States of Affairs and States of Mind: The Effect of Knowledge of Beliefs

Research on the "curse of knowledge" demonstrates a tendency to behave as if others have access to one′s privileged information about a certain state of affairs. We explore the possibility that information about beliefs may induce this tendency, previously attributed exclusively to factual knowledge. In two experiments, subjects predicted the behavior of a buyer in a negotiation scenario. The seller′s agent had a belief about the value of the firm that was independent of its true value. Subjects had information about (1) the true value (i.e., factual knowledge) and (2) the agent′s belief. These two types of information were unknown to the buyer. Subjects′ predictions of buyer behavior were affected by this privileged information about both the factual knowledge and the agent′s belief. This suggests that curse of knowledge applies to information not only about states of affairs but also about states of mind.     

DO FALLIBILIST ACCOUNTS OF THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE UNDERESTIMATE AND ENDANGER SCIENCE?

All fallibilist theories may appear to be defective, because they allegedly underestimate the security of at least some scientific knowledge and thereby leave science less defensible than it otherwise might be. When they call all scientific knowledge conjectural they may seem at first blush to underestimate the superiority of science vis a vis pseudo‐science. Fallibilists apparently fail to account for the fact that science turns theory into facts, because even “facts” are held only provisionally. This impression is false: the relatively secure establishment of facts can be accounted for with a fallibilist view. After theories have been honed through sharp criticism, there is often no reason to doubt some aspects of them. These aspects are what we regard to be factual knowledge, even though these facts are also provisionally accepted as such. We then explain the newly won factual knowledge with deeper theories, which often correct our factual knowledge in spite of its apparent security. Theories of justification add nothing useful to the fallibilists' observation that science finds the best theories because it has the highest standards of criticism. Fallibilist theories today give the best account and defence of science. We may abandon the quest for some kind of assurance that goes beyond the determination that some theory can answer all known objections to it and take up more interesting problems, such as how we can find new objections and how criticism may be improved and made institutionally secure. ¹ 1 I am grateful to Joseph Agassi and an anonymous referee of this journal for comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
     

Comparing the effects of generating questions,testing, and restudying on students' long-term recall in university learning

We compared the long-term effects of generating questions by learners with answering questions (i.e., testing) and restudying in the context of a university lecture. In contrast to previous studies, students were not prepared for the learning strategies, learning content was experimentally controlled, and effects on factual and transfer knowledge were examined. Students' overall recall performance after one week profited from generating questions and testing but not from restudying. When analyzing the effects on both knowledge types separately, traditional analyses revealed that only factual knowledge appeared to benefit from testing. However, additional Bayesian analyses suggested that generating questions and testing similarly benefit factual and transfer knowledge compared with restudying. The generation of questions thus seems to be another powerful learning strategy, yielding similar effects as testing on long-term retention of coherent learning content in educational contexts, and these effects emerge for factual and transfer knowledge.     

Young adults self-derive and retain new factual knowledge through memory integration

The present research investigated the retention of new factual knowledge derived through integration of information acquired across temporally distributed learning episodes. Young adults were exposed to novel facts as they read long lists of seemingly unrelated information, one sentence at a time. They then were presented open-ended questions, the answers to which could be self-derived through integration of pairs of facts from the list. Experiment 1 was the first test of self-derivation of new factual knowledge through integration in adults using open-ended testing (as opposed to forced-choice testing). Participants successfully self-derived integrated knowledge under these more challenging conditions. Experiment 2 was a test for long-term retention of newly self-derived information. Newly derived knowledge remained accessible after a 1-week delay. Striking individual differences were also observed, which were related to whether individuals spontaneously identified the relational structure of the learning task. Insight into the relation between explicit task knowledge and strategic processing was also revealed through examination of response speed at the time of test. Specifically, knowledge of the task structure was associated with response latencies on unsuccessful (but not successful) trials, such that participants who were aware of the opportunity to integrate spent longer when they were subsequently unsuccessful, presumably reflecting directed search strategies and heightened perseverance when those processes failed. Together, the present findings provide direct evidence for the role of memory integration in the long-term accumulation of a semantic knowledge base and have theoretical implications for our understanding of this fundamental form of learning.     

Children's understanding of the inverse relation between multiplication and division

Children's understanding of the inversion concept in multiplication and division problems (i.e., that on problems of the form d * e/e no calculations are required) was investigated. Children in Grades 6, 7, and 8 completed an inversion problem-solving task, an assessment of procedures task, and a factual knowledge task of simple multiplication and division. Application of the inversion concept in the problem-solving task was low and constant across grades. Most participants approved of the inversion-based shortcut but only a slight majority preferred it. Three clusters of children were identified based on their performance on the three tasks. The inversion cluster used and approved of the inversion shortcut the most and had high factual knowledge. The negation cluster used the negation strategy, had lower approval of the inversion shortcut, and had medium factual knowledge. The computation cluster used computation and had the lowest approval and the weakest factual knowledge. The findings highlight the importance of addressing the multiplication and division inversion concept in theories of children's mathematical competence.     

Pragmatic skills predict online counterfactual comprehension: Evidence from the N400

Counterfactual thought allows people to consider alternative worlds they know to be false. Communicating these thoughts through language poses a social-communicative challenge because listeners typically expect a speaker to produce true utterances, but counterfactuals per definition convey information that is false. Listeners must therefore incorporate overt linguistic cues (subjunctive mood, such as in If I loved you then) in a rapid way to infer the intended counterfactual meaning. The present EEG study focused on the comprehension of such counterfactual antecedents and investigated if pragmatic ability—the ability to apply knowledge of the social-communicative use of language in daily life—predicts the online generation of counterfactual worlds. This yielded two novel findings: (1) Words that are consistent with factual knowledge incur a semantic processing cost, as reflected in larger N400 amplitude, in counterfactual antecedents compared to hypothetical antecedents (If sweets were/are made of sugar). We take this to suggest that counterfactuality is quickly incorporated during language comprehension and reduces online expectations based on factual knowledge. (2) Individual scores on the Autism Quotient Communication subscale modulated this effect, suggesting that individuals who are better at understanding the communicative intentions of other people are more likely to reduce knowledge-based expectations in counterfactuals. These results are the first demonstration of the real-time pragmatic processes involved in creating possible worlds.     

FERMI: A Flexible Expert Reasoner with Multi-Domain Inferencing

Expert reasoning combines voluminous domain-specific knowledge with more general factual and strategic knowledge. Whereas expert system builders have recognized the need for specificity and problem-solving researchers the need for generality, few attempts have been made to develop expert reasoning engines combining different kinds of knowledge at different levels of generality. This paper reports on the FERMI project, a computer-implemented expert reasoner in the natural sciences that encodes factual and strategic knowledge in separate semantic hierarchies. The principled decomposition of knowledge according to type and level of specificity yields both power and cross-doman generality, as demonstrated in FERMI's ability to apply the same principles of invariance and decomposition to solve problems in fluid statics, DC-circuits, and centroid location. Hierarchical knowledge representation and problem-solving principles are discussed, and illustrative problem-solving traces are presented.     

Stalnaker on sensuous knowledge

Robert Stalnaker has recently argued that a pair of natural thoughts are incompatible. One of them is the view that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities. The other is the view that knowing what sensuous experience is like involves non-indexical knowledge of its phenomenal character. I argue against Stalnaker’s take on things, elucidating along the way how our knowledge of what experience is like fits together with the natural idea that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities. I am grateful to Nel Block, Dque Chalmers, Benj Hellie, Mike Martin, Susanna Siejel, Robert Stalnaker and especially Majo Spencer for help with this work.     

Science,commonsense and philosophy: A defense of continuity (a critique of "network apriorism")

A popular line in philosophy championed by Jackson and his followers analyses concepts as networks of propositions. It takes even network-propositions characterizing ordinary empirically applicable concepts to be a priori, in contrast to statements of empirical science. This is meant to guarantee both the autonomy of conceptual analysis, and its substantial and informative character. It is argued here, to the contrary, that empirically applicable and entrenched concepts owe the acceptability of their own network precisely to its empirical pedigree. Promoting an empirical proposition into a network proposition does not make it ultimately a priori: no matter how entrenched the network is, it owes its ultimate justification to its empirical pedigree. Autonomy from experience and informativeness clash with each other: the stipulative "knowledge" is a priori in a weak sense, but not informative and substantial, the factual knowledge is substantial but not a priori .     

Canceling updating in the comprehension of counterfactuals embedded in narratives

Participants were given counterfactual sentences--for example, "If Mary had won the lottery she would have bought a Mercedes car"--or factual sentences--for example, "Because Mary won the lottery, she bought a Mercedes car"--embedded in short narratives. Reading times showed that readers were immediately sensitive to the special status of counterfactual information (Experiment 1). In addition, probe-recognition latencies demonstrated that old information was more accessible in counterfactual than in factual stories, and new information was equally accessible in both kinds of stories (Experiment 2). However, after reading additional clauses, new information became less accessible in counterfactual than in factual stories (Experiment 3). These results suggest that counterfactual events are momentarily represented but are later suppressed and the readers' attention goes back to previous events in the story.     

Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments? (Dedicated to the Memory of R.M. Chisholm, 1916–1999)

Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.     

The relation between level of general knowledge and feeling-of-knowing: An adult age study

Younger and older adults were examined in recall and recognition of factual information varying in datedness. It was found that younger adults performed better for questions related to the time period 1970–1983, while the older adults performed better for questions related to the time period 1930–1950. The subjects also did confidence ratings of their "feeling-of-knowing" of the actual questions. On the basis of the cross-over interaction between age and datedness, the relationship between the level of general knowledge and the ability to monitor the knowledge was investigated. Only minor differences were observed between the graphs describing recall and recognition performance as a function of feeling-of-knowing in the four age by datedness combinations. Thus, the results suggest that the ability to supervise context-free semantic information may be intact despite an inferiority in level of knowledge. Comparisons were made between the results of the present study and those of previous studies on metamemory and episodic remembering.     

Knowledge of language and knowledge about the world: A reaction time study of invited and necessary inferences

Necessary inferences (e.g., The jury was not able to deliver its verdict by 3 o'clock. The jury did not deliver its verdict by 3 o'clock.) depend on linguistic knowledge. Invited inferences, (e.g., The jury was able to deliver its verdict by 3 o'clock. The jury delivered its verdict by 3 o'clock) depend on knowledge about the world. Responses were faster to necessary than to invited inferences when subjects verified only one of the two inference types (Experiments 1 and 3). When subjects verified both inference types there was no difference between invited and necessary inferences (Experiments 2 and 4). These data suggest that linguistic and world knowledge are psychologically distinct and that when factual knowledge is not needed in a task it is not processed. In Experiments 3 and 4 incongruent world knowledge slowed response times for both inference types. This suggests that linguistic and factual knowledge are both port of the initial representation of a sentence.     

Value Priorities and Organ Donation in Young Adults

This research identifies major personal values among American university students that predict organ-donation registration with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Participants responded to a factual test of their knowledge about organ donation, indicated whether or not they had registered as posthumous donors, and filled out a personality inventory measuring their personal values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). The data indicated a high level of factual knowledge about organ donation; and the greater the level of knowledge, the more likely participants were registered to donate their organs. Also, participants higher in benevolence, universalism, achievement, and stimulation were more likely to have registered to donate their organs. The results are discussed in terms of the need to develop more effective health-communication campaigns by using specific health-education messages tailored to students majoring in different disciplines or to people in various occupations as a means of increasing their willingness to donate.     

I Remember When You Taught Me That! Preschool Children's Memories of Realistic Learning Episodes

This study examined whether preschool children are able to identify the source of new knowledge that they acquired in a stimulating, interactive learning context. Sixty 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two staged learning events. Several days later, children were asked questions that assessed their knowledge of factual information presented during the events. Children indicated whether they knew the answer to each question and whether they remembered the moment they learned it (i.e. had an episodic memory of the learning event), and then recalled event details. A majority of preschoolers were able to accurately identify how they had learned at least some factual information, but this ability was not consistent across children and test items. Recall of event‐specific details was positively correlated with correct answers to factual questions. The results indicate that when preschool children are asked to reflect on past learning experiences that occurred in complex and realistic contexts, their source monitoring abilities are evident but not yet fully developed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reducing Children's Susceptibility to Commercials: Mechanisms of Factual and Evaluative Advertising Interventions

The aim of this study was to investigate how factual and evaluative interventions modify the effects of television advertising among children in early and middle childhood. First, a conceptual model of advertising intervention was developed, and then this model was experimentally tested drawing on a sample of 5- to 10-year-old children (N = 206). Structural equation modeling analysis confirmed that factual intervention reduced children's susceptibility to commercials by stimulating their advertising knowledge and skepticism, and evaluative intervention reduced children's susceptibility by influencing their attitudes toward commercials negatively. For children older than 6, both factual and evaluative interventions were successful in modifying the effects of advertising, whereas the younger children had difficulty processing any type of intervention.     

Gender differences in autobiographical narratives: He shoots and scores; she evaluates and interprets

Research on autobiographical narratives consistently demonstrates that whereas women's narratives emphasize evaluative information, men's narratives are factually oriented. These narrative differences might reflect gender differences in either the autobiographical knowledge base or the way information from the knowledge base is selected when a narrative is constructed. The present experiment evaluated these two (potentially complementary) hypotheses by assessing memory soon after an event and after a period of 6?weeks, using both open-ended (narrative) and factually oriented (questionnaire) measures. Consistent with past literature, women told longer, richer, more evaluative narratives than did men. However, men recalled more factual information both initially and after 6?weeks and also constructed narratives that were more factually oriented. These data suggest that men and women value factual information differently and that these differences influence both the contents of the autobiographical knowledge base and the way that information in the knowledge base is used to construct personal narratives.     

Knowledge and expectations: Perceived illness in myocardial infarction patients

In a study of 367 patients with myocardial infarction (MI), questionnaires were developed to assess two central aspects of perceived illness: factual and consensual illness knowledge and subjective expectations for the personal consequences of the MI. In a factor analysis, these two aspects of perceived illness were found to load on separate factors, and the patients views of the personal consequences of the MI were only moderately associated with their general cardiac health knowledge. Among a series of sociodemographic, medical, and psychological variables, including a standardized in-hospital patient education programme, the two aspects of perceived illness also proved to have different determinants. Differences in factual and consensual illness knowledge were mainly related to differences in formal education, and this aspect of perceived illness was influenced by the standardized education programme. In contrast, differences in subjective expectations were associated with levels of hopelessness. The implications for psychosocial interventions in the rehabilitation of MI patients are discussed.     

Judging credibility: Can spaced lessons help students think more critically online?

Despite the prevalence of the spacing effect in the psychological literature, the impact of lesson timing has not yet been fully explored in real classrooms. The current study examined whether spacing could improve long‐term retention of both factual and critical thinking curriculum‐based teaching materials for children. Students 9 to 12 years old were taught to judge the credibility of websites in either three consecutive days of lessons or one lesson per week. Thirty‐five days after the final lesson, students were tested on factual knowledge and applied their knowledge to evaluating a new website. Students in the spaced condition remembered more facts from the lessons and were better able to explain their website ratings than students in the massed group.     

Slowing presentation speed increases illusions of knowledge

Prior research on false memories has shown that suggestibility is often reduced when the presentation rate is slowed enough to allow monitoring. We examined whether slowing presentation speed would reduce factual errors learned from fictional stories. Would subjects use the extra time to detect the errors in the stories, reducing reproduction of these errors on a later test? Surprisingly, slowing presentation speed increased the production of story errors on a later general knowledge test. Instructing the reader to mark whether each sentence contained an error, however, did decrease suggestibility. Readers appear to passively accept information presented in stories and need a constant reminder to monitor for errors. These results highlight differences between typical episodic false memories and illusions of knowledge (such as learning from fiction). Manipulations that reduce suggestibility for episodic false memories do not always reduce suggestibility for illusions of knowledge.