Perceptual sensitivity to dimensional and similarity relations in free and rule-governed classifications

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the perceptual primacy of dimensional and similarity relations in the stimulus classifications of younger and older subjects. In Experiment 1, 4- and 10-year-olds were given free classifications in which they could group stimuli according to overall similarity or identities in size, color, or orientation. Both age groups classified stimuli most frequently according to identities on separate dimensions. In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds and adults were given free classifications followed by rule-governed classifications which required them to group stimuli according to specific relations. In the free classifications, a majority of subjects in both age groups classified the stimuli most frequently according to identities on separate dimensions. In the rule-governed classifications, both age groups were more accurate when a single separate relation was required for solution than when overall similarity was required. These results support a differential-sensitivity view of perceptual development, which asserts that individuals at all ages primarily perceive and use separate relations.     

Perceptual automaticity in expert chess players: Parallel encoding of chess relations

A check detection task in a 5 × 5 section of the chessboard, containing a King and one or two potential checking pieces was employed. The checking status (i.e., the presence or absence of a check) and the number of attackers (one or two) were manipulated. It was found that the reaction time cost for adding a distractor was differentially greater inno trials thanyes trials for novice, but not for expert, chess players. In addition, we contrasted standard check detection trials with trials in which one of two attackers was cued (colored red) and the task was to determine the checking status of the cued attacker while ignoring the other attacker. We documented a Stroop-like interference effect on trials in which a cued nonchecking attacker appeared together with an attacker that was checking (i.e., incongruent). These findings suggest automatic and parallel encoding procedures for chess relations in experts.     

知觉经验与知觉内容

知觉(perception)是指我们通过视觉、听觉、触觉、嗅觉、味觉等感觉器官而获得的对事物以及外部世界的意识感知.知觉经验(perceptual experience)的一个显著的特点是它具有某种现象特征,即知觉者会体验到一种"那究竟像什么(what it is like)"的感觉.例如,一个人会从红色视觉经验中体验到"红色究竟像什么"的意识感受性(qualia).知觉内容(perceptual content)粗略地讲是指通过知觉经验向知觉者所传递的信息.关于知觉问题在哲学上的重要性,我们可以从以下几点来看:在形而上学方面,知觉是我们了解外部物理世界究竟存在什么的主要手段;在认识论方面,研究知觉是研究我们如何达到关于外部物理世界的知识的主要手段;在语言哲学方面,知觉内容是我们的心灵与外部物理世界的关联及互动在语言实践上的体现;在心灵哲学方面,知觉经验中的现象特征与意识及意向性之间存在着深层的内在联系.     

Organic self-talk content categories and their relations to sport-specific contextual and personal factors

While strategic self-talk interventions are well documented, less is known regarding organically occurring self-talk. Previously, eight organic self-talk content categories were identified, however contextual and personal factors relating to these categories is unexplored. The aim of the study was to explore the relationships between stress, coping, athletic identity, demographic and sport-related factors and the eight organic self-talk categories of anxiety control, confidence, disengagement, instruction, psych-up, somatic fatigue, worry, and irrelevant. 216 NCAA student-athletes were recruited. Regression was used to determine the relationships between the contextual and personal variables and organic self-talk. Stress, coping and self-talk categories were compared in and out-of-season. Stress was associated with all self-talk frequencies except confidence. Coping was associated with psych-up, confidence and worry. Athletic identity was associated with psych-up, confidence, instruction and disengagement. Age was associated with anxiety control and instruction. Lastly, sport type and division level were associated with disengagement and instruction self-talk respectively.     

Perceptual Variation and Structuralism

I use an old challenge to motivate a new view. The old challenge is due to variation in our perceptions of secondary qualities. The challenge is to say whose perceptions are accurate. The new view is about how we manage to perceive secondary qualities, and thus manage to perceive them accurately or inaccurately. I call it perceptual structuralism . I first introduce the challenge and point out drawbacks with traditional responses. I spend the rest of the paper motivating and defending a structuralist response. While I focus on color, both the challenge and the view generalize to the other secondary qualities.     

Perceptual identification and encoding

Sequences containing 10 numbers from 1–20 were presented in serial-order or random-order at rates of 1/sec, 2/sec, and 4/sec for serial-order or same-orderrecall by eight Ss. Stimulus duration was constant, so that the interpresentation interval decreased as rate of presentation increased. Serial-order recall was greater for serial-order presentation than for random-order presentation. The decrease in recall as presentation rate increased was similar for both serial-order and random-order presentation. This result indicates that serial-order recall of random-order presentation does not involve reordering or repeated sequential scanning. It is consistent with the view that serial-order recall of serial-order presentation is greater because identification time is decreased. due to the decrease in the range of relevant alternatives, so that increased encoding time results in storage of more information.     

Looks and Perceptual Justification

Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks view of the justification of simple visual beliefs. According to the looks view, such beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning how the relevant things look. Unlike under classical foundationalism, under the looks view as I develop it, these reasons are public. They are public with respect to both their content and possession: with respect to content, they are not about ourselves and our experiences, and with respect to their possession, many people can have the very same looks‐related reasons.     

Perceptual organization and attention

It is widely assumed that the grouping of the visual field first described by the Gestalt psychologists and the related phenomenon of texture segregation occur very early in the processing of visual information and involve preattentive processes. All the recent evidence supporting this assumption comes from visual search experiments in which the subject is actively looking for a target and attending to the stimulus. The question at issue is whether these kinds of patterns are perceived under conditions of inattention, i.e., when observers are not searching for them. We performed six experiments to determine whether texture segregation and grouping by similarity or proximity are perceived under conditions of inattention. On the first two trials subjects were asked to report the longer arm of a briefly presented cross which was surrounded by a pattern of ungrouped small elements. On the third trial and subsequent control trials these elements were configured into grouping patterns and subjects queried about them immediately following their line length reports. The results establish that neither texture segregation nor grouping by similarity of lightness or proximity are perceived under conditions of inattention. They support the conclusion that there is an earlier stage of processing than that referred to as preattentive.     

Perceptual systems and realism

Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is theory-laden. To defend realism one has to show first that perception relates us directly with the world without any intermediary conceptual framework. The result of this direct link is the nonconceptual content of experience. Second, one has to show that part of the nonconceptual content extracted from the environment correctly represents features of mind independent objects. With regard to the first condition, I have argued elsewhere that a part of visual processing, which I call “perception,” is theory-neutral and nonconceptual. In this paper, facing the second demand, I argue that a part of the nonconceptual content of perception presents properties that are the properties of mind independent objects. I claim first that nonconceptual content is the appropriate level of analysis of the issue of realism since it avoids the main problems besetting various types of analysis of the issue at the level of beliefs about the world. Then I claim that a subset of the nonconceptual content presents features of objects in the environment as they really are. This paper was mostly written when I was a fellow at the Center of Philosophy of Science in the University of Pittsburgh during the Spring Semester of 2005–2006. A draft of this paper was presented both at the Center’s colloquium and at one of the informal discussion meetings of the fellows. I have very much benefited from the discussion that followed the presentation of the paper and so I would like to thank Gabriele de Anna, Carla Fehr, Malcolm Forster, Lilly Gurova, Nikolay Milkov, and Wang Wei. I am especially indebted to the director of the Center Professor John Norton whose astute comments made me think hard about the issues discussed in the paper. Several of my arguments in Sect. 4 are the result of John’s concerns with the earlier draft of the paper. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for helping me clarify several points in the paper. Thanks to them (especially the second one) the paper is considerably better than it would have been without them.     

Perceptual causality and animacy

Certain simple visual displays consisting of moving 2-D geometric shapes can give rise to percepts with high-level properties such as causality and animacy. This article reviews recent research on such phenomena, which began with the classic work of Michotte and of Heider and Simmel. The importance of such phenomena stems in part from the fact that these interpretations seem to be largely perceptual in nature - to be fairly fast, automatic, irresistible and highly stimulus driven - despite the fact that they involve impressions typically associated with higher-level cognitive processing. This research suggests that just as the visual system works to recover the physical structure of the world by inferring properties such as 3-D shape, so too does it work to recover the causal and social structure of the world by inferring properties such as causality and animacy.     

Phenomenology and Perceptual Content

Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that there is phenomenal intentionality, that is, “a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone”. However, their arguments are open to two lines of objection. First, Horgan and Tienson are not sufficiently clear as to what kind of content it is that they take to be determined by, or to supervene on, phenomenal character. Second, critics have objected that, for their conclusion to follow, Horgan and Tienson would first have to establish the covariation of phenomenology and intentional content, but even so, phenomenal intentionality would still emerge as less plausible than its converse, representationalism. I will address these two challenges by appeal to Husserlian ideas. A consideration of perceptual phenomenology (i.e., phenomenal character) shows that there is a kind of perceptual content that is, indeed, determined by phenomenal character. Such content is conceived in terms of fulfillment conditions, or what it takes to bring aspects of objects and scenes to different, and more complete, ways of givenness. We can establish the primacy of phenomenology, relative to such fulfillment‐conditional content, by tracing it back to the basic phenomenology of visual and other sensations.     

Perceptual Evidence and Information

Quite recently, Luciano Floridi has put forward the fascinating suggestion that knowledge should be analyzed as special kind of information, in particular as accounted information. As I will try tentatively to show, one important consequence of Floridi’s proposal is that the notion of justification, and of evidence, should play no role in a philosophical understanding of knowledge. In this paper, I shall suggest one potential difficulty with which Floridi’s proposal might be consequently afflicted, yet accept the fundamental suggestion that traditional epistemology should be merrily wedded with the philosophy of information; in particular, I shall plead for the less drastic conclusion, according to which, although knowledge should be taken to entail justification, it is the very notion of evidence—in particular of perceptual evidence—that should be analyzed in information-theoretic terms. By so doing, my principal aim will be to explain away an apparent difficulty—which is preliminary to the preoccupations motivating Floridi’s more ambitious attempt—from which Conee and Feldman’s Evidentialism is apparently afflicted. So, the conclusion that I will try to establish is that the notion of perceptual evidence, once it is appropriately analyzed in information-theoretic terms, should play an important role in our understanding of knowledge.     

Perceptual learning and reasons-responsiveness

Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justified or unjustified. Is perception really as independent from reasons as visual illusions make it out to be? I argue no, drawing on psychological evidence from perceptual learning. The flexibility of perceptual learning is a way of responding to new epistemic reasons. The resulting perceptual experiences are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified.