From a necessary being to god

Not a lot of work on theistic arguments has been devoted to drawing connections between a necessary being and theistic properties. In this paper, I identify novel paths from a necessary being to certain theistic properties: volition, infinite power, infinite knowledge, and infinite goodness. The steps in those paths are an outline for future work on what William Rowe (The Cosmological Argument, 1975, p. 6) has called “stage II” of the cosmological argument.     

From being motivated to motivating oneself: A Vygotskian perspective

Conclusion The aim of this paper has been to draw attention to the non-cognitive aspects of Vygotsky's theoretical heritage. We hope that we have succeeded in presenting here his principal ideas on motivation and volition in the present-day problem context. It should be noted that the problem of human freedom and self-determination was of great importance for Vygotsky, though the explicit discussion of this problem is not common in his writings. Approaching this problem both as a philosopher and as a psychologist, Vygotsky inevitably had first to get some idea of the general psychological regularities which could serve as a concrete-psychological basis for the constructive paradigm in the explanation of the phenomena of human freedom and non-freedom. It is highly probable that he planned to discuss this problem at length in his last uncompleted book,Doctrine of Affects. However, even the existing texts provide a weighty and insightful basis not only for scientific research but also for creating applied methods of enhancement of human will-power, or, more exactly, the talent to will. Some of the possibilities, revealed by the Vygotskian approach, are presented in the last section. Many other of Vygotsky's brilliant ideas still await an unbiased reading in the contemporary, rather than merely historical, context.     

From being non-judgemental to deconstructing normalising judgement

Beginning with Carl Rogers' exhortation for counsellors to be non-judgemental of their clients, this article explores the rationale for withholding judgement in therapy, including diagnostic judgement. It traces Rogers' incipient sociopolitical analysis as a foundation for this ethic and argues that Michel Foucault provides a stronger basis for it than Rogers. Foucault unearths the role of normalising judgement in the modern world. Rather than simply offering non-judgemental listening, this article argues for the next step of inviting clients to deconstruct processes of normalising judgement. Questions that invite persons to make a judgement on the system of judgement that envelops them are illustrated. Narrative counselling practices for doing this are exemplified.     

From states of affairs to a necessary being

I develop new paths to the existence of a concrete necessary being. These paths assume a metaphysical framework in which there are abstract states of affairs that can obtain or fail to obtain. One path begins with the following causal principle: necessarily, any contingent concrete object possibly has a cause. I mark out steps from that principle to a more complex causal principle and from there to the existence of a concrete necessary being. I offer a couple alternative causal principles and paths, too. The paths marked out rely on relatively modest causal principles and avoid many obstacles that traditional cosmological arguments face.     

From seeing to being: subliminal social comparisons affect implicit and explicit self-evaluations

The authors hypothesize that social comparisons can have automatic influences on self-perceptions. This was tested by determining whether subliminal exposure to comparison information influences implicit and explicit self-evaluation. Study 1 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information increased the accessibility of the self. Study 2 revealed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information resulted in a contrast effect on explicit self-evaluation. Study 3 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information affects self-evaluations more easily than it affects mood or evaluations of other people. Studies 4 and 5 replicated these self-evaluation effects and extended them to implicit measures. Study 6 showed that automatic comparisons are responsive to a person's perceptual needs, such that they only occur when people are uncertain about themselves. Implications for theories of social cognition, judgment, and comparison are discussed.     

From state church to faith community: an analysis of worldly and spiritual power in the Church of Sweden

The aim of this article is to discuss the current legislation, and power structures in and between different levels of the Church of Sweden in terms of church–state relations and secularisation, with the help of theories from sociology of religion and ecclesiology drawn from José Casanova, Grace Davie and Avery Dulles. With themes from Lutheran theology, including the two regiments and the common priesthood of all believers, we analyse the current legislation and power structures from the perspective of the so-called ‘dual line of responsibility’. The underlying hypothesis is that the structures of the former state church are still deciding the power structures in the Church of Sweden. This creates obscurity concerning the role of the church in public society and negatively affects the ecclesiastical development of the church now that it has lost its earlier status as a state church.     

Ethics and faith: Openness to the relationship between them

This paper was presented at a seminar that outlined the work of the Surrey Ethics Forum. The Forum provides an opportunity for reflection by staff of the Federal University of Surrey and its Associated Institutions on ethical questions, the place of ethics in the curriculum and the role of ethics in the life of future graduates. The purpose of this paper is to argue that openness to the relationship between ethics and faith is itself an ethical task because both ethics and faith claim to protect human dignity and give meaning to the concept of "human flourishing". Analysis of the relationship between ethics, faith, flourishing and narrative can lead to clearer understanding of differences in ethical debates.     

Religious faith and adjustment to long-term hemodialysis

This study examines religious faith as associated with adjustment to end-stage renal failure and its treatment regimen of maintenance hemodialysis. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected initially and after a three-year interval in order to observe changes over time. The variable of the patient's perception of the import of religious faith was found to be positively related to interactional behavior and sick role behavior and to be inversely associated with alienation. Content analysis of qualitative responses for the item of perceived import of religious faith revealed a pattern of increasingly more positive patient attitudes occurring over time.     

The faith of pastoral counseling: Power to change

Pastoral counseling is counseling based on a specific faith. As presented in the biblical heritage, this faith is a power to effect change in one's life. Resistance to affirming this power is basically a fear of failure. Yet failure in the scope of this faith is the prelude to victory. Resistance to admitting our defeats is supported by the cultural assumption that one can accomplish anything by will power and hard work. In contrast, the faith of pastoral counseling is based on the Good News of reconciliation with our failures. Faith functions through the faculty of imagination and is stimulated and supported by caring relationships.     

Suffering and faith

It is hypothesized that, under the impact of suffering or loss, some Christians not only grieve for what has been lost but also experience feelings of separation from their God and mourn that loss also. This spiritual mourning may take different forms and may lead to different outcomes in ways more or less analogous to those described for mourning and variants thereof by various workers. Drawing upon such work, the author describes certain possible forms of spiritual mourning.The preparation of this paper was supported in part by Grant HD-03110 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development and by Maternal and Child Health Training Grant No. MCT=000916A.     

Dialogue and faith

‘Dialogue’ between members of differing traditions is nowadays replacing polemics, debate, and monologue preaching of traditional missionary policy. Terms in which it can be conducted have not yet, however, been widely found. It will be illuminating to discover whether among diverse groups conversation in the terms propounded here could prove fruitful, or at least mutually intelligible. This will be a highly significant test of the theory, expecially in view of the possible importance of this activity for the world's future religious development.1 W. Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Mentor ed. New York 1964), p. 177.      

Dialogue and faith

‘Dialogue’ between members of differing traditions is nowadays replacing polemics, debate, and monologue preaching of traditional missionary policy. Terms in which it can be conducted have not yet, however, been widely found. It will be illuminating to discover whether among diverse groups conversation in the terms propounded here could prove fruitful, or at least mutually intelligible. This will be a highly significant test of the theory, expecially in view of the possible importance of this activity for the world's future religious development.¹     

Kierkegaard's ironic ladder to authentic faith

I would like to express my gratitude to Jonathan Rée for his valuable comments on the first draft of this paper, which is a shorter version of a chapter of myA Search for Authenticity, to be published by Routledge, London.     

Involuntary belief and the command to have faith

Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the problem concerns the coherence of the following claims: (1) one cannot have faith, (2) one has an obligation to have faith, and (3) ought implies can. To solve this dilemma, I offer three solutions that I believe have the philosophical resources to demonstrate the consistency of these claims. Thus, I defend the claim that it is logically possible for a person to be culpable for an involuntary failure to have faith in God.