The moral status of a human fetus: a response to Lee.

It is an undeniable empirical fact that a human fetus is a member of the species homo sapiens from the moment of conception. There is thus an important sense in which it is a human being in itself, and not simply part of a pregnant woman's body, despite what defenders of abortion on demand might want us to think. It is also reasonable to suppose that all human beings, and thus human fetuses, are persons, with all that entails, but this is a metaphysical presupposition as opposed to an empirical fact, and is thus contentious. It is argued, however, that this should be of little comfort to the defenders of abortion, because the mere fact that human fetuses have an inherent tendency to become persons is sufficient reason to confer a moral status upon them, which renders abortion morally problematic at best.     

Jerusalem: The problems and responsibilities of sacred space

Focusing on the central role the city of Jerusalem plays in Christianity, Judaism and Islam, this paper addresses the question of what makes particular cities 'holy' and sacred to people, the meaning and responsibilities that this 'sacredness' entails and whether this 'sacredness' in fact affects the conduct of politicians when determining the fate of a sacred city such as Jerusalem. Answers to these questions are found deep in the human psyche, in what historians of religion have called a 'sacred geography' and in the sense of exile from a holy place that makes it that much more precious to the people attached to it.     

The invasion of reality (or of negotiation): The psychoanalytic ethic and extinction anxiety

Extinction anxiety is the expression used to describe a pervasive and ever more realistic sense of futurelessness. A group emotion characterized by terror of the extinction of the human race, the family, or professional or shared cultural group, it grips the individual with a sense of desperation and impotence through the internal groups present in the mind of every individual. The contribution presented here aims to demonstrate how extinction anxiety has also infected psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic institutions, thereby seriously weakening the ethics of psychoanalysis. The term ethics here should not be confused with morals, but is intended as the happiness that is derived from the capacity to be responsible for one's self and one's own professional identity. The contagion of extinction anxiety has, in fact, accentuated the crisis of psychoanalysts and their faith in psychoanalysis. The author relates a particularly tormented clinical experience in order to show how only the relationship with psychoanalysis and its capacity to interpret the manifestations of the unconscious, enables the recognition of the effects of what he defines as a true invasion of reality, thus restoring to thought the power to establish a deep, transformative, and fecund relationship between internal and external reality.     

Is a Finite Life Such a Bad Idea? Transhumanism and Theological Anthropology

Creaturely life is finite life. Transhumanism suggests that human life will be better and even fulfilled in a new way, if humans can overcome some of the finite conditions now given. I argue that there are theological, ethical, and biological points to be taken into consideration that may challenge the transhuman vision of a good life. The finite conditions of human life are what makes human life human, and these conditions are also part of why the deeper meaning of human life is realized in love for others, and not in the quest for making one's own life go on (almost) endlessly. In addition to looking at some material from popular culture and the philosopher Hans Jonas, the article also draws on recent discussions on transhumanism present in contemporary theology.     

Mending the Broken Frame: Self-Narration in a Constructionist Framework

The communal construction of mental illness makes recovery a daunting challenge since society largely perceives the psychiatrically ill as ??deficient??. Not only does one have to deal with the illness itself, one additionally has to deal with the perpetual stigma associated with the labeling, increasing the personal consequences of these illnesses. In my own journey through mental illness, I have repeatedly tried to construct for myself those structures which would help me become stable and empower me from within rather than rob me of my sense of self. This paper is a small expression of that narrative.     

How stable is common sense psychology and can it be transcended? Reply to Valsiner

Common sense is defined as the set of implications that all members of a given culture take for granted. The stability of common sense as a necessary condition for the maintenance of human relationships and societies is emphasized. Changes may and do occur. However, they can only take place in a very slow and piecemeal fashion in order to maintain intelligibility at all times. Transcendence of common sense by scientific psychology is difficult to envisage, since the phenomena studied are structured by that same common sense, and since communication about them also presupposes common sense. llanscendence through direct negation literally makes no sense.     

ACKNOWLEDGING A HIDDEN GOD: A THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF STANLEY CAVELL ON SCEPTICISM

In his early work, the philosopher Stanley Cavell offers a sustained engagement with the threat of epistemological scepticism, shaped by the intuition that although (as the late Wittgenstein shows) ordinary language use is the practice within which alone meaning is possible (and which can thus not be further analysed or rationalised), it is also a basic human inclination to wish to escape the limitations of the ‘ordinary’. This, for Cavell, is the root of scepticism. Scepticism, on this view, thus appears not primarily as an epistemological but as an (injurious) moral stance, which cannot be refuted but must be continually confronted and overcome. Vis‐à‐vis scepticism, ‘acknowledgement’ is the practice‐based recognition of the world and other people in their continuing elusiveness, which ineluctably involves risk, but just so is the only way of knowing that is appropriate to and honours the (finite) human condition. One problematic aspect of this (very fertile) approach is that Cavell's secular viewpoint makes it difficult for him to say both why the desire for a ‘beyond’ arises in the first place, and why its expression as denial is morally wrong (rather than merely misguided). His approach thus invites a theological ‘supplementation’ which grounds the human condition in an original and real relation to God that is meant to draw the believer, through Christ, into the divine life itself. Such a reinterpretation both elucidates the concepts of scepticism and acknowledgement, and makes these concepts available for a theological outlook that is able to accommodate Cavell's profound insights into ‘the human’.     

Ferenczian Elasticity in the Analysis of an Adolescent

Psychoanalytic work with adolescents poses a challenge for analysts who adhere to standard analytic technique as many adolescents who need analytic intervention resist such a structured approach to analysis. The author finds that elasticity of technique is currently widely used by analysts when working with this difficult age group even though they may be unaware that this is, in fact, a Ferenczian technique. Clinical examples are presented to illustrate how frequently the technique is used in cases of resistant, troubled youth. The author outlines an approach that is sensitive to these resistances and makes compromises in technique based on the principle that engaging a troubled youth in a therapeutic venture is preferable to refusing treatment based on the patient’s not being able to adhere to standard analytic technique. In this sense, Ferenczi was an early herald of the type of contemporary analytic work that is practiced currently especially with a difficult population of patients.

     

A relational model of inquiry and truth: The place of psychoanalysis in human conversation

A challenge is offered to the characterization of psychoanalysis as suffering from potentially fatal epistemic flaws and needing to ground itself in the language of hermeneutics, neuropsychology, or infant observation in order to survive. Psychoanalytic truth is neither made up nor discovered. Psychoanalytic propositions are true in the important sense of being the most useful statements we can make right now about the nature and functioning of the human unconscious. Psychoanalytic theories evolve through rational critical discourse just as theories evolve in all fields of science and scholarship.     

Developing a Validity Argument Through Abductive Reasoning with an Empirical Demonstration of the Latent Class Analysis

This article proposes and demonstrates a methodology for test score validation through abductive reasoning. It describes how abductive reasoning can be utilized in support of the claims made about test score validity. This methodology is demonstrated with a real data example of the Canadian English Language Proficiency Index Program (CELPIP)-General test—a program assessing functional English language ability in the community and workplace. Abductive reasoning seeks the enabling conditions through which a claim about a person's ability makes sense. For example, it makes sense that a person has strong functional language proficiency if he or she has been regularly using English to write emails and meet with colleagues at work. A valid test score should be affected by the extent of a person's engagement with such enabling conditions. Empirical evidence that warrants such an abductively reasoned claim is illustrated through a latent class analysis within a structural equation model. Evidence is examined to investigate whether certain classes of test takers who have been differentially engaging in the enabling conditions do, in fact, predict a person's CELPIP-General performance. The steps of the methodology are summarized in the closing section.     

The Art of Being Human: A Project for General Philosophy of Science

Throughout the medieval and modern periods, in various sacred and secular guises, the unification of all forms of knowledge under the rubric of ??science?? has been taken as the prerogative of humanity as a species. However, as our sense of species privilege has been called increasingly into question, so too has the very salience of ??humanity?? and ??science?? as general categories, let alone ones that might bear some essential relationship to each other. After showing how the ascendant Stanford School in the philosophy of science has contributed to this joint demystification of ??humanity?? and ??science??, I proceed on a more positive note to a conceptual framework for making sense of science as the art of being human. My understanding of ??science?? is indebted to the red thread that runs from Christian theology through the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment to the Humboldtian revival of the university as the site for the synthesis of knowledge as the culmination of self-development. Especially salient to this idea is science??s epistemic capacity to manage modality (i.e. to determine the conditions under which possibilities can be actualised) and its political capacity to organize humanity into projects of universal concern. However, the challenge facing such an ideal in the twentyfirst century is that the predicate ??human?? may be projected in three quite distinct ways, governed by what I call ??ecological??, ??biomedical?? and ??cybernetic?? interests. Which one of these future humanities would claim today??s humans as proper ancestors and could these futures co-habit the same world thus become two important questions that general philosophy of science will need to address in the coming years.     

Functional analysis and the problem of rationality

Functional analysis rescued religion from the oblivion to which positiviste would have consigned it, by taking ‘society’ rather than the individual act as the unit of analysis. The history of functionalism has been a record of increasing concern with such holistic units as societies and social systems. One consequence of this shift away from social action (in the Weberian sense) is that the issue of rationality has become largely redundant. Yet the problem remains: How do we account for ‘contributions’ to the social system in terms that make sense of the perspectives of social actors? An examination of unit actions as they are understood by social actors suggests that functionalism in fact incorporated many of the tenets held by positivists, and that it makes untenable (and implicit) assumptions concerning the ‘objectivity’ of the scientific observer.     

The grammar of aesthetic intuition: on Ernst Cassirer’s concept of symbolic form in the visual arts

This paper provides a précis of Ernst Cassirer’s concept of art as a symbolic form. It does so, though, in a specific respect. It points to the fact that Cassirer’s concept of “symbolic form” is two-sided. On the one hand, the concept captures general cultural phenomena that are not only meaningful but also manifest the way man makes sense of the world; thus myth, religion, and art are considered general symbolic forms. On the other hand, it captures the formal structures and semiotic tools thanks to which meaning is constructed within each general symbolic form (Cassirer called these structures “modes of objectivation”); thus, in art, perspective or the golden section are well-known examples of symbolic forms, now in a narrow sense, i.e. they are means to configure parts into an organized, meaningful whole. The paper will comment on art along both these two dimensions, but its main goal is to provide with concrete examples of aesthetic symbolic forms in the narrow sense in order to show how conceptual meaning can be inscribed in the space of aesthetic intuition.     

Metaphor‐Proof Expressions: A Dimensional Account of the Metaphorical Uninterpretability of Aesthetic Terms

In this article, I start with the observation that aesthetic terms resist metaphorical interpretation; that is, it makes little sense to say that something is beautiful metaphorically speaking or to say something is metaphorically elegant, harmonious, or sublime. I argue that aesthetic terms’ lack of metaphorical interpretations is not explained by the fact that their applicability is not limited to a particular category of objects, at least in the standard sense of ‘category.’ In general, I challenge category‐based accounts of metaphorical interpretability and instead offer an alternative explanation for aesthetic terms’ lack of metaphorical interpretations, one that involves the notion of context shifts rather than category violations. I argue that what is required for metaphorical interpretability is the joint satisfaction of two conditions: (i) multidimensionality and (ii) the presence of a default dimension. Aesthetic terms lack metaphorical readings because they fail to satisfy (ii), even though they satisfy (i). I argue that the alternative account I offer is predictively adequate, more parsimonious, less subject to counterexamples, and hence preferable to the category‐based one.     

Freud's philosophy of the uncanny

This paper is an attempt to uncover and bring to a coherent interpretation Freud's thoughts on the phenomenon of uncanniness. Starting out with the essay “The uncanny” the author wants to show that uncanniness plays an important rôle in the turn that Freud's thinking goes through at this time, and that the concept can serve as a springboard for a critical, phenomeno- logical reading of Freud's thoughts on the development of the ego. The analysis of the phenomenon of uncanniness itself tends to disrupt the coherence of Freud's earlier views and pushes him towards his later thinking. “Unheimlich” in German has the double meaning of uncanny and unhome-like, and what is not at home in itself in an uncanny sense, according to Freud, is precisely the human ego. Freud in “The uncanny” links the interpretation of uncanniness to compulsive repetition and thus makes the connection to trauma and birth anxiety discussed in later works such as “Beyond the pleasure principle” and “Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety”. The origin of our general sensitivity to the uncanny is thus, according to Freud, the loss of the mother suffered by the child as a kind of a priori traumatic experience, which is also the very event that makes the child into an ego. The understanding of traumatic neurosis and other forms of mental illness is consequently linked to an analysis of this primal uncanniness of life.     

Embodied Harm: A Phenomenological Engagement with Stereotype Threat

By applying classical and contemporary insights of the phenomenological tradition to key findings within the literature on stereotype threat (ST), this paper considers the embodied effects of everyday exposure to racism and makes a contribution to the growing field of applied phenomenology. In what follows, the paper asks how a phenomenological perspective can both contribute to and enrich discussions of ST in psychology. In answering these questions, the paper uses evidence from social psychology as well as first personal testimonies from members of marginalized groups to argue that subjectively experienced racial oppression is embodied and thus has effects on selfhood that are harmful. More specifically, it makes the case that what are most often considered to be temporary or context-based consequences of ST are in fact more wide reaching and harmful than assumed in that the harms that result from suffering ST become a part of one’s identity, and thus a background lens through which one experiences the world.     

The Dread of Mutual Creation of Meaning

Anthony Bass's and Ilana Laor's papers are viewed through the lens of the modern philosophical discussion regarding the ways meaning is created. A distinction is thus made, between “the setting” and the meaning of the setting, seeing the latter as inevitably created by the intersubjective dyad. The encounter with an Other, with whom we mutually create the meaning of our thoughts, feelings, and dreams, can be experienced as expanding the configurations of our selves and that of others, and thus, playfully or painfully, makes what was unbearable bearable, making all facets of oneself that could not live before come alive. But this very encounter also holds within it the dread of losing our own sense of self, of integrity and of sanity, and thus results in an impasse or “deadlock.” Because it touches the core of our being, as therapists and as human beings, the issue of “the frame and the picture,” of creating with our patients the meaning of the setting, amplifies this dialectic and is one of the most fascinating and difficult challenges of relational psychoanalysis.     

中国古代"恶"之存在论与价值论探讨

从存在论角度来说,人的本质属性——自然属性与社会属性构成中国古代性恶论的前提和根据。从价值论层面而言,古代性恶论者主张抑恶扬善或存善除恶。这就导致古代性恶论的悖论,一方面在存在论上肯定"恶"有存在的事实和根据,另方面在价值论上却否定"恶"的正当性和合理性。正是因为性恶论者最终的价值取向是使人成善、为善,性恶论和性善论在善恶问题上是殊途同归的:在存在论意义上是殊途——性恶论者道性恶而性善论者道性善,而在价值论意义上是同归——为善。但在去"恶"、除"恶"的正统思想之外,宋明时期的功利学派却不同程度地肯定了"恶"的正当性和合理性。