Epistemological barriers to radical behaviorism

The historian and philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard proposed the concept of epistemological barriers to describe the intellectual challenges encountered by scientists in their work. In order to embrace novel ways of approaching a problem in science, scientists must overcome barriers or obstacles posed by their prior views. For example, Einsteinian physics presents scientists with claims that space is curved and that time and space are on the same continuum. We utilize Bachelard's concept of epistemological barriers to describe the differences between the intellectual journeys students pursuing advanced studies face when attempting to accept cognitive psychology or radical behaviorism. We contend that the folk psychological beliefs that students typically hold when entering these studies pose less challenge to cognitive psychology than to radical behaviorism. We also suggest that these barriers may also partly be involved in the problematic exegesis that has plagued radical behaviorism. In close, we offer some suggestions for dealing with these epistemological barriers.     

Probability and radical behaviorism

The concept of probability appears to be very important in the radical behaviorism of Skinner. Yet, it seems that this probability has not been accurately defined and is still ambiguous. I give a strict, relative frequency interpretation of probability and its applicability to the data from the science of behavior as supplied by cumulative records. Two examples of stochastic processes are given that may model the data from cumulative records that result under conditions of continuous reinforcement and extinction, respectively.     

Interbehavioral psychology and radical behaviorism: Some similarities and differences

Both J. R. Kantor's interbehavioral psychology and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism represent wellarticulated approaches to a natural science of behavior. As such, they share a number of similar features, yet they also differ on a number of dimensions. Some of these similarities and differences are examined by describing their emergence in the professional literature and by comparing the respective units of analysis of the two approaches-the interbehavioral field and the three-term contingency. An evaluation of the similarities and differences shows the similarities to be largely fundamental, and the differences largely ones of emphasis. Nonetheless, the two approaches do make unique contributions to a natural science of behavior, the integration of which can facilitate the development of that science and its acceptance among other sciences and within society at large.     

Misconception and miseducation: Presentations of radical behaviorism in psychology textbooks

Behavior analysts have recently expressed concern about what appear to be misrepresentations of behaviorism in psychology textbooks. This paper presents an analysis of currently used textbooks in the areas of introductory, social, cognitive, personality, and developmental psychology that confirms this. Topics on which behavior analysis is most often misrepresented relate to the role of animal learning research, environmentalism, the "empty organism," language, and the overall utility of the approach. Because textbooks are often a major medium of interaction between the public and behaviorism, behavior analysts must work to correct these errors and to prevent possible negative consequences of widespread misunderstanding. Several potential solutions to these problems are presented that take into account current publishing practices and the monetary contingencies which support them.     

The propensity theory: a decision-theoretic restatement

Probability theory is important because of its relevance for decision making, which also means: its relevance for the single case. The propensity theory of objective probability, which addresses the single case, is subject to two problems: Humphreys’ problem of inverse probabilities and the problem of the reference class. The paper solves both problems by restating the propensity theory using (an objectivist version of) Pearl’s approach to causality and probability, and by applying a decision-theoretic perspective. Contrary to a widely held view, decision making on the basis of given propensities can proceed without a subjective-probability supplement to propensities.     

Data and phenomena: a restatement and defense

This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced, ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms.     

From mechanistic to functional behaviorism.

A shift from mechanistic behaviorism to functional behaviorism is presented against the background of two historical traditions, one with an emphasis on form, the other with an emphasis on function. Skinner's work, which made more contributions to a functional behaviorism than to a mechanistic behaviorism, exemplifies this shift. The two traditions and an account of Skinner's development of functional relations are presented in order to show Skinner's contributions to aligning modern behavior analysis with the functional tradition.     

Bringing radical behaviorism to revolutionary Brazil and back: Fred Keller's Personalized System of Instruction and Cold War engineering education

This article traces the shifting epistemic commitments of Fred S. Keller and his behaviorist colleagues during their application of Skinnerian radical behaviorism to higher education pedagogy. Building on prior work by Alexandra Rutherford and her focus on the successive adaptation of Skinnerian behaviorism during its successive applications, this study utilizes sociologist of science Karin Knorr Cetina's concept of epistemic cultures to more precisely trace the changes in the epistemic commitments of a group of radical behaviorists as they shifted their focus to applied behavioral analysis. The story revolves around a self‐paced system of instruction known as the Personalized System of Instruction, or PSI, which utilized behaviorist principles to accelerate learning within the classroom. Unlike Skinner's entry into education, and his focus on educational technologies, Keller developed a mastery‐based approach to instruction that utilized generalized reinforcers to cultivate higher‐order learning behaviors. As it happens, the story also unfolds across a rather fantastic political terrain: PSI originated in the context of Brazilian revolutionary history, but circulated widely in the U.S. amidst Cold War concerns about an engineering manpower(sic) crisis. This study also presents us with an opportunity to test Knorr Cetina's conjecture about the possible use of a focus on epistemic cultures in addressing a classic problem in the sociology of science, namely unpacking the relationship between knowledge and its social context. Ultimately, however, this study complements another historical case study in applied behavioral analysis, where a difference in outcome helps to lay out the range of possible shifts in the epistemic commitments of radical behaviorists who entered different domains of application. The case study also has some practical implications for those creating distance learning environments today, which are briefly explored in the conclusion.