The Mirror of the Infinite: Gregory of Nyssa on the Vestigia Trinitatis

This essay attempts to demonstrate something of the subtlety and complexity of Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian theology by paying close attention to the way in which, for Gregory, the Triune God is reflected in the "mirror" of the soul—both in its creaturely constitution and in the process of its sanctification by the Holy Spirit. The article is intended chiefly as an argument against the fashionable scholarly opposition between "Eastern" and "Western"—or "Cappadocian" and "Augustinian"—Trinitarianisms; it also is intended as an argument against "social" and "psychological" models of the Trinity alike (neither of which enjoys patristic warrant).     

The spit and image: a psychoanalytic dissection of a colloquial expression

"He is the spit of his father" or "he is the spit and image of his father" is a colloquial expression that has graced informal English for many centuries. When a "spitting image" made an entrance in the manifest content of an analysand's dream, it became possible to add a psychoanalytic point of view to an etymological and anthropological record. After discussing both this clinical case and an "anthropological case history," the author examines the subtle but complex genesis of this colloquial expression from a speculative applied psychoanalytic perspective.     

WHAT IT FEELS LIKE TO BE IN A SUPERPOSITION. AND WHY

This paper attempts an interpretation of Everett's relative state formulation of quantum mechanics that avoids the commitment to new metaphysical entities like worlds or minds. Starting from Everett's quantum mechanical model of an observer, it is argued that an observer's belief to be in an eigenstate of the measurement (corresponding to the observation of a well-defined measurement outcome) is consistent with the fact that she objectively is in a superposition of such states. Subjective states corresponding to such beliefs are constructed. From an analysis of these subjective states and their dynamics it is argued that Everett's pure wave mechanics is subjectively consistent with von Neumann's classical formulation of quantum mechanics. It follows from the argument that the objective state of a system is in principle unobservable. Nevertheless, an adequate concept of empirical reality can be constructed.     

A factor related to the strength of an "Aha!" experience

Abstract: It is natural to assume that the strength of an "Aha!" becomes stronger when an unexpected solution is correct. In this study, this assumption is examined experimentally through a list of possible correct solutions. In the experiment, subjects listed the possible correct solutions before solving the problems, and evaluated the strength of their "Aha!" experience after they solved the problems. It was shown that the strength of the "Aha!" experience was strongest if the correct answer had not been included in the list of possible correct solutions; if included, the strength of the "Aha!" experience corresponded to the answer's position in the list, that is, the later the correct solution listed, the stronger the feeling became. It is suggested that the strength of an "Aha!" experience can be used as an error function in the learning process.     

The Pursuit of Epistemic Good

Pace Zagzebski, there is no route from the value of knowledge to a non–reliabilist virtue–theoretic epistemology. Her discussion of the value problem is marred by an uncritical and confused employment of the notion of a "state" of knowledge, an uncritical acceptance of a "knowledge–belief" identity thesis, and an incoherent presumption that the widely held thought that knowledge is more valuable than true belief amounts to the view that knowledge is a state of true belief having an intrinsic property which a state of 'mere" true belief lacks. Her arguments against a "machine–product" conception of knowledge are undermined by these flaws, while the alternative "agent–act" model she recommends is unattractive, at odds with the knowledge–belief identity thesis she favours, and no solution to the problem of the value of knowledge she poses. I end with the observation that her version of virtue–theoretic epistemology points in the direction of cognitive decision–theoretic norms, and I briefly discuss the bearing of this fact upon her viewpoint.     

Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant

Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an action, is that it issues from the person's constitution, and therefore from the person as a whole, rather than from some force working on or in the person. This in turn implies an account of what makes an action good: what makes an action good is that it is deliberated upon and chosen in a way that unifies the person into a constitutional system. Through deliberative action we constitute ourselves as unified agents. Platonic justice and Kant's categorical imperative are shown to be normative standards for action because they are principles of self-constitution.     

Quantification and Ontology

Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form ' x ', assimilated to theEnglish 'there is something that is a '. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first proposed by Geach. The ontological burden is borne by constant symbols, and truth is defined separately from reference.     

"结构":解读古典经济学哲学构架的逻辑中轴--瓦尔特·本雅明:作品、生活、时代和历史的交叠

马克思的"古典经济学"概念具有明确内涵、外延并与一定的"知识型"相关,这与西方学者在一般的、含糊的意义使用这个概念具有根本的异质性.它界划了一种分析的范式,说明了马克思与资产阶级经济学之间存在着"知识型"的断裂,这种分析范式就是从配第和布阿吉尔贝尔开始的探讨社会结构及由这种结构所决定的运动规律,这是"古典经济学"概念之独特内涵所在.福柯等人忽视了古典经济学的"结构"视角而从"劳动"范畴出发,认为马克思对李嘉图的修正在西方知识的最深层中并未产生真正的间断性,这是没有读懂马克思"古典政治经济学"的真正内涵.     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, "intentionalists" argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and "motivationists" argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of "twisted" self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both "twisted" and "straight" self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

Religion,personality, and clinical assessment

Religion is an integral part of every person's life and occupies a central place in every personality. Viewing religion as referring to that which is of primary importance in one's life, one sees it as performing an integrative function, consolidating and ordering all of the inputs to personality, and giving consistency to one's behavior. Thus, an understanding of the individual and an assessment of his religion are necessary for a complete understanding of his problems.     

The Pursuit of Epistemic Good

Pace Zagzebski, there is no route from the value of knowledge to a non–reliabilist virtue–theoretic epistemology. Her discussion of the value problem is marred by an uncritical and confused employment of the notion of a "state" of knowledge, an uncritical acceptance of a "knowledge–belief" identity thesis, and an incoherent presumption that the widely held thought that knowledge is more valuable than true belief amounts to the view that knowledge is a state of true belief having an intrinsic property which a state of 'mere" true belief lacks. Her arguments against a "machine–product" conception of knowledge are undermined by these flaws, while the alternative "agent–act" model she recommends is unattractive, at odds with the knowledge–belief identity thesis she favours, and no solution to the problem of the value of knowledge she poses. I end with the observation that her version of virtue–theoretic epistemology points in the direction of cognitive decision–theoretic norms, and I briefly discuss the bearing of this fact upon her viewpoint.     

The "Natural" and the "Formal"

The paper presents an argument against a metaphysical conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable structure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) It is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which our reason must deal: the realm of the natural, constituted by the things of our empirical world, and the realm of the formal, constituted by the structures that we use as prisms to view, to make sense of, and to reconstruct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on many foundational problems of logic.     

Genius [corrected] without the "Great Man": new possibilities for the historian of psychology

The Carlylian style of history, more commonly known as the "Great Man" approach, presented the "genius" as an individual worthy of celebration: history as hero worship. This style, which characterized the first wave of the history of psychology, has gone out of historiographic fashion. In its place is the "new history," which is marked by its external focus and privileging of social factors and cultural context in its explanations. This shift in historiographic sensibilities has also led to a revision in the appropriate subject matter for psychologist-historians. This article argues, in contrast, that it is possible to study eminent individuals without resorting to hagiography, and it presents various methods that could be used for this purpose. The aim of such an endeavor is to create a space for critically and historically informed perspectives on greatness and to suggest a reconsideration of the value of an "historical psychology".     

The Trouble With Searle''s Biological Naturalism

John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Min is a sustained attempt to locate the mind and the mental firmly in the realm of the physical. Consciousness,claims Searle, is just an ordinary biological feature of the world ... More specifically,``[t]he mental state of consciousness is just an ordinary biological, that is, physical featureof the brain'. Searle is adamant: ``Consciousness,to repeat, is a natural biological phenomenon'.The purpose of this paper is to establish the claim that Searle's version of biologicalnaturalism, articulated in Rediscovery and defended elsewhere, is an incoherent theory of themind. I attempt to make good on this claim by showing (i) that Searle's biologicalnaturalism is committed to four claims which are individually plausible but not possiblefor Searle to hold simultaneously, (ii) that Searle's biological naturalism is, despiteSearle's protests to the contrary, a form of dualism, and therefore (iii) that Searle'sbiological naturalism is enmeshed in the same philosophical tradition from whichSearle claims to be departing, and finally (iv) that Searle's commitment to the jointnotions of nonreductivism and causal closure of the physical domain creates a problemhis theory of the mind lacks the resources to solve plausibly.     

From handicap to handy capable: training systemic therapists in use of self

This article describes and discusses the rationale for an experiential methodology to help trainees expand their repertoire of behaviors in clinical situations. The goal in addressing the trainee's personal, "handicapping" responses is to pay attention to "how" a therapist is perceived, "why" a therapist has certain blindspots, and "what" the therapist does to co-create a therapeutic impasse. In addition, experientially considering the impact of self encourages therapists to "learn to learn" that they are an active, resourceful participant in the evolutionary process of the therapeutic system.     

An epistemological use of nonstandard analysis to answer Zeno's objections against motion

Three of Zeno's objections to motion are answered by utilizing a version of nonstandard analysis, internal set theory, interpreted within an empirical context. Two of the objections are without force because they rely upon infinite sets, which always contain nonstandard real numbers. These numbers are devoid of numerical meaning, and thus one cannot render the judgment that an object is, in fact, located at a point in spacetime for which they would serve as coordinates. The third objection, an arrow never appears to be moving, is answered by showing that it only applies to a finite number of instants of time. A theory of motion is also advanced; it consists of a finite series of contiguous infinitesimal steps. The theory is immune to Zeno's first two objections because the number of steps is finite and each lies outside the domain of observation. Present motion is hypothesized to be an unobservable process taking place within each step. The fact of motion is apparent through a summing (Riemann integration) of the steps.     

A fallacy of aristotle''s about ends

A distinction between activities and processes plays an important role in Aristotle's argument to establish that the good life is a life of activities, among which metaphysical contemplation is foremost. But, as a result of having failed to distinguish internal from external ends of action, Aristotle makes fallacious inferences from every activity's having an internal end in itself to its possessing features which may be legitimately inferred only from external ends, and from every process's having an internal end that is its terminal point to its having the attainment of that terminal point as an external end. The resulting confusion explains a number of problematic elements in Aristotle's ethical theory.     

Marriage in academe: Hitching your wagon to a star

A frequent pattern of marital dysfunction seen in an academic setting is described. Typically, the wife of a professor sublimates her own strong intellectual achievement needs in order to facilitate her husband's success. After he achieves renown, she expects he will support her efforts to satisfy suppressed achievement strivings. The husband/professor is locked into an external reward system and is unwilling to meet his wife's needs, leading to marital conflict. Background factors in both spouses set up this dysfunctional pattern. Marital therapy with an emphasis on self versus others' expectations for achievement is recommended. A case study is presented.     

Overcoming Relativism? Levinas's Return to Platonism

Emmanuel Levinas's concept of "the face of the Other" involves an ethical mandate that is presumably transcultural or, in his terms, "precultural." His essay "Meaning and Sense" provides his most explicit defense of the idea that the face has a meaning that is not culturally relative, though it is always encountered within some particular culture. Levinas identifies his position there as a "return to Platonism." Through a careful reading of that essay, exploring Levinas's use of religious terminology and the (some-times implicit) relationships of the essay to the work of other phenomenologists and of Saussure, the author seeks to clarify (1) what Levinas retains and what he rejects in returning to Platonism "in a new way," (2) the sense in which this return constitutes an "overcoming" of relativism, and (3) the nature of the phenomenological warrant that he offers for his position.