虚构对象的名字与反描述论论证

直接指称论的反描述论论证主要有三种,即模态论证、认识论论证和语义学论证。多数语言哲学家相信,这三个论证对于反驳一般的关于物理对象名字的指称描述论是有效的。但是,三个论证对于一种可能的虚构对象名字的描述论是否有效,是一个需要讨论的问题。本文根据虚构对象名字在语义上依赖于性质描述的特点,根据这种描述所产生的模态性质、认识论性质和语义学性质,最终得出否定性的结论:三个反描述论论证对于反驳虚构对象名字的描述理论是无效的。因此,对于反驳描述理论来说,如果直接指称论者使用的三个论证确实具有不可替代的作用,则至少对于某些种类的名字,指称的描述理论得到了一定程度的支持。     

空名问题的几种解答

本文介绍和讨论了近来几种关于空名问题的解答.尽管这些解答所依赖的理论机制各不相同,但是它们却都采用了一个共同的策略,那就是它们都假定一个空名的意义与和这个空名相连的所有摹状词都无关.我用各种具体的例子来辩论说这个共同策略是错误的,因而这些解答都是有缺陷的.     

形而上学中的虚构主义

虚构主义是在过去20年间涌现出来的一种很有竞争力的反实在论理论。这种理论认为,某些领域(如数学、伦理)中的理论言谈所涉及的对象在本体论上是不存在的,因此这些理论言谈实际上都不是真的;然而我们可以把它们作为像虚构作品中的言谈一样继续使用下去。本文介绍和讨论了虚构主义的历史和理念,特别强调了这种理论在语言哲学、模态理论、数学哲学、道德哲学、真理理论等领域中的应用和发展。     

虚构对象实在论的语义辩护

关于虚构对象,实在论者认为,指称虚构对象现象构成支持实在论的证据。反实在论者则试图表明,无需坚持实在论,也能解释该现象。针对五种反实在论策略,即罗素式反实在论策略、弗雷格式反实在论策略、亚当斯式反实在论策略、布洛克式反实在论策略和埃弗雷特式反实在论策略,本文分别进行反驳。最终说明,指称虚构对象现象仍将作为支持实在论的证据。     

谈学论译：实体（ousia）是什么？——从术语解析看亚里士多德的实体论

正如巴门尼德使存在成为哲学中一个主导性概念一样．亚里士多德使得实体成为一个极其重要的哲学词汇。《形而上学)中有一个名的论断：那个很久以前直至如今永远在被追问却永远令人疑惑的问题“存在(to on)是什么”,不过是在问“实体(ousia)是什么”(《形》1028^b2)。亚里士多德哲学完全建立在关于实体问题的讨论上,我们可以贴切地称之为“实体论”。在这里,“实体”看来比“存在”更加重要,甚至不啻于此。     

克里普克教授学术访谈录

克里普克在本访谈中澄清了关于其早年的哲学学习经历的一些误解,并就如何正确理解其名著《命名和必然性》中的相关观点,进行了深入的阐说.在他看来,他在该书中提出的关于严格指示词的一般性理论,也适用于对于空名的讨论,但这种升级版本的严格指示词理论本身必须包含对于“假装原则”的承诺.在对于同书中提出的“指称因果论”进行讨论时,克氏进一步对该理论所具有的跨文化有效性进行了辩护,并拒绝了新兴的实验哲学方法论对于基于哲学直觉的传统分析哲学方法论的批评.     

希腊本体论的中国解读：（迷狂与智慧，虚构的与真的）

本文旨在对近几年关于Being问题的讨论做个补充。从原创文化视野看,希腊不仅是西方文化中求“是”与求“真”的源头,而且也是文学艺术与宗教中崇尚“出神”、神秘、热恋、迷狂与虚构的源头。在“迷恋”(philos,爱)与智慧联姻产生哲学(philosophia)之     

纪录片中的搬演:虚构还是真实

本文通过对纪录片中"真实"与"虚构"分析研究,在对典型案例分析的基础上,探讨"搬演"这一后现代主义的叙事法则在纪录片中的价值和意义.     

虚构的幸福与善好的功能 ——拉康对边沁功用主义伦理学的另类解读

从其精神分析伦理学的立场出发,拉康对边沁功用主义伦理学进行了一种全新的解读,拉康认为在伦理学的现代转向中,边沁具有里程碑意义的贡献并非"最大多数人的最大幸福原则",而是这一原则的语言学基础:"虚构理论"。按此理论的理解,幸福与善好是人类基于语言所进行的一种必要的虚构,它已完全丧失其在传统伦理学中的实在论基础。由此,边沁的功用主义既实现了同传统伦理学的形上学基础的决裂,同时又开创了从语言学维度对伦理学进行反思和建构的方向。     

关于虚构对象的合取创造主义

关于虚构对象的作者创造主义是创造主义的主要形式,而作者创造主义信条隐含个体创造主义信条。本文论证个体创造主义者面临判定难题,并提出一种新型的创造主义观点,即合取创造主义,并论证合取创造主义者不面临判定难题,最后为合取创造主义做进一步辩护,说明合取创造主义是一种更有前途的创造主义观点。     

Pleonastic Entities: Fictional Characters and Propositions

Stephen Schiffer holds that propositions are pleonastic entities. I will argue that there is a substantial difference between propositions and fictional characters, which Schiffer presents as typical pleonastic entities. My conclusion will be that if fictional characters are typical pleonastic entities, then Schiffer fails to show that propositions are pleonastic entities.     

Names, Fictional Names and 'Really': David Wiggins

Evans was not wrong (i maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans's 'Julius' is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as 'Vulcan does not really exist', that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or report a concept identical with Vulcan and declares it be really uninstantiated. (The sentence, which partakes of play , is a kind of palimpsest.) It is explained why this second level view of 'exists' is to be preferred.     

The Semantics of Fictional Names

Abstract: In this paper we defend a direct reference theory of names. We maintain that the meaning of a name is its bearer. In the case of vacuous names, there is no bearer and they have no meaning. We develop a unified theory of names such that one theory applies to names whether they occur within or outside fiction. Hence, we apply our theory to sentences containing names within fiction, sentences about fiction or sentences making comparisons across fictions. We then defend our theory against objections and compare our view to the views of Currie, Walton, and others.     

Names, Fictional Names, And 'Really': R.M. Sainsbury

Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives no adequate account of 'really', and I point to unclarities in Wiggins's similar, but distinct, attempt to use 'really' in the logical form of true negative existentials.     

Truth Without Reference: The Use of Fictional Names

Topoi - Singular terms without referents are called empty or vacuous terms. But not all of them are equally empty. In particular, not all proper names that fail to name an existing object fail in...     

Vacuous truth

Special thanks go to Paul Humphreys for his criticisms and helpful comments. Also Richard Gale, Gerald Massey, Nicholas Rescher, David Blumenfeld, James Humber, Richard Ketchum, and Wolfgang Dietel made helpful comments on an earlier version. Each found something in need of repair. Finally, I would like to thank the Hambidge Center and the Center for the Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh for providing in 1988 the setting and the resources that made this paper possible.     

Fictional Models and Fictional Representations

Scientific models consist of fictitious elements and assumptions. Various attempts have been made to answer the question of how a model, which is sometimes viewed as a fiction, can explain or predict the target phenomenon adequately. I examine two accounts (the counterfactual dependency view and the idealization view) of models-as-fictions which are aiming at disentangling the myth of representing the reality by fictional models. I argue that both views have their own weaknesses in spite of many virtues. I propose to re-evaluate the problems of representation from a novel perspective in which some of the model representations can be regarded as fictional representations. I argue that this type of model representation is credible despite being a fictional representation of the reality.