Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets

In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.     

Ambivalences about Nature and Naturalism A Supernaturalist Response to Theodore W. Nunez

As a die-hard supernaturalist, someone "at two with nature" (Woody Allen) who would be at one with God, the author has mixed feelings about Theodore Nunez's defense of "naturalism." Unlike neopragmatists, the author is not troubled by Nunez's general realism about value; he takes exception not to Nunez's theoretical account of truth, but to his specific axiology. He does not share Nunez's confidence that "projective nature" can provide reliable moral inspiration, suggesting instead that such inspiration can arise only from trust in the holiness of God.     

Gut Reactions: Moral Conviction, Religiosity, and Trust in Authority

ABSTRACT— Theory and research point to different ways moral conviction and religiosity connect to trust in political authorities to decide controversial issues of the day. Specifically, we predicted that stronger moral convictions would be associated with greater distrust in authorities such as the U.S. Supreme Court making the "right" decisions regarding controversial issues. Conversely, we predicted that stronger religiosity would be associated with greater trust in authorities. We tested these hypotheses using a survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans (N = 727) that assessed the degree to which people trusted the U.S. Supreme Court to rule on the legal status of physician-assisted suicide. Results indicated that greater religiosity was associated with greater trust in the U.S. Supreme Court to decide this issue, and that stronger moral convictions about physician-assisted suicide were associated with greater distrust in the U.S. Supreme Court to decide this issue. Also, the processes underlying religious trust and distrust based on moral convictions were more quick and visceral than slow and carefully considered.     

Moral Uncertainty and Distributive Sufficiency

According to the sufficiency principle, distributive justice requires that everyone have some sufficient level of resources or well-being, but inequalities above this threshold have no moral significance. This paper defends a version of the sufficiency principle as the appropriate response to moral uncertainty about distributive justice. Assuming that the appropriate response to moral uncertainty is to maximize expected choiceworthiness, and given a reasonable distribution of credence in some familiar views about distributive justice (including libertarianism, sufficientarianism, and egalitarianism), a version of the sufficiency principle strikes the optimal balance between the competing moral risks posed by implementing these views. In particular, it avoids the moral risk posed by views like Nozick’s libertarianism, which forbid redistributive taxation even for the sake of helping to provide for people’s basic needs: failing to do the latter, if it turns out that justice does require it, would be very morally wrong. This “uncertainty argument” has the advantage of minimizing reliance on controversial intuitions about distributive justice, helps to specifying a non-arbitrary threshold for sufficiency, and shows that the substantive moral implications of moral uncertainty are not limited to high-stakes applied ethics issues such as abortion and vegetarianism but instead extend to an issue at the heart of political philosophy.

     

道德决策快的智能机器让人更信任：能力感知的中介作用

本研究旨在探究智能机器的道德决策速度是否以及如何影响人们对其的信任程度。研究分别以智能机器与人类为道德决策主体,采用2（决策速度）×2（决策内容）的被试间设计进行研究发现,对于智能机器和人类,道德性决策均会使人们对其信任,而快速道德决策提高了人们对智能机器的信任程度;此外,研究发现能力感知是智能机器道德决策速度影响人们对其信任程度的中介机制。研究表明人们对智能机器与人类的道德决策速度知觉存在差异。     

Humble trust

I challenge the common view that trust is characteristically risky compared to distrust by drawing attention to the moral and epistemic risks of distrust. Distrust that is based in real fear yet fails to target ill will, lack of integrity, or incompetence, serves to marginalize and exclude individuals who have done nothing that would justify their marginalization or exclusion. I begin with a characterization of the suite of behaviors characteristic of trust and distrust. I then survey the epistemic and moral hazards of distrust, in particular, distrust’s propensity to bias interpretation, to perpetuate itself, to confirm itself, to dishonor, and to insult. Taking seriously these moral and epistemic hazards requires taking affirmative measures to respond to them. I elaborate one such response: “humble trust”. The practice of humble trust issues from skepticism about the warrant of one’s own felt attitudes of trust and distrust, curiosity about who might be unexpectedly responsive to trust and in which contexts, and commitment to abjure and to avoid distrust of the trustworthy. Humble trust enables individuals to trust that they will be trusted.

     

Judgmental God image,social embeddedness,and social trust among the highly religious in the United States

In this article we explore two propositions concerning the manner in which judgmental God image affects social trust among the highly religious in the United States. One proposition argues that having a judgmental God image and being highly embedded in a community of co-religionists can create low levels of social trust through social bonding and the formation of particularized trust. The other proposition maintains that embeddedness in a moral community of co-religionists helps to reinforce the idea that people are basically good and require love and forgiveness. This leads to higher levels of trust. We test an interaction between judgmental God image and social embeddedness with OLS analysis and data from the 2014 Baylor Religion Survey. We restrict the analysis to the highly religious, those who have no doubt about the existence of God and belong to a place of worship. We find that respondents with a judgmental God image who do not belong to a moral community with any or a few friends have the lowest levels of social trust. Those who have a judgmental God image but are highly embedded in a moral community with at least half of their friends have higher levels of social trust. Embeddedness negates the negative effects of judgmental God image on social trust. Implications for research are discussed in the conclusion.     

程序公正、不确定性对公共政策可接受性的影响:情感信任、认知信任的中介作用

为了研究程序公正、不确定性与公共政策可接受性之间的关系,并进一步考察情感信任和认知信任在其中的中介效应,本研究选取公共政策领域,通过问卷调查的方法随机选取510名北京市民进行研究。研究发现,程序公正与公共政策可接受性正相关,不确定性与公共政策可接受性负相关,情感信任中介程序公正与公共政策可接受性,并对不确定性与公共政策可接受性之间有遮掩效应,而认知信任不存在显著的中介作用。     

Patient autonomy and the challenge of clinical uncertainty

Bioethicists have articulated an ideal of shared decision making between physician and patient, but in doing so the role of clinical uncertainty has not been adequately confronted. In the face of uncertainty about the patient's prognosis and the best course of treatment, many physicians revert to a model of nondisclosure and nondiscussion, thus closing off opportunities for shared decision making. Empirical studies suggest that physicians find it more difficult to adhere to norms of disclosure in situations where there is substantial uncertainty. They may be concerned that acknowledging their own uncertainty will undermine patient trust and create additional confusion and anxiety for the patient. We argue, in contrast, that effective disclosure will protect patient trust in the long run and that patients can manage information about uncertainty. In situations where there is substantial uncertainty, extra vigilance is required to ensure that patients are given the tools and information they need to participate in cooperative decision making about their care.     

Justice and Care in Close Relationships

The essay examines the impartialist view of justice as the first virtue of all relationships. I argue that in close associations where duties, obligations, and rights of persons are situationally contingent, abstract principles of justice fail to yield a unified moral perspective about what is fair. Solidarity and trust as moral emotions develop more complex moral competencies that go beyond what principles of justice alone require.     

Forgiven But Not Forgotten: Covert Uncertainty in Overt Responses and the Paradox of Defection‐Despite‐Trust

Despite the widespread belief that trust is a critical determinant of loyalty, empirical and anecdotal evidence calls into question the real‐world robustness of the trust–loyalty link. An important reason for the fuzzy nature of the trust–loyalty link may be the fuzzy nature of trust itself. That is, stated trust judgments embody both a magnitude dimension (i.e., the position along a favorable‐unfavorable continuum) and an uncertainty dimension (i.e., the lack of conviction with which the judgment is held). We investigated this possibility using data pertaining to consumers’ reactions to a service failure and the provider's success in responding to their complaints. We found that the interplay between dissatisfaction with the complaint handling and past experience simultaneously influences trust magnitude and trust uncertainty. However, these two dimensions of trust are shaped by different underlying processes. Finally, uncertainty dampens the impact of stated trust on loyalty.     

Doubting one’s doubt: A formula for confidence?

People feel, think, and act differently when doubt rather than confidence is accessible. A traditional perspective on the accessibility of doubt holds that multiple sources of doubt activation should lead to increased levels of uncertainty. In contrast, we find that under some conditions two sequential sources of doubt activation result in decreased levels of uncertainty. We suggest that this follows from a meta-cognitive process in which people come to “doubt their doubt.” In Study 1, individuals with chronically accessible uncertainty who were further exposed to an uncertainty manipulation paradoxically reported reduced uncertainty. In Study 2, participants were first primed with doubt or certainty and then exposed to a manipulation associated with either confidence (i.e., head nodding) or doubt (head shaking). Supporting the idea that people can either trust or doubt their own doubts, head nodding (vs. shaking) accentuated (vs. attenuated) the impact of the initial doubt vs. certainty manipulation. These findings advance the literature on meta-cognition, self-doubt, and embodiment, and may have clinical applications.     

Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value

Many philosophers assume that, when making moral decisions under uncertainty, we should choose the option that has the greatest expected moral value, regardless of how risky it is. But their arguments for maximizing expected moral value do not support it over rival, risk-averse approaches. In this paper, I present a novel argument for maximizing expected value: when we think about larger series of decisions that each decision is a part of, all but the most risk-averse agents would prefer that we consistently choose the option with the highest expected value. To the extent that what we choose on a given occasion should be guided by the entire series of choices we prefer, then on each occasion, we should choose the option with the highest expected moral value.     

临时性组织中的快速信任：概念、形成前因及影响结果

快速信任是适应临时性组织的速成性、短期性和任务复杂性特点而形成的新的信任研究方向, 其一反传统信任对个性、人际关系和情感的关注而转向对认知、行为和角色的关注。利用快速信任能有效地管理临时性组织的脆弱性、不确定性、风险和期望问题。在介绍快速信任的概念和测量的基础上, 综述了影响快速信任形成的信任倾向、类别与原型和角色等因素, 并阐述了快速信任对团队及系统层面结果变量的影响。未来研究需对快速信任的情感成分、测量及维度划分、快速信任与领导的交互影响、快速信任下的不信任以及快速信任的动态发展方面展开深入探讨。     

合作动机与信任:基于不确定性简化机制的研究

信任是对他人合作行为的预期。Luhmann认为信任是简化不确定性的重要机制。合作动机高的个体有着更高的简化不确定性的需求,从而可能产生更高的信任水平。文章研究了不同合作动机下不确定性对信任的不同影响。实验在社会两难范式下采用不确定性(高、低)和合作动机(高、低)为自变量、信任为因变量的混合设计。结果显示:1.合作动机高的个体更倾向于信任对方;2.合作动机较高时,不确定性增高时个体对他人的信任也增高;合作动机较低时,不确定性增高时个体对他人的信任降低。对此的解释是:不确定性的增高造成个体简化不确定性的需求增高;合作动机高的个体会用信任来简化不确定性,而合作动机低的个体会用不信任来简化不确定性;因此在不确定性增高的情况下,前者对他人的信任程度增强,后者对他人的不信任程度增强。     

Developing Trust

Abstract

This paper examines developing trust in two related senses: (1) rationally overcoming distrust, and (2) developing a mature capacity for trusting/distrusting. In focussing exclusively on the first problem, traditional philosophical discussions fail to address how an evidence- based paradigm of rationality is easily co-opted by (immature) agents in support of irrational distrust (or trust) — a manifestation of the second problem. Well-regulated trust requires developing a capacity to tolerate the uncertainties that chracterise relationships among fully autonomous self-directed agents. Early relationships lack this uncertainty since care-givers take primary responsibility for determining a child's interests, reducing the scope (if not the intensity) of potential conflict between self and other. Once agents recognize that adulthood demands foregoing the security embedded in such relationships of dependency, they are free to embrace a more appropriate paradigm of rationality for guiding their thought and action in interactions with others.     

Quality of Reasons and Degrees of Responsibility

Traditionally, theories of moral responsibility feature only the minimally sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. While these theories are well-suited to account for the threshold of responsibility, it’s less clear how they can address questions about the degree to which agents are responsible. One feature that intuitively affects the degree to which agents are morally responsible is how difficult performing a given action is for them. Recently, philosophers have begun to develop accounts of scalar moral responsibility that make use of this notion of difficulty [Coates and Swenson 2013; Nelkin 2016]. In this paper, I argue that these accounts, although innovative, are incomplete. The degree to which agents are morally responsible is determined not only by the difficulties that agents face but also by the quality of the reasons for which they act.