Are Lesbians Women?

I argue that Mordque Wittig's view that lesbians are not women neglects the complexities involved in the composition of the category “woman.” I develop an articulation of the concept “woman” in the contemporary United States, with thirteen distinct defining characteristics, none of which are necessary nor sufficient. I argue that Wittig's emphasis on the material production of “woman” through the political regime of heterosexuality, however, is enormously fruitful for feminist and queer strategizing.     

Are affordances normative?

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - In this paper we explore in what sense we can claim that affordances, the objects of perception for ecological psychology, are related to normativity....     

Are Dispositions Reducible?

The traditional analysis of dispositions as conditionals is subject to in-superable difficulties. Recently David Lewis has offered a new, reformed analysis intended to meet objections to the old accounts while remaining reductionist about causal powers. I argue that it succeeds in meeting only some of the objections to its predecessors. For the reductionist programme to succeed, more is needed than the correct analysis of dispositions. If dispositional properties are to be reduced, then the world must contain a reduction base. Prima facie this is not the case: the dispositions of medium-sized objects are only reducible to dispositional properties of the structural parts of the objects. The physically ultimate constituents of matter, sub-atomic particles, are simple, and have no properties that could serve as the grounding of their dispositions. Reductionists make three major responses to this argument, which I evaluate. I conclude that the world does not contain anything to which dispositions could be reduced.     

Are creationists rational?

Creationism is usually regarded as an irrational set of beliefs. In this paper I propose that the best way to understand why individual learners settle on any mature set of beliefs is to see that as the developmental outcome of a series of “fast and frugal” boundedly rational inferences rather than as a rejection of reason. This applies to those whose views are opposed to science in general. A bounded rationality model of belief choices both serves to explain the fact that folk traditions tend to converge on “anti-modernity”, and to act as a default hypothesis, deviations from which we can use to identify other, arational, influences such as social psychological, economic and individual dispositions. I propose some educational and public policy strategies that might decrease the proportion of learners who find creationism and anti-science in general a rational choice.     

Are abilities dispositions?

Synthese - Abilities are in many ways central to what being an agent means, and they are appealed to in philosophical accounts of a great many different phenomena. It is often assumed that...     

Are shapes intrinsic?

It is widely believed that shapes are intrinsic properties. But this claim is hard to defend. I survey all known theories of shape properties, and argue that each theory is either incompatible with the claim that shapes are intrinsic, or can be shown to be false.     

Are models necessary?

Modelling is currently one of the most successful and popular ways of dealing with some neurotic problems. It is based on a social learning theory that amongst other virtues takes into account cognitive variables. helps shed light on the aetiology of some neurotic disorders (Rachman. 1972). and seems particularly relevant to the understanding of much child behaviour.The technique of the modelling treatment has been refined over the years, largely through the work of Bandura, and the contention to date has been that behavioural improvement is brought about by vicarious processes (Bandura, 1969). However, since a modelling procedure by necessity involves exposure to a phobic object it is possible that vicarious processes are in fact redundant and that improvement is affected by ‘straightforward’ extinction processes. In short the contention is that interaction with a model disguises the fact that the modelling situation is no more than a modified flooding session. In one of the few studies to test this hypothesis Bandura, Grusec and Menlove (1967) found that exposure alone resulted in some gains for dog-phobic children, but that these changes were neither as great nor as stable as those achieved by similar children in a modelling treatment. Other indirect evidence for this hypothesis can be found by-relating the amount of exposure to the phobic object to outcome in modelling studies. Despite obvious difficulties in cross-trial comparison, rate of success for longer exposure treatments would constitute some support, albeit very tentative, for this hypothesis. Unfortunately, few of the studies contained enough reliable information on the relevant variables to reveal much. Bandura et al. (1967) used 80 min of exposure in all, with success rates of 70%, whilst less exposure time resulted in worse outcome in studies by Spiegler et al. (1969) and Ritter (1969). However, against this, Hill et al. (1968) and Rimm and Mahoney (1969) both report good results with brief participant modelling. The fact that participant modelling seems to be more beneficial than symbolic modelling, may be regarded as some support for the exposure hypothesis, since presumably exposure in these cases is more intense.However, these studies are largely indirect and one test of the hypothesis requires a comparison between groups one of which is exposed to both phobic object and model interaction (symbolic modelling) and one of which is exposed just to the phobic object.     

Are adjustments insufficient?

Many judgmental biases are thought to be the product of insufficient adjustment from an initial anchor value. Nearly all existing evidence of insufficient adjustment, however, comes from an experimental paradigm that evidence indicates does not involve adjustment at all. In this article, the authors first provide further evidence that some kinds of anchors (those that are self-generated and known to be incorrect but close to the correct answer) activate processes of adjustment, whereas others (uncertain anchors provided by an external source) do not. It is then shown that adjustment from self-generated anchors does indeed tend to be insufficient, both by comparing the estimates of participants starting from different anchor values and by comparing estimates with actual answers. Thus, evidence is provided of adjustment-based anchoring effects similar to the accessibility-based anchoring effects observed in the traditional anchoring paradigm, supporting theories of social judgment that rely on mechanisms of insufficient adjustment.     

Are beliefs signals?

Eric Funkhouser argues that beliefs can function as social signals. I argue that Funkhouser’s argument for this conclusion rests on a problematic definition of “signal,” and that on standard definitions, the imperceptibility of beliefs disqualifies them from counting as signals. However, I also argue that Funkhouser’s insights about the social functions of beliefs can be true even if his claim that beliefs are signals is false.     

What Are Quantities?

This paper presents a view of quantities as ‘adverbial’ entities of a certain kind—more specifically, determinate ways, or modes, of having length, mass, speed, and the like. In doing so, it will be argued that quantities as such should be distinguished from quantitative properties or relations, and are not universals but are particulars, although they are not (Fregean) objects, either. A main advantage of the adverbial view over its rivals will be found in its superior explanatory power with respect to both certain fundamental principles of quantity and ordinary quantitative reasoning involving quantitative relations like three times as long as and 2 metres longer than.     

Are Fallacies Vices?

Why are some arguments fallacious? Since argumentation is an intellectual activity that can be performed better or worse, do we evaluate arguments simply in terms of their content, or does it also make sense to evaluate the arguer in light of the content put forward? From a ‘virtue’ approach, I propose understanding fallacies as having some link with intellectual vice(s). Drawing from recent work by Paul Grice, Linda Zagzebski, Andrew Aberdein, and Douglas Walton, this essay argues that if there is some sense of argumentation where an argument is (1) truth-propagating and not (2) put forward in order to ‘win’, fallacies may be the vicious element in arguments that undermines (1), most often because the arguer’s goal is only (2). From this perspective, fallacies may not only be improper ‘moves’ in an argument, but may also reveal something lacking in the arguer’s intellectual character.     

Are Plans Necessary?

According to classical decision theory, an agent realises at time t the option with maximum expected utility (determined by his beliefs and desires at t), where the relevant options are possible actions performed at t. I consider an alternative according to which the relevant options are in general plans, complex courses of action extending into the future.     

What Are the Brain Mechanisms on Which Psychological Processes Are Based?

ABSTRACT— That the human brain is the organ of the mind is not in dispute, but we know remarkably little about the brain mechanisms underlying the mind. What are the functional structures and computational processes of the human brain that subserve cognition, emotion, and behavior? Given the complexity of the human brain, progress in understanding the functional organization and structure of the human brain depends on sophisticated theoretical specifications of the psychological representations and processes that differentiate two or more comparison conditions. Psychological scientists, therefore, are well positioned to lead the search for brain mechanisms underlying psychological processes. Doing so constitutes an expansion of the purview of psychological science beyond a science of behavior, and beyond a science of the mind, to include a science of the brain. Such an expansion of the mission of psychological science has implications for the infrastructure and training needs of the discipline.