HUME'S GENERAL POINT OF VIEW: A TWO-STAGE APPROACH

I offer a novel two-stage reconstruction of Hume's general-point-of-view account, modeled in part on his qualified-judges account in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. In particular, I argue that the general point of view needs to be jointly constructed by spectators who have sympathized with (at least some of) the agents in (at least some of) the actor's circles of influence. The upshot of the account is twofold. First, Hume's later thought developed in such a way that it can rectify the problems inherent in his Treatise account of the general point of view. Second, the proposed account provides the grounds for an adequate and well-motivated modest ideal observer theory of the standard of virtue.     

STANDARDS OF EQUALITY AND HUME'S VIEW OF GEOMETRY

It has been argued that there is a genuine conflict between the views of geometry defended by Hume in the Treatise and in the Enquiry: while the former work attributes to geometry a different status from that of arithmetic and algebra, the latter attempts to restore its status as an exact and certain science. A closer reading of Hume shows that, in fact, there is no conflict between the two works with respect to geometry. The key to understanding Hume's view of geometry is the distinction he draws between two standards of equality in extension.     

A (SELLARSIAN) KANTIAN CRITIQUE OF HUME'S THEORY OF CONCEPTS

Abstract:   In A Treatise of Human Nature , Hume attempts to explain all human cognition in terms of impressions, ideas, and their qualities, behaviors, and relations. This explanation includes a complicated attempted reduction of beliefs , or judgments, to single ideas. This paper attempts to demonstrate one of the inadequacies of this approach, and any of its kind (any attempted reduction of judgments to their constituent parts, single or multiple) via an argument concerning the logical forms of judgment found implicitly in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason , and more explicitly in the works of Wilfrid Sellars.     

A RESOURCE ACCOUNT OF INHIBITION

Abstract— In a letter-naming task, a letter will be named more slowly if it was a distractor on the previous trial. This negative priming effect has been instrumental in renewed interest in inhibition. The present research explored whether inhibition is a result of controlled attention. When the naming task was performed under a mental work load, negative priming was diminished as work load increased. This finding suggests that inhibition is a product of controlled resources and that group differences in inhibition may result from differences in controlled attentional resources, not from inefficient inhibitory mechanisms.     

RULES OF EVIDENCE:

Abstract— Statistical tests define rules of evidence in psychological science Agreed-upon rules of evidence are needed to discuss what is true Statistics are probability statements about the reliability of associations In public and journalistic debates about psychological topics, the need far statistical rules is evident Anecdotes, intuitions, and sensational and unlikely events often dominate popular discussions Psychological science demands that the probability of events and associations be evaluated by statistical means Understanding of statistical tests can be improved by abandoning the term significance, winch means reliability to psychologists, but in everyday English, means importance. The importance of a result depends on magnitude of association, not on whether the event has a nonzero chance of recurring. Given large samples and multiple measures, statistical tests are used too often to draw misleading conclusions about the importance of research results. Better uses of statistics would focus on the magnitude of effects and error estimates     

AN AMERICAN NATURALIST ACCOUNT OF CULTURE

The basic tenets of “classical” naturalism (exemplified in the work of Mead, Buchler, and Randall, among others) are delineated and distinguished from other versions of naturalism. Classical naturalism is also distinguished from reductive materialism and idealism. Nature is asserted to be indefinitely plural and not amenable to monistic or dualistic categorial schemes; that is, the principle of “ontological parity” is maintained. The method of inquiry of naturalism is outlined, along with the notion of truth as perspectivally objective. The metaphysical hypotheses are then used to examine culture. Culture is found to be the specific environment of human being, arising out of, but irreducible to, other natural processes. Culture is described as the cumulative gestures of the human social organism as it discovers and creates itself in mutual constitution with other natural processes and products.     

EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT, RELIABILITY, AND HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Necessity holds that, if a proposition A supports another B, then it must support B. John Greco contends that one can resolve Hume's Problem of Induction only if she rejects Necessity in favor of reliabilism. If Greco's contention is correct, we would have good reason to reject Necessity and endorse reliabilism about inferential justification. Unfortunately, Greco's contention is mistaken. I argue that there is a plausible reply to Hume's Problem that both endorses Necessity and is at least as good as Greco's alternative. Hence, Greco provides a good reason for neither rejecting Necessity nor endorsing inferential reliabilism.