Shared structure need not be shared set-structure

Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make precise the concept of shared structure between models, formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist’s appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be so used, the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes’ and recent semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that “without a formal framework for explicating this concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s concept of similarity between models does ...” (French, 2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103–120, p. 114). Neither concept is vague; either can be made precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French’s (1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for both Weyl and Wigner’s programmes, it was the context of considering the ‘relevant symmetries’ that determined that the appropriate kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models. I wish to thank Katherine Brading, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Martin Thomson-Jones, Antigone Nounou, Stathis Psillos, Dean Rickles, Mauricio Suarez and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and criticisms, and Gregory Janzen for editorial suggestions. Research for this paper was funded by a generous SSHRC grant for which I am grateful     

Tunnel memory for traumatic events

In four experiments subjects remembered the critical information in a traumatic slide as either more focused spatially than in its original presentation or more focused spatially than information in a matched neutral slide. Subjects comprehend a neutral scene by automatically extending its boundaries and understanding the visual information in a broader external context. However, when subjects are negatively aroused by a scene, they process more elaborately those critical details that were the source of the emotional arousal, and they maintain or restrict the scene's boundaries. ‘Tunnel memory’ results from this greater elaboration of critical details and more focused boundaries. Tunnel memory may explain the superior recognition and recall of central, emotion-arousing details in a traumatic event, as shown in previous research on emotion and memory. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multiple routes to enhanced memory for emotionally relevant events

Events associated with aversive or rewarding outcomes are prioritized in memory. This memory boost is commonly attributed to the elicited affective response, closely linked to noradrenergic and dopaminergic modulation of hippocampal plasticity. Herein we review and compare this ‘affect’ mechanism to an additional, recently discovered, ‘prediction’ mechanism whereby memories are strengthened by the extent to which outcomes deviate from expectations, that is, by prediction errors (PEs). The mnemonic impact of PEs is separate from the affective outcome itself and has a distinct neural signature. While both routes enhance memory, these mechanisms are linked to different – and sometimes opposing – predictions for memory integration. We discuss new findings that highlight mechanisms by which emotional events strengthen, integrate, and segment memory.     

结核病控制应加强机构间协作

结核病控制工作是一个需要公共卫生机构与医疗机构密切协作的艰巨任务。然而,长期以来两者之间工作目标的不一致,已经影响了结核病人的转诊和有效管理。从组织学的角度探讨两者之间的关系的现状、现有结核病控制制度的作用有限性和组织创新的必要性,并对建立两者之间良好的关系,促进结核病控制工作提出了建议。     

结核病控制应加强机构间协作

结核病控制工作是一个需要公共卫生机构与医疗机构密切协作的艰巨任务.然而,长期以来两者之间工作目标的不一致,已经影响了结核病人的转诊和有效管理.从组织学的角度探讨两者之间的关系的现状、现有结核病控制制度的作用有限性和组织创新的必要性,并对建立两者之间良好的关系,促进结核病控制工作提出了建议.     

Working memory affects false memory production for emotional events

Whereas a link between working memory (WM) and memory distortions has been demonstrated, its influence on emotional false memories is unclear. In two experiments, a verbal WM task and a false memory paradigm for negative, positive or neutral events were employed. In Experiment 1, we investigated individual differences in verbal WM and found that the interaction between valence and WM predicted false recognition, with negative and positive material protecting high WM individuals against false remembering; the beneficial effect of negative material disappeared in low WM participants. In Experiment 2, we lowered the WM capacity of half of the participants with a double task request, which led to an overall increase in false memories; furthermore, consistent with Experiment 1, the increase in negative false memories was larger than that of neutral or positive ones. It is concluded that WM plays a critical role in determining false memory production, specifically influencing the processing of negative material.     

Gender differences in autobiographical memory for everyday events: retrieval elicited by SenseCam images versus verbal cues

Gender differences are frequently observed in autobiographical memory (AM). However, few studies have investigated the neural basis of potential gender differences in AM. In the present functional MRI (fMRI) study we investigated gender differences in AMs elicited using dynamic visual images vs verbal cues. We used a novel technology called a SenseCam, a wearable device that automatically takes thousands of photographs. SenseCam differs considerably from other prospective methods of generating retrieval cues because it does not disrupt the ongoing experience. This allowed us to control for potential gender differences in emotional processing and elaborative rehearsal, while manipulating how the AMs were elicited. We predicted that males would retrieve more richly experienced AMs elicited by the SenseCam images vs the verbal cues, whereas females would show equal sensitivity to both cues. The behavioural results indicated that there were no gender differences in subjective ratings of reliving, importance, vividness, emotion, and uniqueness, suggesting that gender differences in brain activity were not due to differences in these measures of phenomenological experience. Consistent with our predictions, the fMRI results revealed that males showed a greater difference in functional activity associated with the rich experience of SenseCam vs verbal cues, than did females.     

Sensory and conceptual representations in memory: Motor images that cannot be imaged

Summary The paper argues for a distinction between sensory-and conceptual-information storage in the human information-processing system. Conceptual information is characterized as meaningful and symbolic, while sensory information may exist in modality-bound form. Furthermore, it is assumed that sensory information does not contribute to conscious remembering and can be used only in data-driven process reptitions, which can be accompanied by a kind of vague or intuitive feeling. Accordingly, pure top-down and willingly controlled processing, such as free recall, should not have any access to sensory data. Empirical results from different research areas and from two experiments conducted by the authors are presented in this article to support these theoretical distinctions. The experiments were designed to separate a sensory-motor and a conceptual component in memory for two-digit numbers and two-letter items, when parts of the numbers or items were imaged or drawn on a tablet. The results of free recall and recognition are discussed in a theoretical framework which distinguishes sensory and conceptual information in memory.     

Whatever it is better to be than not to be

The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.     

Event-based prospective memory for poorly attended events

In the most frequently used paradigm for studying event-based prospective memory (PM, Einstein & McDaniel, 1990), participants perform an ongoing task and are asked to perform an additional task when a particular stimulus (the PM cue) is presented. In this study three experiments examined how PM performance depends on stimulus selection, which is a major process involved in executive task control according to current theorizing. Participants made semantic judgments about a target word accompanied by two nontargets (distracters). The target was indicated by its spatial position (Experiment 1) or color (Experiment 2). The findings indicated that PM performance was much poorer when the PM cue was irrelevant to the ongoing task, in spite of the fact that nontargets were processed semantically as shown in Experiment 3.     

Reminiscence bump in memory for public events

People tend to recall more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than from other lifetime periods. Most evidence suggests that differential encoding causes this reminiscence bump. However, the question why personal events are encoded better in those periods is still unanswered. To shed more light on this discussion, we examined memory for public events. Since it is often impossible to ascertain that queried events are equally difficult, we circumvented the issue of equivalence by calculating deviation scores for each trial. We found that participants more frequently answered questions correctly about events that occurred in the period in which they were between 10 and 25 years old. Furthermore, we found that the reminiscence bump was more pronounced for cued recall than for recognition. We argue that these results support the biological account that events are stored better, because the memory system is working more efficiently during adolescence and early adulthood. These results do not falsify the other accounts for differential encoding, because they are not mutually exclusive.     

Prospective memory for future intentions: Some comparisons with memory for past events

Abstract

Memory for future intentions was compared with memory for past activities by asking members of a film society to retrieve names of films they intended to see later on in a Season and films they had seen earlier. Memory for films that had been seen showed the usual recency effect, while retrieval of films to be seen showed an analogous proximity effect in that films to be seen sooner were more accessible. It was also found that recall of past films was inversely related to the total number of such films, but was unrelated to the average time interval since they were seen. In a similar fashion, retrievability of future films was inversely related to the total number of such films and was unrelated to when they were to be seen. There was a small but significant correlation between an individual's ability to retrieve the names of past and future films. Taken together, these correspondences suggest that similar empirical laws may govern the retrieval of stored information about past events and future intentions. Possible interpretations of the proximity effect and its theoretical implications are discussed.     

Putting action memory to the test: testing affects subsequent restudy but not long-term forgetting of action events

Testing memory typically enhances subsequent re-encoding of information (“indirect” testing effect) and, as compared to restudy, it also benefits later long-term retention (“direct” testing effect). We investigated the effect of testing on subsequent restudy and 1-week retention of action events (e.g. “water the plant”). In addition, we investigated if the type of recall practice (noun-cued vs. verb-cued) moderates these testing benefits. The results showed an indirect testing effect that increased following noun-cued recall of verbs as compared to verb-cued recall of nouns. In contrast, a direct testing effect on the forgetting rate of performed actions was not reliably observed, neither for noun- nor verb-cued recall. Thus, to the extent that this study successfully dissociated direct and indirect testing-based enhancements, they seem to be differentially effective for performed actions, and may rely on partially different mechanisms.     

To be and not to be: Dialectical tense logic

The paper concerns time, change and contradiction, and is in three parts. The first is an analysis of the problem of the instant of change. It is argued that some changes are such that at the instant of change the system is in both the prior and the posterior state. In particular there are some changes from p being true to p being true where a contradiction is realized. The second part of the paper specifies a formal logic which accommodates this possibility. It is a tense logic based on an underlying paraconsistent prepositional logic, the logic of paradox. (See the author's article of the same name Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979).) Soundness and completeness are established, the latter by the canonical model construction, and extensions of the basic system briefly considered. The final part of the paper discusses Leibniz's principle of continuity: Whatever holds up to the limit holds at the limit. It argues that in the context of physical changes this is a very plausible principle. When it is built into the logic of the previous part, it allows a rigorous proof that change entails contradictions. Finally the relation of this to remarks on dialectics by Hegel and Engels is briefly discussed.