Directions for judgment and decision making research based on comparison selection: Reply to Arkes,Johnson, and Kardes

Our target article proposed an alternative perspective for studying consumer judgment and decision making, focusing on the types and weights of comparisons consumers select. In this response we consider the major points made by each of the commentators and examine their implications for future work addressing our comparison-focused approach.     

On self-referencing differences in judgment and choice

Compared to judgment, choice is argued to elicit more self-referent processing and thereby produce greater subsequent recall of evaluated information. This response mode effect is shown to be dependent upon sufficient visualization to overcome the use of heuristic processing during choice. When visualizing prior to the task, choice leads to increased thinking about personal consumption occasions relative to judgment, leading to enhanced recall of vivid (vs. non-vivid) attributes. This proposed interaction of task and visualization was found in two experiments that assessed incidental recall following a choice or judgment task. In experiment 1, participants recalled more vivid product attribute information after choosing between options than after rating each option separately, but only when instructed to visualize during evaluation. To eliminate a comparison-based explanation of this effect, a second experiment was conducted that presented only one option in each category. Participants who evaluated their intention to purchase the option (a judgment equivalent of choice) demonstrated greater recall of vivid product attribute information than did participants who rated their liking for the option, and this recall difference was again moderated by instructions to visualize.     

Attention and attribute overlap in preferential choice

Attributes that are common, or overlapping, across alternatives in two-alternative forced preferential choice tasks are often non-diagnostic. In many settings, attending to and evaluating these attributes does not help the decision maker determine which of the available alternatives is the most desirable. For this reason, many existing behavioural theories propose that decision makers ignore common attributes while deliberating. Across six experiments, we find that decision makers do direct their attention selectively and ignore attributes that are not present in or associated with either of the available alternatives. However, they are as likely to attend to common attributes as they are to attend to attributes that are unique to a single alternative. These results suggest the need for novel theories of attention in preferential choice.     

Shopping destination choice in Tehran: An integrated choice and latent variable approach

Integrated choice and latent variable (ICLV) models are increasingly considered in many fields as a means to gain a deeper understanding into the decision process of individuals as well as to potentially improve predictive ability. Literature has shown that the application of ICLV in context of shopping destination choice has not been conducted yet. This study uses data collected from the city of Tehran, Iran on shopping destination choice of 812 individuals. Then these attitudinal questions are used for the development of latent variables regarding the attitude and lifestyle of the participants. By including one latent variable (LV) reflecting the attitudes of clothing and lifestyle’s of grocery travelers the structural model reveals a sample distribution of this LV conditional on fundamental socio-economic characteristics. The results of our latent variable model clearly confirm that personal attitude toward clothing shopping center and lifestyle indeed impact destination choice. The results show that our experiment and the expanded hybrid choice model (HCM) allow appropriately identifying and investigating the effects of mixtures of latent attitudes on the intention shopping destination choice.     

Choice-induced preferences in the absence of choice: Evidence from a blind two choice paradigm with young children and capuchin monkeys

In two studies, we provide a test of the revealed-preferences account of choice-induced preferences. To do so, we introduce a blind two-choice task in which preferences cannot guide choices. Children chose between two similar objects while ignorant of the objects’ identities, and then chose between the rejected alternative and a third similar object. Monkeys were given an illusion of choice between two similar objects, and then chose between the rejected object and a third similar object. Both children and monkeys preferred the third object, indicating that they devalued the rejected object. This response pattern did not occur when the children and monkeys were not given the opportunity to choose between the two initial items. These results provide evidence against a revealed-preferences account of choice-induced preferences and demonstrate that the process of making a choice itself induces preferences.     

Vocational choice: A decision making perspective

We propose a model of vocational choice that can be used for analyzing and guiding the decision processes underlying career and job choices. Our model is based on research in behavioral decision making (BDM), in particular the choice goals framework developed by Bettman, Luce, and Payne (1998). The basic model involves two major processes. First, the selection of a decision strategy according to four choice goals: maximizing decision accuracy, minimizing cognitive effort, minimizing negative emotion, and maximizing justifiability of the decision. Second, the construction of situation-specific preferences, which can reflect irrelevant task and context factors such as the evaluation mode. This basic model is extended to account for social influences and the long decision time typical of most career and job decisions. We review research on vocational choice in light of this model, discuss normative implications for counseling, and outline a research agenda for studying vocational choice from a behavioral decision making perspective.     

The effect of introspection on judgment and decision making is dependent on the quality of conscious thinking

That introspection may impair certain judgments and result in fabrication has been attributed to a distracting shift from more adaptive intuitive processing to more analytic and conscious processing. This phenomenon was studied in an experiment where participants made multidimensional visual choices. It was found that the effect of this shift on decision-making performance was dependent on the quality of the explanations during introspection, while the performance in silent conditions was not. Therefore, it appears that the effect of introspection on judgments is not only influenced by the thinking mode per se, but also by the individual’s ability to approach the decision problem analytically.     

The Loss of Loss Aversion: Paying Attention to Reference Points

We agree with Gal and Rucker ( 2018 , in press) that loss aversion is not as firmly established as typically assumed. We affirm, however, the more general principle put forward within Prospect Theory (D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, 1979), which is that reference points increase people's sensitivity to objective changes in value. We show how the literatures on counterfactual thought, social comparison, and goal pursuit are consistent with the notion that reference points increase sensitivity to change in value, while not being consistent with loss aversion. We then examine, within the framework of Regulatory Focus theory (E. T. Higgins, 1997, 1998), how different reference points combine with characteristics of the actor and the situation to give rise to loss aversion (more sensitivity to negative outcomes than to positive outcomes) as well as to the reverse pattern (more sensitivity to positive outcomes than to negative outcomes). Our review suggests that the status quo, even when used as a reference point, is not necessarily neutral. It also suggests that anchor points other than the status quo may serve as reference points and that people may use more than one reference point simultaneously. More generally, we call for a critical examination of the “bad is stronger than good” principle.     

Multi-attribute choice and affect: The influence of naturally occurring and manipulated moods on choice processes

Based on a two-dimensional model of affect that views Pleasantness and Arousal as affect's two primary dimensions, this study investigates the effects of emotions on choice processes and outcomes. In Study 1, subjects first described their naturally occurring emotional state and then performed two multi-attribute product choice tasks. Subjects in more pleasant mood deliberated longer, used more decision-related information, re-examined more previously examined information, and made more interdimensional moves. Subjects in more aroused mood spent less time deliberating, revealed less information, ignored more product-describing attributes, and re-examined less of previously examined information. Study 2 replicated many of these effects with experimentally manipulated emotions and using a managerial decision-making task. The results are interpreted in terms of (1) a congruency between one's hedonic state and selected decision strategy and (2) a restriction in attentional capacity induced by increased Arousal.     

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.     

Neural correlates of affective influence on choice

Making the right choice depends crucially on the accurate valuation of the available options in the light of current needs and goals of an individual. Thus, the valuation of identical options can vary considerably with motivational context. The present study investigated the neural structures underlying context dependent evaluation. We instructed participants to choose from food menu items based on different criteria: on their anticipated taste or on ease of preparation. The aim of the manipulation was to assess which neural sites were activated during choice guided by incentive value, and which during choice based on a value-irrelevant criterion. To assess the impact of increased motivation, affect-guided choice and cognition-guided choice was compared during the sated and hungry states. During affective choice, we identified increased activity in structures representing primarily valuation and taste (medial prefrontal cortex, insula). During cognitive choice, structures showing increased activity included those implicated in suppression and conflict monitoring (lateral orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate). Hunger influenced choice-related activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Our results show that choice is associated with the use of distinct neural structures for the pursuit of different goals.     

Consumer evaluation of net utility: Effects of competition on consumer brand selection processes

This study explores how brand-related information is integrated within a competitive environment. Specifically, we develop a structural equation model of competition between two brands, which includes each brand's price-quality characteristics (i.e., net utility). The model simultaneously tests how the net utility of the focal and competing brands affects consumers' attitudes, intentions, and choice regarding the focal brand. This study extends existing research with the findings that price-quality evaluations of a focal brand and net utility perceptions of competing brands influence consumers' attitudes, intentions, and choice regarding the focal brand. Thus, in order to attract consumers to their brands, marketers should focus not only on improving the performance and net utility of their own brands, but also on studying competing brands in the marketplace.     

On the role of language in social choice theory

Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory are usually compared either regarding the normative plausibility or regarding the logical strength of the axioms involved. Here, instead, we propose to compare axiomatizations according to the language used for expressing the axioms. In order to carry out such a comparison, we suggest a formalist approach to axiomatization results which uses a restricted formal logical language to express axioms. Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory then turn into definability results of formal logic. The advantages of this approach include the possibility of non-axiomatizability results, a distinction between absolute and relative axiomatizations, and the possibility to ask how rich a language needs to be to express certain axioms. We argue for formal minimalism, i.e., for favoring axiomatizations in the weakest language possible.     

Suppressing feelings: A double‐edged sword to consumer judgment and choice

Consumers may suppress their feelings toward the attractive looks of products when they wish to minimize the influence of feelings on their judgments and choices. However, this research suggests that feeling suppression may result in a paradoxical reliance on feelings in product judgments and choices, especially when the product performance judgment is difficult to make. Findings from a series of experiments suggest that this paradoxical effect stems from the requisite resource input for feeling suppression and the consequent resource competition with functionality processing which then impairs product performance judgment.     

The Subtle Influence of Check and X Marks: How Symbolic Markings Influence Judgment

Symbols can exert an influence on how we think, feel, and even behave. Here we examine whether symbolic markings serve as primes and influence how people make judgments. We propose that making either a check or an X mark to indicate an opinion can lead people to process the same information differently, thereby influencing the judgment people make. Across four experiments, we find that the check and X marks carry different symbolic associations; people associate check with good and X with bad. We also find downstream consequences of these mental associations. People who make positively connoted check marks (as opposed to negatively connoted X marks) to indicate their judgments are more agreeable toward familiar, controversial social policies as well as market research survey items on values and life styles. Differential symbolic markings with check and X marks seem to shape how people think and make judgments.     

Determining preschoolers' preferences for choice-making opportunities: choice of task versus choice of consequence

Individuals may prefer contexts with the option to choose between 2 reinforcing stimuli or between 2 tasks relative to contexts in which others select the same events. We evaluated children's preferences for conditions characterized by (a) the opportunity to choose between tasks and (b) the opportunity to choose between putative reinforcers delivered following the completion of a task relative to no-choice and no-reinforcement control conditions. Three of 4 participants preferred the consequence-choice condition; the task-choice condition was no more preferred than the no-choice condition in any case.     

Decision by sampling: The role of the decision environment in risky choice

Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that we make. Here, I review the application of DbS to risky decision making. According to classical theories of risky decision making, people make stable transformations between outcomes and probabilities and their subjective counterparts using fixed psychoeconomic functions. DbS offers a quite different account. In DbS, the subjective value of an outcome or probability is derived from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons with a sample of other outcomes or probabilities from the decision environment. In this way, the distribution of attribute values in the environment determines the subjective valuations of outcomes and probabilities. I show how DbS interacts with the real-world distributions of gains, losses, and probabilities to produce the classical psychoeconomic functions. I extend DbS to account for preferences in benchmark data sets. Finally, in a challenge to the classical notion of stable subjective valuations, I review evidence that manipulating the distribution of attribute values in the environment changes our subjective valuations just as DbS predicts.