Structural representation and surrogative reasoning

It is argued that a number of important, and seemingly disparate, types of representation are species of a single relation, here called structural representation, that can be described in detail and studied in a way that is of considerable philosophical interest. A structural representation depends on the existence of a common structure between a representation and that which it represents, and it is important because it allows us to reason directly about the representation in order to draw conclusions about the phenomenon that it depicts. The present goal is to give a general and precise account of structural representation, then to use that account to illuminate several problems of current philosophical interest — including some that do not initially seem to involve representation at all. In particular, it is argued that ontological reductions (like that of the natural numbers to sets), compositional accounts of semantics, several important sorts of mental representation, and (perhaps) possible worlds semantics for intensional logics are all species of structural representation and are fruitfully studied in the framework developed here.     

The Poverty of Analysis

I argue that philosophy is like science in three interesting and non-obvious ways. First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic: philosophical claims, just like scientific claims, are not guaranteed by the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the same kind of empirical support as scientific theories. And finally, the central questions of philosophy concern actuality rather than necessity: philosophy is primarily aimed at understanding the actual world studied by science, not some further realm of metaphysical modality.     

The non-abstractness of mental representations

An argument is made that formal abstract mental representations are lacking because they fail to accommodate the contribution of the medium. The importance of the medium is singled out and several respects in which it resists formal characterization noted. Specifically, it is pointed out that the medium can always be relevant, that the aspects by which it is made so are not in principle demarcated or constrained, and that they cannot be restricted a priori at the time of encoding. The examination of several ways by which specifications of medium could be incorporated into mental representations suggests that to obtain a full account of the medium one has to abandon some basic characteristics of mental representations. Conversely, maintaining the concept of mental representation in its standard sense leaves the medium, and with it some fundamental properties of human cognition, outside of one's scientific account. This conclusion serves as the basis for more general comments regarding the study of mind.     

Objective Similarity and Mental Representation

The claim that similarity plays a role in representation has been philosophically discredited. Psychologists, however, routinely analyse the success of mental representations for guiding behaviour in terms of a similarity between representation and the world. I provide a foundation for this practice by developing a philosophically responsible account of the relationship between similarity and representation in natural systems. I analyse similarity in terms of the existence of a suitable homomorphism between two structures. The key insight is that by restricting attention to only those homomorphisms induced by causal processes, we can solve two philosophical problems with a single assumption. First, causal structure provides an adequate source for the bias required to ensure the similarity relation is non-trivial; second, it provides an adequate source for the directionality required to move from similarity to representation. I defend this account against objections by Goodman and van Fraassen and demonstrate that it is indeed the account of similarity's role in representation assumed by psychological practice.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

The Truth Will Set You Free: Towards the Religious Study of Science

This article explores the notion that science can be viewed as a religion and that our understanding of science will be enhanced, if we study it in the same manner that we use to study any other religion. More specifically, it builds on concepts developed by Max Weber in his analysis of salvation religions to describe some ways in which science promises liberation and the institutional conditions under which that liberation will take place. While to a certain extent this exploration might be viewed as an effort to demythologize science, it is not an attack on science, as much as it is an attempt to demonstrate the potential benefits of opening up the scientific enterprise to more thorough and creative external examination.     

WHAT IT TAKES TO LIVE PHILOSOPHICALLY: OR,HOW TO PROGRESS IN THE ART OF LIVING

This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth-directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition-based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are correct. The essay argues that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life. The offered view acknowledges more ways to develop the art of living and enables a broader range of people to count as living philosophically.     

California Unnatural: On Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude

Abela accepts Fine's account of realism and instrumentalism, but thinks that we can reject the Natural Ontological Attitude by distinguishing the theoretical attempt to make sense of scientific practice from choosing the attitude we bring to the debate, or to science itself. But Abela's attitudes are vulnerable to Fine's criticisms of the philosophical positions. However, if we take attitude as contrastive and as full-blooded enough to lead to different behaviour we can see a gap in Fine's position. He cannot tell us why it is science that he trusts. When we look more widely, the philosophical positions might be seen as ways of justifying that trust.     

Sinnott-Armstrong,Walter, ed., Moral Psychology,Volume 1. The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness,Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2008, pp. xix + 583, US$30.00/£17.95 (paper)

In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our naïve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at stake in deciding between these two ways of understanding our everyday view. In the third and final part of the paper we offer an argument in favour of our alternative.     

心理表征哲学及其联结主义诠释

对心理表征问题进行自然的解释是至关重要的,但这方面的研究都是建立在有关概念和命题表征的预设的基础之上的,所以有必要弄清概念表征和命题表征的哲学解释;联结主义也对心理表征问题作了解释,根据被表征的是什么以及通过什么来表征的原则,联结主义网络主要通过四种方式对概念和命题进行表征。总的来说,联结主义对概念和命题的表征与它们的哲学解释并不是一一对应的,其方法论基础是费耶阿本德的多元方法论,即"怎么都行"。     

Forgiveness and Standing

Despite broad agreement that forgiveness involves overcoming resentment, the small philosophical literature on this topic has made little progress in determining which of the many ways of overcoming resentment is forgiveness. In a recent paper, however, Pamela Hieronymi proposed a way forward by requiring that accounts of forgiveness be “articulate” and “uncompromising.” I argue for these requirements, but also claim that Hieronymi’s proposed articulate and uncompromising account must be rejected because it cannot accommodate the fact that only some agents have the standing to forgive. I end by sketching an alternative account which, I claim, explains the phenomenon of standing.     

Synthetic Neuroethology

Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are used to conduct prosthetically enhanced thought experiments concerning the evolvability of mental representations. Central to this essay is a discussion of the computer simulation and evolution of three-dimensional synthetic animals with neural network controllers. The minimally cognitive behavior of finding food by exhibiting positive chemotaxis is simulated with swimming and walking creatures. These simulations form the basis of a discussion of the evolutionary and neurocomputational bases of the incremental emergence of more complex forms of cognition. Other related work has been used to attack computational and representational theories of cognition. In contrast, I argue that the proper understanding of the evolutionary emergence of minimally cognitive behaviors is computational and representational through and through.     

Alignment and commitment in joint action

Important work on alignment systems has been applied to philosophical work on joint action by Tollefsen and Dale. This paper builds from and expands on their work. The first aim of the paper is to spell out how the empirical research on alignment may be integrated into philosophical theories of joint action. The second aim is then to develop a successful characterization of joint action, which spells out the difference between genuine joint action and simpler forms of coordination based on alignment. I begin by introducing the empirical research and two definitions of joint action. I then argue that instead of using this research in conjunction with Searle’s account of collective intentionality, as Tollefsen and Dale suggest, we would be better served by applying this research to Gilbert’s account of plural subjects. In the final sections I distinguish between alignment, coordination, and joint action, clarify the roles of joint commitment and sub-personal alignment in joint action, and argue that these concepts are both consistent and mutually supportive. Combining these two research programs gives us an account of joint action that does justice to both the empirical and philosophical research.     

Analog and digital,continuous and discrete

Representation is central to contemporary theories regarding the mind/brain. But the nature of representation—both in the mind/brain and more generally—is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations vary in a step-wise manner. In other words, ‘digital’ is synonymous with ‘discrete’, while ‘analog’ is synonymous with ‘continuous’. I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is (and should be) used in cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis’s account of analog and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation. I will argue that the distinctions available in this fourfold account better accord with representational features of interest in cognitive science than the received analog/digital dichotomy.     

Thinking theologically about reproductive and genetic enhancements: the challenge.

Current philosophical and legal bioethical reflections on reprogenetics provides little more than a rationalization of the interests of science. There are two reasons for this. First, bioethicists attempt to address ethical issues in a "language of precision" that characterizes science, and this works against analogical and narratological modes of discourse that have traditionally provided guidance for understanding human nature and purpose. Second, the current ethical and legal debate is framed by a public/private distinction that banishes robust norms to the private realm, and leaves a minimalist public discourse of harm avoidance that is insuffucient for regulating the science. In this essay, I argue that Mark Hanson's account of anxiety provides a valuable starting point for addressing deficiencies in the current philosophical and legal debate, and it highlights the need for a theological discourse on genetic enhancements. Through an assessment of Joel Shuman's criticism of the public/private distinction, I show how the needed theological discourse should be situated in the context of robust communities, and how such a communitarian inter-ethic is compatible with a variant of liberalism. Finally, I critically assess James Keenan's account of virtue and perfection, in order to outline what a sufficient discourse on reproductive and genetic enhancements requires.     

The location problem for color subjectivism

According to color subjectivism, colors are mental properties, processes, or events of visual experiences of color. I first lay out an argument for subjectivism founded on claims from visual science and show that it also relies on a philosophical assumption. I then argue that subjectivism is untenable because this view cannot provide a plausible account of color perception. I describe three versions of subjectivism, each of which combines subjectivism with a theory of perception, namely sense datum theory, adverbialism, and the virtual color proposal, and argue that each version faces serious objections. Considering these three theories of perception to be exhaustive of those available to the subjectivist, I conclude that subjectivism is untenable and that the scientifically motivated argument for this view is unsound. I then offer the diagnosis that the philosophical assumption on which this argument relies is mistaken.     

Symbolic representation of probabilistic worlds

Symbolic representation of environmental variables is a ubiquitous and often debated component of cognitive science. Yet notwithstanding centuries of philosophical discussion, the efficacy, scope, and validity of such representation has rarely been given direct consideration from a mathematical point of view. This paper introduces a quantitative measure of the effectiveness of symbolic representation, and develops formal constraints under which such representation is in fact warranted. The effectiveness of symbolic representation hinges on the probabilistic structure of the environment that is to be represented. For arbitrary probability distributions (i.e., environments), symbolic representation is generally not warranted. But in modal environments, defined here as those that consist of mixtures of component distributions that are narrow ("spiky") relative to their spreads, symbolic representation can be shown to represent the environment with a relatively negligible loss of information. Modal environments support propositional forms, logical relations, and other familiar features of symbolic representation. Hence the assumption that our environment is, in fact, modal is a key tacit assumption underlying the use of symbols in cognitive science.     

Eliminating Racism: Dummett's On Immigration and Refugees and the Philosophy of Language

abstract   This paper examines a claim made by Michael Dummett in his recent book On Immigration and Refugees that the feeling of racism can be removed by the creation of a social climate in which the expression of that feeling is disreputable. I suggest that Dummett's claim can be better appreciated if viewed in the light of some guiding principles of his project in the philosophy of language. With these principles in place, I argue that they provide convincing support for Dummett's claim, as well as showing an important connection between On Immigration and Dummett's broader philosophical concerns. I conclude the essay by suggesting some ways in which the insights gleaned from Dummett's philosophy may be applied to the case of asylum seekers and their representation by the media and in political rhetoric.     

Blessed,precious mistakes: deconstruction,evolution, and New Atheism in America

This paper explores the ways that Daniel C. Dennett’s bestselling 2006 book Breaking the Spell traffics in a set of distinctly American presumptions about the relationship between religion and science. In this Americanized atheism, religion is presumed to be a set of logically organized propositional beliefs–a misbegotten science in need of correction or elimination. I show that a convergent critique, drawing on both evolutionary theory and deconstruction, highlights the limitations of this approach. This convergence highlights the theme of accident in both pluralist evolutionary biology and continental philosophy of religion. Thematizing accident opens up a new conversational space between a deconstructive approach to religion and postadaptationist evolutionary theory, with implications not only for a philosophical understanding of religion, but for new, postsecular atheisms.