谈判者第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响：角色的调节作用

谈判者在大多数情况下都希望能顺利达成协议,但很多时候多种因素使得谈判进入僵局或者破裂。本研究利用模拟谈判的手段,综合考察了第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响。很多谈判者出于害怕吃亏或者希望获得更多收益,向对手提出较高的第一次开价。研究一证明第一次出价越高,谈判越容易失败。有趣的是,第一次开价的高低与谈判破裂之间的关系会受到谈判角色的影响,谈判者的权力不同会使得他们的第一次开价具有不同的作用。研究二证实,当谈判双方权力不对等时,第一次出价对谈判破裂的负面作用受到了权力的影响。弱者的第一次出价越高,谈判越容易破裂。中介分析表明,当弱者出价较高时,容易让对方感到竞争性过强,因此不愿意达成协议。本研究不仅丰富了谈判破裂和第一次出价的理论研究,而且对于谈判者具有实践意义     

Unfixing the fixed pie: a motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation

Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountability reduced FPPs during face-to-face negotiation and produced more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 corroborated these results: Accountable negotiators revised their FPPs even when information exchange was experimentally held constant. Experiment 2 also showed that accountability is effective during the encoding of outcome information. Negotiators appear flexible in their reliance on FPPs. which is consistent with a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.     

Implementation intentions and the willful pursuit of prosocial goals in negotiations

Three studies examined whether the self-regulation strategy of forming implementation intentions (i.e., if-then plans) facilitates the attainment of prosocial goals when a limited resource is to be distributed between two parties who hold adverse cognitive orientations. In three experiments, pairs of negotiators were assigned prosocial goals that either had to be supplemented with plans (if-then plans, Gollwitzer, 1999) on how to act on these goals or not. Experiment 1 used a mixed-frames negotiation paradigm in which one negotiation partner operated on a gain-frame, the other on a loss-frame. When participants had the prosocial goal to find fair agreements and furnished it with a respective if-then plan, unfair agreements in favor of the loss-frame negotiator no longer occurred. Experiment 2 used a same-frame negotiation paradigm, where both negotiation partners had either a loss or a gain-frame. When loss-frame pairs had furnished their prosocial goals to cooperate with the negotiation partner with a respective if-then plan, reduced profits as compared to gain-frame pairs of negotiators were no longer observed. In addition, negotiators who had formed implementation intentions were more likely to use the integrative negotiation strategy of logrolling (i.e., making greater concessions on low rather than high priority issues). Experiment 3 used a computer-mediated negotiation task in order to analyze the effects of prosocial goals and respective implementation intentions on the course of the negotiation. Again, implementation intentions facilitated the pursuit of prosocial goals in the face of adversity (i.e., loss frames) by use of the integrative negotiation strategy of logrolling. The present research adds a self-regulation perspective to the research on negotiation by pointing out that the effects of negotiation goals can be enhanced by furnishing them with respective plans (i.e., implementation intentions).     

The Impact of Alcohol on Negotiator Behavior: Experimental Evidence1

Business‐related drinking is an important organizational and managerial activity with particular relevance to the negotiation process. This paper investigates the influence of a moderate amount of alcohol on negotiator behavior and negotiated outcomes. We conducted 2 negotiation studies involving inebriated and sober participants, and found that inebriated negotiators used more aggressive tactics, made more mistakes, and reached less integrative agreements than did sober negotiators. Across both studies, we found that inebriated negotiators were unaware that alcohol had affected their negotiations.     

谈判中的时间因素

研究时间因素对谈判的影响有利于提高人们对时间重要性的认识,有效谈判策略的运用和整合结果的实现。时间因素对谈判者认知、行为和谈判结果的影响具体表现在：时间压力会降低谈判者的认知动机,使谈判者更加依赖认知启发式;暂停和中场休息是否会为谈判带来积极影响应该视不同的谈判事件和不同的心理状态而定;拉大谈判与结果实现之间的时间距离会提高谈判的共同结果,这可以从折扣效应和建构水平理论中得到解释。将来的谈判研究会进一步从时间向空间拓展     

The interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations: a motivated information processing approach

Three experiments tested a motivated information processing account of the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. In Experiment 1, participants received information about the opponent's emotion (anger, happiness, or none) in a computer-mediated negotiation. As predicted, they conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one (controls falling in between), but only when they had a low (rather than a high) need for cognitive closure. Experiment 2 similarly showed that participants were only affected by the other's emotion under low rather than high time pressure, because time pressure reduced their degree of information processing. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that negotiators were only influenced by their opponent's emotion if they had low (rather than high) power. These results support the motivated information processing model by showing that negotiators are only affected by their opponent's emotions if they are motivated to consider them.     

The mind and heart (literally) of the negotiator: personality and contextual determinants of experiential reactions and economic outcomes in negotiation

The authors developed and tested a model proposing that negotiator personality interacts with the negotiation situation to influence negotiation processes and outcomes. In 2 studies, the authors found that negotiators high in agreeableness were best suited to integrative negotiations and that negotiators low in agreeableness were best suited to distributive negotiations. Consistent with this person-situation fit argument, in Study 1 the authors found that negotiators whose dispositions were a good fit to their negotiation context had higher levels of physiological (cardiac) arousal at the end of the negotiation compared with negotiators who were "misplaced" in situations inconsistent with their level of agreeableness, and this arousal was in turn related to increased economic outcomes. Study 2 replicated and extended the findings of Study 1, finding that person-situation fit was related to physiological (heart rate), psychological (positive affect), and behavioral activation (persistence) demonstrated during the negotiation, and these measures in turn were related to the economic outcomes achieved by participants.     

Too much information: the perils of nondiagnostic information in negotiations

Two studies showed that possessing information about a negotiation counterpart that is irrelevant to the negotiation task can impair negotiators' effectiveness because such knowledge impedes effective information exchange. In Study 1, negotiators who possessed diagnostic and nondiagnostic forms of information were each less likely to exchange information about their preferences within the negotiation. However, only those negotiators who possessed nondiagnostic information achieved inferior negotiation outcomes as a result. In Study 2, negotiators possessing nondiagnostic information about their counterparts in electronically mediated negotiations were more likely to terminate the search for mutually beneficial outcomes prematurely and declare impasses. They were also less able to use diagnostic forms of information to make mutually beneficial trade-offs. As a result, negotiators in these dyads achieved inferior outcomes.     

The more (complex), the better? The influence of epistemic motivation on integrative bargaining in complex negotiation

Negotiating about a larger number of issues is often argued to enhance the potential for integrative bargaining. However, the enhanced complexity may also make negotiators more susceptible to bias, making it less likely for them to reach win–win agreements. We argue that epistemic motivation, the motivation to hold accurate perceptions of the world, provides a key to solve this paradox. In a negotiation experiment we manipulated complexity by having participants negotiate about 6 or 18 issues and we manipulated epistemic motivation by making participants process‐accountable or not. Under low complexity, there was no effect of epistemic motivation on created value. Under high complexity, however, negotiators with high epistemic motivation created more value than negotiators with low epistemic motivation. Thus, negotiating about larger numbers of issues was only beneficial for negotiators if they were motivated to think deeply and thoroughly. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Effects of Anger on Negotiation Strategies: A Cross‐Cultural Investigation

This study assessed the effects of negotiators’ anger on their own and their counterparts’ use of negotiation strategies and whether such effects were moderated by national culture. Participants (N= 130) were 66 sojourning Chinese and 64 Americans who performed an intracultural negotiation simulation. Findings indicated that (a) anger caused negotiators to use more positional statements and propose fewer integrative offers, (b) anger caused the counterparts to use fewer positional statements but also exchange less information about priorities, (c) Chinese negotiators used more persuasive arguments as their counterparts’ anger increased, whereas Americans did not, and (d) Chinese negotiators used more distributive and fewer integrative tactics than American negotiators. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed in this article.     

Strategic Timing in Group Negotiations: The Implications of Forced Entry and Forced Exit for Negotiators with Unequal Power

This study used a three-person mixed-motive negotiation to (1) investigate the effects of asymmetrical caucusing (i.e., negotiations in which parties possess unequal opportunities to engage in discussion) on group negotiations and (2) assess potential explanations for these effects. Negotiators who were excluded from part of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who remained throughout the discussion, and those who were excluded from the latter half of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who were excluded from the beginning. In addition, groups that excluded the low power negotiator from part of the discussion achieved less integrative agreements than groups that excluded the high power negotiator and groups that retained all negotiators throughout the discussion. The results highlight the importance of negotiator participation for gaining a share of rewards and the critical role played by negotiators with low power for determining the quality of agreements reached.     

Distributive spirals: negotiation impasses and the moderating role of disputant self-efficacy

Negotiations do not always end in agreements. Yet, we know little about impasses and how they affect negotiators. In three studies, we compare how negotiators experience impasses and agreements, paying particular attention to the moderating role of disputant self-efficacy. Specifically, we propose and find that negotiators who impasse find themselves caught in a distributive spiral-they interpret their performance as unsuccessful, experience negative emotions, and develop negative perceptions of their counterpart and the process. In terms of their future behavioral intentions, they are less willing to work together in the future, plan to share less information, plan to behave less cooperatively, and they lose faith in negotiation as an effective means of managing conflicts. As predicted, negotiators with relatively high levels of self-efficacy were insulated from some of these negative outcomes.     

Negotiating over Time: Impediments to Integrative Solutions

Most negotiation relationships consist of interactions that occur across time. This paper explores the influence of two variables on the outcomes of such negotiations: the mobility of negotiators and the frame of the short-term sacrifice required to reach long-term gain. Specifically, we focus on the integrativeness of agreements both within a static negotiating period as well as across several negotiations. Subjects participated in an experiment that consisted of 10 similar negotiations across time, with two issues being addressed in each negotiation. The experiment was created to allow for the possibility of a moderately advantageous integrative agreement within each static negotiation, as well as a superior integrative agreement across negotiations. A higher level of negotiator mobility was predicted to decrease the integrativeness of outcomes across negotiations. This prediction was supported. The frame of the sacrifice required of subjects was predicted to affect integrativeness both within as well as across negotiations, such that subjects would be less likely to sacrifice on an issue, or issues, if it meant accepting a perceived loss rather than a reduced gain. This prediction was not supported. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for managerial negotiation and decision making.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

群体关系与问责对信息共享意愿及谈判行为的影响研究

本研究就国人的群体关系与问责对谈判者行为及信息共享意愿进行考察,试图探讨文化对谈判者的影响。通过对128名在校大学生的模拟谈判实验,发现谈判者在群内谈判比在群际谈判时有更高的信息共享意愿和更少的强硬行为,群体关系和问责对信息共享意愿及主观利益冲突有交互效应。具体而言,高度问责时,谈判者在群内谈判比群际谈判时有更多的信息共享意愿;低度问责时,谈判者在群内谈判比群际谈判时有更少的主观利益冲突。     

The influence of power on the information search, impression formation, and demands in negotiation

Based on work by Fiske (1992), we argue that power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation. Experiment 1 showed that negotiators with less power ask more diagnostic than leading questions, and more belief-congruent than incongruent questions, when facing a competitive rather than cooperative partner. Experiment 2 suggested that this result was caused by stronger accuracy and impression motivation among less powerful negotiators. Experiment 3 showed that belief-congruent rather than incongruent questions produce more positive impressions during negotiation. And when less powerful negotiators are asked leading questions about their willingness to cooperate (compete), they responded with lower (higher) demands. The results are discussed in terms of a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.     

The Negotiated Allocation of Benefits and Burdens: The Impact of Outcome Valence, Contribution, and Relationship

This laboratory study investigates negotiated allocations of benefits and burdens. We compare both the distributive and integrative aspects of negotiation to determine whether benefits and burdens are allocated according to the same norms of distributive justice and how well negotiators integrate their interests. We hypothesize that the distribution of resources depends on the valence of the resources and negotiators′ relative contributions to those resources. We also expect that the efficiency of agreements depends on the valence of resources, the negotiators′ contributions, and the time horizon of their relationships. Results support the hypotheses. Equity is more commonly used to allocate burdens than benefits; agreements for allocating burdens are less integrative than those for benefits; and agreements are more efficient when relationships are long term and subjects contribute unequally to the resources being allocated than when they contribute equally or relationships are short term. We discuss these results in terms of Taylor′s (1991) hypothesis about the asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events.     

Perspective taking as a means to overcome motivational barriers in negotiations: when putting oneself into the opponent's shoes helps to walk toward agreements

Previous negotiation research predominantly focused on psychological factors that lead to suboptimal compromises as opposed to integrative agreements. Few studies systematically analyzed factors that impact the emergence of hurtful partial impasses (i.e., nonagreements on part of the issues). The present research investigates negotiators' egoistic motivation as a determinant for the emergence of partial impasses. In addition, the authors seek to demonstrate that perspective taking serves as a powerful tool to avoid impasses and to overcome egoistic impediments. Specifically, it was predicted that within an integrative context perspective-takers succeed to exchange concessions on low- versus high-preference issues (i.e., logroll), thereby increasing their individual profits without inflicting hurtful losses upon their counterparts. Three studies were conducted to test these predictions. Study 1 reveals that whereas negotiators' egoistic motivation increases the risk of partial impasses, perspective taking alleviates this risk. Study 2 demonstrates that this beneficial effect of a perspective-taking mindset is limited to integrative negotiations and does not emerge in a distributive context, in which negotiators are constrained to achieve selfish goals by inflicting hurtful losses on their counterparts. Study 3 confirms the assumption that in an integrative context egoistic perspective-takers overcome the risk of impasses by means of logrolling. The findings of the present studies are discussed with respect to their contribution to research on negotiations, social motivation, and perspective taking.