Shared structure need not be shared set-structure

Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make precise the concept of shared structure between models, formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist’s appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be so used, the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes’ and recent semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that “without a formal framework for explicating this concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s concept of similarity between models does ...” (French, 2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103–120, p. 114). Neither concept is vague; either can be made precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French’s (1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for both Weyl and Wigner’s programmes, it was the context of considering the ‘relevant symmetries’ that determined that the appropriate kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models. I wish to thank Katherine Brading, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Martin Thomson-Jones, Antigone Nounou, Stathis Psillos, Dean Rickles, Mauricio Suarez and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and criticisms, and Gregory Janzen for editorial suggestions. Research for this paper was funded by a generous SSHRC grant for which I am grateful     

结核病控制应加强机构间协作

结核病控制工作是一个需要公共卫生机构与医疗机构密切协作的艰巨任务。然而,长期以来两者之间工作目标的不一致,已经影响了结核病人的转诊和有效管理。从组织学的角度探讨两者之间的关系的现状、现有结核病控制制度的作用有限性和组织创新的必要性,并对建立两者之间良好的关系,促进结核病控制工作提出了建议。     

结核病控制应加强机构间协作

结核病控制工作是一个需要公共卫生机构与医疗机构密切协作的艰巨任务.然而,长期以来两者之间工作目标的不一致,已经影响了结核病人的转诊和有效管理.从组织学的角度探讨两者之间的关系的现状、现有结核病控制制度的作用有限性和组织创新的必要性,并对建立两者之间良好的关系,促进结核病控制工作提出了建议.     

Gender differences in autobiographical memory for everyday events: retrieval elicited by SenseCam images versus verbal cues

Gender differences are frequently observed in autobiographical memory (AM). However, few studies have investigated the neural basis of potential gender differences in AM. In the present functional MRI (fMRI) study we investigated gender differences in AMs elicited using dynamic visual images vs verbal cues. We used a novel technology called a SenseCam, a wearable device that automatically takes thousands of photographs. SenseCam differs considerably from other prospective methods of generating retrieval cues because it does not disrupt the ongoing experience. This allowed us to control for potential gender differences in emotional processing and elaborative rehearsal, while manipulating how the AMs were elicited. We predicted that males would retrieve more richly experienced AMs elicited by the SenseCam images vs the verbal cues, whereas females would show equal sensitivity to both cues. The behavioural results indicated that there were no gender differences in subjective ratings of reliving, importance, vividness, emotion, and uniqueness, suggesting that gender differences in brain activity were not due to differences in these measures of phenomenological experience. Consistent with our predictions, the fMRI results revealed that males showed a greater difference in functional activity associated with the rich experience of SenseCam vs verbal cues, than did females.     

Sensory and conceptual representations in memory: Motor images that cannot be imaged

Summary The paper argues for a distinction between sensory-and conceptual-information storage in the human information-processing system. Conceptual information is characterized as meaningful and symbolic, while sensory information may exist in modality-bound form. Furthermore, it is assumed that sensory information does not contribute to conscious remembering and can be used only in data-driven process reptitions, which can be accompanied by a kind of vague or intuitive feeling. Accordingly, pure top-down and willingly controlled processing, such as free recall, should not have any access to sensory data. Empirical results from different research areas and from two experiments conducted by the authors are presented in this article to support these theoretical distinctions. The experiments were designed to separate a sensory-motor and a conceptual component in memory for two-digit numbers and two-letter items, when parts of the numbers or items were imaged or drawn on a tablet. The results of free recall and recognition are discussed in a theoretical framework which distinguishes sensory and conceptual information in memory.     

Event-based prospective memory for poorly attended events

In the most frequently used paradigm for studying event-based prospective memory (PM, Einstein & McDaniel, 1990), participants perform an ongoing task and are asked to perform an additional task when a particular stimulus (the PM cue) is presented. In this study three experiments examined how PM performance depends on stimulus selection, which is a major process involved in executive task control according to current theorizing. Participants made semantic judgments about a target word accompanied by two nontargets (distracters). The target was indicated by its spatial position (Experiment 1) or color (Experiment 2). The findings indicated that PM performance was much poorer when the PM cue was irrelevant to the ongoing task, in spite of the fact that nontargets were processed semantically as shown in Experiment 3.     

Whatever it is better to be than not to be

The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.     

Prospective memory for future intentions: Some comparisons with memory for past events

Abstract

Memory for future intentions was compared with memory for past activities by asking members of a film society to retrieve names of films they intended to see later on in a Season and films they had seen earlier. Memory for films that had been seen showed the usual recency effect, while retrieval of films to be seen showed an analogous proximity effect in that films to be seen sooner were more accessible. It was also found that recall of past films was inversely related to the total number of such films, but was unrelated to the average time interval since they were seen. In a similar fashion, retrievability of future films was inversely related to the total number of such films and was unrelated to when they were to be seen. There was a small but significant correlation between an individual's ability to retrieve the names of past and future films. Taken together, these correspondences suggest that similar empirical laws may govern the retrieval of stored information about past events and future intentions. Possible interpretations of the proximity effect and its theoretical implications are discussed.     

Scale effects in memory for the timeof events

This study addressed the question of how people remember the time of past events. Stimuli were 10 news events that had occurred from 6 months to 20 years before the study. In contrast to previous studies of memory for time, subjects were asked to provide estimates of the stimulus events on multiple time scales, including year, month, day of the month, day of the week, and hour. If judgments are based on direct information about the age of the memory, accuracy should decrease monotonically as one moves to finer scales. Alternatively, if subjects reconstruct the time from fragmentary information associated with the event, one would expect that estimates on finer time scales would often exceed grosser scales in accuracy. Results for accuracy, confidence, and number of recall cues supported the latter position. In addition, subjects reported a variety of types of recall cues, the most common being memory for personal experiences or events that were contiguous with the news event.     

Being the agent: memory for action events

Whoever paid the bill at the restaurant last night, will clearly remember doing it. Independently from the type of action, it is a common experience that being the agent provides a special strength to our memories. Even if it is generally agreed that personal memories (episodic memory) rely on separate neural substrates with respect to general knowledge (semantic memory), little is known on the nature of the link between memory and the sense of agency. In the present paper, we review results from two experiments investigating the effects of agency on both explicit and implicit memory traces. Performance of normal subjects is compared to that of schizophrenic patients in order to explore the role of awareness of action on memory. It is proposed that reliable first-person information is necessary to create a stable and coherent motor memory trace.     

Eye fixations and memory for emotional events.

Subjects watched either an emotional, neutral, or unusual sequence of slides containing 1 critical slide in the middle. Experiments 1 and 2 allowed only a single eye fixation on the critical slide by presenting it for 180 ms (Experiment 1) or 150 ms (Experiment 2). Despite this constraint, memory for a central detail was better for the emotional condition. In Experiment 3, subjects were allowed 2.70 s to view the critical slide while their eye movements were monitored. When subjects who had devoted the same number of fixations were compared, memory for the central detail of the emotional slide was again better. The results suggest that enhanced memory for detail information of an emotional event does not occur solely because more attention is devoted to the emotional information.     

To be and not to be: Dialectical tense logic

The paper concerns time, change and contradiction, and is in three parts. The first is an analysis of the problem of the instant of change. It is argued that some changes are such that at the instant of change the system is in both the prior and the posterior state. In particular there are some changes from p being true to p being true where a contradiction is realized. The second part of the paper specifies a formal logic which accommodates this possibility. It is a tense logic based on an underlying paraconsistent prepositional logic, the logic of paradox. (See the author's article of the same name Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979).) Soundness and completeness are established, the latter by the canonical model construction, and extensions of the basic system briefly considered. The final part of the paper discusses Leibniz's principle of continuity: Whatever holds up to the limit holds at the limit. It argues that in the context of physical changes this is a very plausible principle. When it is built into the logic of the previous part, it allows a rigorous proof that change entails contradictions. Finally the relation of this to remarks on dialectics by Hegel and Engels is briefly discussed.     

Implicit memory is not immune to interference

Does interference, a primary source of forgetting in explicit memory, also affect implicit memory? Several early and highly influential studies have suggested that implicit memory is immune to interference. In contrast, a number of subsequent investigations have reported evidence for interference. As well, amnesic patients, whose performance relies primarily on implicit memory, often show interference effects. A review of methods, materials, and findings suggests that interference occurs on implicit tests when targets and nontargets are similar and so compete as potential responses to the memory cue. Further, there is some evidence that the degree of interference on implicit tasks is affected by the number of competing items and their strength relative to the target. Interference effects in implicit memory seem to parallel those in explicit memory, and the authors consider the implications of this conclusion for theoretical concepts of memory and the brain.