Response to commentary: is collaboration a viable target for family therapists?

In response to Zimmerman's commentary, ‘Is collaboration a viable target for family therapists?’ we explore more conventional perspectives of therapeutic collaboration featured in the family therapy literature, including Zimmerman's commentary. In particular, we critique essentialist and universal formulations that portray the client–therapist relationship to be inherently unequal as inconsistent and limiting. We conclude by addressing what appear to be some misunderstandings in Zimmerman's commentary and clarify what we see as differences between his ideas and our stance on collaboration and power in family therapy.     

Addressing moral problems through practical reasoning

In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation.     

Bullying is detrimental to health, but all bullying behaviours are not necessarily equally damaging

The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of 'negative behaviours' and 'bullying' in the workplace on the health and well-being of employees, to what extent the effects remain beyond the period of the experience as well as the extent to which they affect third-parties or witnesses. The paper also raises the question whether some behaviours associated with bullying may be more damaging than others. Potential sex differences and differences between occupational contexts are considered. To achieve these aims, a national cross-sectional study (N=5,388) was carried out. In absolute terms those who labelled their experience as bullying had substantially worse health than those who were not bullied. However, counter to what was expected, stronger associations were found between negative behaviour and adverse health effects than for self-reported (self-labelled) bullying and health. Previous targets as well as witnesses also reported worse health than those who were neither bullied nor had witnessed bullying. The findings also imply that some negative behaviours were more difficult to deal with than others. In all cases differences between the sexes and between occupational contexts emerged.     

On agreed actions without agreed notions

In his plea for consensual democracy in Africa, Kwasi Wiredu recommends unanimity about what is to be done, not what ought to be done, or unanimity on action rather than unanimity of values, beliefs and opinion. I caution the use of this procedural instrument by showing that some issues are so value-laden that a group decision cannot be value-neutral. It may sometimes be more productive to entertain value differences to keep them from going underground and becoming dangerous. However, the ability to locate some common interest or ground seems to be crucial for such value confrontation.     

Situating vision in the world

Recently, there has been a great deal of interest in what has been called 'situated cognition', which has included claims that certain forms of representation are inadequate for modeling active organisms or agents such as humans and robots. In this article, I suggest that a weakness in classical theories of visual representation is the way in which representations connect with the real world, which may account for many of the concerns expressed by the situated cognition community. Specifically, I claim that what current theories lack is any provision for a certain form of direct, preconceptual connection between objects in the visual world (visual objects or proto-objects) and their representations in the visual system. This type of connection is akin to what philosophers and semanticists have referred to as an 'indexical' or 'demonstrative' reference and what some cognitive scientists have referred to as 'deictic pointers'. I explain why such a mechanism is needed and suggest that many workers have, in fact, been studying precisely this under the term 'visual index'. The visual index hypothesis is illustrated with the results of some relevant experiments, including multiple object tracking, visual routines and subset-selected visual searches. Indexing theory provides a synthesis that has profound implications for explaining a wide range of psychophysical findings, certain results in infant cognitive development and also some ancient problems in the philosophy of mind.     

On Retaining Classical Truths and Classical Deducibility in Many-Valued and Fuzzy Logics

In this paper, I identify the source of the differences between classical logic and many-valued logics (including fuzzy logics) with respect to the set of valid formulas and the set of inferences sanctioned. In the course of doing so, we find the conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for any many-valued semantics (again including fuzzy logics) to validate exactly the classically valid formulas, while sanctioning exactly the same set of inferences as classical logic. This in turn shows, contrary to what has sometimes been claimed, that at least one class of infinite-valued semantics is axiomatizable.     

Long-term effects of losing a spouse or child in a motor vehicle crash

In this article we examine the long-term effects of the sudden, unexpected loss of a spouse or child. In the spouse study, interviews were conducted with 39 individuals who had lost a spouse in a motor vehicle crash 4 to 7 years ago and with 39 matched controls. In the parent study, interviews were conducted with 41 parents who had lost a child in a crash and with 41 matched controls. Control respondents were matched to bereaved respondents case-by-case on the basis of sex, age, income, education, and number and ages of children. Significant differences between bereaved spouses and controls were revealed on several indicators of general functioning, including depression and other psychiatric symptoms, social functioning, psychological well-being, reactivity to good events, and future worries and concerns. For the most part, these differences persisted when variables such as present family income and present marital status were statistically controlled. Comparisons between bereaved and control parents also revealed significant differences on some measures of general functioning (especially depression), but these were not as pervasive as the differences obtained in the spouse study. Responses to questions about current thoughts and feelings suggest that the deceased continued to occupy the thoughts and conversations of bereaved spouses and parents. Moreover, a large percentage of respondents (from 30% to 85%, depending on the question), continued to ruminate about the accident or what might have been done to prevent it, and they appeared to be unable to accept, resolve, or find any meaning in the loss. Taken together, the data provide little support for traditional notions of recovery from the sudden, unexpected loss of a spouse or child.     

Environmental Behavior of Visitors to a Science Museum

ABSTRACT

Increasingly, informal science and environmental education institutions are addressing conservation messaging and environmental behavior in programming, exhibits, and interpretation. Yet, little is known about what pro-environmental behaviors visitors are currently undertaking, what characteristics those environmental behaviors may have in common, and what differences might exist among visitor populations. This study investigated environmental behaviors and attitudes of visitors (N = 689) to an informal science museum, including separate foci on members and nonmembers based on previous work suggesting differences between the two groups. To improve research, policy, and educational interventions that address environmental behavior, researchers have long sought to uncover relationships among unique environmental behaviors. To this end, the authors explored whether five commonly recommended pro-environmental behaviors shared underlying characteristics that could be used to group those behaviors. They uncovered some dissimilarity in self-reported environmental behaviors among members and nonmembers. Although no single shared construct underlying the behaviors was evident, the authors did find, for nonmember visitors, a suite of three traditional environmental behaviors and, for members, a suite of four contemporary environmental behaviors. They discuss implications for practice and future research.     

King Ideology — “Urmensch” — “Troonsbestijgingsfeest”

The aim of this article is to show the structural continuity of the idea of justification and grace between the Cistercian abbot Bernard of Clairvaux and the Augustinian friar and church reformer Martin Luther in a forward reading of the two. Others, such as Peter Manns, the Obermann School and the Finnish Luther research have pointed at some link between Catholicism, including Bernard, and Luther, but they have also pointed to differences, especially as to their understanding of justification and grace. This article goes a bit further, by showing structural similarities between the two theologians, separated by some 400 years, also when it comes to the understanding of faith and grace. By so doing it furthermore questions what has been the dominant view among Lutherans: that Luther broke entirely with his Catholic past, with the exception of Augustine. The article therefore treats of factors that have been decisive for this view, such as the almost hostile perceptions of mysticism and Bernard as a mystic as well as of Mariology and Bernard as a mariolate. It is demonstrated that these labelings, the mystic and the mariolate, are based on a backward reading of Bernard's teaching, and that he first and foremost was a theologian preaching the justification by grace through faith because of Christ. The question is if Bernard, whom Luther evaluated highly as a preacher of Christ, can be seen as a model for Luther.     

Field of Vision: Radical Uncertainty and the Analyst's Conduct: Commentary on Paper by Donnel B. Stern

There is a relationship between biography and theory. The analyst's ideas or formulations about his patients—theories really—must be determined, to some degree, by the certain and uncertain impact of his own history. Harry Stack Sullivan brought psychoanalysis squarely into the ambit of the relational/historical world by insisting that the mind is thoroughly and inherently social. In doing so, he staked a claim for the link between history, that is, social experience, and personhood. Our personalities and our theories are social-historical constructions. In relation to this, some differences between the interpersonal/relational and Bionian concepts of field theory are provided. One important difference pertains to the role of the analyst's conduct. Two meanings of conduct—to behave or to organize behavior—are at the center of what distinguishes the interpersonal/relational view of the analyst's position in the field from the Bionian view. For the relational analyst, action in the analytic field, including enactment, is conduct, and conduct is always bidirectional. The analyst, then, is a medium to alter, to reconstruct the self. He does not provide experience, he is experience. The form of an analytic exchange gives shape to the field and its content.     

Where is the phenomenology of attention that Husserl intended to perform? A transcendental pragmatic-oriented description of attention

For the most part, attention occurs as a theme adjacent to much more topical and innovatingly operating acts: first, the intentional act, which represents a destitution of the abstract opposition between subject and object and which paves the way for a detailed analysis of our perceptive horizontal subjective life; second, the reductive act, specified in a psycho-phenomenological sense as a reflective conversion of the way I am looking at things; third, the genetic method understood as a genealogy of logic based on our experiential affective pre-discursive world-life. In this respect, here are some of the leading questions of my investigation: What are the differences and the proximities between these methods and attentional activity? Why is the latter not put to the fore as a method? To what extent is this secondary part played by attention linked to the constitution of phenomenology as opposed to psychology (for which attention is a central theme), and what does it mean for the impossibility of phenomenology to freeing itself completely from psychology?     

Pragmatic,Existentialist and Phenomenological Interpretations of Marxism

In his book, Hermeneutics and Reflection (2013), Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann outlines what he sees as the fundamental differences between Edmund Husserl’s “theoretical” phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s “a-theoretical” phenomenology, which he frames in terms of the distinction between “reflective observation” and “hermeneutic understanding”. In this paper, I will clarify the sense of these terms in order to elucidate some of the crucial similarities and differences between Husserl and Heidegger. Against von Herrmann’s characterization of the Husserlian project, I argue that we should not consider these differences in terms of “reflection”, since this runs the risk of misconstruing Husserlian phenomenology with the philosophical tradition he was striving against. Taken together, by way of a close reading of von Herrmann, the following discussion will serve as a brief sketch of the early Heidegger’s turn away from Husserlian phenomenology and toward his own hermeneutic phenomenology.     

ANIMAL PASSIONS AND BEASTLY VIRTUES: COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY AS THE UNIFYING SCIENCE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE SUBJECTIVE,EMOTIONAL, EMPATHIC,AND MORAL LIVES OF ANIMALS

Abstract. In this essay, my response to four papers that were presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion in a session devoted to my research on animal behavior and cognitive ethology, I stress the importance of interdisciplinary research and collaboration for coming to terms with various aspects of animal behavior and animal cognition. I argue that we have much to learn from other animals concerning a set of “big” questions including who we are in the grand scheme of things, the role science (“science sense”) plays in our understanding of the world in which we live, what it means to “know” something, what some other ways of knowing are and how they compare to what we call “science,” and the use of anecdotes and anthropomorphism to inform studies of animal behavior. I ask, Are other minds really all that private and inaccessible? Can a nonhuman animal be called a person? What does the future hold if we continue to dismantle the only planet we live on and persecute the other animal beings with whom we are supposed to coexist? I argue that cognitive ethology is the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals, because it is essential to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines in the company of their friends and when they are alone. It is also important to learn why both the similarities and differences between humans and other animals have evolved. The more we come to understand other animals, the more we will appreciate them as the amazing beings they are, and the more we will come to understand ourselves.     

The Experience of Regret and Disappointment

Regret and disappointment have in common the fact that they are experienced when the outcome of a decision is unfavourable: They both concern “what might have been”, had things been different. However, some regret and disappointment theorists regard the differences between these emotions as important, arguing that they differ with respect to the conditions under which they are felt, and how they affect decision making. The goal of the present research was to examine whether and how these emotions also differ with respect to the way in which they are experienced. Participants were asked torecall aninstance of intense regret or disappointment andto indicate what they felt, thought, felt like doing, did, and were motivated to do during this experience (cf. Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Significant differences between regret and disappointment were found in every category. These differences were most pronounced for “action tendencies” (what participants felt like doing) and “emotivations” (what they were motivated to do). These results suggest that the two emotions have differential implications for future behaviour.     

Are there fundamental differences in the peripheral mechanisms of visceral and somatic pain?

There are some conspicuous differences between the sensibilities of cutaneous and visceral tissues: (1) Direct trauma, which readily produces pain when applied to the skin, is mostly without effect in healthy visceral tissue. (2) Pain that arises from visceral tissues is initially often poorly localised and diffuse. (3) With time, visceral pains are often referred to more superficial structures. (4) The site of referred pain may also show hyperalgesia. (5) In disease states, the afflicted viscera may also become hyperalgesic. In this target article, I consider to what extent differences in the physiology, anatomy, and chemistry of peripheral processing systems explain these different sensibilities. In almost every aspect, there are subtle differences in the properties of the processing mechanisms for cutaneous and visceral information. These may arise because of distinct developmental cues operating in the two domains. Many of the differences between visceral and cutaneous afferents are quantitative rather than qualitative. The quantitative differences, for example in the density of afferent innervation, can be large. The quantitative differences in the numbers of afferents alone may be a sufficient explanation for some aspects of the differential sensibility, for example, the poor localisation of sensation and the apparent insensitivity to focal yet tissue-damaging stimuli. In addition, the few clear qualitative differences apparent in the innervations of the two tissue types may be of special importance. That the encoding of visceral nociceptive events may occur by an intensity mechanism rather than a specificity mechanism could be the key difference in viscerosensory and somatosensory processing.     

Norms,Rules and Steadfast Love: Towards an Inclusive Theology of Intimacy

Abstract

This article argues that defenders of the traditional view that marriage is the necessary condition for sexual experience generally make two important mistakes. First, they underestimate how open to emergent forms marriage actually is. And second, they confuse marriage as a norm for sexual expression with marriage as a rule. This article attempts a simple clarification of this basic distinction and, in so doing, is able to throw considerable fresh light on the place of marriage in the Christian understanding of sexuality. First, there will be some reminders about how adaptable the institution of marriage has actually been and may continue to be. Second, attempts will be made to explain the differences between a norm and a rule. Finally some possibilities and consequences arising from this distinction will be explored. These will provide some promptings towards what is called here ‘an inclusive theology of intimacy’. Radical Christians are cautioned regarding their peremptory search for alternatives to marriage. People inside and outside the churches who reject marriage may be rejecting versions of it which, while undoubtedly historical, simply do not bring to light the possibilities released by what might be called ‘the marital norm’.     

Teacher,parent and student perceptions of the motives of cyberbullies

Understanding the motivation of students who cyberbully is important for both prevention and intervention efforts for this insidious form of bullying. This qualitative exploratory study used focus groups to examine the views of teachers, parents and students as to the motivation of students who cyberbully and who bully in other traditional forms. In addition, these groups were asked to explain their understanding of what defines bullying and cyberbullying. The results suggested that not only were there differences in definitions of cyberbullying and bullying between the three groups, but also that there were differences in perceptions of what motivates some youth to cyberbully. The implications of these results are discussed for both prevention and intervention strategies.     

Units of counting: Developmental changes

Insofar as counting is directed toward a definite quantification goal, only items that qualify as valid instances of what is being quantified should be included in the count. Thus, the choice of what to treat as a unit to be counted depends upon one's quantification goals. The present research examined developmental changes in the way children define units for counting. In the first experiment, children were shown arrays of toy animals and asked to count either the number of families or the number of individuals within a family. In the second and third experiments, the stimuli were objects that came apart into two pieces. Children were shown arrays composed of some intact objects and some objects that were separated into their parts, and they were asked either to count the number of wholes or the number of pieces in the entire array. Virtually all the counts children generated were based on some type of common unit, even if it was only defined by physical discreteness. However, marked age differences emerged in children's adaptation of their counting units to what they were asked to count.     

The role of preference in speed choice

Individual differences with regard to speed preference may be a source of speed heterogeneity and conflicts in traffic, such as tailgating and dangerous overtaking. The main aim of the current study was to explore drivers’ speed preferences when driving for different reasons (saving money on fuel, driving safely, driving for fun or driving as usual) and the relationship of these preferences to observed speeds and self-reported speed. 193 drivers were interviewed at five different locations, and were asked about their speeds on roads they had just travelled. Drivers’ speeds on these roads were also sampled with a speed gun. The results showed large differences between speeds chosen for different driving purposes; the lowest speeds were chosen when the goal was economy and the highest when driving for fun. In addition, there were individual differences in speed preferences such that some drivers indicated that their usual speed was above what they believed was a safe speed while others indicated that they usually drove even slower than what they thought was safe. These differences may account for much of the speed heterogeneity observed in on-road behaviour. The results also showed that drivers’ speed choices are highly influenced by their usual speeds, even more so than their beliefs regarding what constitutes a safe speed, which may help explain non-compliance with speed limits. No relationship was found between speed choice and risk perception.