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1.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Phillip MontagueEmail: |
2.
Rasmus Thybo Jensen 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):371-388
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational
motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous
preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest
we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance
both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
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Rasmus Thybo JensenEmail: |
3.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
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Jeff WisdomEmail: |
4.
Robert Huseby 《Res Publica》2008,14(1):1-18
Thomas Pogge has argued that we have strong negative duties to assist the global poor because we harm them through our contribution to the global economic order. I argue that Pogge’s concept of harm is indeterminate. The resources
of any group will typically be affected by at least two economic schemes. Pogge suggests that the responsibility for any affected
group’s shortfall from a minimum standard ought to be shared between the contributing schemes. I argue that shared responsibility
can be interpreted in two different ways. Unfortunately, both interpretations are problematic. Lastly, I suggest a strategy
for amending this problem.
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Robert HusebyEmail: |
5.
Craig Reeves 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):137-164
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt struggled to defend the possibility of judgment against the obvious problems encountered in attempts to offer
legally valid and morally meaningful judgments of those who had committed crimes in morally bankrupt communities. Following
Norrie, this article argues that Arendt’s conclusions in Eichmann are equivocal and incoherent. Exploring her perspectival
theory of judgment, the article suggests that Arendt remains trapped within certain Kantian assumptions in her philosophy
of history, and as such sees the question of freedom in a binary way. The article argues that Adorno’s philosophy of freedom
provides the resources to diagnose and overcome Arendt’s shortcomings. Adorno’s position provides a way of embracing the antinomical
character of judgment, by emphasising the need for elements of reason and nature in the phenomenon of freedom. In Adorno’s
lights, judgment becomes an attempt to express a ‘spirit of solidarity’ with the tragic status of the potentially free but
actually unfree subject of modernity.
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Craig ReevesEmail: |
6.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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Stewart CohenEmail: |
7.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
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Shannon VallorEmail: |
8.
Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Sophia》2007,46(3):237-243
According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined
in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical
theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue that Bergmann and Rea
are mistaken: skeptical theists cannot consistently rely on what they take to be God’s commands.
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Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
9.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):97-114
Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide
an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization
is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed
to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal
to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence
is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities
though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
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Luca MorettiEmail: |
10.
David Kishik 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):111-128
This is a paper about the way language meshes with life. It focuses on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, and compares it with
Leo Tolstoy and Saint Augustine’s confessions. My aim is to better understand in this way what it means to have meaning in
language, as well as meaning in life.
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David KishikEmail: |
11.
Dorothée Legrand 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):67-87
The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that
one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other
hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness
of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree,
however about which modes of givenness are involved.
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Dorothée LegrandEmail: URL: http://dorotheelegrand.googlepages.com |
12.
David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
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David PhillipsEmail: |
13.
Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Morgan Luck 《Sophia》2007,46(3):287-293
In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of
religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen
Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly,
I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive
than Mumford’s causation-based definition.
相似文献
Morgan LuckEmail: |
14.
Per Sandin 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):153-167
This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two
versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer’s communitarian version and Brian Orend’s prudential one. I investigate
first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that
a version of Walzer’s doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the
doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend’s version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that
his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not.
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Per SandinEmail: |
15.
Kelly Becker 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):245-260
There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing
to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge
that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to
entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe
herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is implausible, however, and this then threatens to undermine contrastivism’s
anti-skeptical results.
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Kelly BeckerEmail: |
16.
Luca Incurvati 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(2):261-274
Leon Horsten has recently claimed that the class of mathematical truths coincides with the class of theorems of ZFC. I argue
that the naturalistic character of Horsten’s proposal undermines his contention that this claim constitutes an analogue of
a thesis that Daniel Isaacson has advanced for PA. I argue, moreover, that Horsten’s defence of his claim against an obvious
objection makes use of a distinction which is not available to him given his naturalistic approach. I suggest a way out of
the objection which is in line with the naturalistic spirit of Horsten’s proposal but which further weakens the analogy with
Isaacson’s Thesis. I conclude by evaluating the prospects for providing an analogue of Isaacson’s Thesis for ZFC.
相似文献
Luca IncurvatiEmail: |
17.
Irene McMullin 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(2):201-220
In this paper I respond to the view that Heidegger is unable to account for the possibility of immediately experiencing others
in their concrete particularity. Critics have argued that since Mitsein characterizes Dasein’s mode of being regardless of the presence or absence of others, Heidegger has essentially granted it
the status of an a priori category. In doing so, they argue, Heidegger reduces the other to a mere interchangeable token whose
uniqueness is subsumed under the generality of the established category. In contrast, I argue that the Heideggerian ‘a priori’
must be understood as a living responsiveness to particularity, not a top-down imposition of abstract categoriality. The argument
further shows that this responsiveness must be understood in terms of temporal particularity. The bulk of the paper then demonstrates
the nature of such responsiveness when it is the temporal particularity of the other Dasein that is being encountered. I show
that such encounters are a necessary condition for the possibility of world time and the worldly space of shared significance.
Because my encounter with the other Dasein is a direct experience of her originary temporality—the fundamental expression
of her concrete care-defined way of being—such encounters are not simple subsumptions of the other to an a priori category.
They are, rather, a temporal responsiveness to the unique mode of intuitive givenness characterizing other Dasein.
相似文献
Irene McMullinEmail: |
18.
Owen Anderson 《Sophia》2008,47(2):201-222
In ‘The Presuppositions of Religious Pluralism and the Need for Natural Theology’ I argue that there are four important presuppositions
behind John Hick’s form of religious pluralism that successfully support it against what I call fideistic exclusivism. These
are i) the ought/can principle, ii) the universality of religious experience, iii) the universality of redemptive change,
and iv) a view of how God (the Eternal) would do things. I then argue that if these are more fully developed they support
a different kind of exclusivism, what I call rational exclusivism, and become defeaters for pluralism. In order to explain
rational exclusivism and its dependence on these presuppositions I consider philosophers J.P. Moreland, William Lane Craig,
and Alvin Plantinga, who offer arguments for their forms of exclusivism but I maintain that they continue to rely on fideism
at important points. I then give an example of how knowledge of the Eternal can be achieved.
相似文献
Owen AndersonEmail: |
19.
Bas van der Vossen 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):299-302
In this paper I respond to Bernd Krehoff’s article ‘Legitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot Be the
Whole Story’. I criticize Krehoff’s use of Raz’s theory of authority to evaluate the legitimacy of our political institutions.
Krehoff argues that states cannot (always) claim exclusive authority and therefore cannot possess exclusive legitimacy. Although
I agree with his conclusion, I argue that the questions of legitimacy and (Razian) authority are distinct and that we need
to focus more on the former in order to really support and defend Krehoff’s conclusions.
相似文献
Bas van der VossenEmail: |
20.
James R. Beebe 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):181-196
The abductivist reply to skepticism is the view that commonsense explanations of the patterns and regularities that appear
in our sensory experiences should be rationally preferred to skeptical explanations of those same patterns and regularities
on the basis of explanatory considerations. In this article I critically examine Laurence BonJour’s rationalist version of
the abductivist position. After explaining why BonJour’s account is more defensible than other versions of the view, I argue
that the notion of probability he relies upon is deeply problematic, that he incorporates an implausible double-standard concerning
a priori and a posteriori justification, and that his view is vulnerable to skepticism about the a priori. I suggest that
some of these problems are due to idiosyncratic commitments BonJour makes and that abductivists would be better off without
them. I conclude with some suggestions about how to improve BonJour’s abductivist response to skepticism.
相似文献
James R. BeebeEmail: |