塞尔哲学的新进展:社会本体论

20世纪哲学的语言转向是哲学史上的一次伟大变革,言语行为理论就是在这样的背景下诞生的。塞尔在成名作《言语行为:语言哲学论》(Speech Acts:An Essay in the Philosophy of Language,1969)发表多年之后才发现,语言除了交流的功能外,还起着一个额外的作用,那就是部分地构成制度性实在,     

重复与改变——《有限公司》中的语言问题

语言哲学在当下的西方哲学界中已不再是一个急需解决的问题,这也许可归功于德里达的努力。但这不能忽视语言哲学在历史过程中所起到的关键作用,特别是自弗雷格到塞尔,途经胡塞尔、罗素、海德格尔、维特根斯坦、维也纳学派、奥斯丁等等。本文在阅读德里达《有限公司》基础上,试图理清语言哲学在上世纪走过的路程,在此过程中,每个思想家都留下了自身的足迹,尽管这些思想前辈们的观念多么地相互对立,但作为人类的整体来说,前一代人的足迹所开拓出来的路,使后一代人有了走下去的方向和决心。同时,语言哲学并不是象牙塔里的问题,它与现实有着密切的联系。     

心理理论和语言能力的关系

心理理论和语言能力的关系已日益引起研究者们的关注.文章综述了以非人灵长类动物、正常儿童和特殊人群为对象进行的有关心理理论和语言关系的研究,从比较和发展的角度进行了理论分析.提出一定的语言能力水平也许是通过心理理论测试的前提条件,但二者有着不同的发展规律,并表现为复杂的共存关系.     

中国文化中非言语行为的社会认知

中国文化中具有十分丰富的社会认知思想,其中包括通过非言语行为进行社会认知的思想。中国文化中非言语行为的社会认知,是指通过对认知对象的非言语行为的判断以达到对认知对象的了解过程,包括视瞻、言语、容止、颜色、声音、好尚等内容。中国文化中非言语行为的社会认知是典型的具有中国文化特色的社会认知,它以中国社会、中国文化、中国人的思维和生活方式以及中国语言特有的形式表现出来,既不同于西方的社会认知思想,也有别于现代社会认知的理念和范式,形成了独具特色、自成体系的中国人的社会认知心理思想。     

中医气论的本质是关系本体论

学界在对中医气论的阐释中常将气作为核心,把"气"当作具有第一性的"实体实在"。这种观点非常容易产生原子论和实体主义倾向,与中医学的临床实践相违背。现代科学的进展和中医学实践证明,原子论和实体主义的思想实际上并不符合客观世界的真实情况。若是从系统科学中"关系实在"的视角来看,作为"关系实在"的气化才应该是气论的核心,气论的本质应该是关系本体论。确定中医学理论在现代语境之中的定位,有助于深入发掘我国优秀的传统思想,并可促进中医现代化,由此来推动中医学的复兴。     

间接言语行为在大学英语教学中的应用

在以往的英语教学中,我们往往侧重于词汇、语法、听力、阅读等方面的学习,学生们大多只是掌握了语言层面的东西,可是真正在生活中应用这门语言的时候就会遇到很多瓶颈,因为人们在交流中并非直截了当地,而是间接地向对方表达自己的真实意图,这就是语言使用的间接现象,这个现象时刻影响着我们日常的交流,尤其是对英语学习者造成了很大的困难。文章试图就间接言语行为在大学英语教学中的应用作以初步探讨,以期对大学英语教学起到指导作用。     

会话、心灵与实在——塞尔言语行为思想的三个维度

Speech act is an important issue of the philosophy of language. With the development from analytic philosophy to the philosophy of language,and then to the philosophy of mind,the contemporary philosopher Searle has been dedicating himself to perfecting speech act theory for decades. Firstly,based on the whole process of conversation,he enriched speech act theory within the framework of pragmatics,widening the scope of the philosophical study of meaning; secondly,by introducing the notion of intentionality,h...     

语言加工过程中的视听跨通道整合

日常生活中, 语言的使用往往出现在某个视觉情境里。大量认知科学研究表明, 视觉信息与语言信息加工模块并不是独立工作, 而是存在复杂的交互作用。本文以视觉信息对语言加工的影响为主线, 首先对视觉信息影响言语理解, 言语产生以及言语交流的相关研究进展进行了综述。其次, 重点对视觉信息影响语言加工的机制进行了探讨。最后介绍了关于视觉信息影响语言加工的计算模型, 并对未来的研究方向提出了展望。     

教师管教言语行为语效的比较研究

本研究采用Searle对语旨行为的分类标准,采用情境模拟法,探讨教师对学生管教过程中不同言语事件中的断言、指令、承诺、表达以及宣告行为,研究学生对教师的管教言语使用时产生的情绪体验、对教师交际意图的理解、可能的行为倾向,以探明不同言语行为的语效。发现:⑴学生对教师发出的五种言语行为所引发的情绪体验、交际意图认知、行为倾向之间的存在显著差异。表达易引起被试愉快情绪,其次是断言与指令,承诺与宣告易引起被试不愉快情绪。对教师言语交际意图的认知以及服从行为倾向,表达、断言、指令高于承诺与宣告。⑵被试对五种管教言语行为交际意图的认知与其对教师管教的言语的情绪反应以及行为倾向间均存在显著的正相关。     

制度建构的“语言—心理—伦理”三维一体分析

陌生人社会治理呼唤公正合理的制度设计,社会本体论的语用转向为制度伦理带来了新的研究视角。语言是通达心智最为便捷的通道,也是连接道义和规范的必然桥梁。制度性事实是依赖制度运行的人类基本社会活动,由于语言对制度与制度性事实建构的同构性,通过对制度性事实建构的“语言—心理—伦理”三维一体化审视,可以实现对制度建构过程的深度透析。制度创建者的言语行为背后蕴含的集体心理和伦理规约成为制度理性的重要来源,言语行为在成功执行中实现事实(外在世界的各种恰当条件)与价值(由集体意向性表征的独立于个体欲望的理由)的统一,保证了建构的合理性。由此,制度建构的语言、心理和伦理分析是三维一体的。     

Language,Ontology, and Metaphysics

Thomas Hofweber's Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics is ambitious, thought‐provoking, and a good read. It expands upon a project he's developed in several previous papers—a project that seamlessly weaves together both metaphysics and metametaphysics. The book is as much about methodology as it is about the substantive conclusions he draws about what there is. As a consequence, it is a long book that covers a lot of ground. Since I cannot do justice to all of it, I hope my fellow symposiasts will take up parts of the book that I neglect. There is a lot of good stuff in there.     

Social Structures and the Ontology of Social Groups

Social groups—like teams, committees, gender groups, and racial groups—play a central role in our lives and in philosophical inquiry. Here I develop and motivate a structuralist ontology of social groups centered on social structures (i.e., networks of relations that are constitutively dependent on social factors). The view delivers a picture that encompasses a diverse range of social groups, while maintaining important metaphysical and normative distinctions between groups of different kinds. It also meets the constraint that not every arbitrary collection of people is a social group. In addition, the framework provides resources for developing a broader structuralist view in social ontology.     

Social Ontology as Convention

I will argue that social ontology is constituted as hierarchical and interlocking conventions of multifarious kinds. Convention, in turn, is modeled in a manner derived from that of David K. Lewis. Convention is usually held to be inadequate for models of social ontologies, with one primary reason being that there seems to be no place for normativity. I argue that two related changes are required in the basic modeling framework in order to address this (and other) issue(s): (1) a shift to an intentional model—among other reasons, in order to account for normativity—and (2) moving away from the belief-desire, propositional attitude, framework for understanding the intentional realm toward an interactive, pragmatic model of intentionality. These shifts provide natural approaches to: (1) understanding the normativities of social realities; (2) the sense in which social ontology is often constituted in implicit relations among the participants rather than elaborated and iterated explicit beliefs and desires; (3) and language.     

Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology

It is a commonplace within philosophy that the ontology of institutions can be captured in terms of constitutive rules. What exactly such rules are, however, is not well understood. They are usually contrasted to regulative rules: constitutive rules (such as the rules of chess) make institutional actions possible, whereas regulative rules (such as the rules of etiquette) pertain to actions that can be performed independently of such rules. Some, however, maintain that the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is merely a linguistic one. In this paper I present the status account of constitutive rules in order to address this criticism. According to the status account constitutive rules pertain to institutional statuses and statuses are to be understood in terms of status rules. Status rules concern the enabling and constraining roles of institutions, and constitutive rules specify the preconditions that have to be met in order for them to play these roles. Even though I end up endorsing the claim that the distinction mentioned is a linguistic one, I go on to argue that there is an underlying reality that constitutive rules serve to make apparent.

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Language,Ontology, and the Carnap-Quine Debate

Philosophia - On a widespread reading, the Carnap-Quine debate about ontology concerns the objectivity and non-triviality of ontological claims. I argue that this view mischaracterizes...     

Mathematical Practice,Fictionalism and Social Ontology

From the perspective of mathematical practice, I examine positions claiming that mathematical objects are introduced by human agents. I consider in particular mathematical fictionalism and a recent position on social ontology formulated by Cole (2013, 2015). These positions are able to solve some of the challenges that non-realist positions face. I argue, however, that mathematical entities have features other than fictional characters and social institutions. I emphasise that the way mathematical objects are introduced is different and point to the multifaceted role that relations and interconnections play in this context. Finally, I argue that mathematical entities can be considered to be pragmatically real.

     

Fundamental Quantification and the Language of the Ontology Room

Nihilism is the thesis that no composite objects exist. Some ontologists have advocated abandoning nihilism in favor of deep nihilism, the thesis that composites do not exist_O, where to exist_O is to be in the domain of the most fundamental quantifier. By shifting from an existential to an existential_O thesis, the deep nihilist seems to secure all the benefits of a composite‐free ontology without running afoul of ordinary belief in the existence of composites. I argue that, while there are well‐known reasons for accepting nihilism, there appears to be no reason at all to accept deep nihilism. In particular, deep nihilism draws no support either from the usual arguments for nihilism or from considerations of parsimony.