Games and Fiction: Partners in the Evolution of Culture

In this essay, I argue that the time is right in the philosophy of sport to follow the lead of systems thinking and emphasize the contextual embeddedness of sport, not its distinctive characteristics, least of all any claims for metaphysical independence. Accordingly, I analyze similarities between two cultural conventions—namely, literature (in particular fiction) and games—through the lens of evolution. I argue that common roots can be observed in games and fiction when looking at them structurally, semantically, and socially. I suggest that both games and fictional storytelling were adaptive in similar ways and that both preceded what is arguably the capstone cultural achievement of formal language.     

Narrative Fiction and Epistemic Injustice

This article looks at the role that narrative fiction—film, television, and literature—can play in countering and mitigating epistemic injustice. The notion of epistemic injustice is explicated by Miranda Fricker as a distinctive kind of injustice done to a knower in her role as a knower and is identified in two forms: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. The operation of both types of epistemic injustice depend upon the social imagination and the shared concepts of social identity within it—what it is to be a man, woman, straight, black, gay, transgender. It is here that narrative fiction becomes pertinent, as it has the potential to influence the social imagination for the better. Fricker uses fictional scenarios to clarify her notions of epistemic injustice; I argue that aside from elucidating analysis of our epistemic practices, fiction can also provide epistemic correctives. In the first through fourth sections of the paper, I explore ways in which narrative fiction can combat testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. The fifth section then considers the unique features of narrative fiction in this capacity to resist epistemic injustice and argues that it capitalizes on advantages that other approaches cannot share in.     

Fan fiction and early Christian apocrypha

This article applies insights from the study of contemporary fan fiction to the early Christian Jesus tradition, in particular to so-called apocryphal literature. Both fan fiction and the apocrypha are representative of hypertextual literary practices where authors rewrite already existing narrative universes. In modern-day fandom, fan fiction is used for myth maintenance, for social and cultural identification and criticism, and for sharing interpretations of the shared narrative universe within the fan community. The article introduces the reader to fan fiction and fan fiction studies and discusses how these modern phenomena may shed heuristic light on the literary strategies and functions of early Christian apocrypha.     

Religiousness and Mental Health: Systematic Review Study

Many people use religious beliefs and practices to cope with stressful life events and derive peace of mind and purpose in life. The goal of this paper was to systematically review the recent psychological literature to assess the role of religion in mental health outcomes. A comprehensive literature search was conducted using medical and psychological databases on the relationship between religiosity and mental health. Seventy-four articles in the English and Arabic languages published between January 2000 and March 2012 were chosen. Despite the controversial relationship between religion and psychiatry, psychology, and medical care, there has been an increasing interest in the role which spirituality and religion play in mental health. The findings of past research showed that religion could play an important role in many situations, as religious convictions and rules influence the believer’s life and health care. Most of the past literature in this area reported that there is a significant connection between religious beliefs and practices and mental health.     

Consultation from the Consultant's Perspective

This presentation examines psychoanalysis from the standpoint of fictionalism. Fictionalism maintains that all aspects of human experience are creations of imagination, that mind‐made realities constitute for human beings their sole realms of existence, and that it is only about these realms that anything at all can be known. No other knowable realities exist. Fictionalism is an aesthetic orientation that considers these imaginative constructs artistic renderings that are aesthetically formed and experienced, and that must be comprehended and evaluated aesthetically. Furthermore, it regards these artistic constructs as works of fictions—invented textual realities woven by the perpetual interplay of multitudinous signifiers into ever‐changing psychical configurations. From a fictionalist's perspective, “truth”; becomes, paradoxically, a manifestation of fiction. The term fiction intends not only to underscore the radical divergence of fictionalism's philosophical perspective from realism's but to emphasize its reinterpretation of the materialities realism posits as also inventions of imagination. Fictionalism does not, however, simply reverse the hierarchy and valuation of the real/fiction dichotomy but modifies the very understanding of this dichotomy's conceptualization and, by reinscribing realism as itself a form of fiction, even diminishes some of the antagonism inherent in this age‐old rivalry. Rooted deep in psychoanalytic tradition, realism's role has been complex, inconsistent, contradictory, and often embarrassingly naive. Fictionalism contests the many postulates of realism that psychoanalysis has incorporated so fundamentally into its theory and technique. Focusing primarily on transference, I argue not only that this phenomenon has been misconstrued within a realist framework but that most of the other features of psychoanalysis have been as well because psychoanalysis is basically a fictional enterprise.     

INTERNISTS OF THE MIND OR PHYSICIANS OF THE SOUL: DOES PSYCHIATRY NEED A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY?

Although psychiatry is interested in what both body and mind contribute to behavior, it sometimes emphasizes one more than the other. Since the early 1980s, American psychiatry has shifted its interest from mind and psyche to body and brain. Neuroscience and psychopharmacology are increasingly at the core of psychiatry. Some experts claim that psychiatry is no longer interested in problems in living and positive goals such as mental health, happiness, and morality but rather has narrowed its focus to mental disorders addressed with psychotropic drugs. In view of this trend, psychiatry needs to confront two questions in social philosophy. If it is no longer directly concerned with health and happiness, how does it relate to these positive goals? And how does it relate as a medical institution to religious institutions, schools, and other organizations that directly promote health, happiness, morality, and the purposes of life? It is not enough for psychiatry to renounce its moral role; its practices still shape cultural values. Psychiatry should take more responsibility for developing a public philosophy that addresses these issues.     

From psychotherapy to psychoanalysis: Frederik van Eeden and Albert Willem van Renterghem

At the end of the nineteenth century, the unconscious was discovered by various students of the human mind. No agreement existed, however, about its nature–whether it represented the seat of the abnormal, the supranormal, or both. Frederik van Eeden (1860–1932), better known as a writer than as a physician, and Albert Willem van Renterghem (1846–1939), a country doctor, were both attracted by the philosophy of psychic monism and were disappointed by official medical science. They felt that that the mind played a greater role in curing and healing than official medicine could acknowledge. Van Eeden, a socialist, moved away from medical science. Fascinated by psychical research, he embraced Spiritualism and joined the Roman Catholic Church. His attitude toward psychoanalysis was ambivalent. Van Renterghem, by contrast, became a respected and well-to-do psychiatrist, and was one of the first Dutch physicians to embrace psychoanalysis. This study of two Dutch psychiatrists shows on the one hand that only gradually the mystically tinged soul of the first dynamic psychiatry became the conscious and unconscious mind of depth psychology, and on the other hand that the reception of psychoanalysis was furthered by the prevailing interest in mysticism.     

Updating Thought Theory: Emotion and the Non‐Paradox of Fiction

Over the past four decades, the paradox of fiction has sparked considerable debate among philosophers. Unfortunately, the most promising solution to this puzzle, thought theory, currently earns its plausibility by way of intuition rather than evidence. I aim to address this by updating thought theory in light of recent empirical findings on affect. I will draw upon a wide range of scientific research—on the cognitive mechanisms driving emotion, the role of affect in counterfactual mind wandering and prospection, and the evolutionary function of affect—to substantiate the claim that fictions can give rise to both real and rational emotional states.     

Literature and Thought Experiments

Like works of literature, thought experiments present fictional narratives that prompt reflection in their readers. Because of these and other similarities, a number of philosophers have argued for a strong analogy between works of literary fiction and thought experiments, some going so far as to say that works of literary fiction are a species of thought experiment. These arguments are often used in defending a cognitivist position with regard to literature: thought experiments produce knowledge, so works of literary fiction can too. This article concedes that works of literary fiction can be put to use in thought experiments, but not in a way that is helpful to the cognitivist. In particular, it draws three disanalogies in the ways we engage critically with thought experiments and with literary fictions. First, we use thought experiments to make arguments; second, we read thought experiments in strongly allegorical terms; and third, the terms of criticism we apply to thought experiments and to works of literature differ. Although these disanalogies present problems for the cognitivist position, they also give us a sharper picture of the distinctive educative potential of works of literary fiction.     

Intersubjectivity in Wittgenstein and Freud: Other Minds and the Foundations of Psychiatry

Intersubjectivity, the cooperation of two or more minds, is basic to human behavior, yet eludes the grasp of psychiatry. This paper traces the dilemma to the “problem of other minds” assumed with the epistemologies of modern science. It presents the solution of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, known for his treatment of other minds in terms of “human agreement in language.” Unlike recent studies of “Wittgenstein's psychology,” this one reviews the Philosophical Investigations' “private language argument,” the crux of his mature views on mind. It reads that argument as recording his shift from the modern egocentric paradigm of mind to an intersubjective one. The paper contrasts the merits of Wittgenstein's reduction of subject and object to grammar with the problems of Freud's metapsychological reduction. It shows how Wittgenstein's intersubjective method avoids the excesses of behaviorism and phenomenology, offering a specifically human way to adapt mechanistic and interpretive means to the communicative ends of psychiatry.     

Commentary on Carola M. Kaplan's “Navigating Trauma in Joseph Conrad's Victory: A Voyage From Sigmund Freud to Philip M. Bromberg”

This commentary adds a few additional sparks to Carola M. Kaplan's incandescent essay at the boundary of literary fiction and psychoanalysis, and attempts to place her already generous treatment of my work into a perspective that enriches her synthesis. Conceptually, I try to further develop our shared understanding of why the legacy of developmental trauma too relationally barren to allow cognitive symbolization and self-reflection, leads to an adult life shaped by a dissociated mental structure that channels the “best of intentions” toward tragically predestined defeat. But beyond our conceptually explicit link, and perhaps even more central, is that the history of my own attempt to “navigate trauma” at the interface of psychoanalysis and literature has become part of a deeper connection between Kaplan and me. I discuss this implicit link between us as representing the fuller meaning of intersubjectivity and the wonders of selfhood, otherness, and human relatedness. My overarching emphasis is that Professor Kaplan, meticulously respecting the boundary of what defines fiction in literature, has simultaneously demonstrated the permeability of the boundary between fiction and nonfiction in human relationships —showing that what is most human in human beings is in one way always nonfiction if it is experientially authentic.     

Semantic Presuppositions in Political Personhood: The Case of Discourse-Theoretic Rationality and Social Externalism

Questions about the mind and those about politics have conventionally found separate treatments in the philosophical literature. This paper proposes that crucial assumptions about the nature of the human person in politics actually turn on a compatible account of mental content. The particular relation that I will focus on here would be one between a discourse-theoretic model of persons in political ontology and social externalism in philosophy of mind. For the former, I’ll concern myself largely with Philip Pettit’s presentation of it and its expression in terms of intentional systems which, I’ll argue, renders itself to a version of social externalism that emerges out of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. An auxiliary consequence of this exercise is the diagnosis of a familiar problem that is associated with the notion of rule-following—I’ll argue that skepticism about rule-following is only tenable when one holds on to an internalist thesis about the individuation of mental content. This objection is dissolved once a theory of understanding is adopted which works with a distinctly externalist account of mental content. Finally, I will take stock of the implications of this exercise in terms of suggesting basic grounds for a philosophically interesting relationship between political ontology and philosophy of mind.

     

Redefining the psychological autopsy: A proposal for collaboration between forensic pathology and investigative psychology

Excepting psychiatry, psychology and medicine remain largely separate disciplines. In forensic inquiries, the psychologist assesses the mind, whereas the pathologist examines the body. Both fields, however, actively participate in the same investigations, albeit from different standpoints, contributing to explorations of crime scene dynamics, identification of offenders, and legal proceedings. In recent years, peer review has become a staple of research, because subjecting work to scrutiny by other experts promotes accuracy. Forensic pathologists would benefit from insights provided by investigative psychology, particularly if asked to apply psychology to their testimony, and integration with forensic pathology may increase the acceptance of empirical profiling evidence in the courtroom. Additionally, incorporation of medical findings—such as wound patterns, evidence of range of fire, and cause of death determinations—could add another level of detail to techniques like smallest space analysis. The following functions as a proposal for the incorporation of forensic pathological findings into investigative psychology research and the application of investigative psychology to forensic pathology practice. Cooperation has the potential to extend the scope of knowledge in both disciplines, to increase their applicability to and acceptance in legal contexts and to maximize the probative value of evidence provided in the court of law.     

Johann Christian August Heinroth (1773–1843): the first professor of psychiatry as a psychotherapist

Heinroth is known as the first professor of psychiatry. His chair was established 200 years ago on the 21st of October 1811. His major importance for the history of psychotherapy has not yet been acknowledged. Heinroth regarded restriction as well as activation as fundamental remedies for mental illnesses. Restriction meant making a voluntary decision to live a life based on religious faith and to abstain from earthly satisfaction. Within his specific psychotherapeutical module—the ‘‘direct-psychic’’method—he utilized the patient’s mental powers—mood, mind and will, but also his spirituality. His therapeutic approach additionally contained elements of cognitive,behavioral and conversational therapy.     

Humanism and Embodiment: Remarks on Cause and Effect

I understand humanism to be the meta‐ethical view that there exist discoverable (nonmoral) truths about the human condition, that is, about what it means to be human. We might think that as long as I believe I am realizing my unique human potential, I cannot be reasonably contradicted. Yet when we consider systemic oppression, this is unlikely. Systemic oppression makes dehumanizing conditions and treatment seem reasonable. In this paper, I consider the nature of understanding—drawing in particular upon recent defenses of realism in the philosophy of science—and argue that humanism makes sense if we recognize more thoroughly the role of cause and effect in practical deliberation. By this I mean the cause‐and‐effect relation between mind and body and between minds, bodies, and the world. Three philosophical sources—Marxism, Buddhism and Christianity—show what this might mean, as I indicate in the second half of the paper.     

Mental illness and the mind-brain problem: Delusion,belief and Searle's theory of intentionality

Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality.     

Collective intentionality and socially extended minds

There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking about the social dimension of individual minds. We then turn to a brief overview of the individualistic approaches advanced by Ludwig and Spaulding in this volume. And we close with a discussion of the transformative role of the social mind in individual life presented by Kern and Moll, as well as the distributed approach to interacting systems defended by Goldstone and Theiner.     

Robots and the Sacred in Science and Science Fiction: Theological Implications of Artificial Intelligence

In science-fiction literature and film, human beings simultaneously feel fear and allure in the presence of intelligent machines, an experience that approximates the numinous experience as described in 1917 by Rudolph Otto. Otto believed that two chief elements characterize the numinous experience: the mysterium tremendum and the fascinans. Briefly, the mysterium tremendum is the fear of God's wholly other nature and the fascinans is the allure of God's saving grace. Science-fiction representations of robots and artificially intelligent computers follow this logic of threatening otherness and soteriological promise. Science fiction offers empirical support for Anne Foerst's claim that human beings experience fear and fascination in the presence of advanced robots from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology AI Lab. The human reaction to intelligent machines shows that human beings in many respects have elevated those machines to divine status. This machine apotheosis, an interesting cultural event for the history of religions, may—despite Foerst's rosy interpretation—threaten traditional Christian theologies.     

A Black Theological Response to Race-Based Medicine: Reconciliation in Minority Communities

The harm race-based medicine inflicts on minority bodies through race-based experimentation and the false solutions a race-based drug ensues within minority communities provokes concern. Such areas analyze the minority patient in a physical proxy. Though the mind and body are important entities, we cannot forget about the spirit. Healing is not just a physical practice; it includes spiritual practice. Efficient medicine includes the holistic elements of the mind, body, and spirit. Therefore, the spiritual discipline of black theology can be used as a tool to mend the harms of race-based medicine. It can be an avenue of research to further particular concerns for justice in medical care . Such theology contributes to the discussion of race-based medicine indicating the need for the voice, participation, and interdependence of minorities. Black theology can be used as a tool of healing and empowerment for health equity and awareness by exploring black theology’s response to race-based medicine, analyzing race in biblical literature, using biblical literature as a tool for minority patient empowerment, building on past and current black church health advocacy with personal leadership in health advocacy.

     

From Drive to Affectivity: Contextualizing Psychological Life

It is the thesis of this article that the shift in psychoanalytic thinking from the primacy of drive to the primacy of affectivity moves psychoanalysis toward a phenomenological contextualism and a central focus on dynamic intersubjective systems. Unlike drives, which originate deep within the interior of a Cartesian isolated mind, affect—that is, subjective emotional experience—is something that from birth onward is regulated, or misregulated, within ongoing relational systems. Therefore, locating affect at the center automatically entails a radical contextualization of virtually all aspects of human psychological life.