Two principles of Bayesian epistemology

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Colloquium on Logic, Probability, and Methodology at the A. P. A. Eastern Division Meetings in December 1987. I am indebted to all those who participated in that discussion, and especially to Teddy Seidenfeld and Bas C. van Fraassen.     

Reasons and religious belief

This paper purports a limited study of the concept of reason. It analyzes the claim of religious belief to be reasonable. The context for this analysis is an examination of some evidential (criteriological) connections between reasonable belief and ‘(good) reasons’ for such belief. Consideration of the typical sort of evidential connection shows, not surprisingly, that religious belief cannot claim to be reasonable. But it is argued that there is (at least) one other sort of connection, and that it is philosophically plausible to regard this connection as definitive of a quite distinctive sense of ‘reasonable’, with its own kind and style of criteria, according to which religious belief can be thought reasonable.     

Reasons for withdrawing belief in vivid autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that many people hold personal memories for events that they no longer believe occurred. This study examines the reasons that people provide for choosing to reduce autobiographical belief in vividly recollected autobiographical memories. A body of non-believed memories provided by 374 individuals was reviewed to develop a qualitatively derived categorisation system. The final scheme consisted of 8 major categories (in descending order of mention): social feedback, event plausibility, alternative attributions, general memory beliefs, internal event features, consistency with external evidence, views of self/others, personal motivation and numerous sub-categories. Independent raters coded the reports and judged the primary reason that each person provided for withdrawing belief. The nature of each category, frequency of category endorsement, category overlap and phenomenological ratings are presented, following which links to related literature and implications are discussed. This study documents that a wide variety of recollective and non-recollective sources of information influence decision-making about the occurrence of autobiographical events.     

From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic

Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al. (2011) [7, Part 1]). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010 [16, Chapter 7]). Section 1 introduces the semantics and then, in Section 2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008) [2]. Section 3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (i) that it is language independent in a key sense, (ii) that it admits connections with the Principle of Indifference but these connections do not lead to paradox, (iii) that it can capture the phenomenon of learning from experience, and (iv) that while the logic advocates scepticism with regard to some universal hypotheses, such scepticism is not problematic from the point of view of scientific theorising.     

关帝信仰形成原因探究

在关羽被神化的历程中,社会各界都积极参与,归纳起来有三条脉络即民间、封建帝王和正统宗教(佛教、道教),它们分别以其各具特色的方式对关羽加以崇奉,而且互相影响、互相促进,共同完成了这一神化。本文针对这三条脉络分别探究其神化关羽的原因,指出封建社会帝王们对关羽的进封是随着具体的社会政治需求而不断改变的;民间对关羽的尊崇则体现了民众信仰的实用主义;而正统宗教纳关羽为神则是其适应社会的体现。     

Social epistemology and the aim(s) of education

In Knowledge in a Social World (1999) Alvin Goldman has defended a ‘veritistic’ or truth-oriented, monistic account of the aim of education. In particular, he argued that the inculcation of true belief constitutes the ultimate goal of education, with other educational activities having only instrumental value insofar as they aid in this goal. In contrast, Harvey Siegel has defended a pluralistic alternative, on which the critical capacity for sustaining rational belief represents an independent, non-instrumental epistemic end of education. I argue that while some of Siegel's objections represent challenges to the sufficiency of Goldman's veritistic model, his alternative account fails to recognise the necessity of truth as an educational goal. This therefore commits Siegel to an unsatisfying pluralism regarding the ideal aim of education. Crucially, this disagreement hinges on two very different ways of understanding the nature of rationality: as instrumental or as epistemic. On Goldman's instrumentalist view, rationality merely involves the ordering of one's means to the end of true belief. However, Kelly (2003) has raised significant counterexamples against the instrumentalist view, and I adapt these to the case of the epistemic ends of education. I thus defend a non-pluralistic account of the ultimate end of education as involving knowledge in the ‘strong’ sense. This, I argue, overcomes the objections raised against Goldman and Siegel's accounts, and better accords with the notion of an ideal characterisation of the aim of education.     

Knowledge requires commitment (instead of belief)

Philosophical Studies - I argue that S knows that p implies that S is properly committed to the truth of p, not that S believes that p. Belief is not required for knowledge because it is possible...     

(Non)Complementary updating of belief in two hypotheses

Past research has led to the conclusion that two competing hypotheses are represented dependently, and confidence in them is updated in a complementary manner. It is argued here that confidence in two hypotheses can be represented either dependently or independently. Changes in confidence in the former case are always complementary, but changes in the latter case are complementary only under certain conditions. In three simulated medical diagnosis experiments, subjects learned about two illnesses in a manner expected to lead to either dependent or independent confidence. They were then presented with two symptoms sequentially (for each of several patients), updating confidence after each. Experiment 1 demonstrated that changes in confidence in the two illnesses were largely complementary for subjects with dependent, but not independent, confidence. Experiment 2 showed that encouraging consideration of the alternative led to more complementary changes for subjects with independent confidence. Experiment 3 succeeded in producing complementary changes from these subjects. Thus, complementarity does not imply dependent confidence, nor does independent confidence imply non-complementarity.     

Problems for virtue theories in epistemology

This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism and the nature of the self; and problems with pluralism and the goals of epistemology. Moral objections to virtue theory are identified––specifically, both the idea that there can be a radical axiological priority to character and the anti-enlightenment tendencies in virtues approaches. Finally, some strengths to virtue theory are conceded, while the role of epistemic luck is identified as an important topic for future work.     

Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence

A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most damning violation of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception—not a common occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles.     

Noncomparabilism in epistemology

Contemporary epistemologists assume a view I call ‘comparabilism.’ They do not, however, argue for this view. I claim that noncomparabilism is a viable alternative. I further argue that noncomparabilism has advantages over comparabilism. An ancestor of this paper was included as a chapter in my dissertation, which was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree at the University of Arizona in November of 2001. I am grateful for discussions of this material with audiences at the University of Arizona and Iowa State University; for comments from an anonymous referee; for comments, discussion, and encouragement from Tom Christiano, Heimir Geirsson, Scott Hendricks, Kristen Hessler, Keith Lehrer, Bill Robinson, Holly Smith, Peter Vranas and especially Alvin Goldman.

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The brief Reasons for Living Inventory for adolescents (BRFL-A)

This study modified and evaluated the psychometric properties of the Reasons for Living Inventory (RFL) in samples of adolescents. Internal consistency reliability, corrected item-total scale correlation, and exploratory factor analysis procedures were used with a mixed sample of 260 adolescents to identify 14 items for the brief version of the RFL (BRFL-A). Confirmatory factor analyses provided support for the five-factor oblique structure of the BRFL-A in a psychiatric inpatient sample with a range of suicidal behaviors. Reliabilities of the BRFL-A subscales were satisfactory. Four of the five subscales differentiated between suicidal and nonsuicidal adolescents. Significant correlations were found between three BRFL-A subscales and several suicide indices. Convergent-discriminant validity was examined by correlating the BRFL-A subscales with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Adolescents (MMPI-A) Content Scales. Limitations of the study are discussed.This study was supported in part by a Project Grant from the Graduate College, The University of Northern Iowa.     

An epistemology for practical knowledge

Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form.     

Children’s prior experiences of their successes and failures modulate belief alignment

ABSTRACT

An ability to flexibly learn from others while at other times relying upon one’s own judgements is an important adaptive human capacity. The present research investigated how others’ epistemic states and prior experience of their own independent ability in a given task modulate young children’s selective learning. In particular, we asked whether 4-year-old children’s judgement concerning the location of a hidden object is modulated both by an informant’s knowledge states and by the absence/presence of a prior experience with a particular task. We found that the children were more likely to align their judgement according to the informant’s verbal report when the informant was knowledgeable than when she was ignorant – but only when they had explicitly experienced their own incapability to accurately guess an object’s location. The findings suggest that 4-year-old children are able to combine their own experience with others’ input to make their judgement.     

Characterizing belief bias in syllogistic reasoning: A hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis of ROC data

The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863, 2010). The discrepancy between Dube et al.’s, Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863 (2010) results and the previous three decades of work, together with former’s methodological criticisms suggests the need to revisit earlier results, this time collecting confidence-rating responses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis, we reanalyzed a corpus of 22 confidence-rating studies (N =?993). The results indicated that extensive replications using confidence-rating data are unnecessary as the observed receiver operating characteristic functions are not systematically asymmetric. These results were subsequently corroborated by a novel experimental design based on SDT’s generalized area theorem. Although the meta-analysis confirms that believability does not influence discriminability unconditionally, it also confirmed previous results that factors such as individual differences mediate the effect. The main point is that data from previous and future studies can be safely analyzed using appropriate hierarchical methods that do not require confidence ratings. More generally, our results set a new standard for analyzing data and evaluating theories in reasoning. Important methodological and theoretical considerations for future work on belief bias and related domains are discussed.