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1.
Alessandro Ferrara 《Res Publica》2011,17(4):377-383
This paper engages with Ferrajoli’s contribution to the philosophical debate on constitutional democracy and in particular
his conception of ‘structural entrenchment’, or the basis upon which one can defend the normativity of the Constitution as
‘higher law’, which can trump or limit legislation, without infringing democratic principles. Ferrajoli’s own understanding
of ‘structural entrenchment’ is compared to Rawls’s and Dworkin’s arguments in support of it. Ferrajoli’s position is neither
grounded on a philosophy of history, as in Rawls, nor on a version of moral realism, as for Dworkin, but on a formal understanding
of the nature of fundamental rights, and in a conception of democratic sovereignty as ‘joint ownership.’ 相似文献
2.
Stephen Finlay 《Synthese》2010,177(1):67-89
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing ‘detaching problems’ by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine
three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed
to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number
of senses for ‘ought’. The semantics for ‘ought’ that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these
problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for ‘ought’ provides a more satisfactory solution. 相似文献
3.
Oliver Feeney 《Res Publica》2006,12(4):357-383
Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity has been regularly discussed and criticized for being inadequate regarding
natural inequalities. In so far as this egalitarian goal is sound, the purpose of the paper is to see how the prospect of
radical genetic intervention might affect this particular inadequacy. I propose that, in a post-genetic setting, an appropriate
response would be to extend the same rules regulating societal inequalities to a regulation of comparable genetic inequalities.
I defend this stance against recent arguments from the authors of From Chance to Choice and from Colin Farrelly’s alternative of the genetic difference principle.
Thanks and appreciation to Dr. Pete Morris, Noreen McGuire and Ann Feeney for their support and encouragement. My thanks also
to the participants of the Ninth Manchester Graduate (Brave New World 2005) Conference in Political Theory, where a shorter
version of this paper was read. 相似文献
4.
E. J. Coffman 《Synthese》2006,151(2):257-272
In this paper, I consider some issues involving a certain closure principle for Structural Justification, a relation between
a cognitive subject and a proposition that’s expressed by locutions like ‘S has a source of justification for p’ and ‘p is
justifiable for S’. I begin by summarizing recent work by Peter Klein that advances the thesis that the indicated closure
principle is plausible but lacks Skeptical utility. I then assess objections to Klein’s thesis based on work by Robert Audi
and Anthony Brueckner. One finding is that the typical statement of the relevant closure principle can express a number of
different closure principles, and that recognizing this helps to resolve certain disputes. 相似文献
5.
Volker Heins 《Res Publica》2012,18(1):79-91
If justice means equal participation and inclusion, as authors such as Axel Honneth or Nancy Fraser have argued, the question
still remains: inclusion in what, and of whom? This question has not been investigated with sufficient attention. Drawing
on the example of the experience of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, I address this issue by distinguishing different meanings
of equality which correspond to different types of political struggles. In so doing, I re-examine Honneth’s claim that the
critical theory of recognition has no room for cultural groups as referents of a potential ‘fourth principle of recognition’
beyond legal equality, the merit principle, and love. It is argued that Honneth’s critique of collective rights neglects crucial
differences between the types of groups that exist in modern states, and between the different kinds of struggles for equality
waged by those groups. 相似文献
6.
Maria Paola Ferretti 《Res Publica》2009,15(3):269-287
Granting differential treatment is often considered a way of placing some groups in a better position in order to maintain
or improve their cultural, economic, health-related or other conditions, and to address persistent inequalities. Critics of
multiculturalism have pointed out the tension between protection for groups and protection for group members. The ‘rule-and-exemption’
approach has generally been conceived as more resistant to such criticism insofar as exemptions are not conceded to minorities
or ethical and religious groups as such, but to individuals who are part of those groups. However, I show that when a government
grants an exemption, it inevitably provides a definition of the relevant group in question, and the tendency is to take cultural
membership as ‘given’ or as defined by group spokespersons. I discuss some problems related to these definitions and defend
instead a definition based on shared group interests. 相似文献
7.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
8.
Christopher Nathan 《Res Publica》2011,17(3):211-225
There is an apparent problem in identifying a basis for equality. This problem vanishes if what I call the ‘intuited response’
is successful. According to this response, there is no further explanation of the significance of the feature in virtue of
which an individual matters, beyond the bare fact that it is the feature in virtue of which an individual matters. I argue
against this claim, and conclude that if the problem of identifying a basis for equality is to be resolved, it is necessary
to defend a substantive account of the independent significance of some feature. 相似文献
9.
Andreas Bartels 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):267-281
The paper discusses three different ways of explaining the referential stability of concepts of physics. In order to be successful,
an approach to referential stability has to provide resources to understand what constitutes the difference between the birth
of a new concept with a history of its own, and an innovative step occurring within the lifetime of a persisting concept with
stable reference. According to Theodore Arabatzis’ ‘biographical’ approach (Representing Electrons 2006), the historical continuity of representations of the electron manifests itself by the numerical stability of experimental
parameters like the charge-to-mass ratio, and the continued acceptance of earlier experiments as manifestations of electron
properties. I argue, against Arabatzis’ approach, that the stability of experimental parameters justifies the assumption that
there exists a chain of representations of a unique theoretical entity only if this stability occurs against the background
of evidence for theoretical continuity. The Bain/Norton approach proposes to add exactly this element to the picture, but
fails to reach its aim by focusing on formal similarities of Hamiltonians as an indicator of theoretical continuity. I shall
argue that theoretical continuity has to be demonstrated rather on the level of particular solutions. This task is accomplished
by the semantic embedding approach by means of defining a co-reference criterion for theoretical terms requiring the existence
of semantic embedding relations between the terms that occur in particular solutions of different theories. 相似文献
10.
Liezl van Zyl 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):405-415
Some philosophers believe that a change in motive alone is sometimes sufficient to bring about a change in the deontic status
(rightness or wrongness) of an action. I refer to this position as ‘weak motivism’, and distinguish it from ‘strong’ and ‘partial
motivism’. I examine a number of cases where our intuitive judgements appear to support the weak motivist’s thesis, and argue
that in each case an alternative explanation can be given for why a change in motive brings about (or, in some cases, appears
to bring about) a change in deontic status. 相似文献
11.
Gert Biesta 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):141-153
Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good
citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I
ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this
question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the
political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to
explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order.
For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the
extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure
of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what
the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning
and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational
implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on
the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on
the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This
is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for
a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy. 相似文献
12.
B. Brogaard 《Synthese》2006,152(1):47-79
Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’
argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by
Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then
the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust
Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that
it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even
though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely
denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires
a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting
concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked. 相似文献
13.
Stefano Predelli 《Erkenntnis》2006,65(3):385-403
In this essay, I explain how certain suggestions put forth by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Schlick regarding the interpretation
of indexical expressions may be incorporated within a systematic semantic account. I argue that the ‘hybrid’ approach they
propose is preferable to more conventional systems, in particular when it comes to the interpretation of cases of cross-contextual
ellipsis. I also explain how the hybrid view entails certain important and independently motivated distinctions among contextually
dependent expressions, for instance between ‘here’ and ‘local’. 相似文献
14.
Under the independence and competence assumptions of Condorcet’s classical jury model, the probability of a correct majority
decision converges to certainty as the jury size increases, a seemingly unrealistic result. Using Bayesian networks, we argue
that the model’s independence assumption requires that the state of the world (guilty or not guilty) is the latest common
cause of all jurors’ votes. But often – arguably in all courtroom cases and in many expert panels – the latest such common
cause is a shared ‘body of evidence’ observed by the jurors. In the corresponding Bayesian network, the votes are direct descendants
not of the state of the world, but of the body of evidence, which in turn is a direct descendant of the state of the world.
We develop a model of jury decisions based on this Bayesian network. Our model permits the possibility of misleading evidence,
even for a maximally competent observer, which cannot easily be accommodated in the classical model. We prove that (i) the
probability of a correct majority verdict converges to the probability that the body of evidence is not misleading, a value
typically below 1; (ii) depending on the required threshold of ‘no reasonable doubt’, it may be impossible, even in an arbitrarily
large jury, to establish guilt of a defendant ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’. 相似文献
15.
Robert Jubb 《Res Publica》2009,15(4):337-353
In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. Cohen’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘Facts and Principles’,
by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing
three theses that Cohen has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism
about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly argue
that they are analytically independent of each other. I then offer an outline of the foundationalism about grounding thesis,
characterising it, as Cohen does, as a demand of logic. That thesis claims that whenever a normative principle is dependent
on a fact, it is so dependent in virtue of some other principle. I then argue that although this is true as a matter of logic,
it, as Cohen admits, cannot be true of actual justifications, since logic cannot tell us anything about the truth as opposed
to the validity of arguments. Facts about a justification cannot then be decisive for whether or not a given argument violates
the foundationalism about grounding thesis. As long as, independently of actual justifications, theorists can point to plausible
logically grounding principles, as I argue contractualists can, Cohen’s thesis lacks critical bite. 相似文献
16.
William W. Tait 《Synthese》2006,148(3):603-622
We discuss the semantical categories of base and object implicit in the Curry-Howard theory of types and we derive derive logic and, in particular, the comprehension principle in
the classical version of the theory. Two results that apply to both the classical and the constructive theory are discussed.
First, compositional semantics for the theory does not demand ‘incomplete objects’ in the sense of Frege: bound variables
are in principle eliminable. Secondly, the relation of extensional equality for each type is definable in the Curry-Howard
theory. 相似文献
17.
Alan Haworth 《Res Publica》2007,13(1):77-100
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’.
I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections
fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the
liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that
Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public
interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit,
if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard
against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. 相似文献
18.
Michael Wolff 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):359-371
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory
of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view
they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning
perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only
the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article
published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer
in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published
in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical
theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. 相似文献
19.
Ryan W. Davis 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(2):207-222
Political liberals, following Rawls, believe that justice should be ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical.’ In other words,
a conception of justice ought to be freestanding from first-order moral and metaethical views. The reason for this is to ensure
that the state’s coercion be justified to citizens in terms that meet political liberalism’s principle of legitimacy. I suggest
that privileging a political conception of justice involves costs—such as forgoing the opportunity for political theory to
learn from other areas of philosophy. I argue that it is not clear that it provides any benefit in return. Whether a political
conception of justice more adequately satisfies the liberal principle of legitimacy than a metaphysical conception of justice
is an open question. To show this, I describe three ways in which political conceptions of justice have been developed within
the literature. I then argue that while each might be helpful in finding reasons that reasonable citizens can accept, all
face challenges in satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy. Political conceptions of justice confront the same set
of justificatory problems as ‘metaphysical’ conceptions. The question of whether a political conception is preferable should
receive greater scrutiny. 相似文献
20.
Michael Blome-Tillmann 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(1):29-53
Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen
into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically
basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from
recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections
of this kind, viz. at what I call the Error-Theory Objection, the Gradability Objection and the Clarification-Technique Objection.
The paper concludes that none of these objections can provide decisive evidence against contextualism. 相似文献