On hating in the first person plural: thinking psychoanalytically about racism, homophobia, and misogyny.

On the basis of personal, cultural, and clinical references, misogyny, homophobia, and racism are conceptualized as structured forms of hatred grounded in a defensive use of the first person plural voice. This use of hatred defends against dangers associated with desires linked to the first person singular. In these hatreds, "I want" is defensively transformed into "we hate." Disidentification from and hatred of the object appear where identification and yearning had been. Along with this defensive move into plurality, with these forms of hatred comes the use of what is conceptualized as the "hermeneutics of transparency." Here the hated qualities of the objects in question are sensed to be transparently obvious, a matter not of thought but of perception. The underlying premises of these hatreds are then contrasted with the underlying premises of psychoanalysis. Effective psychoanalytic work with these hatreds entails resisting the moral pressure to disidentify from them, while bearing the often profound discomfort linked with identifying with them.     

Theory of Mind in schizophrenia: first person vs third person perspective

Patients suffering from schizophrenia have an impaired meta-representation also known as Theory of Mind (ToM). Moreover, the presence of delusions or other positive symptoms of schizophrenia has been correlated to poor ToM performances. Lack of insight is a common symptom of schizophrenia and can be considered a critical manifestation of impaired ToM abilities. In particular, the present study addresses the role of perspective ToM ability in schizophrenic patients. Thirty severely delusional schizophrenic patients completely lack insight when interviewed about their delusions. Seven subsequently gain insight about their mental state when perspective is shifted from the first person to third person. These data suggest that in some delusional schizophrenic patients, it may be possible to gain access to and modify their mental states.     

Relative truth and the first person

In recent work on context-dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. I will argue that the sentences that apparently give rise to relative truth should be understood by relating them in a certain way to the first person. More precisely, such sentences express what I will call ‘first-person-based genericity’, a form of generalization that is based on an essential first-person application of the predicate. The account differs from standard relative truth account in crucial respects: it is not the truth of the proposition expressed that is relative to the first person; the proposition expressed by a sentence with a predicate of taste rather has absolute truth conditions. Instead it is the propositional content itself that requires a first-personal cognitive access whenever it is entertained. This account, I will argue, avoids a range of problems that standard relative truth theories of the sentences in question face and explains a number of further peculiarities that such sentences display.     

The concept of the fully functioning person

Conclusion Here then is my theoretical model of the person who emerges from therapy—a person functioning freely in all the fullness of his organismic potentialities; a person who is dependable in being realistic, self-enhancing, socialized and appropriate in his behavior; a creative person, whose specific formings of behavior are not easily predictable; a person who is ever changing, ever developing, always discovering himself and the newness in himself in each succeeding moment of time. This is the person who in an imperfect way actually emerges from the experience of safety and freedom in a therapeutic experience, and this is the person whom I have tried to describe for you in pure form.My purpose has not been to convince you of the correctness of this view. Indeed I would have to confess that I have written this paper primarily for my own satisfaction, to clarify the thoughts which have been stirring in me. But if this presentation causes you to formulate your view of the person who emerges from therapy, or enables you to point out flaws in my own thinking which I have not yet seen, or arouses in you the desire to put to objective test either this picture or one which you paint for yourself, then it will have fully served both its primary and its secondary purpose.Reprinted by permission from Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, Vol. 1, No. 1, August, 1963.     

Separability of item and person parameters in response time models

This paper discusses two forms of separability of item and person parameters in the context of response time (RT) models. The first is separate sufficiency: the existence of sufficient statistics for the item (person) parameters that do not depend on the person (item) parameters. The second is ranking independence: the likelihood of the item (person) ranking with respect to RTs does not depend on the person (item) parameters. For each form a theorem stating sufficient conditions, is proved. The two forms of separability are shown to include several (special cases of) models from psychometric and biometric literature. Ranking independence imposes no restrictions on the general distribution form, but on its parametrization. An estimation procedure based upon ranks and pseudolikelihood theory is discussed, as well as the relation of ranking independence to the concept of double monotonicity.I am indebted to Wim van der Linden for bringing Thissen's (1983) paper to my notice, and to Martijn Berger, Frans Tan, and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view (a reply to L. A. Paul)1

Abstract

In her very interesting ‘First-personal modes of presentation and the problem of empathy’ (2017, 315–336), L. A. Paul argues that the phenomenon of empathy gives us reason to care about the first person point of view: that as theorists we can only understand, and as humans only evince, empathy by appealing to that point of view. We are skeptics about the importance of the first person point of view, although not about empathy. The goal of this paper is to see if we can account for empathy without the ideology of the first person. We conclude that we can.     

Five-year-old children's difficulty with false belief when the sought entity is a person

A total of 153 children (excluding those who erred on control questions), mainly 5 and 7 years of age, participated in two experiments that involved tests of false belief. In the task, the sought entity was first at Location 1 and then, unknown to the searching protagonist, it moved to Location 2. In Experiment 1, performance was well below ceiling in 5-year-olds when the sought entity was a person, and this contrasted with a task in which the sought entity was a physical object. Performance was especially inaccurate when the sought person moved of his or her own volition rather than when the sought person was requested to move by a third party. Interestingly, 5-year-olds were more likely to nominate Location 1 when asked where the searching protagonist would look first than when asked what he or she would do next. In Experiment 2, however, 5-year-olds also tended to nominate Location 1 following a question that included the word "first" even in a test of true belief--a patently incorrect response. Altogether, the results suggest that 5-year-old children have considerable difficulty with a test of false belief when the sought entity is a person acting under his or her own volition. This suggests that 5-year-olds' handle on states of belief is surprisingly fragile in this kind of task.     

A dynamic interactive theory of person construal

A dynamic interactive theory of person construal is proposed. It assumes that the perception of other people is accomplished by a dynamical system involving continuous interaction between social categories, stereotypes, high-level cognitive states, and the low-level processing of facial, vocal, and bodily cues. This system permits lower-level sensory perception and higher-order social cognition to dynamically coordinate across multiple interactive levels of processing to give rise to stable person construals. A recurrent connectionist model of this system is described, which accounts for major findings on (a) partial parallel activation and dynamic competition in categorization and stereotyping, (b) top-down influences of high-level cognitive states and stereotype activations on categorization, (c) bottom-up category interactions due to shared perceptual features, and (d) contextual and cross-modal effects on categorization. The system's probabilistic and continuously evolving activation states permit multiple construals to be flexibly active in parallel. These activation states are also able to be tightly yoked to ongoing changes in external perceptual cues and to ongoing changes in high-level cognitive states. The implications of a rapidly adaptive, dynamic, and interactive person construal system are discussed.     

Subject in first person--subject in third person: subject, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity

In this article, the author traces the history of the concepts of subject, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity in different psychoanalytic theories in the last decades. She argues that the uniqueness of these concepts and their different implications were not emphasized enough. The author discusses the various implications and contexts of the concept of subject in psychoanalytic theory proper and to relate as to: (1). The need to distinguish between the concepts of subject and subjectivity; (2). The mutual interdependence of the subject and his subjectivity and the intersubjective domain (both in the development of the individual and in theoretical thought pertaining to it). Her point of departure is from the position of the subject as a free creature, the centrality of the experiencing individual, from his/her perspective—the subject in the first person. She tries to explain the paradox implicit in the experiential dimension, the place of the other as participant, as both negating and recognizing—the subject in the third person. She suggests the interdependency of the first-person experience of subjectivity on the intersubjective dimension.     

Second person thought

There are modes of presentation of a person in thought corresponding to the first and third person pronouns. This paper proposes that there is also thought involving a second person mode of presentation of another, which might be expressed by an utterance involving ‘you’, but need not be expressed linguistically. It suggests that co-operative activity is the locus for such thought. First person thought is distinctive in how it supplies reasons for the subject to act. In co-operative action there is first person plural intending and judging. So there is a way of thinking of another, when openly co-operating with him or her, which plays the distinctive role of giving reason for contribution to the co-operative activity. In slogan form, ‘you’ is ‘we minus I’. The way children learn to use second and third person pronouns is naturally explained on this view. Contrasting less sophisticated kinds of co-operative activity with more sophisticated forms, and considering some issues about common knowledge and common purpose, help to fill out the proposal.     

The response order effect: People believe the first person who remembers an event

When groups of people remember an event, the order in which they discuss their memories is important. In three experiments, a response order effect was shown in which participants believed the first speaker to be more accurate and more confident than a subsequent speaker. Further, participants were more likely to report as their own memory what the first speaker reported than what a subsequent speaker reported. The experiments showed that the response order effect was not due to intrinsic characteristics of what the first speaker said. Even when participants chose the response order themselves and the speakers’ dialogue was counterbalanced, participants still believed that the first speaker was more accurate and confident than a subsequent speaker. Because in most situations the person who introduces a particular topic into a discussion is more accurate, people may assume that this is true, even when the response order is random.     

A meta-analysis of correlations between depression and first person singular pronoun use

Depression is a burden. We discuss how theories, identification, assessment, and treatment of depression are at least partially tied to the correlation between first person singular pronoun use and individual differences in depression. We conducted a meta-analysis (k = 21, N = 3758) of these correlations, including numerous unpublished correlations from the file drawer. Our fixed effects analysis revealed a small correlation (r = 0.13, 95% CI = [0.10–0.16]) by modern standards. The correlation was not moderated by gender, nor by whether the effect had been published. These results more firmly establish first person singular pronoun use as a linguistic marker of depression—a marker that appears to be useful across demographic lines.     

The concept of the person and the value of life

The concept of the person has come to be intimately connected with questions about the value of life. It is applied to those sorts of beings who have some special value or moral importance and where we need to prioritize the needs or claims of different sorts of individuals. "Person" is a concept designating individuals like us in some important respects, but possibly including individuals who are very unlike us in other respects. What are these respects and why are they important? This paper sets out to answer these questions and to develop a coherent and useful concept of the person.     

A demonstration of undergraduate students' first impressions and their ratings of pathology

An interactive team exercise based in the dual topic areas of social and abnormal psychology is described that employs videotaped case studies to sensitize students to the processes by which they form first impressions of other people, and to various issues regarding assessments of mental disorders. Each of three case studies is presented in two parts: Part I simulates a "first impression" condition--involving students' ratings of perceived pathology--by briefly showing only a patient (no soundtrack present), and Part 2 constitutes a "further disclosure" condition by giving more exposure-involving therapists' diagnoses and assessments-of the same patient with both sight and soundtrack presented. Data are reported from 12 introductory psychology classes in which students (N=367) rated the three patients on psychopathology as perceived severity of disorder as compared to the actual assessments (also contained on the videotapes) made by clinical psychologists and psychiatrists. The demonstration is useful in eliciting consistent and predictable first impressions from students, in stimulating classroom discussion about the value and accuracy of person perceptions and first impressions, and in alerting students to problems related to the identification of mental disorders.     

Memory for incidentally perceived social cues: Effects on person judgment

Dynamic face cues can be very salient, as when observing sudden shifts of gaze to a new location, or a change of expression from happy to angry. These highly salient social cues influence judgments of another person during the course of an interaction. However, other dynamic cues, such as pupil dilation, are much more subtle, affecting judgments of another person even without awareness. We asked whether such subtle, incidentally perceived, dynamic cues could be encoded in to memory and retrieved at a later time. The current study demonstrates that in some circumstances changes in pupil size in another person are indeed encoded into memory and influence judgments of that individual at a later time. Furthermore, these judgments interact with the perceived trustworthiness of the individual and the nature of the social context. The effect is somewhat variable, however, possibly reflecting individual differences and the inherent ambiguity of pupil dilation/constriction.     

Categorizing others: the dynamics of person construal

A fundamental question in social cognition is whether people categorize others on the basis of the social groups to which they belong. Integrating ideas from related work on face processing, the current research explored the emergence and boundary conditions of person categorization. Using speeded responses to facial stimuli as a marker of category activation, the authors showed in 3 experiments that person categorization: (a) occurs only under active-encoding conditions and (b) does not extend to applicable but task-irrelevant categorical dimensions, but (c) is sensitive to overlap in the perceptual features that support multiple categorical construals. The authors consider the implications of these findings for models of social-cognitive functioning and the component processes that support person perception.     

Confusing one person with another: what errors reveal about the elementary forms of social relations

Seven studies investigated the cognitive structure of social relationships exhibited in the patterns of substitutions that occur when people confuse a person with another. The studies investigated natural errors in which people called a familiar person by the wrong name, misremembered with whom they had interacted, or mistakenly directed an action at an inappropriate person. These studies tested the relational-models theory of A. P. Fiske (1990b, 1991) that people use 4 basic models for social relationships. All 7 studies provide support for the theory; Ss tend to confuse people with whom they interact in the same basic relationship mode. In addition, Ss confuse people of the same gender. Other factors (age, race, role term, similarity of names) generally have smaller, less reliable effects, indicating that the 4 elementary modes of relationships are among the most salient schemata in everyday social cognition.     

Understanding others: the face and person construal

The face is a critical stimulus in person perception, yet little research has considered the efficiency of the processing operations through which perceivers glean social knowledge from facial cues. Integrating ideas from work on social cognition and face processing, the current research considered the ease with which invariant aspects of person knowledge can be extracted from faces under different viewing and processing conditions. The results of 2 experiments demonstrated that participants extracted knowledge pertaining to the sex and identity of faces in both upright and inverted orientations, even when the faces were irrelevant to the task at hand. The results of an additional experiment, however, suggested that although the extraction of person knowledge from faces may occur unintentionally, the process is nonetheless contingent on the operation of a semantic processing goal. The authors consider the efficiency of person construal and the processes that support this fundamental facet of social-cognitive functioning.     

Dissecting the time course of person recognition in natural viewing environments

Person recognition often unfolds over time and distance as a person approaches, with the quality of identity information from faces, bodies, and motion in constant flux. Participants were familiarized with identities using close‐up and distant videos. Recognition was tested with videos of people approaching from a distance. We varied the timing of prompted responses in the test videos, the amount of video seen, and whether the face, body, or whole person was visible. A free response condition was also included to allow participants to respond when they felt ‘confident’. The pattern of accuracy across conditions indicated that recognition judgments were based on the most recently available information, with no contribution from qualitatively diverse and statistically useful person cues available earlier in the video. Body recognition was stable across viewing distance, whereas face recognition improved with proximity. The body made an independent contribution to recognition only at the farthest distance tested. Free response latencies indicated meta‐knowledge of the optimal proximity for recognition from faces versus bodies. Notably, response bias varied strongly as a function of participants’ expectation about whether closer proximity video was forthcoming. These findings lay the groundwork for developing person recognition theories that generalize to natural viewing environments.