How to Silence Content with Porn,Context and Loaded Questions

Catharine MacKinnon claimed that pornography silence's women's speech where this speech is protected by free speech legislation. MacKinnon's claim was attacked as confused because, so it seemed, pornography is not the kind of thing that can silence speech. Using ideas drawn from John Austin's account of speech acts, Rae Langton defended MacKinnon's claim against this attack by showing how speech can, in principle, be silenced by pornography. However, Langton's defence requires us to deviate from a widely held understanding of what kind of speech is protected; namely the expression of opinions, ideas, and thoughts. In this paper I provide an alternative defence of MacKinnon's claim which requires no such deviation. I argue that because the truth‐conditions of sentences are context‐sensitive it is possible for there to be contexts in which, when those in attendance believe rape myths, it is not possible to express certain opinions, ideas, or thoughts. Given that pornography is a significant contributor to rape myth acceptance, this argument addresses the accusation of confusion facing MacKinnon without the need for deviation. The cross‐examination of a complainant in a rape trial is used as an illustration.     

FEMINIST ATTITUDES TOWARD PORNOGRAPHY CONTROL

Feminist attitudes toward legislative control of pornography were investigated. A sample of 119 recipients of the National Organization of Women Newsletter in a Southern California community responded to a questionnaire assessing variables expected to be related to pornography control: demographic variables, and attitudes toward pornography, censorship, free speech, and the harm of pornography. Values were related to attitude toward pornography control, especially the prioritizing of responsibility versus freedom. Attitudes toward pornography were also significant predictors; however, beliefs about importance of protecting free speech and the harm of pornography were the strongest predictors, with the protection of free speech making the largest contribution. In understanding "mainstream" feminists' attitudes toward pornography control, the most important variables appear to be those that assess the consequences of pornography.     

ILLOCUTION,SILENCING AND THE ACT OF REFUSAL

Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby argue that there may be a free‐speech argument against pornography, if pornographic speech has the power to illocutionarily silence women: women's locution ‘No!’ that aims to refuse unwanted sex may misfire because pornography creates communicative conditions where the locution does not count as a refusal. Central to this is the view that women's speech lacks uptake, which is necessary for illocutionary acts like that of refusal. Alexander Bird has critiqued this view by arguing that uptake is not necessary for the illocutionary act of refusal. The Hornsby‐Langton view, then, is philosophically indefensible. Here I defend the philosophical cogency of the Hornsby‐Langton approach.     

The Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance v. The BOG: And the Winner Is…?

The Supreme Court dismissed the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of speech. The Court's dismissal itself violates the free speech of the proposers of the Ordinance. It is not possible for both pornographers to perform the speech act of making pornography and feminists to perform the speech act of proposing the Ordinance. I show that the speech act of proposing the Ordinance takes First Amendment precedence over the speech act of making pornography.     

Linguistic authority and convention in a speech act analysis of pornography

Recently, several philosophers have recast feminist arguments against pornography in terms of Speech Act Theory. In particular, they have considered the ways in which the illocutionary force of pornographic speech serves to set the conventions of sexual discourse while simultaneously silencing the speech of women, especially during unwanted sexual encounters. Yet, this raises serious questions as to how pornographers could (i) be authorities in the language game of sex, and (ii) set the conventions for sexual discourse—questions which these speech act-theoretic arguments against pornography have thus far failed to adequately answer. I fill in this gap of the argumentation by demonstrating that there are fairly weak standards for who counts as an authority or convention-setter in sexual discourse. With this analysis of the underpinnings of a speech act analysis of pornography in mind, I discuss a range of possible objections. I conclude that (i) the endorsement of censorship by a speech act analysis of pornography competes with its commitment to the conventionality of speech acts, and, more damningly, that (ii), recasting anti-pornography arguments in terms of linguistic conventions risks an unwitting defence of a rapist's lack of mens rea—an intolerable result; and yet resisting this conclusion requires that one back away from the original claim to women's voices being ‘silenced’.     

A Practical Account of Autonomy: Why Genetic Counseling is Especially Well Suited to the Facilitation of Informed Autonomous Decision Making

In genetic counseling, facilitation of autonomous decision-making is seen as a primary aim and respect for autonomy is used to justify a nondirective counseling approach whereby clients are free to make their own choices after being given all necessary information. However in the genetic counseling literature, autonomy as a concept appears to be interpreted variably and often narrowly. We offer a practical account of autonomy that is coherent, consistent and philosophically defensible for the genetic counseling setting. At the same time we demonstrate how nondirective counseling may serve to frustrate rather than facilitate client autonomy. We suggest that promoting purposeful dialogue rather than counseling that is nondirective is more conducive to client autonomy.     

Evaluation in constitutional law: An application to the first amendment

This article argues that program evaluation data may be useful to the courts when they are deciding First Amendment constitutional law disputes. Specifically, we focus on how program evaluation data, quantitative and qualitative, may be dispositive in dealing with two types of First Amendment cases—pornography and commercial speech. The different evaluative approaches that are warranted with each type of case are compared and contrasted. The different possible legal routes that program evaluation data may take to influence the outcome of constitutional law disputes determines the empirical type of approach to be utilized. Where pornography cases lend themselves more to social science data being used in trials, cases of commercial speech are more likely to use data at the appellate level. Social scientists interested in conducting legally relevant research should structure their research accordingly.     

Sincerity Silencing

Catharine MacKinnon claims that pornography silences women in a way that violates the right to free speech. This claim is, of course, controversial, but if it is correct, then the very free speech reasons for protecting pornography appear also to afford reason to restrict it. For this reason, it has gained considerable attention. The philosophical literature thus far focuses on a type of silencing identified and analyzed by Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton (H&L). This article identifies, analyzes, and argues for the importance of a different type of silencing. As we shall see, there are compelling reasons in favor of regarding H&L silencing as a free speech violation and, as I argue here, the same can be said for sincerity silencing. Although additional work needs to be done to show that either one actually is a free speech violation, I demonstrate here that both types of silencing equally warrant this further attention. Moreover, I show that sincerity silencing is a fairly widespread phenomenon; so, therefore, is the harm it constitutes. As a result of these considerations, then, we can safely conclude that sincerity silencing also requires our attention.     

Democracy and Pornography: On Speech,Rights, Privacies,and Pleasures in Conflict

This article investigates the intersections of secrecy/interiority, the state, and speech/expression, and their implications for the rights of women. I propose a critique of commercial pornography that reanimates MacKinnon's claim that pornography and American democracy are in a relationship of mutual reinforcement, and incorporates poststructuralist (Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Butler) commitments to secrecy and unintelligibility, as well as their role in the production of pleasure.     

On Pornography: MacKinnon,Speech Acts,and “False” Construction

Although others have focused on Catharine MacKinnon's claim that pornography subordinates and silences women, I here focus on her claim that pornography constructs women's nature and that this construction is, in some sense, false. Since it is unclear how pornography, as speech, can construct facts and how constructed facts can nevertheless be false, MacKinnon's claim requires elucidation. Appealing to speech act theory, I introduce an analysis of the erroneous verdictive and use it to make sense of MacKinnon's constructionist claims. I also show that the erroneous verdictive is of more general interest.     

A Partial Defense of Illocutionary Silencing

Catharine MacKinnon has pioneered a new brand of anti‐pornography argument. In particular, MacKinnon claims that pornography silences women in a way that violates their right to free speech. In what follows, we focus on a certain account of silencing put forward by Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton, and we defend that account against two important objections. The first objection contends that this account makes a crucial but false assumption about the necessary role of hearer recognition in successful speech acts. In response, we argue that, as silencing primarily concerns communication, Hornsby and Langton are perfectly correct to treat hearer recognition as they do. The second objection contends that their particular account of silencing has the unacceptable result of undermining the responsibility of rapists. We here argue that no such result follows from their account.     

Attitudes Toward Pornography and the Characteristics Attributed to Pornography Actors

Proponents and opponents of pornography often use the assumed characteristics and motivations of female pornography actors to justify their position. The purpose of this study was to examine the relations among attitudes toward pornography, gender, and beliefs about both female and male pornography actors. University students (N = 165) completed measures assessing their attitudes toward pornography and their beliefs about male and female pornography actors. Attitudes toward pornography were significantly related to beliefs about both male and female pornography actors, as was gender. A larger discrepancy between beliefs about female pornography actors and women in general than between male pornography actors and men in general was found. Male participants rated female pornography actors similar to male pornography actors, whereas female participants rated female pornography actors more negatively than male pornography actors. Across participant gender, female pornography actors were believed to come from more dysfunctional families than male pornography actors. In general, male pornography actors were attributed more positive motivations for their work than female pornography actors.     

Pornographies

To be radical about pornography used to mean that one favored less censorship; now it often means that one favors more. That political change reflects a shift in the dominant paradigm of pornography and its putative evils. Until quite recently, most people who believed pornography wrong thought that it offended against decency and propriety and was therefore obscene . That was certainly the view of the law. English judges first created the crime of obscene libel in 1727 on the basis that such expression tended to corrupt the morals of the King's subjects, a thought that inspired most subsequent legislation in the common-law world. Sometimes the underlying concern really was paternalistic: pornography degrades and corrupts its producers and consumers; the law forces them to become better people. More often, however, it was just moralism of the familiar sorts: the view that a majority of a community is entitled to enforce its moral views on the rest, either because that is democratic or because that is just what it means to be a community. The obscenity paradigm thus had two features. First, it was illiberal: it ranked personal autonomy below realizing the good, enforcing the majority will, or embodying communitarian values. Second, it was gender neutral: to understand the nature of pornography did not require theorizing relations between men and women. On the obscenity paradigm, pornography was a matter of virtue versus vice, majorities versus minorities.     

The Solipsism of Pornography: Speech Act Theory and the Anti-Porn Position

The present essay takes as its point of departure the resurgence of the anti-porn argument claiming that pornography is harmful. It focuses especially on philosopher Rae Langton’s attempt to use speech act theory to defend the anti-porn position of Catherine MacKinnon. Langton’s argument is critiqued for assuming that we can ascertain the function of pornography without considering the situations of its use. It hence runs counter to the particularizing intent of speech act theory as such, which emphasizes the need to study speech in context. Rather than dismiss the anti-porn position Langton defends as faulty, the essay suggests that it remains an incontrovertible facet of the pornographic situation, and as such should be dialectically engaged. In the second half of the essay, therefore, the reasoning that informs the antiporn position is shown to be incompatible with the recurrent claim that porn is the expression of a male desire to dominate women. Rather, a closer look at Langton’s defense of the anti-porn argument helps us see that pornography is the expression of cognitive possibilities unique to the historical conditions that have brought it forth, and as such is every bit as self-conflicting as is capitalism itself.     

Pornography,Religion, and the Happiness Gap: Does Pornography Impact the Actively Religious Differently?

Club good models developed by economists suggest that the club provides a benefit to members by fostering the provision of semi-public goods. In the case of religion, churches create enforcement mechanisms to reduce free riding. Consequently, the psychic costs of deviant activity should be higher for individuals who belong to religious groups with strong social norms. Data from the General Social Survey are used to examine whether the cost of using pornography is greater for the more religiously involved. We measure the cost of using pornography as the happiness gap or the gap between the average happiness reported by individuals who do and individuals who do not report using pornography. The happiness gap is larger for individuals who regularly attend church and who belong to religious groups with strong attitudes against pornography.     

The pleasure is momentary…the expense damnable?: The influence of pornography on rape and sexual assault

The effects of pornography, whether violent or non-violent, on sexual aggression have been debated for decades. The current review examines evidence about the influence of pornography on sexual aggression in correlational and experimental studies and in real world violent crime data. Evidence for a causal relationship between exposure to pornography and sexual aggression is slim and may, at certain times, have been exaggerated by politicians, pressure groups and some social scientists. Some of the debate has focused on violent pornography, but evidence of any negative effects is inconsistent, and violent pornography is comparatively rare in the real world. Victimization rates for rape in the United States demonstrate an inverse relationship between pornography consumption and rape rates. Data from other nations have suggested similar relationships. Although these data cannot be used to determine that pornography has a cathartic effect on rape behavior, combined with the weak evidence in support of negative causal hypotheses from the scientific literature, it is concluded that it is time to discard the hypothesis that pornography contributes to increased sexual assault behavior.     

Enhancing the salience of free speech rights increases differential perceived free speech protections for criminal acts against Black versus White targets

Hate crime charges offer enhanced sentences for prejudice‐motivated acts in recognition of the injury that extends beyond the victim to other members of the targeted group. The present study builds upon and extends previous work illuminating how anti‐Black prejudice influences application of free speech protections to justify criminal acts against Black (vs. White) targets, which subsequently reduces support for hate crime charges for the act by investigating the potential effects of environmental cues that increase the salience of free speech rights. The present work tested the main and interactive effects of act target (Black vs. White), anti‐Black prejudice, and the salience of freedom of speech on perceived free speech protections for a prejudice‐motivated criminal act and the consequent influence on support for hate crime charges. Replicating previous findings, greater anti‐Black prejudice predicted more perceived free speech protections for Black‐targeted acts, which predicted less support for hate crime charges. Low‐bias participants viewed Black‐ versus White‐targeted acts as less protected by free speech rights and more deserving of hate crime charges; high‐bias participants viewed the two acts similarly. Making the right to free speech (compared to protections from search and seizure) salient amplified differential perceptions of free speech protections based on prejudice and target group, which predicted support for hate crime charges. This work holds implications for justification processes and highlights the importance of studying culture‐specific values.     

On the comparison of TAT and free speech techniques in personality assessment

Schnurr, Rosenberg, and Oxman (1992) recently compared the free speech samples and Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) responses of 95 normal adults. They concluded that the two techniques are not interchangeable, and that the TAT, which proved superior in the prediction of individual differences, may be preferable to free speech instructions for eliciting data in content analytic studies. We disagree with both conclusions. Various forms of narrative speech samples may be highly correlated, so long as psychologically meaningful, well-validated, and higher order content categories are used. The use of first-order content categories is less likely to contribute to the study of personality.     

On the Comparison of TAT and Free Speech Techniques in Personality Assessment

Schnurr, Rosenberg, and Oxman (1992) recently compared the free speech samples and Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) responses of 95 normal adults. They concluded that the two techniques are not interchangeable, and that the TAT, which proved superior in the prediction of individual differences, may be preferable to free speech instructions for eliciting data in content analytic studies. We disagree with both conclusions. Various forms of narrative speech samples may be highly correlated, so long as psychologically meaningful, well-validated, and higher order content categories are used. The use of first-order content categories is less likely to contribute to the study of personality.     

The Legitimacy of Pseudo‐Expert Discourse in the Public Sphere

This article examines the role of expertise in public debate, specifically the ways in which expertise can be mimicked and deployed as “pseudo‐expert discourse” to generate legitimacy for views that have otherwise been discredited. The article argues that pseudo‐expert discourse having a clear public health or safety impact should be regulated. There have been some attempts to legally regulate this speech through various means; however, these attempts at regulation have been met with fierce resistance, because of free‐speech concerns. The article suggests that these appeals to free speech in the context of pseudo‐expert discourse are both misguided and misplaced. Moreover, because speakers with the relevant expertise or perceived expertise are able to secure uptake of their views, they have a moral responsibility to not deceive or mislead audiences, and may also have various legal responsibilities.