Emotional Justification

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non‐basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties.     

Justification as faultlessness

According to deontological approaches to justification, we can analyze justification in deontic terms. In this paper, I try to advance the discussion of deontological approaches by applying recent insights in the semantics of deontic modals. Specifically, I use the distinction between weak necessity modals (should, ought to) and strong necessity modals (must, have to) to make progress on a question that has received surprisingly little discussion in the literature, namely: ‘What’s the best version of a deontological approach?’ The two most obvious hypotheses are the Permissive View, according to which justified expresses permission, and the Obligatory View, according to which justified expresses some species of obligation. I raise difficulties for both of these hypotheses. In light of these difficulties, I propose a new position, according to which justified expresses a property I call faultlessness, defined as the dual of weak necessity modals. According to this view, an agent is justified in \(\phi\)-ing iff it’s not the case that she should [/ought] not \(\phi\). I argue that this ‘Faultlessness View’ gives us precisely what’s needed to avoid the problems facing the Permissive and Obligatory Views.     

Justification and Forgetting

This article sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism (MJP). MJP presupposes a nontraditional notion of memorial justification according to which what makes one's present belief that p prima facie justified is that which provided one with prima facie justification to believe that p originally (or some portion thereof). The article offers support for MJP by examining a series of cases that involve forgetting, and in doing so, criticizes views of Jennifer Lackey, David Owens, Michael Huemer, and George Pappas.     

Luther and Justification

In this article, I reflect on Luther's doctrine on justification as it came out in different ways in some of his seminal writings between 1518 and 1538, all represented in volume 2 of The Annotated Luther. Discovering the righteousness of God as something already given to humans opened fundamentally new perspectives to Luther.     

Justification and awareness

In Justification Without Awareness, Michael Bergmann attacks Internalism and Mentalism. His attack on Internalism refutes some versions of an awareness requirement for justification but leaves another standing and well-motivated. His attack on Mentalism, while successful, leaves us with a difficult question—what non-mental features play a role in determining justification?—that his own externalist theory fails to answer correctly.     

Interpretation and Justification

Whenever understanding is sought we are obliged to justify our interpretations – to demonstrate that they furnish an adequate understanding of the world and its objects. The problem is to know whether this is possible – that what we take to be conclusive justifications do not covertly appeal to other favoured interpretations or systems of explanation, thus obviating the possibility of a neutral justification. By exploring the nature of interpretation, I argue that neutral justifications of interpretations about works of art are indeed possible and that such interpretations can be shown to be true or false.     

正当性与合法性

证成国家即确立国家的正当性,就是要表明至少存在着道德上可接受的国家或者从明智角度而言可取的国家。国家的合法性指国家所持有的一套针对其具体公民的复合道德权利,这种意义上的合法性概念不同于非常成问题的韦伯式合法性概念。评价国家的洛克式进路严格区分了国家的正当性与合法性,并将二者建立在不同的基础之上,认为这两种评价都很重要。相反,康德式进路则用同样的论证来支持国家的正当性与国家的合法性,它根据人们所应该选择的东西而非人们的实际选择来评价制度,是一种非个人性的评价方式。康德主义者对自愿主义的忠诚是半心半意的,他们试图把对国家的一般性评价作为唯一的制度评价范畴。所有现存国家都是不合法的,但国家却有可能是正当的。国家的正当性与合法性不同于国家具体行为的正当性,现存国家不具有合法性也不意味着公民对国家的任何行为都是正当的。     

Privacy and Justification*

In this paper, I aim to demonstrate the importance of liberal engagement in public debate, in the face of Nagel’s claim that respect for privacy requires liberals to withdraw from their ‘control of the culture’. The paper starts by outlining a pluralist conception of privacy. I then proceed to examine whether there really is liberal cultural control, as Nagel affirms it, and whether such control truly involves a violation of privacy. Moreover, I argue that Nagel’s desire to leave the social and cultural space radically neutral is incompatible with Rawls’ conception of public reason and clashes with the need to justify liberal institutions.*Winner of the inaugural Res Publica Postgraduate Essay Prize, 2005.