A scalar product model for the multidimensional scaling of choice

A multidimensional scaling analysis is presented for replicated layouts of pairwise choice responses. In most applications the replicates will represent individuals who respond to all pairs in some set of objects. The replicates and the objects are scaled in a joint space by means of an inner product model which assigns weights to each of the dimensions of the space. Least squares estimates of the replicates' and objects' coordinates, and of unscalability parameters, are obtained through a manipulation of the error sum of squares for fitting the model. The solution involves the reduction of a three-way least squares problem to two subproblems, one trivial and the other solvable by classical least squares matrix factorization. The analytic technique is illustrated with political preference data and is contrasted with multidimensional unfolding in the domain of preferential choice.The present work was initiated at Oregon Research Institute under National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH 12972. It was reformulated and completed while the first author was a Visiting Research Fellow at Educational Testing Service.Presently at the Department of Mathematics, University of Toronto.     

Using advertising alignment to improve product placement effects on product choice: The power of facilitating analogies

Two studies investigate the utility of analogical reasoning for improving the likelihood of consumer choice after a product placement. Data suggest that analogical transfer to real‐life situations of a product solution featured in a placement can be facilitated by judicious use of accompanying advertising. Ads that are distinct from placement content are associated with higher choice frequencies for the focal item than are ads that play as extensions of a show episode in which a product was placed. This presumably occurs because distinct ads promote generalization of the solution viewed in the product placement, and this, in turn, facilitates later analogical mapping of the solution.     

Situated embodied cognition: Monitoring orientation cues affects product evaluation and choice

Consumers generally prefer products that are easy to interact with. In three studies, we show that this preference arises from the fit between product orientation and monitored situational constraints. Flexible right-handers, who monitor situational constraints, recall product orientations better and prefer products for which the handle is oriented in the direction of the hand used for grasping. When their ability to monitor situational constraints is impaired, the preference for easy-to-grasp products is attenuated. The findings highlight that motor fluency is a relevant cue for decision making when consumers assess how to interact with a product. The implications of these results for embodiment and fluency research are discussed.     

The effect of respondents' nationality and familiarity with a product category on the importance of product attributes in consumer choice: Globalization and the evaluation of domestic and foreign products

This study compared the perceptions of 376 Japanese and 191 Canadian consumers concerning the importance of different product attributes for categories of products at various stages of globalization. There was less multivariate statistical difference between the two countries for those products at a more advanced stage of globalization (consumer electronics and clothing vs. food). The joint effects of the degree of familiarity with the category of product and the country of the respondent on the importance of the product attributes were tested. The effect of familiarity was found to result in a significant statistical multivariate difference for the clothing category only. The observed statistical power of the effect of country of respondent confirmed that more statistical difference was apparent for the least globalized product. No multivariate significant statistical interaction was found between familiarity and country of respondent. Using a multi-attribute model, the evaluation of the three categories of product was computed for seven different countries of manufacture. Comparison of the total scores of each country for each product category for the Japanese and the Canadian samples confirmed that the most globalized product showed least difference in its evaluation between countries of manufacture. A well-known strong bias toward domestic products was, however, observed in both samples.     

Rationalizing two-tiered choice functions through conditional choice

Set-valued choice functions provide a framework that is general enough to encompass a wide variety of theories that are significant to the study of rationality but, at the same time, offer enough structure to articulate consistency conditions that can be used to characterize some of the theories within this encompassed variety. Nonetheless, two-tiered choice functions, such as those advocated by Isaac Levi, are not easily characterized within the framework of set-valued choice functions. The present work proposes conditional choice functions as the proper carriers of synchronic rationality. The resulting framework generalizes the familiar one mentioned above without emptying it and, moreover, provides a natural setting for two-tiered choice rules.     

Optimal choice

We present a classification and theoretical analysis of discrete-trial and free-operant choice procedures in which reinforcement is assigned to one alternative only, or independently to both, is either always available or conditionally available, and is either "held" or not from trial to trial. Momentary-maximizing and (globally) optimal choice sequences are defined in terms of initializing and marker events. Free-operant choice is analyzed in terms of a clock space whose axes are the times since the last A and B choices. The analysis shows that most molar matching data are derivable from momentary maximizing, and that the momentary-maximizing hypothesis has not been adequately tested in either discrete-trial or free-operant situations.     

Conflict-mediated choice

Research on behavioral decision making has demonstrated that preferences are affected by the set of options under consideration. Formal models offer an account of such choice-set effects on the basis of principles according to which the similarity of the options in the choice set has an effect on choice probabilities. Behavioral formulations are Tversky's (1972) elimination-by-aspects (EBA) model, based on the principle of sequential elimination, and Tversky and Simonson's (1993) componential context (CC) model, based on the principle of pairwise comparisons subject to loss aversion. While these principles are assumed to determine choice behavior, the conflict induced by the set of options under consideration is assumed to be merely a source of indeterminacy in choice behavior. This paper challenges past models by offering a behavioral account of choice-set effects according to which the effect of similarity on choice probabilities is mediated by conflict. A conflict-mediated choice (CMC) model is developed, its testable implications are derived, and its predictions are contrasted with those of the EBA model and the CC model. Specifically, it is described how, according to each of the three models, choice probabilities are affected by the similarity of the options in the choice set and how choice-set effects are moderated by the relative weight of the attributes along which the options are positioned. In two experimental studies, the CMC model offers an accurate account of observed choice-set effects and outperforms the alternative models.     

Emotion-regulation choice

Despite centuries of speculation about how to manage negative emotions, little is actually known about which emotion-regulation strategies people choose to use when confronted with negative situations of varying intensity. On the basis of a new process conception of emotion regulation, we hypothesized that in low-intensity negative situations, people would show a relative preference to choose to regulate emotions by engagement reappraisal, which allows emotional processing. However, we expected people in high-intensity negative situations to show a relative preference to choose to regulate emotions by disengagement distraction, which blocks emotional processing at an early stage before it gathers force. In three experiments, we created emotional contexts that varied in intensity, using either emotional pictures (Experiments 1 and 2) or unpredictable electric stimulation (Experiment 3). In response to these emotional contexts, participants chose between using either reappraisal or distraction as an emotion-regulation strategy. Results in all experiments supported our hypothesis. This pattern in the choice of emotion-regulation strategies has important implications for the understanding of healthy adaptation.     

Preference for free choice over forced choice in pigeons

Eight severely retarded young men learned color and line-tilt discrimination. After 95% accuracy was achieved for both dimensions, they were combined to form "conflict-compound" stimuli in which prior reinforcement history was reversed for one element of the compound and unchanged for the other. When responding to the compound was 95% accurate, control exerted by each element was measured. The unchanged element consistently exercised control in agreement with the reinforcement contingencies associated with the compound, regardless of whether it was color or line orientation. The reversed element, which had a conflicting prior history or reinforcement, most often exerted control associated wtih original training, or no control, suggesting that it had been "ignored" during the compound. Conflict compounds produced selective attention. When elements were combined to form "compatible-compound" stimuli, both exercised control in agreement with the compound in post-tests. Selective attention was not produced by compatible compounds.     

Elaboration and choice

Dhar and Gorlin (2013) proposed a dual-process perspective on choice. We applaud the effort to generate such a model, and we support the effort to integrate potentially disparate literatures under a general theoretical approach. In an attempt to further that goal of integration, we discuss similarities and differences between the proposed approach and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty, 1977, Petty and Cacioppo, 1979, Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) — one of the earliest models of evaluative judgment to propose different mechanisms and consequences of judgments formulated at different levels of motivation and ability to process available information. In addition, because many choice settings involve familiar options that have been previously evaluated, we discuss potential implications of the literature on influences of attitudes on behavior (which can often be framed as involving a choice to act or not or to act in one way rather than another). In each case, we believe that these previous social psychological literatures provide insights that could enhance and extend the proposed model.     

Scalable choice models

Two representational criteria for probabilistic choice models are studied. These criteria, called scalability and weak scalability, are shown to be characterized by behavioral axioms designated, respectively, as pairwise dependence and weak pairwise dependence. The former is shown to be equivalent to the order independence axiom of Tversky. In addition, structural conditions on the choice alternatives are established under which all axioms are equivalent.     

Understanding choice utterances

When individuals offer choices, they intend them to be mandatory (requiring action) or permissive (not requiring action), and they intend them to be open (allowing the choice of both options) or closed (not allowing the choice of both options). In two studies subjects were presented with sets of syntactically equivalent disjunctive sentences with varying content designed to represent four patterns of permitted choice. The research indicates that individuals distinguish four distinct uses of “or” in deontic contexts, and that individuals more often judge choices as mandatory than permissive. The research also compared responses to questions about choice giver intent and receiver choice. The data indicate that when judging intent, individuals are inclined to understand some choices to be permissive. However, when judging what action they might take as choice receiver, subjects tend to regard action to be mandatory. It appears that although people have some facility in assessing a permission giver's intent, they often apply a more restrictive rule to themselves than is required by the choice giver.     

Maximizing,choice freedom,and duration judgments in choice making

This paper examines (a) whether people are less accurate in judging choice time as choice tasks involve more choice options, more choice information, or a combination of both and (b) whether people with a higher tendency to look for the best option in choice making (maximizers) have less accurate duration judgments of choice time as compared to people who are more easily settling for a choice outcome that is satisfactory (satisficers). A multilevel analysis is used to explore the relationships of interest using data collected through a series of choice tasks. In general, the results suggest that people seem to misjudge time durations when making choices. Moreover, empirical evidence demonstrates that people with an outspoken tendency to maximize in choice making do not differ significantly in estimating choice time accurately as compared to people who experience almost no need to maximize.     

The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

Influencing choice without awareness

Forcing occurs when a magician influences the audience’s decisions without their awareness. To investigate the mechanisms behind this effect, we examined several stimulus and personality predictors. In Study 1, a magician flipped through a deck of playing cards while participants were asked to choose one. Although the magician could influence the choice almost every time (98%), relatively few (9%) noticed this influence. In Study 2, participants observed rapid series of cards on a computer, with one target card shown longer than the rest. We expected people would tend to choose this card without noticing that it was shown longest. Both stimulus and personality factors predicted the choice of card, depending on whether the influence was noticed. These results show that combining real-world and laboratory research can be a powerful way to study magic and can provide new methods to study the feeling of free will.