‘If something doesn’t look right,go find out why’: how intuitive decision making is accomplished in police first-response

ABSTRACT

Intuition is an important mechanism by which organizational actors make significant decisions; however, precisely how intuitive decisions are taken is not well understood and hence is worthy of closer scrutiny. First-response decisions, because of the conditions under which they are executed, offer researchers an interesting and relevant context for the study of intuitive decision making in organizations. We used qualitative methods to explore how “peak performing” police officers used intuition in first-response decisions. Our findings show that intuition’s role in first-response occurs in two differing but complementary ways: “recognition-based intuition” and “intuition-based inquiry”. This finding builds on previous intuition research and informs current debates in behavioural sciences regarding “default-intervention” versus “parallel-competitive” variants of dual-process theory; it also reveals how a complex and situated mix of intuition and analysis can guide effective decision making and support peak performance in uncertain, dynamic and complex environments that typify many organizational decision processes. Our findings contribute to intuition research by extending the current theory of “intuition-as-expertise” in going beyond a simple “recognize-and-respond” model. We propose a “Perceiving-Knowing-Enacting-Closing” framework which captures the complex role that intuition in combination with analysis plays in police first-response decisions, and discuss implications for decision-making policies and practices in organizations.     

Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs

Political psychologists have been quick to use prospect theory in their work, realizing its potential for explaining decisions under risk. Applying prospect theory to political decision‐making is not without problems, though, and here we address two of these: (1) Does prospect theory actually apply to political decision‐makers, or are politicians unlike the rest of us? (2) Which dimension do politicians use as their reference point when there are multiple dimensions (e.g., votes and policy)? We address both problems in an experiment with a unique sample of Dutch members of parliament as participants. We use well‐known (incentivized) decision situations and newly developed hypothetical political decision‐making scenarios. Our results indicate that politicians’ deviate from expected utility theory in the direction predicted by prospect theory but that these deviations are somewhat smaller than those of other people. Votes appear to be a more important determinant of politicians’ reference point than is policy.     

决策者的认知特征对决策过程及企业战略选择的影响

在不确定环境下,企业的最高决策者的个人特性和行为对于企业的战略决策起着关键的作用。本研究探讨决策者的认知特征对于战略决策的过程以及最终形成的战略决策的影响。研究采用情境实验法,根据某企业的实际情形编写了一个商业案例,案例提供了决策者所需要的信息,并制造出高不确定的情境。148名来自大学管理学院的学生被要求对于该案例进行分析并填写有关量表。对数据进行结构方程模型的分析后得到如下结果：决策者的认知复杂性和认知需要与他们对企业内外环境的周密分析具有显著的正向关系,而且通过后者影响到对于环境中蕴含的机会的判断,并最终影响是否进入某项业务的决策。     

Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation

It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two “systems” in the mind: one system (System 1) is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other (System 2) is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher‐order cognition. I use the term “reflectivism” to capture the view that conscious reflection—in the “System 2” sense—is a necessary feature of good moral judgment and decision‐making. This is not to suggest that System 2 must operate alone in forming our moral decisions, but that it plays a normatively ineliminable role. In this paper, I discuss arguments that have been offered in defense of reflectivism. These arguments fit into two broad categories; let us think of them as two sides of a coin. On the first side are arguments about the efficaciousness of conscious reasoning—for example, without conscious deliberation we will make bad moral judgments and decisions. On the other side of the coin are arguments about the centrality of conscious deliberation to normative actions—for example, without conscious deliberation we are no more agential than animals or automatons. Despite their attractiveness, I argue that these arguments do not successfully establish that reflection is a necessary component of good moral judgment and decision‐making. If I am right, the idea that good moral judgment and decision‐making can result from entirely automatic and subconscious processes gains traction. My goal in this paper is to show that reflectivism fails to include the full range of cases of moral decision‐making and that a theory of automaticity may do a better job. I briefly discuss at the end of the paper how an account of successful automatic moral judgment and decision‐making might begin to take shape.     

Decision Workshops for the Improvement of Decision-Making Skills and Confidence

This article describes the development and evaluation of a workshop program to help people become more confident and effective as decision makers. The workshops, based on conflict theory, consisted of five 2-hour sessions, in which participants learned about the major decisional coping patterns and the critical steps of decision making. Participants also practiced decision-making skills and learned how to use decisional balance sheets, future diaries, and other aids to vigilant decision making. The 76 participants were classified as “problem clients” (N = 44, “learners” (N = 30), and “others” (N = 2). A follow-up questionnaire administered 3 months after the final session revealed that the workshops had promoted increased confidence in decision making and less reported use of maladaptive patterns of decision making.     

What a Feeling: The Role of Immediate and Anticipated Emotions in Risky Decisions

The risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis argues that many risky decisions are not only predicted by anticipated emotions, as most consequentialistic decision making theories would presume, but also by immediate emotions. Immediate emotions refer to the “hot” visceral feelings people feel as they contemplate a specific decision option at the cusp of making a decision, whereas anticipated emotions are those emotions that people forecast that they will feel once they experience possible consequences of that decision. Four studies focused on the role of both types of emotions in decisions under risk and uncertainty. Decisions were substantively predicted by immediate emotional states beyond anticipated emotions or the subjective probability attached to outcomes. Thus, risky choices may be prompted, in part, by how people feel about the “riskless” portion of the decision—specifically, the various decision options they are contemplating—rather than the potential outcomes those options may produce. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Age differences in financial decision making: The benefits of more experience and less negative emotions

The emerging literature on aging and decision making posits that decision‐making competence changes with age, as a result of age differences in various cognitive and noncognitive individual‐differences characteristics. In a national life‐span sample from the United Kingdom (N = 926), we examined age differences in financial decisions, including performance measures of sunk cost and credit card repayment decisions, and self‐report measures of money management and financial decision outcomes. Participants also completed four individual‐differences characteristics that have been proposed as relevant to financial decision making, including two cognitive ones (numeracy and experience‐based knowledge) and two noncognitive ones (negative emotions about financial decisions). First, we examined how age was related to the four financial decision‐making measures and the four individual‐differences characteristics. Older age was correlated to better scores on each of the four financial decision‐making measures, more experience‐based knowledge, less negative emotions about financial decisions, whereas numeracy and motivation were not significantly correlated with age. Second, we found that considering both the two cognitive and the two noncognitive individual‐differences characteristics increased predictions of financial decision making, as compared with considering either alone. Third, we examined how these four individual‐differences characteristics contributed to age differences in financial decision making. Older adults' higher levels of experience‐based knowledge and lower levels of negative emotions seemed to especially benefit their financial decision making. We discuss implications for theories on aging and decision making, as well as for interventions targeting financial decisions.     

How Politicians’ Reelection Efforts Can Reduce Public Trust,Electoral Support,and Policy Approval

Politicians’ desire for reelection motivates them to be responsive to voters’ policy preferences. In the traditional view, voters choose between candidates based on their delivery of favorable outcomes such as ideologically appealing policies or a prospering economy. However, research in psychology shows that, in addition to outcomes, people care about procedural fairness and, particularly, impartial decision‐makers who make decisions without personal motives and interests. This, I argue, confronts politicians with a delicate task: politicians must present voters with favorable policy outcomes but without appearing as if they pursue these policies based on a personal, vote‐maximizing motive for reelection. In four survey experiments, I find support for this argument. Participants were significantly less inclined to trust and vote for politicians and support their policies when political decisions were described as motivated by reelection considerations than when no such motive was present. The findings advance our understanding of how citizens view political representation and have important implications for research on public opinion, legislative behavior, and democratic theory.     

迫选规则体验法: 检验规范性和描述性风险决策理论的新尝试

为寻求检验规范性和描述性风险决策理论的通用标准, 本研究以期望价值理论和齐当别抉择模型为例, 探讨了“迫选规则体验法”的适用性。被试为120名大学生, 实验任务为要求被试分别完成自主决策(采用未知规则: 真规则)和规则迫选决策(遵循给定规则: 假规则)任务, 并对决策后的情感和认可程度进行评定。研究发现: (1) 被试在自主决策条件下比在规则迫选条件下体验到的正性情感程度更强, 负性情感的程度更弱; (2) 被试在自主决策与规则迫选决策两种条件下做出的相同决策越多, 该被试对迫选规则更加认可并体验到的正性情感程度越强, 负性情感的程度越弱; (3) 与期望价值理论相比, 齐当别抉择模型可能符合更多决策者的实际决策规则。这些结果表明, 作为检验规范性和描述性风险决策理论的新尝试, 迫选规则体验法可能更有助于回答“决策者实际采用的决策规则是什么”的问题。     

No Time to Waste: Restricting Life‐Span Temporal Horizons Decreases the Sunk‐Cost Fallacy

In three studies, we examined the influence of restricted and expansive temporal horizons on the sunk‐cost fallacy. The sunk‐cost fallacy occurs when prior investments instead of future returns influence decisions about future investments. When making decisions about future investments, rational decision makers base decisions on future consequences, not already‐invested costs that are “sunk” and cannot be recovered. In Study 1, we restricted young adult college students' temporal horizons by instructing them to imagine that they did not have much longer to live; this manipulation decreased the sunk‐cost fallacy. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 and also found that the consequences of manipulating temporal horizons were most pronounced for prior investments of time and that prior investments of time and money had different implications for the sunk‐cost fallacy, depending on the social or nonsocial decision domain. In Study 3, we manipulated temporal horizons by instructing students to imagine their time as a college student was coming to an end. Results were mostly similar to Study 2 but also suggested that focusing on one's mortality may have unique consequences. Implications of the three studies for understanding age differences in sunk‐cost decisions, interventions to improve sunk‐cost decisions, and the situations in which interventions might be most needed are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Encouraging Prosocial Decisions: The Role of Fairness Salience and Uncertainty

Although the decision to engage in prosocial behavior has received research attention, the literature offers a limited understanding of fairness and uncertainty as antecedents. We propose that one can encourage prosocial decision making simply by invoking the notion of fairness because of its effects on the perceived trustworthiness of the invoking party. We also elucidate the complex role of uncertainty in prosocial decisions in that it has a negative effect while also serving to strengthen the positive effect of fairness salience. Our ideas are tested in two prosocial decision contexts, including participative pricing (i.e., “pay what you want”) and charitable giving. Data from an archival study of a naturally occurring event and two controlled experiments offer support for our arguments. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulatory Focus and Political Decision Making: When People Favor Reform Over the Status Quo

Two studies examined the impact of self‐reported use of promotion‐related (i.e., eagerness) and prevention‐related (i.e., vigilance) strategies when making “risky” or “conservative” decisions about economic reform under good, average, or poor economic conditions. Consistent with regulatory focus theory ( Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2000 ), in both studies strategic vigilance was associated with making a conservative choice, whereas strategic eagerness was associated with making a risky choice. In addition, along with perceptions of economic conditions, chronic strength of prevention focus (Study 1) or situationally induced prevention focus (Study 2) was associated with using strategic vigilance, whereas chronic strength of promotion focus (Study 1) or situationally induced promotion focus (Study 2) was associated with using strategic eagerness. Finally, regulatory focus and economic perceptions indirectly predicted economic reform decisions through their impact on strategy use. Our studies are the first to demonstrate that vigilant or eager strategy use is associated with “conservative” or “risky” political decisions.     

Decision Space Structure and its Influence upon Post-Decisional Confidence

All decisions are inevitably accompanied by a certain degree of confidence. It is assumed that during a compensatory-multi-attribute utility decision process, a cognitive structure, named Decision Space (DS) is formed. This includes cognitive representations of the offered alternatives and of an “ideal” alternative in the form of sets of meaning values. Psychological distances can be “calculated” among all the alternatives. It is hypothesized that Post-Decisional Confidence (PDC) is dependent upon DS structure. PDC is higher when the distance of the chosen alternative from the “ideal” alternative (δ) is minimal, and when the distances of the non-chosen alternatives from the “ideal” alternative (δ) is maximal. 46 subjects participated in a decision-making experiment designed to test this hypothesis. The results supported our hypothesis. It was also found that d and δ have differing degrees of influence on PDC, and that this differential influence is dependent upon the relevance of each for the specific decision. Some theoretical implications of DS were discussed.     

Trust,Distrust, and Security: An Untrustworthy Immigrant in a Trusting Community

In security studies, there is an unquestioned assumption of a linear link between trust and security. However, such an assumption neglects complex identity dynamics that can be involved in trust‐building discourses for engendering security. There needs to be greater examination into what is meant by trust, and upon what, and whom, and how the politics of identity works in social trust building and how states can influence this process. This article contributes to the literature on trust, security, and identity in International Relations (IR) by making a case for a conceptual focus on the formation of particularized distrust towards “the other” as a corollary to trust and security of “the self.” It is argued that in the construction of a political community where security is associated with trust, particularized distrust can also be promoted through institutional discourses—strengthening the “trusting we” by constructing “the other” who can challenge social trust and feelings of security associated with it. The argument is illustrated through critically examining a state‐level narrative in Norway in relation to “the other,” that is, the immigrant. Through this illustrative example, mutual constitutiveness of trust and distrust in a self/other discursive construction will be shown.     

On the Spot Ethical Decision-Making in CBRN (Chemical,Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Event) Response

First responders to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) events face decisions having significant human consequences. Some operational decisions are supported by standard operating procedures, yet these may not suffice for ethical decisions. Responders will be forced to weigh their options, factoring-in contextual peculiarities; they will require guidance on how they can approach novel (indeed unique) ethical problems: they need strategies for “on the spot” ethical decision making. The primary aim of this paper is to examine how first responders should approach on the spot ethical decision-making amid the stress and uncertainty of a CBRN event. Drawing on the long-term professional CBRN experience of one of the authors, this paper sets out a series of practical ethical dilemmas potentially arising in the context of a large-scale chemical incident. We propose a broadly consequentialist approach to on the spot ethical decision-making, but one which incorporates ethical values and rights as “side-constraints”.     

How formulating implementation plans and remembering past actions facilitate the enactment of effortful decisions

Building on prior research studying effortful decision making and enactment processes (Bagozzi, Dholakia, & Basuroy, 2003; BDB), we identify and provide an in‐depth understanding of two specific self‐regulatory strategies: (1) formulating an implementation plan, and (2) remembering past actions, that decision makers can use in facilitating enactment of effortful decisions. The results of three experiments, in which the decision maker's goal and self‐regulatory strategy were manipulated, showed that for goals that decision makers chose volitionally, the motivational effects of both these strategies lay in increasing levels of proximal implementation‐related variables (implementation intentions, plan completeness, plan enactment, and goal realization) significantly. In contrast, for goals that were assigned to participants, these strategies' motivational effects additionally extended to significantly increasing distal goal‐related variables (goal desire, goal intentions, perceived self‐efficacy, and implementation desires). The theoretical implications of our findings are discussed, and future research opportunities are explored. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What goes around comes around: The integrated role of emotions on consumer ethical decision‐making

The current study aims to further our understanding of the integrated role of emotions on consumer decision‐making involving ethical issues, by considering the influence of both positive and negative emotions on ethical decision‐making process. It considers not only the emotions experienced prior to ethical decision‐making (pre‐decision emotions) but also those resulting from the course of action chosen (post‐decision emotions). Scenarios are used, and the results of the structural modelling analyses support the proposed relationships between current emotions, consumers' ethical decision‐making, post‐decision emotions and future ethical behavioural intentions. The data suggest the possible existence of a “virtuous ethical cycle”, whereby positive emotions lead to more ethical consumer decisions and behaviours; and these in turn lead to more positive (post‐decision) emotions, which have a positive and significant effect on future ethical behavioural intentions. In addition, happiness emerges as exerting a pivotal role in predicting consumer ethical decisions.     

Arousal enhances herding tendencies when decision making

This research examines how arousal enhances consumer tendencies to be influenced by the majority when decision making, also known as “herding.” Physiological arousal was manipulated in three controlled experiments, using discrete choice decisions as the dependent variable. The results suggest that arousal enhances tendencies to choose more popular options and that deindividuation mediates the effect of arousal on choice. This research enriches our understanding of the theoretical relationship between arousal and consumer decision making, by suggesting that arousal increases herding. The practical relevance of our findings suggests that strategies to increase herding effects, such as “popular choice” stickers and social media metrics, may be enhanced by making the experience more arousing.