The Virtue of Nussbaum's Essentialism

This paper shows that Nussbaum's Aristotelian essentialism effectively combines resources for constructive social criticism (even in "traditional" societies) with concern for the concrete particulars of realized ways of life. Many critics of Nussbaum's views have failed to appreciate its many virtues in this regard. Yet Nussbaum's confidence in the broad possibilities of internal social criticism demands a better account of the moral openness of human cultures than anything Nussbaum has herself provided. Even Nussbaum's reading of Aristotle – as well as the ethical antirelativism on which it depends – demands a richer account than Nussbaum has so far offered of the essential openness of human world interpretations.     

Naturalized Epistemics and Conditional Reasoning

The continued predominance of SL-logic and deductive paradigms in the research on conditional-based reasoning by experimental psychologists is examined and criticized. After recounting the history and influence of the model, I note the emergence of trends in epistemology and other areas of theory that might provide a springboard for the critique of the model, and I argue that a new approach to examining reasoning with conditionals ought to be developed. I conclude that a superior approach would model such reasoning with sociolinguistic, inductive, and neurophysiological parameters, and that it would not involve any comparison of subjects' reasoning with the standard deductive rules of logic.     

Book Reviews

James Campbell, Understanding John Dewey: Nature and Cooperative Intelligence
Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric     

Political Animals: Luck, Love and Dignity

Human beings are both needy and dignified. How should we think about the relationship between our neediness and our worth? Card argues well that our vulnerability to luck is intertwined in the very conditions of moral agency. We can see the merit of her approach even more clearly by turning to some difficulties the Stoics have in preserving dignity while removing vulnerability. Stoicism does, however, help us to sort through the difficulties involved as we try to combine love of particular people with respect for all human life. Richardson is correct to suggest that love itself can animate the concern for all humanity; I also agree with him that institutions must play a major role in any solution to problems of inequality between nations. Although the “capabilities approach” offers an attractive account of one part of the goal of just political institutions, combining, as Moody-Adams suggests, respect for difference with a commitment to universal norms, I now believe that the capabilities account should be combined with a form of Rawlsian political liberalism that protects spaces within which citizens may pursue the good as they understand it.     

Far Away Now: Time and Distance Revisited

Einstein claimed that we do not know what it means to say that events distant from one another are simultaneous, because there is no way to determine this operationally. Reichenbach and Grunbaum claimed that determinate time relations just do not exist among events not connectible by a causal signal and that, therefore, such relations can, within certain limits, be stipulated by convention. But I argue that the independent existence of such relations is demonstrated by asking and answering a series of questions based on the intelligibility, though not the existence, of faster-than-light signals. I further argue that (1) only by demonstrating the unintelligibility of such questions and their answers can the conventionality thesis be maintained; (2) none of the available arguments to show such unintelligibility works; and (3) the conventionality thesis is therefore false.     

Is Wittgenstein's Resort to Ordinary Language an Appeal to Empirical facts?

There are two widely held views in the literature as regards Wittgenstein's philosophy. One says that Wittgenstein in his later work appeals to ordinary language in his effort to show how the philosophical problems can be dissolved, and the other says that his investigation is a grammatical one. This paper undertakes to examine what is meant by a grammatical investigation, especially in view of the fact that this investigation relies on empirical facts that have to do with linguistic usage. The examination is carried out by concentrating on what Wittgenstein has to say on the issue of knowledge – in particular, how the way we use the word contributes to the dismissal of Moore's answer to the challenge of scepticism. The conclusion is that Wittgenstein's resort to ordinary language is not typically empirical. The examples of ordinary usage that he cites may be contingent, but they could not have been different given the language games they are part of. The correct use of words Wittgenstein appeals to is not fixed by some kind of essence, but neither is it decided by a majority rule. It gets entrenched in a complex nexus of practices. Wittgenstein's reference to "use" instead of 'usage"and to "linguistic facts" instead of "sociological facts" lends support more to a logical than to an empirical investigation.     

A Solution to the Cable Guy Paradox

The Cable Guy will definitely come between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and I can bet on one of two possibilities: that he will arrive between 8 and 12, or between 12 and 4. Since I have no more information, it seems (eminently) plausible to suppose the two bets are equally attractive. Yet Hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval is, initial appearances to the contrary, more choice worthy. In this paper, I rebut the argument.     

A New Solution to Moore's Paradox

Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddnessagainst the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions tothe problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But``consistency' is a theory-laden concept, having different contours indifferent semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriateonly if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning withtruth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate whenit comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory whichaccounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals(Update Semantics) buys us a solution to Moore's paradox as a corollary.It turns out that Moorean propositions, when looked at through the lenseof an appropriate semantic theory, are inconsistent after all.     

Buridan's Solution to the Liar Paradox

Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e. to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence ‘What I am saying is false’. It has been argued that either (1) this solution is ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences [Read, S. 2002. ‘The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine’, Vivarium, 40 (2), 189–218] or else (2) it weakens his theory of truth, making his ‘a logic without truth’ [Klima, G. 2008. ‘Logic without truth: Buridan on the Liar’, in S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo and E. Genot, Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, Berlin: Springer, 87–112 (Chapter 5); Dutilh Novaes, C. 2011. ‘Lessons on truth from mediaeval solutions to the Liar Paradox’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 61 (242), 58–78]. Against (1), I will argue that Buridan's solution by means of truth by supposition does not involve new principles. Self-referential sentences force us to handle supposition more carefully, which does not warrant the accusation of adhoccery. I will also argue, against (2), that it is exaggerated to assert that this solution leads to a ‘weakened’ theory of truth, since it is consistent with other passages of the Sophismata, which only gives necessary conditions for the truth of affirmative propositions, but sufficient conditions for falsity.     

说谎者悖论及其相关悖论的一种解决

依本文之见,说谎者悖论以及某些与之相关的悖论之被导出源于对某些不合理的前提的接受;而这些前提之被接受又源于对＂是真的＂与＂是假的＂这两个词的关键语义特性缺乏认识。本文为决定这些语义特性的基础提供了说明;这一基础包含两个论点,第一,每一语句均有其含义;第二,每一语句陈说的字面内容是一个命题态度的内容,因而具有某种一般形式。借助于这一基础,本文为这两个词构造了一个不同于传统意义上的塔尔斯基式真理理论的意义理论以说明这些特性,并借助于该理论论证说谎者悖论及其某些相关悖论的导出没有根据。     

The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox

The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the “No Friday Argument,” which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the “Unprojectible Announcement Argument,” the “Wright & Sudbury Argument,” and the “Epistemic Blindspot Argument.” The reason that the Surprise Exam Paradox has persisted this long is not because any of these arguments is problematic. On the contrary, each of them is correct. The reason that it has persisted so long is because each argument is only part of the solution. The correct solution requires all three of them to be combined together. Once they are, we may see exactly why the No Friday Argument fails and therefore why we have a solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox that should stick.     

A Propositional Logic with Relative Identity Connective and a Partial Solution to the Paradox of Analysis

We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction , interpreted as the intensional identity of statements and in the context . PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko’s sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one. We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic models. We also show that PLRI can be used to give a partial solution to the paradox of analysis. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

论Priest对Sorites悖论的模糊解悖方案

G.Priest在1998-2003年之间有一个对sorites悖论的模糊解悖方案,根据该解悖方案,对含混语言的最佳语意论应该是某种的模糊语意论。在这样的模糊语意论中,边界语句是既真且假的语句,而sorites悖论中所涉及的离断律和等同传递律则不是有效的推论步骤。Priest并试图利用这样的语意论去说明：为什么sorites悖论看起来像是有效的论证,以及为什么切割点的存在尽管必然却违反直觉。我在本文中论证：Priest的模糊解悖方案是一个完全失败的方案,因此最好被放弃。我论证,Priest的模糊解悖方案至少有以下几个主要的问题：它与Priest的真理理论以及双面真理论不兼容、它对于sorites悖论的诊断有特设的嫌疑、它对于sorites悖论为何看起来有效的说明不具有可信度、它对于切割点存在何以违反直觉的说明也不具有可信度、它有将高阶含混性崩塌为一阶含混性之虞。     

The Metaethical Paradox of Just War Theory

The traditional requirements upon the waging of a just war are ostensibly independent, but in actual practice each tenet is subject ultimately to the interpretation of a legitimate authority, whose declaration becomes the necessary and sufficient condition. While just war theory presupposes that some acts are absolutely wrong, it also implies that the killing of innocents can be rendered permissible through human decree. Nations are conventionally delimited, and leaders are conventionally appointed. Any group of people could band together to form a nation, and any person could, in principle, be appointed the leader of any nation. Because the just war approach assumes absolutism while implying relativism, the stance is paradoxical and hence rationally untenable.     

说谎者悖论的一个新解决方案的纲要(英文)

首先,本文在第二节中提出了谎者悖论所包含的一些问题,比如加强的说谎者悖论,Curry悖论,Yablo悖论,偶然的说谎者悖论,以及塔尔斯基的真不可定义性定理。其次,在第三节简单介绍了塔尔斯基的分层理论,并且指出了他方案的一个最大不足之处就是把一个真谓词分成了很多个个真谓词,这和我们的直观很不符合。之后在第四节介绍了我的一个解悖方案,并讨论了它的一些性质,比如可靠性,完全性,以及我的方案和塔尔斯基方案的区别。第五节说明了第二节中提到的一些问题在我的这个方案下如何处理。     

意外考试悖论的博弈分析

本文从博弈的角度分析了意外考试悖论,指出了以往解决方案的不足,给出了一种新的方案。根据这个新方案,考试悖论的推理中使用了倒推法和弱下策反复剔除法。本文接着讨论了这些博弈推理方法的不足。然后把这个新的博弈方案用到卡片悖论和方格悖论这些考试悖论的变种里。最后指出,在考试悖论里,比起倒推法,弱下策剔除法是引起悖论的更根本的原因。     

析社会建构论心理学思想的四个层面

从社会建构论心理学中萃取四个核心概念,各代表一个思想层面,以此结构出社会建构论心理学思想体系的概观：（1）批判：心理不是对客观现实的“反映”;（2）建构：心理是社会的建构;（3）话语：是社会借以实现建构的重要媒介;（4）互动：社会互动应取代个体内在心理结构和心理过程成为心理学研究的重心。