顿悟问题思维僵局早期觉察的脑电研究

思维僵局不仅是顿悟问题有别于常规问题的重要要素, 而且是顿悟赖以实现的基础。先前研究虽对顿悟瞬间的脑认知活动进行了较充分的探讨, 但却较少对思维僵局的有关过程进行研究。思维僵局究竟是源于早期的知觉阶段还是晚期的问题加工阶段至今仍是未解之谜, 但它却是人们认识顿悟过程所必需的。只有充分认识和理解了该过程, 才可能更全面地理解顿悟究竟建立在怎样的脑认知表征的基础之上。研究运用ERPs技术, 采用猜谜任务范式对顿悟中思维僵局产生的阶段及其脑认知活动进行了探讨。研究发现, 在120~210 ms和620~800 ms内, “有僵局”谜题较之“无僵局”谜题在额-中央区分别诱发了一个更正的P170和晚期LPC。其中, P170主要反映人脑对思维僵局的早期觉察, LPC则主要表征人脑经过一定解题尝试后对前期预评估僵局的修正和有意识反思。这些结果挑战了传统的思维僵局的晚期产生假说, 支持思维僵局的“早期产生机制”假说, 表明人脑在早期知觉阶段就能直觉地觉察思维僵局的存在。     

In the mood to get over yourself: mood affects theory-of-mind use

Understanding others' behavior often involves attributing mental states to them by using one's "theory of mind." We argue that using theory of mind to recognize differences between one's own perspective and another's perspective is a deliberate process of inference that may be influenced by incidental mood. Because sadness is associated with more systematic and deliberate processing whereas happiness is associated with more heuristic processing, we predicted that theory-of-mind use would be facilitated by sadness compared with happiness. Two experiments supported this prediction, demonstrating that participants were more likely to utilize knowledge about others to make inferences about their mental states when they were induced to feel sad than when they were induced to feel happy. These results provide both theoretical insight into the psychological mechanisms that govern theory of mind as well as practical insight into a common source of variability in its use.     

Investigating the effect of mental set on insight problem solving

Mental set is the tendency to solve certain problems in a fixed way based on previous solutions to similar problems. The moment of insight occurs when a problem cannot be solved using solution methods suggested by prior experience and the problem solver suddenly realizes that the solution requires different solution methods. Mental set and insight have often been linked together and yet no attempt thus far has systematically examined the interplay between the two. Three experiments are presented that examine the extent to which sets of noninsight and insight problems affect the subsequent solutions of insight test problems. The results indicate a subtle interplay between mental set and insight: when the set involves noninsight problems, no mental set effects are shown for the insight test problems, yet when the set involves insight problems, both facilitation and inhibition can be seen depending on the type of insight problem presented in the set. A two process model is detailed to explain these findings that combines the representational change mechanism with that of proceduralization.     

Mental models and problem solving: Three challenges to a theory of restructuring and insight

The Gestalt psychologists' view of restructuring and the associated phenomenon of insight is discussed and related to findings in modern cognitive psychology. In line with Ohlsson (1984b) it is assumed that search in semantic memory is an indispensable part of restructuring. However, in contrast to Ohlsson's (1984b) information processing theory of restructuring and insight the present paper focuses on the role of mental models. It is asserted that the Gestalt approach to problem solving is compatible with the idea that a mental model is manipulated. The paper discusses three assumptions of restructuring and insight, all of which are related to mental models: (a) restructuring involves manipulating a mental model; (b) the experience of insight is based on "seeing" something in a mental model; (c) restructuring aims at realizing structural balance in a mental model. To assess the validity of these three assumptions is seen as a challenge to future research on human problem solving.     

Dynamics and constraints in insight problem solving

This article reports 2 experiments that investigated performance on a novel insight problem, the 8-coin problem. The authors hypothesized that participants would make certain initial moves (strategic moves) that seemed to make progress according to the problem instructions but that nonetheless would guarantee failure to solve the problem. Experiment 1 manipulated the starting state of the problem and showed that overall solution rates were lower when such strategic moves were available. Experiment 2 showed that failure to capitalize on visual hints about the correct first move was also associated with the availability of strategic moves. The results are interpreted in terms of an information-processing framework previously applied to the 9-dot problem. The authors argue that in addition to the operation of inappropriate constraints, a full account of insight problem solving must incorporate a dynamic that steers solution-seeking activity toward the constraints.     

Priming problem solving with conceptual processing of relevant objects

In the present study, the author explored the effect of processing relevant information on producing solutions to brief insight problems. She hypothesized that the conceptual processing of objects relevant to the target solution would facilitate that solution relative to unrelated objects or the shallow processing of words. The author also explored the effect of knowledge of the relationship between the initial object-processing task and the problem-solving task. The results showed that participants who conceptually processed objects related to the target solution (Experiment 1), but not those who shallowly processed words related to the target solution (Experiment 2), were more likely to produce the solution relative to the control; and knowledge of the relationship between objects and solutions made no difference in the frequency of target solutions produced. The results of Experiment 3 showed that conceptual processing of an object could prime a nondominant solution for an ambiguously worded problem. Taken together, the results of the studies supported the effect of conceptual processing on facilitating insight in problem solving.     

执行功能对言语顿悟问题解决的影响:基于行为与ERPs的研究

执行功能是否影响顿悟问题解决,顿悟问题解决中的表征重组阶段是否涉及执行功能仍存在争议。基于此,通过2个研究探讨执行功能对顿悟问题解决的影响。研究1初步探讨执行功能与个体顿悟能力之间的关系,结果发现个体的执行功能与其顿悟问题解决成绩之间存在显著正相关,刷新功能可以显著预测顿悟成绩;研究2使用汉字字谜任务,通过行为与ERPs技术探讨执行功能对言语顿悟问题解决的影响,其中研究2a,行为实验发现高工作记忆刷新能力的个体反应时显著小于低工作记忆刷新能力的个体,说明执行功能中工作记忆刷新亚成分影响顿悟问题解决。研究2b脑电结果发现,"顿悟"条件较之"无顿悟"条件诱发了一个更强的早期成分P2和N2,以及中晚期P3。P2可能主要反映人脑对思维僵局的早期觉察,受到执行功能高低的影响。280~500 ms内,中晚期P3则主要体现以新旧思路交替为特征的僵局打破过程,不受执行功能高低的影响,结果表明汉字字谜顿悟问题的表征重组阶段并未受到执行功能的影响,更倾向认为该阶段为一个突进的过程。综合2个研究说明,执行功能影响顿悟问题解决,其主要作用于顿悟问题解决过程的问题空间搜索阶段,而表征重组阶段是一个突进式的过程。     

Reaction time indices of attention deficits in boys with disruptive behavior disorders

Boys with diagnoses in the disruptive behavior disorder (DBD) spectrum and normal controls were tested in two reaction time (RT) experiments. In Experiment I simple warned RT was measured and the length and regularity of the preparatory intervals were varied in order to study sustained attention in the sense of preparation. With age and IQ controlled, DBD boys had slower and more variable RT overall than controls and showed generally more pronounced effects of variations in the length and sequence of the preparatory intervals. The results suggest that DBD boys are subject to lapses of attention which are increased by a relatively long preparatory interval, and that they have a particular problem with temporal uncertainty. In Experiment II some aspects of selective attention were studied in a paradigm in which stimulus modality uncertainty and response selection were varied. DBD boys showed greater effects of modality uncertainty but not response selection than controls. No differences between subdiagnoses within the DBD spectrum could be demonstrated.     

创造性思维四阶段的神经基础

华莱士(Wallas)四阶段论是创造性思维过程研究的重要模型, 该模型认为创造性思维包括准备期、酝酿期、明朗期、验证期。相关神经机制研究表明, 准备期主要包括题目呈现前大脑状态和静息状态的研究, 内侧额叶/ACC及颞叶构成准备期网络; 酝酿期主要包括酝酿期提示、延迟顿悟以及心智游移的相关研究, 这一阶段涉及左右脑的共同参与, 海马、腹内侧前额叶等脑区在酝酿过程中起重要作用; 现有顿悟研究反映明朗期和验证期神经活动, 前额叶、扣带回、颞上回、海马、楔叶、楔前叶、舌回、小脑等在内的脑区构成其神经基础, 其中, 扣带回、前额叶在不同角度进行的研究中均有参与, 颞上回是负责远距离联想的关键脑区, 海马参与定势打破与新颖联系形成, 外侧额叶是定势转移的关键脑区, 楔前叶、左侧额下/额中回、舌回在原型激活中起关键作用, 左外侧前额叶参与对答案细节性的验证加工。未来研究可从研究对象、研究内容、研究手段三方面加以改进, 以对创造性思维过程作更系统的探讨。     

Mental object rotation and the planning of hand movements

Recently, we showed that the simultaneous execution of rotational hand movements interferes with mental object rotation, provided that the axes of rotation coincide in space. We hypothesized that mental object rotation and the programming of rotational hand movements share a common process presumably involved in action planning. Two experiments are reported here that show that the mere planning of a rotational hand movement is sufficient to cause interference with mental object rotation. Subjects had to plan different spatially directed hand movements that they were asked to execute only after they had solved a mental object rotation task. Experiment 1 showed that mental object rotation was slower if hand movements were planned in a direction opposite to the presumed mental rotation direction, but only if the axes of hand rotation and mental object rotation were parallel in space. Experiment 2 showed that this interference occurred independent of the preparatory hand movements observed in Experiment 1. Thus, it is the planning of hand movements and not their preparation or execution that interferes with mental object rotation. This finding underlines the idea that mental object rotation is an imagined (covert) action, rather than a pure visual-spatial imagery task, and that the interference between mental object rotation and rotational hand movements is an interference between goals of actions.     

Mental object rotation and the planning of hand movements.

Recently, we showed that the simultaneous execution of rotational hand movements interferes with mental object rotation, provided that the axes of rotation coincide in space. We hypothesized that mental object rotation and the programming of rotational hand movements share a common process presumably involved in action planning. Two experiments are reported here that show that the mere planning of a rotational hand movement is sufficient to cause interference with mental object rotation. Subjects had to plan different spatially directed hand movements that they were asked to execute only after they had solved a mental object rotation task. Experiment 1 showed that mental object rotation was slower if hand movements were planned in a direction opposite to the presumed mental rotation direction, but only if the axes of hand rotation and mental object rotation were parallel in space. Experiment 2 showed that this interference occurred independent of the preparatory hand movements observed in Experiment 1. Thus, it is the planning of hand movements and not their preparation or execution that interferes with mental object rotation. This finding underlines the idea that mental object rotation is an imagined (covert) action, rather than a pure visual-spatial imagery task, and that the interference between mental object rotation and rotational hand movements is an interference between goals of actions.     

知识经验与顿悟：来自认知神经科学的证据

知识经验对于顿悟问题解决是一把双刃剑,强势知识会阻碍顿悟问题解决,弱势知识才是顿悟问题解决的关键。强势知识引导的组块效应、约束效应和固着效应等心理定势现象,“帮助”问题解决者以惯用方案来理解、思考和解决问题。之所以会这样,可能是因为大脑内存在一套具有优先级差的层级加工系统,赋予惯用方案的优先级最高。不过,惯用方案不仅不能够解决顿悟问题,而且还会通过注意竞争和注意失灵方式来阻碍新异方案的探索和执行,所以,问题解决者往往都会进入思维僵局。僵局的打破和顿悟的实现,需要抑制住强势知识及其相关的惯用方案、激活弱势知识和新异方案,这违反了大脑的认知加工惯性,是很难以自发发生的。但是,可以通过激活扩散来增强弱势知识的激活水平,或者是拓宽注意范围、提高注意灵活性来增加弱势知识激活的可能性,从而促进顿悟问题解决。     

Brain regions activated by endogenous preparatory set shifting as revealed by fMRI

An ongoing controversy concerns whether executive control mechanisms can actively reconfigure the cognitive system in preparation for switching to a new task set. To address this question, we recorded brain activity from 14 healthy participants, using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging, while they performed a cued attention task. Critically, in any particular trial, the cued task set was either the same as that in the previous trial or switched. As was hypothesized, cue-related, switch-specific preparatory activity was observed in a network of dorsal frontal and parietal brain areas that are typically associated with cognitive control processes. Moreover, the magnitude of switch-specific preparatory activity varied with the number of possible task sets that could be presented in a given trial block. These findings provide compelling support for the existence of top-down, preparatory control processes that enable set switching. Furthermore, they demonstrate that global task structure is a critical determinant of whether switch-specific preparatory activity is observed.     

Can You Do It? How Preschoolers Judge Whether Others Have Learned

Two experiments investigated how preschoolers judge whether learning has occurred. Experiment 1 showed that 3- and 4-year-olds used an individual's ability to demonstrate knowledge to judge whether he/she had learned something, regardless of that individual's claim about whether he/she had learned. Experiment 2 considered whether children responded based on just the character's demonstrative ability or whether children integrate various pieces of mental state knowledge to make a judgment about learning. Using a similar procedure, preschoolers were first told that the character claimed to be ignorant and then that they learned or did not learn a piece of information. In these cases, judgments of learning changed when the characters' claims and demonstrative abilities conflicted. These results suggest that children's understanding of learning involves the integration of various pieces of mental state knowledge. This process starts in the preschool years, but these data also suggest that crucial developments are taking place after age 4.     

Positive and Negative Affects Facilitate Insight Problem‐Solving in Different Ways: A Study with Implicit Hints

This study investigates the influence of affective states on the use of implicit hints when solving insight problems. To examine this, two experiments were conducted, both with Duncker's (1945) radiation problem as an insight problem. When primed with a hint, positive affect inhibited the number of incorrect solutions generated in Experiment 1 and increased the number of correct solutions in Experiment 2. In contrast, negative affect enhanced the participants’ performance regardless of the presence of hints across the two experiments. These results indicate that positive and negative affect facilitate insight problem‐solving in different ways. It seems that positive affect implicitly prompts the acceptance of cues and broadens people's search of a problem space, and negative affect encourages people to intensively focus on solving the insight task. The results suggest a resolution of a long‐standing debate on the effectiveness of positive versus negative affect in solving a problem.     

Conditions of error priming in number-fact retrieval

Analysis of errors in simple multiplication has shown that answers retrieved on previous trials are initially inhibited (negative error priming) but later are promoted as errors to subsequent problems (positive error priming). Two experiments investigated whether error priming is associated either with problem-specific retrieval processes or with representations of answers that can be manipulated independently of problems. In Experiment 1, answers were primed by visually presenting products for 200 msec prior to problems. Correct-answer primes facilitated retrieval, related-incorrect primes interfered with retrieval more than unrelated primes, and both effects were greater for more difficult problems. Primes affected only the trial on which they were presented, however, whereas both negative and positive error priming from previous problems were observed across trials. In Experiment 2, subjects named and retrieved multiplication products on alternating trials. Just-named products were inhibited as errors to the following multiplication problem (i.e., negative error priming), but, compared to positive priming from previous retrieved products, positive error priming from previously named numbers was weak. The results indicate that positive error priming is due mainly to an encoding or retrieval bias produced by previous problems, whereas negative error priming entails suppression, or de-selection, of answer representations.     

The effects of promotion and prevention cues on creativity.

This study tested whether cues associated with promotion and prevention regulatory foci influence creativity. The authors predicted that the "risky," explorative processing style elicited by promotion cues, relative to the risk-averse, perseverant processing style elicited by prevention cues, would facilitate creative thought. These predictions were supported by two experiments in which promotion cues bolstered both creative insight (Experiment 1) and creative generation (Experiment 2) relative to prevention cues. Experiments 3 and 4 provided evidence for the process account of these findings. suggesting that promotion cues, relative to prevention cues, produce a riskier response bias (Experiment 3) and bolster memory search for novel responses (Experiment 4). A final experiment provided evidence that individual differences in regulatory focus influence creative problem solving in a manner analogous to that of incidental promotion and prevention cues.     

What makes an insight problem? The roles of heuristics, goal conception, and solution recoding in knowledge-lean problems

Four experiments investigated transformation problems with insight characteristics. In Experiment 1, performance on a version of the 6-coin problem that had a concrete and visualizable solution followed a hill-climbing heuristic. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the difficulty of a version of the problem that potentially required insight for solution stems from the same hill-climbing heuristic, which creates an implicit conceptual block. Experiment 3 confirmed that the difficulty of the potential insight solution is conceptual, not procedural. Experiment 4 demonstrated the same principles of move selection on the 6-coin problem and the 10-coin (triangle) problem. It is argued that hill-climbing heuristics provide a common framework for understanding transformation and insight problem solving. Postsolution receding may account for part of the phenomenology of insight.     

Menatal addition: A test of three verification models

Three explanations of adults’ mental addition performance, a counting-based model, a direct-access model with a backup counting procedure, and a network retrieval model, were tested. Whereas important predictions of the two counting models were not upheld, reaction times (RTs) to simple addition problems were consistent with the network retrieval model. RT both increased with problem size and was progressively attenuated to false stimuli as the split (numerical difference between the false and correct sums increased. For large problems, the extreme level of split (13) yielded an RT advantage for false over true problems, suggestive of a global evaluation process operating in parallel with retrieval. RTs to the more complex addition problems in Experiment 2 exhibited a similar pattern of significance and, in regression analyses, demonstrated that complex addition (e.g., 14+12=26) involves retrieval of the simple addition components (4+2=6). The network retrieval/decision model is discussed in terms of its fit to the present data, and predictions concerning priming facilitation and inhibition are specified. The similarities between mental arithmetic results and the areas of semantic memory and mental comparisons indicate both the usefulness of the network approach to mental arithmetic and the usefulness of mental arithmetic to cognitive psychology.     

An analysis of response,direction, and place learning in an open field and T maze

Rats were trained to locate food in a response, direction, or place problem on an open field located at 2 positions. In Experiment 1, both the response and direction groups solved the problem. The place group failed to solve the task in approximately 300 trials. Experiment 2 demonstrated that rats need distinguishable start points to solve a place problem when neither a response nor a direction solution is available. Findings from Experiment 3 suggest that a combination of path traveled and distinct cues help to differentiate start points. Experiment 4 replicated the findings using a T maze. These results suggest "place" solutions are difficult for rats. The data are discussed with respect to conditional learning and modern spatial mapping theory.