Slouching Toward Policy: Lazy Bioethics and the Perils of Science Fiction

Too much contemporary bioethical discourse is weak on science, lazily citing and adopting science fiction scenarios rather than science facts in the framing of analyses and policies. We challenge bioethicists to take more seriously the role of providing informed insight into and oversight over contemporary science and its implications and applications. Bioethicists must work harder to understand the fast-changing truths and limits of basic science, and they must incorporate only appropriate and authentic science into their discourse, just as they did in the past when addressing the quandaries of clinical medicine. The field of bioethics is not so old and entrenched that its future is assured. Bioethicists must make themselves useful to society in order to deserve and retain the public's trust. They can best do this by ensuring that decision making and public policy are grounded in facts, not fictions and fantasies.     

The Contribution of the Protestant Church in Germany to the Pluralist Discourse in Bioethics: The Case of Stem Cell Research

Christian contributions to the public discourse on bioethicscome from individual Christians, from Christian churches, andfrom academic theology. All contributors must frame their argumentsin such a way as to account for the pluralism of worldviewsin contemporary Germany. For this purpose, they must take issuewith certain hermeneutical and discourse theoretical considerations.That is to say, in order for their contributions to remain normativelyauthentic in a Christian and Protestant sense, these must relateto Scripture and to Protestantism's confessional documents,and in order for these contributions to remain pertinent andrelevant to the facts, they must relate to biomedical, philosophical,and legal contexts. Given these hermeneutical and discoursetheoretical requirements, two church statements addressing theethical discussion concerning the use of embryonic stem cellsfor medical research are analyzed.     

Neither Mereology nor Magic,but Teleology

Contemporary theories of universals have two things in common: first, they are unable to account for necessary connections between universals that form a structure. Second, they leave teleology out of their accounts of instantiation. These facts are not unrelated; the reason why contemporary theories have such trouble is they neglect the ancient idea that universals are ends at which nature aims. If we want a working theory of universals, however, we must return to this idea. Despite its unpopularity among realists, teleology is not a disposable eccentricity, and its dismissal is not an improvement on ancient views.     

Grounding and anchoring: on the structure of Epstein’s social ontology

Brian Epstein’s The Ant Trap is a praiseworthy addition to literature on social ontology and the philosophy of social sciences. Its central aim is to challenge received views about the social world – views with which social scientists and philosophers have aimed to answer questions about the nature of social science and about those things that social sciences aim to model and explain, like social facts, objects and phenomena. The received views that Epstein critiques deal with these issues in an overly people-centered manner. After all, even though social facts and phenomena clearly involve individual people arranged in certain ways, we must still spell out how people are involved in social facts and phenomena. There are many metaphysical questions about social properties, relations, dependence, constitution, causation, and facts that cannot be answered (for instance) just be looking at individual people alone. In order to answer questions about (e.g.) how one social entity depends for its existence on another, we need different metaphysical tools. Epstein thus holds that social ontological explanations would greatly benefit from making use of the theoretical toolkit that contemporary analytical metaphysics has to offer. He focuses specifically on two metaphysical instruments: grounding and anchoring. This paper examines Epstein’s understanding and use of these tools. I contend that Epstein is exactly right to say that contemporary metaphysics contains many theoretical instruments that can be fruitfully applied to social ontological analyses. However, I am unconvinced that Epstein’s tools achieve what they set out to do. In particular, I will address two issues: (1) How is grounding for Epstein meant to work? (2) Is anchoring distinct from grounding, and a relation that we need in social ontology?     

Buddhism and Science: Allies or Enemies?

Buddhist teachings and modern science are analogous both in their approach to the search for truth and in some of the discoveries of contemporary physics, biology, and psychology. However, despite these congruencies and the recognized benefits of science, Buddhism reminds us of the dangers of a tendency toward scientific reductionism and imperialism and of the sciences' inability to deal with human moral and spiritual values and needs. Buddhism and science have human concerns and final goals that are different, but as long as the boundaries between them are not trespassed, they can be mutually corrective and allied to benefit humankind. Buddhism must be open to the discoveries of science about the physical world as must all religions today, but no matter how much it may have to modify some of its ancient beliefs, its basic truths—the truths about human suffering and its release—will remain untouched.     

Anthropocentric Rhetorical Discourse in Popular Science Writing about Human Evolution

Discourse describing evolution in contemporary popular science writing often posits that humans evolved not from an ape, but from a merely ape-like or generalized primate. Contemporary fossil and genetic evidence, though, have revealed what can accurately be described as an extinct ape species as ancestral to the human lineage. The persistence of ambiguous terms in popular science writing may be interpreted as a form of anthropocentric rhetorical discourse. Nonetheless, while such discourse is often justified in terms of increasing the public understanding of science, it may also mitigate (whether consciously intended or not) religion-based resistance to evolutionary theory.     

Towards decompartmentalization

Education can only be effective if interdisciplinary and decompartmentalized. The young must have a scientific culture if they are to adapt to the contemporary world and to its evolution. Teaching science must be a way of training the mind to reasoning, to method, to discernment. Science nevertheless remains but a means, an aid for decision; scientific truth must be made relative by resting upon the history of science.     

Understanding and the facts

If understanding is factive, the propositions that express an understanding are true. I argue that a factive conception of understanding is unduly restrictive. It neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. For science uses idealizations and models that do not mirror the facts. Strictly speaking, they are false. By appeal to exemplification, I devise a more generous, flexible conception of understanding that accommodates science, reflects our practices, and shows a sufficient but not slavish sensitivity to the facts.

A software agent model of consciousness.

Baars (1988, 1997) has proposed a psychological theory of consciousness, called global workspace theory. The present study describes a software agent implementation of that theory, called "Conscious" Mattie (CMattie). CMattie operates in a clerical domain from within a UNIX operating system, sending messages and interpreting messages in natural language that organize seminars at a university. CMattie fleshes out global workspace theory with a detailed computational model that integrates contemporary architectures in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Baars (1997) lists the psychological "facts that any complete theory of consciousness must explain" in his appendix to In the Theater of Consciousness; global workspace theory was designed to explain these "facts." The present article discusses how the design of CMattie accounts for these facts and thereby the extent to which it implements global workspace theory.     

Domains of Sciences,Universes of Discourse and Omega Arguments

Each science has its own domain of investigation, but one and the same science can be formalized in different languages with different universes of discourse. The concept of the domain of a science and the concept of the universe of discourse of a formalization of a science are distinct, although they often coincide in extension. In order to analyse the presuppositions and implications of choices of domain and universe, this article discusses the treatment of omega arguments in three very different formalizations of arithmetic. In Peano's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals, while the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of all individuals. In Gödel's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization, but the universe of discourse coincides with the domain. In Whitehead-Russell's formalization the domain is a class of logical notions in Tarski's sense, that are necessarily not individuals, whereas the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization. The present approach emphasizes the viewpoint that the universe of discourse of a given discourse is important in determining which propositions are expressed by which sentences.     

Reasonable magic and the nature of alchemy: Jewish reflections on human embryonic stem cell research

The controversy about research on human embryonic stem cells both divides and defines us, raising fundamental ethical and religious questions about the nature of the self and the limits of science. This article uses Jewish sources to articulate fundamental concerns about the forbiddenness of knowledge in general and of knowledge thought of as magical creation. Alchemy, and the turning of elements into gold and into substances for longevity, and magic used for the creation of living beings was at stake in various Talmudic texts. Since contemporary discourse calls regenerative science magical, and makes claims about its restorative power, careful reflection on when magic is forbidden and when it is responsible allows a novel understanding of ethical questions in stem cell research.     

Orthodoxy and Science

The Orthodox Church is uneasy about contemporary science. What causes its uneasiness is not exclusively its slow reception of modern culture. An important cause is the fact that contemporary research sidelines ethical and spiritual criteria. The practical application of scientific discoveries in the area of biotechnologies provides abundant evidence for this. That said, progress is being made in regard to the Orthodox appraisal of modern culture and contemporary science and toward self-assessment against current cultural trends. This progress cannot make an impact, however, without an authenticating framework. Fortunately, three documents of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church provide an implicit framework for addressing matters such as the Orthodox attitude toward science, especially biology and its related branches, in light of theological anthropology and traditional ethical and spiritual criteria. A shared particularity of these documents is that they consider modern culture and scientific research in a missional perspective.     

Toward Poetic Science

This article is an extension of earlier discussion in the present journal regarding feelings in literature and, more broadly, the distinction between literary and scientific discourse. Valid though this distinction may be on some level, it is argued herein that it owes its very existence, in part, to a problematically narrow view of what constitutes science, one that not only eschews the life of feeling but that fails to abide by the primary obligation of the scientific endeavor—namely, to practice fidelity to the phenomena of concern. In this respect, it might plausibly be said that much of contemporary psychological science is not scientific enough and that, consequently, a more open and capacious conception is called for. More specifically, it is suggested that a portion of the discipline move in the direction of what might be called poetic science, a form of science that, in its very art-fulness, can do justice to the ambiguity, complexity, and depth that characterizes lived experience.     

Producing the Post-Fordist Public: The Political Economy of Public Engagement with Science

The commercial exploitation of scientific knowledge and increased public participation in democratic decision-making about science and technology have emerged as the two central themes of contemporary science policy in Britain. We argue that the prominence of participatory discourse in contemporary science policy is primarily due to the close fit of this discourse with the post-Fordist and post-industrial economic strategy of the British state. Participation is a form of immaterial labour which gains currency in this phase of capitalism, blurring the distinctions between production and consumption, and between the economy and the political or communicative public sphere. Participation is cognitive, interpretative, affective, and social work which enters into the construction of technologies as bundled material artefacts and cultural meanings. Participation operates both in the production and consumption of goods and in the legitimation of social and political relations. Public engagement exercises prepare the product for the market and the market for the product. Such exercises therefore instantiate the way in which immaterial labour is both productive and political. Participation activates, but also disciplines, the subjectivities of post-Fordist publics. Contrary to the rhetoric of democratization that has accompanied public engagement efforts, these programmes potentially operate as forms of control and co-optation, and promote the shaping of publics as markets.     

DO FALLIBILIST ACCOUNTS OF THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE UNDERESTIMATE AND ENDANGER SCIENCE?

All fallibilist theories may appear to be defective, because they allegedly underestimate the security of at least some scientific knowledge and thereby leave science less defensible than it otherwise might be. When they call all scientific knowledge conjectural they may seem at first blush to underestimate the superiority of science vis a vis pseudo‐science. Fallibilists apparently fail to account for the fact that science turns theory into facts, because even “facts” are held only provisionally. This impression is false: the relatively secure establishment of facts can be accounted for with a fallibilist view. After theories have been honed through sharp criticism, there is often no reason to doubt some aspects of them. These aspects are what we regard to be factual knowledge, even though these facts are also provisionally accepted as such. We then explain the newly won factual knowledge with deeper theories, which often correct our factual knowledge in spite of its apparent security. Theories of justification add nothing useful to the fallibilists' observation that science finds the best theories because it has the highest standards of criticism. Fallibilist theories today give the best account and defence of science. We may abandon the quest for some kind of assurance that goes beyond the determination that some theory can answer all known objections to it and take up more interesting problems, such as how we can find new objections and how criticism may be improved and made institutionally secure. ¹ 1 I am grateful to Joseph Agassi and an anonymous referee of this journal for comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
     

请守住科学的底线

针对告别中医中药风潮,提出既然以“科学”的旗号,首先,立论就应恪守科学精神,尊重客观事实,注重历史地考察问题,讲究哲学思考,而不可不顾事实与历史背景,随意编造;也不可削足适履,以“物理科学”观,规范所有的科学学科。并就医学与物理科学的关系做了分析。认为:以科学的名义围剿中医学,命题本身就是错的。     

Empirical evaluation and justification of methodologies in psychological science.

The purpose of this article is to describe a relatively new movement in the history and philosophy of science, naturalism, a form of pragmatism emphasizing that methodological principles are empirical statements. Thus, methodological principles must be evaluated and justified on the same basis as other empirical statements. On this view, methodological statements may be less secure than the specific scientific theories to which they give rise. The authors examined the feasibility of a naturalistic approach to methodology using logical and historical analysis and by contrasting theories that predict new facts versus theories that explain already known facts. They provide examples of how differences over methodological issues in psychology and in science generally may be resolved using a naturalistic, or empirical, approach.     

Evolutionary Theology and God–Memes: Explaining Everything or Nothing

It is not uncommon for Darwinists and memeticists to speculate not only that god–memes (cultural units for belief in a god) evolved as maladaptive traits but also that these memes do not correspond to anything real. However, a counter–Darwinian argument exists that some god–memes evolved as adaptive traits and did so with a metaphysical correspondence to reality. Memeticists cannot disallow these positive claims, because the rules they would use to disallow them would also disallow their negative claims. One must either accept that positive Darwinian theological claims can fall within the bounds of science (and therefore be judged on their explanatory merits alone) or must disallow both sets of arguments, including any claims that god–memes fail to correspond to reality. Given that many Darwinists do not appear to accept a modest version of science that avoids negative metaphysical claims, precedence exists in memetic and Darwinian discourse for making positive metaphysical claims as well.     

Applying social constructionism to psychotherapy

Social constructionism is the view that many of the abstract quantities, our relations according to these, and the relationships of evelyday life, are human made processes and contexts into which we have been born, or into which we can gain access by our credentials in society. Social constructionism has investigated personhood, male-female gender roles, sexuality, and the dzferent conceptualisations of appropriate social roles and emotional displays. All fields of science, study and debate are seen as historical processes occurring in human contexts of supporters and dissenters who gather round in a complex changing pattern. Explanations are not regarded as indisputable facts or truths, but only approximations, or part of a discourse between schools of thought.     

CIPHERS OF TRANSCENDENCE: COGNITIVE AESTHETICS IN SCIENCE

Modern epistemology is reluctant to presume the objectivity of a mental event. Because a valid theory of knowledge is subjected to objective standards of rationality, the invocation of a transcendent ground of existence termed ‘god’ is deemed extra‐systematic. This reference lacks warrant because it fails to satisfy the impartial criteria methodologically basic to contemporary paradigms of knowledge. Still the biochemist Arthur Peacocke (1924–2006) claimed defensible public truth for an ultimate reality based on the ‘supremely’ rational nature of existence; it is the further contention of this paper that there are intelligible patterns to the universe whose discovery is incapable of ‘objective’ explanation. By failing to meet these criteria, however, they do not fall into irrationality, still less do they disqualify or exclude themselves from public consideration; quite the opposite. There are perhaps depths to human experience then, including science, to which an existentialist epistemology is appropriate. In this connection the philosophy of Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) provides a compelling account of the transition of scientific research into aesthetics and theological discourse.