In the name of democracy: The value of democracy explains leniency towards wrongdoings as a function of group political organization

According to the “democracy‐as‐value” hypothesis, democracy has become an ideological belief system providing social value to democratic individuals, groups and institutions, granting legitimacy to their actions (even if dishonest or violent), and protecting them from consecutive punishments. The present research investigates the extent to which this legitimizing process is based on the individual endorsement of democratic principles. Across four experiments, following the misdeed of a (few) group member(s), respondents who valued democratic group organization and democracy in general expressed more lenient retributive justice judgments towards democratic (as compared with nondemocratic) offender groups. These findings shed light on the ways in which democratic ideology infuses justice judgments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Development and Evaluation of the Belief Acceptance Scale

The Belief Acceptance Scale (BAS) is a nine question scale that was developed to evaluate how open and accepting an individual is to other people’s beliefs across interdependent life domains. The purposes of this article are to demonstrate the internal consistency of the BAS and examine the instrument’s substructure and to correlate the BAS with validated measures of religiosity and demographic data gathered from a web-based Survey of Spiritual Experiences. The BAS focuses on cultural beliefs instead of religious motivations and was designed to be administered to religious and non-religious individuals. Three domains of belief acceptance were tested: the internal or subjective openness to other beliefs (Psychological Domain), willingness to participate in other ideologies and rituals (Reciprocal Domain), and the willingness to date or marry outside one’s belief system or cultural background (Social Domain). Responses from 350 individuals were correlated and analysed to estimate the scale’s internal consistency and subscale structure. Analyses support the validity of the BAS scores in that they demonstrate expected correlations with demographic data and standardised measures of religiosity. The results show that the BAS is an internally consistent scale with a coherent substructure that adequately measures openness to other beliefs, ideologies and belief systems.     

Two routes to perspective: Simulation and rule‐use as approaches to mentalizing

We review evidence relating to children's ability to acknowledge false beliefs within a simulation account according to which our focus is set by default to the world as we know it: hence, our current beliefs assume salience over beliefs that do not fall into this category. The model proposes that the ease with which we imaginatively shift from this default depends on the salience of our current belief, relative to the salience of the belief that is being simulated. However, children do use a rule‐based approach for mentalizing in some contexts, which has the advantage of protecting them from the salience of their own belief. Rule‐based mentalizing judgements might be faster, cognitively easier and less prone to error, relative to simulation‐based judgements that are much influenced by salience. We propose that although simulation is primary, rule‐based approaches develop as a shortcut; we thus grow from individuals capable of using only simulation into individuals capable of both techniques.     

The psychology of meta-ethics: exploring objectivism

How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.     

Believe What I Believe: Correspondence Between the Beliefs of Young Adults and the Perceived Beliefs of Their Caregivers

Little research has examined the mechanisms through which adult children adopt beliefs across a range of contexts. Through an online survey, the authors examined belief transmission via the correspondence between beliefs of 837 young adults and the perceived ideological beliefs of their caregivers as a function of attachment, parental behavior, and religious beliefs in four domains: moral, political, religious, and lifestyle. The strongest predictor of belief transmission across domains was the geographic location in which the participants were sampled, with individuals currently residing in the Southern region of the United States indicating greater belief transmission compared with those residing in the Midwestern region of the United States. Women also exhibited greater belief transmission compared with men. Controlling for these predictors, we also found that insecurity was negatively related to belief transmission, whereas authority, autonomy, and religious attachment were positively related to belief transmission in some contexts. Taken together, these results suggest that the relationships that young adults remembered having had with their primary caregivers were associated with the transmission of their caregivers’ beliefs.     

What Kind of Christian Are You? Religious Ideologies and Political Attitudes

Through measures of orthodoxy, images of God, and instrumental beliefs, scholars of the social scientific study of religion have been able to demonstrate how abstract and specific religious beliefs influence political and social attitudes. Building upon this work, this article uses a unique data set to measure social and prosperity gospel support. Further, it examines the roots and political behavioral consequences of support to these religious ideologies. The results show that religious tradition, congregational messages, and social demographics all influence doctrinal support. However, these relationships are conditional upon race. The results also show that the social gospel promotes an emphasis on the structural sources of social problems and the importance of rehabilitation, which leads to higher levels of self‐expressed liberalism and democratic identification. Conversely, the prosperity gospel promotes holding individuals accountable for social problems and punishing deviant behavior, which leads to higher levels of self‐expressed conservatism and Republican identification. The data also suggest that race matters, as the relationship between prosperity gospel support and political attitudes is more powerful for blacks than whites.     

Bible Beliefs,Conservative Religious Identity,and Same‐Sex Marriage Support: Examining Main and Moderating Effects

Research finds that Americans who espouse theologically conservative beliefs about the Bible generally oppose same‐sex marriage. Studies exploring this link, however, have been limited in that their operationalization of fundamentalist belief has been problematically conceptualized and they have potentially confounded the effect of conservative religious identity. The current study asks: (1) How do distinct beliefs about the nature and authority of the Bible influence same‐sex marriage support? (2) Do these beliefs influence same‐sex marriage support independently of conservative religious identity? (3) To what extent do Bible beliefs and conservative religious identity moderate one another's effects? And (4) to what extent are these factors moderated by religious tradition and frequency of Bible reading? Analyses of 2006 Portraits of American Life Study data reveal that while identifying as religiously conservative is the strongest predictor of opposition to same‐sex marriage, believing in inerrancy and creationism remain strong predictors in full models. I also find moderating effects between belief in creationism, inerrancy, inspiration; religious‐conservative identity; and religious tradition. Findings clarify how theological beliefs and religious identity shape support for same‐sex marriage across religious traditions.     

Differences between belief and knowledge systems

Seven features which in practice seem to differentiate belief systems from knowledge systems are discussed. These are: nonconsensuality, “existence beliefs,” alternative worlds, evaluative components, episodic material, unboundedness, and variable credences. Each of these features gives rise to challenging representation problems. Progress on any of these problems within artificial intelligence would be helpful in the study of knowledge systems as well as belief systems, inasmuch as the distinction between the two types of systems is not absolute.     

Individual Differences in Commitment to Value‐Based Beliefs and the Amplification of Perceived Belief Dissimilarity Effects

The commitment to beliefs (CTB) framework (Maxwell‐Smith & Esses, 2012) proposes that there are individual differences in the extent to which people generally follow beliefs that are a reflection of their values. The current research hypothesized that CTB would amplify the effects of perceived belief dissimilarity or incompatibility, such that individuals higher in CTB would display more pronounced reactions to belief‐relevant groups, events, or individuals seen as incompatible with their value‐based beliefs. We tested our hypothesis in three studies that assessed participants' CTB and their perceptions of belief dissimilarity or incompatibility with regard to other religious groups (Study 1), political parties during a national election (Study 2), and their romantic partner (Study 3). CTB amplified the effects of perceived belief dissimilarity or incompatibility on people's biases toward other religious groups, voting intentions and behavior in a national election, and their evaluative and behavioral responses toward their romantic partner. These results collectively suggest that perceptions of belief dissimilarity or incompatibility are particularly important cues for individuals with higher levels of CTB as they encounter other people or events that are relevant to their beliefs.     

Changes in student teachers' agency beliefs during a teacher education year,and relationships with observed classroom quality,and day‐to‐day experiences

Background Conceptualizations of teachers' agency beliefs converge around domains of support and instruction. Aim We investigated changes in student teachers' agency beliefs during a 1 year teacher education course, and related these to observed classroom quality and day‐to‐day experiences in partnership schools during the practicum. Samples Out of a sample of 66 student teachers who had responded to at least two out of four times to a questionnaire (18 men 48 women; mean age 26.4 years), 30 were observed during teaching, and 20 completed a 4‐day short form diary. Methods Confirmatory factor analysis validated two agency belief constructs. Multi‐level models for change investigated individual differences in change over time. Multi‐level path models related observation and diary responses to agency beliefs. Results Supportive agency belief was high and stable across time. Instructional agency belief increased over time, suggesting a beneficial effect of teacher education. This increase was predicted by observed classroom quality (emotional support and student engagement) and daily positive affect and agency beliefs. Conclusions Teacher education is successful in creating a context in which student teachers' supportive agency beliefs can be maintained and instructional agency beliefs can increase during the course.     

Testing the Situationism Scale in Europe: Scale validation,self‐regulation and regional differences

The term situationism refers to an individual's belief about the importance of a behaviour's context. This study tested whether the degree of situationism expressed by individuals in various regions of Europe was consistent with self‐regulation and cross‐cultural theories. The English version of a Situationism Scale (measuring beliefs about the relation between the environment and one's own behaviour) was translated into five additional languages: Dutch, German, Hungarian, Italian and Slovenian. Young adults (N = 1106, M_Age = 22.9 years, 79% female) across Europe responded to one of the six language versions of the scale as part of a larger survey. Results indicated that: new language versions were psychometrically valid; there was a positive relation between situationism and the use of situation‐control strategies; and situationism was higher for individuals from regions that are Eastern European and relatively more interdependent, compared with individuals from regions that are Western European and relatively less interdependent. As the first evaluation of the Situationism Scale outside America, this study supports the Scale's validity and suggests not only may some effects of situationism be universal, but between‐ and within‐culture differences in situationism exist. Overall, when making judgments and decisions about the self, cultural background and individual differences in situationism may come into play.     

Beyond the purely cognitive: Belief systems,social cognitions,and metacognitions as driving forces in intellectual performance

This study explores the way that belief systems, interactions with social or experimental environments, and skills at the “control” level in decision-making shape people's behavior as they solve problems. It is argued that problem-solvers' beliefs (not necessarily consciously held) about what is useful in mathematics may determine the set of “cognitive resources” at their disposal as they do mathematics. Such beliefs may, for example, render inaccessible to them large bodies of information that are stored in long-term memory and that are easily retrieved in other circumstances. In other cases, individuals' reactions to an experimental setting (fear of failure, or the desire to “look mathematical” while being videotaped) may induce behavior that is almost pathological—and at the same time, so consistent that it can be modeled. In general, such “environmental” factors establish the context within which individuals access and utilize the information potentially at their disposal. Protocols illustrating these points are presented and discussed. A model based on an axiomatization of students' beliefs about plane geometry is outlined, and is shown to correspond closely to their problem-solving performance. A framework is offered for analyzing problem-solving performance at three qualitatively different levels: access to cognitive resources stored in LTM, executive or control decision-making, and belief systems.     

Democracy and Fatalism in the Former Soviet Union1

Recent political events in the former Soviet Union suggest that democracy has only a tenuous hold in this region. Underlying many of these events may be psychological values and beliefs ill conducive to the development of democracy. In the 2 studies described in this paper, conducted in 1995 and 1998, 2 large and representative groups of manual workers, students, civil servants, managers, and the retired from 4 former Soviet republics completed measures of fatalism, attitudes toward democracy, and democratic participation (N= 2,672 and 925). Structural equation analyses of the data from both studies find that particular groups (in particular, manual workers and the retired) hold the strongest fatalistic beliefs, which in turn predict democratic attitudes, voting behavior, and political‐party membership. These findings are discussed in the light of possible interventions that might promote democratic participation in the region.     

How misinformation taints our belief system: A focus on belief updating and relational reasoning

This commentary complements Stanley et al.'s (2022) target article by concentrating on the process of false belief construction and its associated cognitive mechanisms. It also concurs with the target article that a deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanisms by which consumers revise their truth judgments in view of new evidence is needed. Specifically, this essay develops two main dimensions: the first about what we know from the actual construction of truth judgments; the second about what we know from the cognitive mechanisms by which truth judgments are constructed. Particularly on this second dimension, I develop the idea that relational reasoning is key to understanding how individuals integrate new information within their internal belief systems. These two dimensions are both process-minded, yet one is about how beliefs evolve over time, whereas the other is about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie belief construction. Overall, an understanding of these two elements is crucial to finding behavioral interventions that may curb the spread of misinformation.     

The Fairness of National Decision‐making Procedures: The Views of Adolescents in 18 European Countries

This study examines adolescents' evaluation of the fairness of three forms of democratic decision‐making procedures (direct democracy, representative democracy and group representation) and one non‐democratic procedure (oligarchy). Social dominance orientation‐Egalitarianism (SDO‐E), religious group identification and the countries' level of democracy are examined as predictors. The 2008 Europroject dataset was used, which contained 4441 native majority adolescents (mean age = 16.1 years) in 18 European countries. Adolescents evaluated direct democracy as most fair, followed by group representation, representative democracy and oligarchy. This rank order was found independent of the issue under consideration (moral or social), and of SDO‐E and religious identification, and across the countries. In addition, adolescents scoring higher on SDO‐E and on religious identification found group representation and non‐democratic oligarchy fairer. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning

A novel explanation of belief bias in relational reasoning is presented based on the role of working memory and retrieval in deductive reasoning, and the influence of prior knowledge on this process. It is proposed that belief bias is caused by the believability of a conclusion in working memory which influences its activation level, determining its likelihood of retrieval and therefore its effect on the reasoning process. This theory explores two main influences of belief on the activation levels of these conclusions. First, believable conclusions have higher activation levels and so are more likely to be recalled during the evaluation of reasoning problems than unbelievable conclusions, and therefore, they have a greater influence on the reasoning process. Secondly, prior beliefs about the conclusion have a base level of activation and may be retrieved when logically irrelevant, influencing the evaluation of the problem. The theory of activation and memory is derived from the Atomic Components of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture and so this account is formalized in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Two experiments were conducted to test predictions of this model. Experiment 1 tested strength of belief and Experiment 2 tested the impact of a concurrent working memory load. Both of these manipulations increased the main effect of belief overall and in particular raised belief‐based responding in indeterminately invalid problems. These effects support the idea that the activation level of conclusions formed during reasoning influences belief bias. This theory adds to current explanations of belief bias by providing a detailed specification of the role of working memory and how it is influenced by prior knowledge.     

Ethical Issues in Counselling and Psychotherapy: The Background

Ethical issues have their roots in the belief systems of individuals and society. Codes of ethics are seen as attempts to ensure that behaviour accords with these belief systems. An outline model is presented which highlights some aspects of beliefs, feelings and conscious and unconscious processes, and their effects upon the conscious behaviours of the individual. Aspects of social change and context are briefly considered, together with the subsequent effects upon beliefs and ethics, and issues of responsibility.     

Belief in free will as an adaptive,ungrounded belief

False beliefs and delusions are usually regarded negatively, especially in psychology and evolutionary biology. Recently, McKay and Dennett (2009b) have argued that there are ungrounded beliefs which confer benefits on individuals even if they are false. I propose to expand this class of beliefs to include the belief that one has free will, and I will defend the claim that this belief is advantageous, even if it is false. One derives one’s belief in control from one’s experience of control, which is generated by a set of cognitive systems termed “control systems.” While the control systems and the interpretive mechanism are useful in and of themselves, the belief in personal free will is adaptive because it directly leads to fitness-increasing behaviors. As such, we have good reason to regard the belief that one has free will as an adaptive, ungrounded belief. This paper will also suggest that further research on the possible distinction between belief in personal free will and belief in general free will may put us in a better position to understand recent, apparently contradictory data on individuals’ beliefs regarding free will and other related phenomena.     

When Beliefs Lead to (Im)Moral Action: How Believing in Torture's Effectiveness Shapes the Endorsement of Its Use

Does believing in torture's effectiveness shape the endorsements of its use? Using a multimethod approach across six studies, we provide converging evidence that efficacy beliefs can help increase understanding of individual differences and situational influences on torture support. Studies 1a and 1b found that torture opinions contained more efficacy‐based language than other types of harm and that people relied more on torture efficacy than torture's inherent morality when conveying their views. Study 2 assessed predictors of torture favorability including effectiveness and other key covariates, revealing that efficacy beliefs strongly predicted torture favorability—an association that retained its predictive validity above and beyond individual differences known to influence torture support. Mediation analyses further showed that efficacy beliefs explained key associations with torture support. Studies 3 and 4 used moral dilemmas requiring decisions about torture versus other harm. Results showed that individuals who believed harm would be effective were more likely to endorse its use; this was especially evident for torture judgments. Study 5 replicated the torture‐efficacy effect while also revealing efficacy effects for other interrogation techniques, thus suggesting the effect is driven more by the instrumental objective of torture than harm or moral violations. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Justifying Outcomes Versus Processes: Distributive and Procedural Justice Beliefs as Predictors of Positive and Negative Affectivity

System justifying beliefs can have adaptive consequences for individuals that include enhanced coping and decreased emotional distress. The present study examined whether individual differences in two kinds of system justifying beliefs uniquely predict dispositional affect. Participants from across the United States were recruited via internet to complete dispositional measures of procedural and distributive justice beliefs, and also brief measures of positive and negative affectivity. While belief in fair outcomes (distributive just world beliefs) was generally associated with greater positive affectivity, belief in fair processes (procedural just world beliefs) was modestly associated with decreased negative affectivity. In addition, positive and negative affectivity were predicted by interactions between procedural and distributive just world beliefs, with each accentuating the general emotional benefit provided by the other. Finally, an interactive effect of procedural just world beliefs and social class was obtained for positive affectivity, with greater positive affectivity occurring for disadvantaged (lower income) individuals who had strong procedural just world beliefs. In general, these results suggest the potential for unique and interactive relationships between particular system justifying beliefs and measures of emotion, especially among members of advantaged versus disadvantaged groups.