Applying the Theory of Affective Intelligence to Support for Authoritarian Policies and Parties

Emotion, after a long period of inattention, began to attract greater scrutiny as a key driver of human behavior in the mid‐1980s. One approach that has achieved significant influence in political science is affective intelligence theory (AIT). We deploy AIT here to begin to understand the recent rise in support for right‐wing populist leaders around the globe. In particular, we focus on specific emotional appraisals on elections held at periods of heightened threat, including the two 2015 terror attacks in France, as influences on support for the far‐right Front National among conservatives. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, we speculate that threats can generate both anger and fear, and with very different political consequences. We expect fear to inhibit reliance on extant political dispositions such as ideological identification and authoritarianism, while anger will strengthen the influence of these same dispositions. Our core findings, across repeated tests, show that fear and anger indeed differentially condition the way habits of thought and action influence support for the far right in the current historical moment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is anger that mobilizes the far right and authoritarians. Fear, on the other hand, diminishes the impact of these same dispositions.     

Does authoritarianism imply ethnocentric national attitudes: A revised look at the “authoritarian triad” and right‐wing ideology

Dozens of studies have shown that authoritarian people are ethnocentric. They are described as nationalistic, prejudiced, and hostile toward ethnic/national out‐groups. However, it can be argued that this critical claim remains unproven, as researchers do not take into consideration the very conservative right‐wing views typical of authoritarian people. To address this problem, two theoretical approaches were contrasted: the most commonly used right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) approach and the group authoritarianism approach. Both approaches define authoritarianism as the covariance of submission, aggression, and conventionalism, but they differ in that the former is inextricably related to right‐wing ideology while the latter is not. This paper presents the results of two survey studies conducted on samples of 600 and 400 respondents. In Study 1, it was found that RWA and group authoritarianism had different patterns of relationships with in‐group and out‐group national attitudes, providing strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that the right‐wing ideology generated ethnocentric national attitudes. Study 2 showed a strong direct effect of right‐wing ideology on ethnocentric national attitudes, while the impact of “pure” authoritarian covariance is marginal and sometimes even seems to be negative (e.g., ethnic prejudices). These findings suggest that authoritarianism has little to do with ethnocentric national attitudes. It is not the covariance of authoritarian attitudes that results in growing ethnocentrism. The true perpetrator can be found in the large component of right‐wing ideology contained in such measurement instruments as the RWA scale.     

Authoritarianism without Dominant Ideology: Political Manifestations of Authoritarian Attitudes in Hungary

Since the publication of Adorno, Frenkel‐Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950 ) classic study, considerable debate has developed concerning the political and ideological correlates of authoritarianism. This paper examines relationships between authoritarianism, on the one hand, and self‐identification with ideological labels, attitudes toward political extremists, and party preferences, on the other hand. The survey data have been collected in Hungary between 1994 and 2002. Findings indicate that it is the center‐right ideology and political orientation that attracts most authoritarians, yet authoritarian extreme‐left also survives. The findings also show that liberal orientation and center‐left identification constitute the political counter‐pole of authoritarianism. Extreme‐right supporters are found to be attracted only to particular aspects of authoritarianism.     

Authoritarianism and fear responses to pictures: The role of social differences

Authoritarianism can be defined as the covariation of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981). All three of these tendencies involve adherence to specific standards of behavior: standards that could be exposed to threat and disruption. This study is an investigation of the self‐reported fear of authoritarians in response to threats. A sample of 126 university students was exposed to a series of pictures of potentially threatening people and situations. In general, participants with high scores on authoritarianism were more fearful than participants with low scores. This result was found for both social threats (i.e., social differences, social disorder) and personal threats (i.e., animals, dangerous situations). The strongest association between authoritarianism and fear involved cases of social differences, defined as elements of a person's appearance or behavior that involve diversity or deviance from common social norms. Regression analyses also indicated that variation in authoritarianism could be best predicted by fear of social differences. Thus, these data suggest that authoritarians are relatively sensitive to threat, and particularly to threats involving the “outsider” who does not fit authoritarian standards of uniformity and order. The data are also consistent with recent research and theory that right‐wing ideology is at least partly motivated by threat and fear.     

Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism

Fifty years after the publication of The Authoritarian Personality, the empirical literature on authoritarianism continues to grow even though there is no widely accepted theory to account for the phenomenon. The absence of a secure theoretical grounding severely limits our understanding of authoritarianism. This paper offers a new conceptualization in which authoritarian predispositions originate in the conflict between the values of social conformity and personal autonomy. Prejudice and intolerance should be observed among those who value social conformity and perceive a threat to social cohesion. These hypotheses were tested with a sample of undergraduate students; the questionnaire included new measures of the dimension of social conformity–autonomy as well as items from Altemeyer's RWA (right–wing authoritarianism) scale.     

Finding the Loch Ness Monster: Left‐Wing Authoritarianism in the United States

Although past research suggests authoritarianism may be a uniquely right‐wing phenomenon, the present two studies tested the hypothesis that authoritarianism exists in both right‐wing and left‐wing contexts in essentially equal degrees. Across two studies, university (n = 475) and Mechanical Turk (n = 298) participants completed either the RWA (right‐wing authoritarianism) scale or a newly developed (and parallel) LWA (left‐wing authoritarianism) scale. Participants further completed measurements of ideology and three domain‐specific scales: prejudice, dogmatism, and attitude strength. Findings from both studies lend support to an authoritarianism symmetry hypothesis: Significant positive correlations emerged between LWA and measurements of liberalism, prejudice, dogmatism, and attitude strength. These results largely paralleled those correlating RWA with identical conservative‐focused measurements, and an overall effect‐size measurement showed LWA was similarly related to those constructs (compared to RWA) in both Study 1 and Study 2. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that LWA may be a viable construct in ordinary U.S. samples.     

Beauty and the Beast: Authoritarianism and gender roles of Israeli footballers,basketballers, non-athletes,and their wives

This study quantitatively compared authoritarianism and gender roles of 51 Israeli football players, 50 basketball players, 41 non-athletes and their wives (mean age = 27 years). As hypothesized, we found significant positive intercorrelations among RWA, anti-feminist attitudes, masculine traits, and interest in male-typical occupational and hobby preferences among men. Football players were more authoritarian, anti-feminist, religious, supportive of the political right, masculine, and interested in male-typical occupations and hobbies. The greatest authoritarianism, feminism, political right attitudes, and religiosity differences were found between the football players and their wives, and the football players’ wives were significantly more authoritarian, anti-feminist, and politically rightist, than both the wives of the basketball players and those of the non-athletes. Football is discussed as a politically right wing subculture that perpetuates traditional gender roles.     

Fear,Anger, and Voting for the Far Right: Evidence From the November 13, 2015 Paris Terror Attacks

The conjecture that negative emotions underpin support for far‐right politics is common among pundits and scholars. The conventional account holds that authoritarian populists catalyze public anxiety about the changing social order and/or deteriorating national economic conditions, and this anxiety subsequently drives up support for the far right. We propose that while emotions do indeed play an independent causal role in support for far‐right parties and policies, that support is more likely built upon the public’s anger rather than fear. This article explores the relative impact of fear and anger in reaction to the 2015 Paris terror attacks on the propensity to vote for the French far‐right party, the Front National, in the 2015 regional elections. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that anger is associated with voting for the Front National, while fear is associated with voting against the Front National. Moreover, anger boosts the Front National vote most powerfully among far‐right and authoritarian voters. On the other hand, fear reduces support for the far right among those same groups.     

Social Representations of History and the Legitimation of Social Inequality: The Causes and Consequences of Historical Negation1

The stories of history tend to favor dominant groups. Two longitudinal studies indicated that ideologies negating historical injustice experienced by Māori (the indigenous peoples of New Zealand) predicted increased opposition toward social policies promoting material reparation among New Zealand European undergraduates. Historical negation was, in turn, predicted by right‐wing authoritarianism (Study 2). These findings suggest that the authoritarian motivation to protect the positive history of the in‐group causes New Zealand Europeans to actively position historical injustices performed by earlier colonial generations as irrelevant. Positioning history in this fashion has important consequences for the mobilization of political attitudes and, in particular, opposition toward social and political policies relating to the distribution of resources and status within society.     

When threat to society becomes a threat to oneself: Implications for right‐wing attitudes and ethnic prejudice

The relationships between threat on one hand and right‐wing attitudes and ethnic prejudice on the other were investigated in a heterogeneous sample (N = 588). Specifically, we considered the perception of economic and terroristic threats in terms of their consequences at the societal and personal levels. Previous studies revealed that societal consequences of threat, rather than personal consequences, are related to right‐wing attitudes. However, the present results challenge these findings. More specifically, three important results emerged. First, items probing the distinct threat levels loaded on separate dimensions for economic and terroristic threat, validating the distinction between societal and personal threat consequences. Second, consistent with previous research, this study revealed that perceived societal consequences of threat yield strong and robust relationships with all target variables. However, personal consequences of threat were also associated with higher levels of right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), and ethnic prejudice in particular. Third, societal and personal consequences of threat interacted in explaining the target variables. More specifically, feeling personally threatened by terrorism was only related to higher levels of RWA in the presence of low levels of threat to society, whereas experiencing personal economic threat was only related to higher levels of SDO and ethnic prejudice when high societal economic threat was experienced. In sum, although the perception of societal consequences of threat plays a prominent role in explaining right‐wing attitudes and ethnic prejudice, the perception of being personally affected by threat is also associated with higher levels of RWA and SDO, and especially ethnic prejudice.     

Threat and authoritarianism in the United States, 1978-1987

Studies at both the individual and collective levels have implicated threat as an important factor in authoritarianism. As a follow-up to Sales's (1973) study relating behavioral indicators of authoritarianism to levels of social threat, the present research analyzed archival data from the United States for high-threat (1978-1982) and low-threat (1983-1987) periods. Societal measures of most attitude and behavioral components of the authoritarian syndrome significantly decreased between the high-threat and the low-threat periods. These results support the threat-authoritarianism relationship but also suggest a more complicated theoretical model that links perceived social conditions, arousal of authoritarian sentiments, dispositional authoritarianism, and the nature of political appeals--particularly those that engage authoritarian aggression.     

Relationships between right-wing authoritarianism, terrorism threat, and attitudes towards restrictions of civil rights: a comparison among four European countries

The present study tested the role of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), terrorist threat, and sociopolitical 'climate' as predictors of support for governmental anti-terrorism policies and actions. Two dimensions of analysis were defined: the presence versus absence of al-Qaeda attacks, and adherence to surveillance versus anti-surveillance mainstream politics. In order to study the influence of these two contextual dimensions on the expression of attitudes, we selected four European countries that fall into these two dimensions--Poland, Belgium, Spain, and the UK. Results from our study provide support for the contention that attitudes towards restrictions of civil rights are related to RWA independently of the cultural context. Moreover, in the UK sample, we found that the threat of terrorism increases acceptance of limitations of civil liberties, but only among people who hold authoritarian beliefs. However, in Spain, the other country that experienced terrorist attacks, this moderation effect was not found which is interpreted in terms of differences in the sociopolitical climate in both countries. As predicted, we did not find such moderation effect in countries in which threat is relatively low (Poland and Belgium). The results are discussed with reference to the conceptual framework based on the importance of fear experiences, security-focused policies, as well as the specific cultural context in the study of reaction to terrorist threat.     

Endorsement of sexist ideology in Taiwan and the United States: Social dominance orientation,right‐wing authoritarianism,and deferential family norms

Despite close relationships between men and women in daily lives, gender inequality is ubiquitous and often supported by sexist ideology. The understanding of potential bases of sexist ideology is thus important. According to Duckitt's dual‐process model (2001), different worldviews may explain different types of sexist ideology. Individuals who hold a “competitive world” worldview tend to endorse group‐based dominance. This lends itself to the endorsement of hostile sexism, because hostile sexism is an obvious form of male dominance. Conversely, individuals who hold a “dangerous world” worldview tend to adhere to social cohesion, collective security, and social traditions. This lends itself to the endorsement of benevolent sexism, because benevolent sexism values women who conform to gender norms. As predicted by Duckitt's model, research has shown that social dominance orientation, a general orientation towards the endorsement of group‐based dominance, is closely associated with hostile sexism. Furthermore, right‐wing authoritarianism, which measures adherence to social traditions, is closely associated with benevolent sexism. Due to the interdependent nature of gender relationships, the current research proposed that a relationship‐based belief in hierarchy, deferential family norms, and norms depicting proper manners among family members should predict the endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism, after controlling for social dominance orientation and right‐wing authoritarianism. As predicted, according to student samples collected in Taiwan and the US, the endorsement of deferential family norms predicted the endorsement of hostile sexism and of benevolent sexism, respectively. In addition, among men and women, social dominance orientation predicted hostile sexism more strongly (as opposed to benevolent sexism), whereas right‐wing authoritarianism predicted benevolent sexism more strongly (as opposed to hostile sexism). Implications regarding relationship norms, social dominance orientation, right‐wing authoritarianism, and sexist ideology are discussed.     

Sense‐making in the wake of September 11th: A network analysis of lay understandings

The objective of this research was to document and explore British university students' immediate understanding of the events of September 11th. A network analysis of lay causal perceptions procedure was employed to capture the social perceptions and sense‐making of respondents at a time when they and the world struggled to impose meaning and coherence on the events. The study also examined the possible effects of ‘belief in a just world’ and ‘right‐wing authoritarianism’ on the pattern of perceived causes. The results suggest that most participants perceive cultural and religious differences, the history of conflict in the Middle East, unfairness and prejudice as being the distal causes of the individual agent's emotions and actions. There is also some evidence that right‐wing authoritarianism and belief in a just world have an interactive effect on the strength of the perceived link between some of these causes.     

The authoritarian dynamic and Brexit: Understanding the relationship between authoritarianism and wanting to leave the EU

Individual-level authoritarianism is prominent in explanations of preferences for Brexit. We contend that extant accounts have provided an incomplete theoretical and empirical understanding of this relationship. Drawing on the idea of the ‘authoritarian dynamic’, we show that perceptions of the economic/cultural threat of immigration have stronger effects on the pro-Brexit views of individuals with weak authoritarian predispositions (libertarians). At the same time, perceptions of normative threat, which pertain to concerns like loss of faith in or lack of consensus among established authorities, have a greater impact on the pro-Brexit views of individuals with high authoritarian predispositions (authoritarians). These conditional relationships, which have previously gone unacknowledged, are crucial to understanding which individuals are likely to respond to ‘increased threat’ with pro-Brexit attitudes. We demonstrate these relationships with pro-Brexit views using British Election Study longitudinal panel data. The results clarify the conditional impact of threats and authoritarian predispositions on attitudes.     

Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism

There has been a long history of work on authoritarianism that has looked at the role of societal threat. Much of the empirical research in this tradition has relied on aggregate data to examine the relationship between societal threat and authoritarian attitudes and behaviors. Our analysis uses individual-level data and a range of perceived threat measures to better understand the dynamics of authoritarianism and threat. We also move beyond the hypothesis of a direct relationship between threat and authoritarianism, and hypothesize instead that the relationship involves interaction effects: societal threat activates authoritarian predispositions. As predicted, our analysis finds no evidence of a direct effect of societal threat but significant evidence of an interaction between authoritarian predispositions and perceived threat. We consider the implications of these results for our understanding of authoritarianism.     

How a terror attack affects right‐wing authoritarianism,social dominance orientation,and their relationship to torture attitudes

Self‐reported level of right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA ), the two facets of social dominance orientation (SDO ‐Dominance and SDO ‐Egalitarianism) and pro‐torture attitudes were measured both in the immediate aftermath (terror salience, N = 152) of the terror attacks in Paris and Brussels and when terrorism was not salient (non‐salience, N = 140). Results showed that RWA and pro‐torture attitudes, but not SDO ‐Dominance and SDO ‐Egalitarianism, were significantly higher immediately after. Furthermore, RWA and SDO both predicted pro‐torture attitudes more strongly under terror salience. We argue that the reason why RWA is higher under terror salience is a response to external threat, and that SDO ‐Dominance may be more clearly related to acceptance of torture and other human‐rights violations, across context. Future research on the effects of terror‐related events on sociopolitical and pro‐torture attitudes should focus on person‐situation interactions and also attempt to discriminate between trait and state aspects of authoritarianism.     

Support for Anti‐Muslim Policies: The Role of Political Traits and Threat Perception

We explored how political beliefs and attitudes predict support for anti‐Muslim policies and extremist behavior in the United States following the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. A large sample completed measures of authoritarianism, social dominance orientation (SDO), generalized prejudice, identification with all humanity (IWAH), perceptions of Muslim threat, and support for anti‐Muslim policies and behaviors. These measures accounted for 73% of the variance in moderate anti‐Muslim policies and 55% of the variance in extreme anti‐Muslim policies. Authoritarianism and SDO directly and indirectly predicted support for anti‐Muslim policies, with their effects partially mediated by generalized prejudice, IWAH, and perceptions of Muslims as threatening. Threat both mediated and moderated the relationship between authoritarianism and anti‐Muslim policies. A negative interaction between authoritarianism and perceptions of Muslims as threatening predicted moderate anti‐Muslim policies, but a positive interaction predicted extreme anti‐Muslim policies. A tentative explanation is offered. Perceptions of Muslim threat was consistently a powerful predictor of anti‐Muslim policies and willingness to engage in extremist behaviors targeting Muslims. Programs to combat anti‐Muslim prejudice should consider the role of threat‐related stereotypes in expressions of anti‐Muslim prejudice.     

Social representations of history and the legitimation of social inequality: the form and function of historical negation

Three studies examined the form and function of ideologies that negate (versus recognise) the historical basis of claims for reparation for past injustices. Historical negation (a) predicted opposition towards the resource‐specific aspects of social policy and (b) functioned as the mechanism though which majority group members high in a threat‐driven security‐cohesion motivation (indexed by right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA)) legitimated policy opposition in both undergraduate student (Study 1) and general population (Study 2) samples of the majority group (New Zealand Europeans/Pakeha). Study 3 experimentally manipulated historical negation in a general population sample using extracts adapted from political speeches, and demonstrated that historical negation increased opposition among liberal voters towards the resource‐specific aspects of bicultural policy. These results suggest that history serves an important symbolic function in mobilising support for public policies regarding intergroup relations because temporal continuity is central to claims of legitimacy, especially where resources are involved. Research in this area is important for any nation with a history of intergroup conflict, as it aids not only in understanding the form and function of historical narratives that legitimate social inequality, but also provides insight into the ways in which such discourses can be countered and re‐formulated in order to promote social equality. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nationalism, Internationalism, and Perceived UN Irrelevance: Mediators of Relationships Between Authoritarianism and Support for Military Aggression as Part of the War on Terror

The present research tests a model of predicted relationships among right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), nationalism, internationalism, perceived United Nations (UN) irrelevance, and support for the use of aggressive military action against countries perceived to support terrorism. In the hypothesized model, nationalism and internationalism were expected to mediate the relationship between authoritarian dispositions and support for aggressive military policies, while internationalism was expected to predict perceived UN irrelevance. Perceived UN irrelevance was also expected to predict support for military aggression directly. Across samples of community adults, hypotheses were largely supported, with only minor changes being made to the proposed model in order to improve model fit.