Impact of perceived consensus on stereotypes about obese people: a new approach for reducing bias.

In 3 experiments, the authors tested the effect of perceived social consensus on attitudes toward obese people. Participants completed self-report measures of attitudes toward obese people prior to and after manipulated consensus feedback depicting attitudes of others. In Study 1 (N=60), participants decreased negative and increased positive stereotypes after learning that others held more favorable attitudes toward obese people. In Study 2 (N=55), participants improved attitudes when they learned about favorable attitudes of obese people from an in-group versus an out-group source. In Study 3 (N=200), a consensus approach was compared with other stigma reduction methods. Social consensus feedback influenced participants' attitudes and beliefs about causes of obesity. Providing information about the uncontrollable causes of obesity and supposed scientific prevalence of traits also improved attitudes.     

Examining how people reason about controversial scientific topics

Improving scientific literacy requires examining both what people believe about scientific issues and why they hold those beliefs. We examined how people justified their agreement with statements regarding evolution, climate change, genetically modified foods, and vaccinations. Participants rated their level of agreement with statements reflecting the scientific consensus on these topics, then responded to open-ended questions asking them to justify their position and to generate challenges to their belief. Responses to individual difference measures allowed us to assess the relationship between participants’ positions on these scientific issues and cognitive style, conspiracy ideation, religious service attendance, and political ideology. Qualitative analyses revealed inconsistent and topic-specific patterns of reasoning. Additionally, greater agreement with scientific conclusions was related to a greater predisposition towards analytical thinking and stronger self-reported political liberalism. These findings provide a next step for better understanding why some individuals reject science and for developing more effective means of improving science acceptance.     

Does “putting on your thinking cap” reduce myside bias in evaluation of scientific evidence?

Abstract

The desire to maintain current beliefs can lead individuals to evaluate contrary evidence more critically than consistent evidence. We test whether priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduces this often-observed myside bias, when people evaluate scientific evidence about which they have prior positions. We conducted three experiments in which participants read a news-style article about a study that either supported or opposed their attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. We manipulated whether participants completed a test posing scientific reasoning problems before or after reading the article and evaluating the evidence that it reported. Consistent with previous research, we found that participants were biased in favor of evidence consistent with their prior attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. Priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduced myside bias only when accompanied by direct instructions to apply those skills to the task at hand. We discuss the processes contributing to biased evaluation of scientific evidence.     

Due deference to denialism: explaining ordinary people’s rejection of established scientific findings

Synthese - There is a robust scientific consensus concerning climate change and evolution. But many people reject these expert views, in favour of beliefs that are strongly at variance with the...     

The influence of social consensus information on intergroup attitudes: the moderating effects of ingroup identification

Two studies examined the role of ingroup identification in the influence of social consensus information (information about others' beliefs) on intergroup attitudes. Research demonstrates that consensus information influences individuals' intergroup attitudes. However, the extent to which individuals identify with the group providing consensus information seems important to understanding consensus effects. In Study 1, 100 high or low ingroup identifiers received information that other ingroup members held favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward African Americans and then provided their own attitudes. In Study 2, 250 participants completed an ingroup identification manipulation (high, low, or control) before receiving favorable or no consensus information. Results of both studies demonstrated that ingroup identification moderated consensus effects, such that high identifiers were more susceptible to others' beliefs than individuals in the low identification and control conditions. In determining critical factors involved in consensus effects, we hope to create a useful method to promote favorable intergroup attitudes and behaviors.     

The Influence of Social Consensus Information on Intergroup Helping Behavior

Previous research demonstrates that social consensus information (information about other people's beliefs) has a powerful influence on intergroup attitudes. The present study examined the influence of consensus information on helping behavior. White participants were provided with favorable or no consensus information about African Americans, and then we assessed their racial attitudes and their willingness to help an African American versus a White person. Replicating previous findings, we found that individuals who received favorable, as compared to no, consensus information had more favorable attitudes toward African Americans. More importantly, our results demonstrated that participants who received favorable consensus information were more likely to help an African American individual than those who did not receive consensus information. Consensus information did not influence behavior toward a White person. In understanding when and why consensus information influences stereotypes and prejudice, we hope to create a useful method to reduce negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors.     

The Influence of Social Consensus Information on Intergroup Attitudes: The Moderating Effects of Ingroup Identification

ABSTRACT

Two studies examined the role of ingroup identification in the influence of social consensus information (information about others' beliefs) on intergroup attitudes. Research demonstrates that consensus information influences individuals' intergroup attitudes. However, the extent to which individuals identify with the group providing consensus information seems important to understanding consensus effects. In Study 1, 100 high or low ingroup identifiers received information that other ingroup members held favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward African Americans and then provided their own attitudes. In Study 2, 250 participants completed an ingroup identification manipulation (high, low, or control) before receiving favorable or no consensus information. Results of both studies demonstrated that ingroup identification moderated consensus effects, such that high identifiers were more susceptible to others' beliefs than individuals in the low identification and control conditions. In determining critical factors involved in consensus effects, we hope to create a useful method to promote favorable intergroup attitudes and behaviors.     

Beliefs in and About God and Attitudes Toward Voluntary Euthanasia

I use data from the General Social Survey to evaluate several hypotheses regarding how beliefs in and about God predict attitudes toward voluntary euthanasia. I find that certainty in the belief in God significantly predicts negative attitudes toward voluntary euthanasia. I also find that belief in a caring God and in a God that is the primary source of moral rules significantly predicts negative attitudes toward voluntary euthanasia. I also find that respondents’ beliefs about the how close they are to God and how close they want to be with God predict negative attitudes toward voluntary euthanasia. These associations hold even after controlling for religious affiliation, religious attendance, views of the Bible, and sociodemographic factors. The findings indicate that to understand individuals’ attitudes about voluntary euthanasia, one must pay attention to their beliefs in and about God.     

Cultivating the Opinionated: The Need to Evaluate Moderates the Relationship Between Crime Drama Viewing and Scary World Evaluations

The literature on cultivation processes assumes that second‐order judgments (e.g., attitudes) are repeatedly updated during viewing (i.e., on‐line) and can be reported when asked. In this article, we propose this reasoning only holds for people high in their need to evaluate (NTE). Low‐NTE individuals do not update their opinions on‐line and have to construct their attitudes memory‐based, limiting the likelihood of finding second‐order relationships. Results from a cross‐sectional survey among 226 adolescents indicate that crime drama viewing and scary world beliefs are only correlated among high‐NTE individuals. NTE does not moderate cultivation through nonfiction. The theoretical implications of memory‐based attitudes for second‐order cultivation are discussed, and suggestions are made for future research on attitudinal media effects.     

Why are some moral beliefs perceived to be more objective than others?

Recent research has investigated whether people think of their moral beliefs as objectively true facts about the world, or as subjective preferences. The present research examines variability in the perceived objectivity of different moral beliefs, with respect both to the content of moral beliefs themselves (what they are about), and to the social representation of those moral beliefs (whether other individuals are thought to hold them). It also examines the possible consequences of perceiving a moral belief as objective. With respect to the content of moral beliefs, we find that beliefs about the moral properties of negatively valenced acts are seen as reliably more objective than beliefs about the moral properties of positively valenced acts. With respect to the social representation of moral beliefs, we find that the degree of perceived consensus regarding a moral belief positively influences its perceived objectivity. The present experiments also demonstrate that holding a moral belief to be objective is associated with a more ‘closed’ response in the face of disagreement about it, and with more morally pejorative attributions towards a disagreeing other person.     

I,You, or He: Examining the Impact of Point of View on Narrative Persuasion

ABSTRACT

Narratives can be used to persuade individuals to change their attitudes and behaviors, and can be especially effective is in changing attitudes toward individuals that are stigmatized or otherwise labeled as outgroup members. One feature that can influence a story’s persuasive effectiveness is the story’s point of view (POV). This study experimentally investigated the relative impacts of 1st-, 2nd-, and 3rd-person POVs on attitudes toward, and beliefs about, gay people. Results showed that participants who read the 3rd-person story had significantly more positive attitudes toward gay people than those who read the 1st-person story. In all cases, POV appeared to have no impact upon narrative transportation or identification.     

Implicit ambivalence from attitude change: an exploration of the PAST model

Traditional models of attitude change have assumed that when people appear to have changed their attitudes in response to new information, their old attitudes disappear and no longer have any impact. The present research suggests that when attitudes change, the old attitude can remain in memory and influence subsequent behavior. Four experiments are reported in which initial attitudes were created and then changed (or not) with new information. In each study, the authors demonstrate that when people undergo attitude change, their old and new attitudes can interact to produce evaluative responses consistent with a state of implicit ambivalence. In Study 1, individuals whose attitudes changed were more neutral on a measure of automatic evaluation. In Study 2, attitude change led people to show less confidence on an implicit but not an explicit measure. In Studies 3 and 4, people whose attitudes changed engaged in greater processing of attitude-relevant information than did individuals whose attitudes were not changed.     

Maintenance and decay of past behavior influences: anchoring attitudes on beliefs following inconsistent actions

Three studies investigated the influence of past behavior on the stability of the attitudes it elicits. In Experiment 1, the effect of a bogus behavior feedback was long lasting when people engaged in biased scanning, presumably because this process elicits behavior-consistent beliefs. In contrast, the effect of the feedback decayed when participants were forced to consider whether the behavior might have undesirable outcomes. A second experiment using a different behavioral paradigm and a field study further supported the interpretation that individuals resolve conflict between a past behavior and subsequent beliefs about it by aligning attitudes with beliefs instead of behavior.     

Reconciling Compensatory and Noncompensatory Strategies of Cue Weighting: A Causal Model Approach

When forming a judgment about any unknown item, people must draw inferences from information that is already known. This paper examines causal relationships between cues as a relevant factor influencing how people determine the amount of weight to place on each piece of available evidence. We propose that people draw from their beliefs about specific causal relationships between cues when determining how much weight to place on those cues, and that understanding this process can help reconcile differences between predictions of compensatory and lexicographic heuristic strategies. As causal relationships change, different cues become more or less important. Across three experiments, we find support for the use of causal models in determining cue weights, but leave open the possibility that they work in concert with other strategies as well. We conclude by discussing relative strengths and weaknesses of the causal model approach relative to existing models, and suggest areas for future research. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selective memory biases in individuals' memory for health-related information and behavior recommendations

Behavior change is central to both prevention and treatment of many chronic diseases. Frequently, however, individuals do not initiate the behavior change recommendations suggested by health professionals. One explanation for low rates of compliance with such recommendations may be selective memory biases in favor of information supporting the idea that one is healthy. Two studies examined whether memory for health information would be biased by preexisting health beliefs. In the first study (N?=?113), individuals' attitudes about the value of alcohol consumption influenced their memory for pro- versus anti-alcohol information. Participants showed better memory for information supporting their attitudes. In Study 2 (N?=?50), memory for behavioral recommendations depended on participants' behavioral practices. Participants displayed better memory for behavioral recommendations consistent with the idea that they were healthy than for recommendations which challenged those beliefs. These findings illustrate an additional manner in which selective processing can affect health promotion efforts, suggest that a motivation to maintain existing health beliefs may underlie the memory differences, and demonstrate that there may be value in developing efforts to ensure that people remember potentially threatening health recommendations.     

Overconfidence in estimation: Testing the anchoring-and-adjustment hypothesis

People are frequently overconfident in the accuracy of their estimates of uncertain quantities. The present study requested 50%- or 90%-confidence ranges. Overconfidence is shown when less than the target percentage of ranges include the true value. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) proposed that people use an anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: They begin with a starting value, one supplied to them or generated by them, and insufficiently adjust their estimates around this anchor. The present data support the proposed anchoring process. If subjects receive another person's point estimates, their own implicit point estimates are correlated with these values. However, anchoring- and-adjustment processes do not invariably produce overconfidence. Subjects who receive anchors are no more overconfident than are those who do not receive anchors. If subjects are required to produce a point estimate first, overconfidence decreases; processes involved in explicitly displaying the point estimate are implicated. Overconfidence may occur because people do not realistically assess their estimation ability.     

Defensive pride and consensus: strength in imaginary numbers

Failure (Study 1) and attachment separation thoughts (Study 2) caused exaggerated consensus estimates for personal beliefs about unrelated social issues. This compensatory consensus effect was most pronounced among defensively proud individuals, that is, among those with the combination of high explicit and low implicit self-esteem (Study 1) and the combination of high attachment avoidance and low attachment anxiety (Study 2). In Study 3, another form of defensive pride, narcissism, was associated with exaggerated consensual worldview defense after a system-injustice threat. In Study 4, imagined consensus reduced subjective salience of proud individuals' troubling thoughts. Compensatory consensus is seen as a kind of defensive self-affirmation that defensively proud people turn to for insulation from distressing thoughts.     

内在锚与外在锚对锚定效应及其双加工机制的影响

通过2（外在锚类型：高锚VS低锚）×2（内在锚类型：有VS无）被试间设计,考察不同锚定信息来源：由外部世界提供的外在锚与个体自身内部产生的内在锚信息对锚定效应及其加工机制的影响。结果发现：（1）当内在锚不存在时,外在高低锚组的估计值有显著差异,当内在锚存在时此种差异变得不显著;（2）当内在锚存在时,外在高低锚组被试的答题反应时有显著差异,内在锚与外在锚一致时反应时比不一致时更快,当内在锚不存在时,此种差异变得不显著。实验结果表明,当锚定调整机制与选择通达机制同时存在时,前者更占优势;锚定信息一致性会影响不同加工机制的启动,一致的信息会激活选择通达机制,不一致的信息则会激活锚定调整机制。     

Prejudiced People Perceive More Community Support for Their Views: The Role of Own,Media, and Peer Attitudes in Perceived Consensus

People often overestimate others' support for their views (false consensus effect). Recent research has shown that this is particularly marked in the relation between perceived consensus and prejudice. The current research asked whether this partly arises in an in‐group stereotype of the community as prejudiced. We investigated relations between different sources of normative information (self, media, peers), estimates of community attitudes, and perceived consensus in a sample of 135 community members. Media prejudice predicted community attitudes, and this further predicted consensus. However, strongest was a direct relation between own prejudice and perceived consensus. The results indicate a desire to appear nonprejudiced, relative to others. Confronting prejudiced people with information about community norms is a promising intervention under these circumstances.     

False Consensus and False Uniqueness in Estimating the Prevalence of Health-Protective Behaviors

The degree to which people perceive that their health-relevant behaviors are also performed by their peers may influence whether they continue these practices or are susceptible to change. The present paper examined estimates of social consensus for health-relevant behaviors. It was hypothesized that respondents would perceive their own behaviors to be relatively more common than do people not performing them, the so-called False Consensus Effect. However, in terms of the accuracy of consensus estimates, people who behave in undesirable ways will tend to overestimate the actual number of others who behave similarly. In contrast, people who behave in desirable ways will underestimate the actual number of people who behave like themselves (false uniqueness). A group of college-aged males were asked to report about their performance of a series of health-relevant behaviors and to estimate the frequency of each behavior among their peers. The findings strongly supported the first two hypotheses and provided some support for the third. One practical implication of the results is that persons with unhealthy practices may resist public health campaigns and other interventions by overestimating consensus for their own behaviors. Also, individuals who think their undesirable health behaviors are relatively common may believe that they involve few health risks for them. The research suggests the need for further research on social cognitions about health, illness, and health-protective behaviors.