-down processes in the perceptual learning of noise-vocoded speech. Similar processes may facilitate comprehension of speech in an unfamiliar accent or following cochlear implantation.     

Perceptual experience and posttest improvements in perceptual accuracy and consistency

Two experiments investigated the relationship between perceptual experience (during practice) and posttest improvements in perceptual accuracy and consistency. Experiment 1 investigated the potential relationship between how often knowledge of results (KR) is provided during a practice session and posttest improvements in perceptual accuracy. Experiment 2 investigated the potential relationship between how often practice (PR) is provided during a practice session and posttest improvements in perceptual consistency. The results of both experiments are consistent with previous findings that perceptual accuracy improves only when practice includes KR and that perceptual consistency improves regardless of whether practice includes KR. In addition, the results showed that although there is a relationship between how often KR is provided during a practice session and posttest improvements in perceptual accuracy, there is no relationship between how often PR is provided during a practice session and posttest improvements in consistency.