Causal condition,causal asymmetry,and the counterfactual analysis of causation

In a recent paper Causal Asymmetry, Douglas Ehring has proposed an intriguing solution to the vexing problem of causal asymmetry. The aim of this paper is to show that his theory is not satisfactory. Moreover, the examples that I use in showing the defect of Ehring's theory also indicate that the counterfactual analysis of causation has a problem that cannot be remedied by Marshall Swain's suggested refinement of the counterfactual analysis of causation in Causation and Distinct Events.     

Three obstructions: forms of causation,chronotopoids, and levels of reality

The thesis is defended that the theories of causation, time and space, and levels of reality are mutually interrelated in such a way that the difficulties internal to theories of causation and to theories of space and time can be understood better, and perhaps dealt with, in the categorial context furnished by the theory of the levels of reality. The structural condition for this development to be possible is that the first two theories be opportunely generalized.

Similarity judgments of same-category object representations: Effects of physical size,manipulability, and word frequency

ABSTRACT

Studies of object similarity have focused on the relationship between different physical objects and their mental representations or between instances of the same physical object and its mental representation. The present study is the first to investigate the structure of within-category psychological space. We provided evidence that large objects and frequently mentioned objects are perceived as less similar to each other compared to small objects or less frequently mentioned objects. Further, similarity judgments were higher for manipulable objects compared to non-manipulable objects. The relevance of these data to the isomorphism between physical and psychological spaces is also discussed.     

Powers, causation, and modality

A complex theory concerning powers, natures, and causal necessity has emerged from the writings of P. H. Hare, E. H. Madden, and R. Harré. In the course of rebutting objections that other critics have raised to the power account of causation, I correct three of its genuine difficulties: its attempt to analyze power attributions in terms of conditional statements; its characterization of the relation between something's powers and its nature; and its doctrines concerning conceptual necessity. The resulting interpretation of causal modalities is then subsumed under a more general power account of modality, related at a number of points to considerations concerning powers, and further illustrating their philosophical importance.     

Agency, properties and causation

The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property of that substance which brought about the effect in question is examined and criticized; it is argued that it is based on an illegitimate application of Mill’s Methods of Difference and Agreement to the case. Mill’s methods, it is suggested, are methods of empirical, not of ontological enquiry. The paper then turns to examine an argument by Mele which appears to depend on a structurally rather similar assumption that if there is nothing about a subject which could explain why she does one thing rather than another, it cannot really be up to that subject which thing occurs. It is suggested that, too, the inference is faulty, and that once it is rejected, one common objection to libertarianism—the argument from luck—might be more readily met.     

Correlation,partial correlation,and causation

Philosophers and scientists have maintained that causation, correlation, and “partial correlation” are essentially related. These views give rise to various rules of causal inference. This essay considers the claims of several philosophers and social scientists for causal systems with dichotomous variables. In section 2 important commonalities and differences are explicated among four major conceptions of correlation. In section 3 it is argued that whether correlation can serve as a measure of A's causal influence on B depends upon the conception of causation being used and upon certain background assumptions. In section 4 five major kinds of “partial correlation” are explicated, and some of the important relations are established among two conceptions of “partial correlation”, the conception of “screening off”, the conception of “partitioning”, and the measures of causal influence which have been suggested by advocates of path analysis or structural equation methods. In section 5 it is argued that whether any of these five conceptions of “partial correlation” can serve as a measure of causal influence depends upon the conception of causation being used and upon certain background assumptions. The important conclusion is that each of the approaches (considered here) to causal inference for causal systems with dichotomous variables stands in need of important qualifications and revisions if they are to be justified.     

Language,duration estimation,and causation

Burt (2002) raises several interesting points in his commentary on our paper. However, the most important difference between his and our studies, the design, was not addressed. We argue that our experimental approach makes more realistic assumptions for causal interpretation. The other points that he raises—the relationship between practical and statistical significance, the verbs used by our participants, and definitions of memory—are all discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contingency, causation, and adaptive inference

In contingency judgment tasks involving 2 event types, individuals weight the a and b cells of a 2 x 2 contingency table more than the c and d cells. Some theorists have argued that they can provide normative justifications for this weighting and that the weighting reflects simple heuristics that are adaptive in the real world. The authors show that, to avoid error, individual judgments about real contingencies should be more subtle than these supposedly adaptive heuristics allow.     

Dynamical agents: Consciousness, causation, and two specters of epiphenomenalism

The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and body.

Determination,realization and mental causation

How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, ‘determination’) provides the key to solving the problem of MC: if mental properties are determinables of their physical realizers, then (since determinables and determinates are distinct, yet don’t causally compete) all three threats may be avoided. Not everyone agrees that determination can do this good work, however. Some (e.g., Douglas Ehring, Eric Funkhauser, and Sven Walter) object that mental-physical realization can’t be determination, since such realization lacks one or other characteristic feature of determination. I argue that on a proper understanding of the features of determination key to solving the problem of MC these arguments can be resisted.